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THE
BRAHMASŪTRAS
AND
THEIR PRINCIPAL COMMENTARIES
(A CRITICAL EXPOSITION)

VOLUME II

With Foreword by
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By
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Dedicated to

Dharmabhūṣaṇa Sri K. Seetharama Rao
Founder-Proprietor: Dāsaprakash Group of Hotels
Madras, Mysore and Ootacamund

and

Founder-Trustee: Sri Ganga Bai Charities, Madras
who lived up to the ideal

'अन्त्येषु रेमिरे धीरा न ते मध्येषु रेमिरे'

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श्रीमतां ब्रह्मसूत्राणां तिस्रो व्याख्यानपद्धतीः ।
विवृणोमि यथाप्रज्ञमधीतस्य शुशुत्सया ।।

EDITORIAL FOREWORD

We have pleasure in placing before Sanskrit scholars and students this second volume of Dr. B. N. K. Sharma's work: "Brahmasūtras and Their Principal Commentaries", of which the first volume was published in the *Bharatiya Vidya Series*, in September 1971.

The importance of the Brahmasūtras in the evolution of India's philosophical thought and its culmination in the Vedānta Darśana need hardly be emphasized. Dr. Sharma, an eminent Professor of Sanskrit brought up in the best traditions of ancient and modern scholarship, critically examines the commentaries of Śaṁkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva, the three great exponents of Indian philosophy and sometimes the commentary of Bhāskara also,—as in the course of his first volume. Following the same plan of exposition and criticism, he has introduced the niceties of thought and interpretation from the great commentaries on these Bhāṣyas of these Ācāryas by their eminent followers like Vācaspati Miśra, Amalānanda, Sudarśana Sūri, Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha, to mention only the more important ones. The present Volume covers the second, third and fourth Pādas of the Avirodha Adhyāya and the first Pāda of the third Adhyāya.

The second Adhyāya is called the Avirodha-Adhyāya. Its four Pādas are called by Madhva Yuktipāda, Samayapāda Śrutivirodhaparihārapāda and Yuktisahitaśrutivirodhaparihārapāda. It may be noticed that the second Pāda of Adhyāya II which is called Tarkapāda by Śaṁkara and others is designated as Samayapāda where the word Samaya is used in the sense of a school or Darśana. This Pāda is naturally of absorbing interest to all students of philosophy as it contains Bādarāyaṇa's review of all the other schools of philosophical thought current in his time.

Almost all the other Ācāryas have taken the first ten Sūtras beginning with *Racanānupapatteḥ to refer to the refutation of* Nirīśvara-Sāṁkhya. According to Madhva, these ten Sūtras are divided into five adhikaraṇas and they refute four shades of Sāṁkhya doctrine (a) Nirīśvara (b) Seśvara (c) Prakṛtyupasarjana-Puruṣakartṛtvavāda (d) Puruṣopasarjanaprakṛtikartṛtvavāda and (e) the Cārvāka school. Madhva finds justification in refuting Cārvāka at this stage in this Pāda. If Jainas and Bauddhas are refuted, why not the Cārvāka also? Śaṁkara feels that Cārvāka *is refuted in Eka ātmanas śarīre bhāvāt* (iii, 3, 53). But Madhva feels that as Adhyāya III is a Sādhana-Adhyāya the refutation of Cārvāka will be more appropriate to Samayapāda than to Guṇopasaṁhārapāda in Adhyāya III.

The most debated adhikaraṇa here is the last one which most of the Bhāṣyakāras have regarded as a review of the Bhāgavata or the Pañcarātra school. Dr. Sharma calls for a fresh look at this adhikaraṇa as a possible review of the prestigious Śākta system. Śaṁkara does not give any place to refutation of Śāktadarśana. According to Madhva, the Pañcarātra school is not refuted here by the Sūtrakāra as there is nothing objectionable according to the Sūtrakāra in that school. Objections against Pañcarātra, according to Madhva, are frivolous. Pañcarātra refers to "Jivotpatti" but as Jīva is "nitya" according to Vedānta, the 'utpatti' of Jīva refers to the utpatti of Samkarṣaṇa and other manifestations of Brahman and not to the origination of the individual soul. And Samkarṣaṇa and others, according to the Pañcarātra, are manifestations of Brahman and they are equal to Brahman and from Pūrṇa-Brahman we can have the manifestation of other Pūrṇa forms like Samkarṣaṇa, because of the Vicitraśakti of Brahman. The issue is worth pursuing.

The third Pāda is philosophically the most important and has a living interest to students of philosophy and religion; for here we meet with the intimate questions relating to the agency of the Ātman, his dimension, relation to Brahman as its *amśa* and so forth. Madhva gives a fresh definition of *amśa* as *"Tadadhīnatve sati tatsadṛśatvam."* As explained in the first Adhyāya, Madhva states that Brahman is the nimittakāraṇa and Prakṛiti is the upādānakārana. Jīva is created in the sense of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti. In the Viyadadhikaraṇa, Madhva explains that Viyad or Ākāśa has two senses of space and ether. Space or avakāśa cannot be created except in the sense of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti.

We are confident Dr. Sharma's close analytic study of these and other interesting problems will prove an indispensable and enlightening tool to Tarkarasikas of both Indian and Western philosophy.

J. H. Dave

FOREWORD

It is gratifying that so much research and writing exists about Indian philosophy. For those who write in English it is perhaps disappointing that Indian philosophy is not more studied and taught in the West. However, a number of prominent writers have laid the foundations for a deeper appreciation of the patterns of Indian thought. One of these distinguished writers is undoubtedly Dr. B. N. K. Sharma, whose massive and pioneering *History of the Dvaita School* in two volumes is one of the most important contributions to the history of Indian philosophy. He is also of course known for his more popular writings. But perhaps what in essence is his most vital contribution is his ability to look at Vedanta in perspective.

For various reasons Advaita has had a dominant position in the consciousness of the Indian tradition aroused by writers in the nationalist period—for instance by Vivekananda and Radhakrishnan. Perhaps now there has been some shift of emphasis, and Dr. Sharma is one of those principally responsible.

All this is brought out well in his *Brahmasūtras and their Principal Commentaries*, the first volume of which has already attracted favourable notice. It is a great pleasure for me to commend the second volume. It is a systematic work and will be of considerable use for both teachers and students of these seminal texts. It adds to the use of the work that though essentially the commentary is in English it includes a full notation in Sanskrit to assist the scholar. Dr. Sharma's interest in Dvaita is reflected in the fully balanced way in which he shows the positions of Śamkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva (though he also of course draws on other positions—Indian both ancient and modern and Western).

I have learned much from this book: may others do so also.

NINIAN SMART
University of Lancaster,
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29th July, 1974.

PREFACE

In March 1969, I started work on a research project covering the Brahmasūtras and their principal commentaries belonging to the Dvaita, Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita traditions of their interpretation. The first volume of their critical and comparative study was published in September 1971. This is the second volume of the project comprising Pādas 2, 3 and 4 of Adhyāya II and the first Pāda of Adhyāya III. The completion of the remaining part of the project in one more volume depends on the continuation of the facilities I have received under the U.G.C. scheme or the availability of similar facilities from other sources in some other form. I express my grateful thanks to the University Grants Commission, New Delhi for its assistance and facilities which have enabled me to undertake this stupendous project and to carry forward the work as far as the portion which has gone into print in these two volumes.

Readers of the first volume will have seen for themselves how while the Samanvaya of Śāstra in B. thro' Paramamukhyavṛtti in B. and Mukhyavṛtti in 'Aparatattvas' enriches the meaning and content of validity of Śruti both ways, the technique of Samanvaya in Pratyagabhinnanirviśeṣabrahman thro' Akhaṇḍārtha and the methodology of Adhyāropāpavāda in respect of Aparatattvas which (the latter) are shown to be 'mithyā' thro' such technique impoverishes the meaning and content of validity of Śrutis all round. The two techniques of Samanvaya are not thus *in pari materia* and cannot therefore be judged by the same standard as modes of harmonization of 'Śrutisiddhānta'.

The second Pāda of the Avirodha-Adhyāya with which this volume commences is best designated as "Samaya-Pāda", as it controverts doctrines of leading schools of philosophical thought hostile to Vedāntic

Theism. The purpose of this refutation is to enable Adhikārins or earnest seekers of truth to have their faith and conviction in Vedāntic Theism reinforced.

M's commentary on this Pāda shows important divergences from others in the constitution of many of the adhikaraṇas here. The very first adhi., of S, R and others, of ten Sūtras, has been split up by him into five separate adhi-s. This shows an independent spirit of inquiry in finding room for four distinctive shades of Sāmkhya thought and the Cārvāka school within the ten Sūtras which they have dealt with as a single adhi., devoted exclusively to a refutation of the Nirīśvara Sāmkhya system. The reader will find the justification for taking a fresh look at these Sūtras in Vyāsatīrtha's *TC*. The inclusion of the Cārvāka system for criticism in this Pāda distinguishes M's commentary from those of S and Bhāskara. Its introduction in the third Pāda of Adhyāya III, in S's Bhāṣya will strike any detached observer as out of place.

The appropriation of the Sūtra : *Mahaddīrghavad vā...* (ii, 2, 11) to a defence of Brahmavāda in S's commentary has been similarly objected to by Vyāsatīrtha. While dealing with this topic, I have examined the views of Dr. Belvalkar. Modern scholars will find in the critique of the schools of Buddhism and Jainism given by M and his commentators very much more than a rechauffe of what has been said by S Bhāskara and R.

The *piece de resistance* of this Pāda is the socalled Pañcarātra-adhikaraṇa. M. has been the first to show that it has in reality nothing to do with that school and is, instead, a criticism of the Śākta doctrine. Nimbārka, Keśava Kashmiri and Baladeva have accepted this finding. In repelling S's criticisms of the alleged defects of the Bhāgavata school as misplaced, M. and his commentators have brought to light some hitherto unknown facts regarding Bhāgavata theology. One of these is that the ancient Bhāgavata school stands committed to the acceptance of Guṇaguṇyabheda thro' Viśeṣas or Saviśeṣābheda between B and its attributes. The other is that there is no 'Tāratamya' between B and its manifestations. These receive indirect confirmation from the evidence let in by S. himself in his criticism of the Bhāgavata doctrine and from the statements attributed by him to the Bhāgavatas on the authority of a Pañcarātra Śruti.

The fact that R has conceded to S that the first two Sūtras of this adhi. are a criticism of the Bhāgavata doctrine, maintaining at the same time that the last two Sūtras refute these criticisms, does not necessarily confer on it any preferential title to acceptance as representing the in-

tention of the Sūtrakāra. Chronological priority alone of an interpretation cannot be a true test of its correctness or its fitness to reflect the true intention of the Sūtrakāra. When several conflicting traditions claim to reflect his position correctly, it is good to take the advice of the great poet: पुराणमित्येव न साधु सर्वम् ।
and resist the temptation to succumb to the glamor of chronological priority. In the present case, the context of refutation of hostile schools (Paramatanirākaraṇam) would disallow any attempt at bringing in the defence of any school, even if it should be the Sūtrakāra's own, in one separate adhikaraṇa, albeit to dismiss misplaced objections against it. See also Appendix.

As the strictures on the Pañcarātra in regard to *Jīvotpatti* and the Vyūha doctrine and the alleged censure of Vedas in the Pañcarātra turn out, by all accounts and in the last analysis, to be a mere rhetorical flourish without substance (See Pages 108-121) it is time to call a halt to the association of the Utpattyasambhavādhikaraṇa with the Pañcarātra school, be it in full or in part, for criticism or for rehabilitation. It seems M. has adopted the right course in accommodating the Pañcarātras among the source-books of the Sūtrakāra's system under i, 1, 3 and upholding its validity as resting on the Śrutis (*śrutimūla*) in the Smṛtyadhi. (ii, 1, 1-3) as against non-Vedāntic Smṛtis, which allows the Sūtrakāra the necessary opportunity to conclude his review of hostile schools with a refutation of Śaktivāda.

M. holds the Tātparyaliṅgas to be the safest guides in settling the meaning and import of the Sūtras. Dr. P. M. Modi (*A Critique of Brahmasūtras* Part I) dismisses them as "defective" because "the Acharyas and even the modern scholars who have followed the same have come to divergent conclusions" (p. xviii). But then, the Sūtrakāra himself sets great store by this method as can be seen from his resorting to it in different adhikaraṇas and what applies to parts of the work must indeed be applicable to the whole. The divergence of conclusions among the Acharyas or others is not a reflection on the genuineness of the technique but is due to mental reservations in applying it. This may be seen by integrating the two opening Sūtras with *Jagadvyāpāravarjam* and *Anāvṛttiś śabdāt* from the concluding part of the Sūtras and let the integration speak for itself. It is verily because "the doctrine of the Sūtrakāra cannot be derived from an examination of some scattered remarks or from a few technical words in the Sūtras" (*op. cit.* p. vii) that M. insists on giving full weight to the inner dialectic of the Sūtrakāra's work as reflected by the language and wording of the Sūtras, the natural syntactic arrangement of their parts, the smooth sequence of thought among their topics, the contextual propriety of particular

interpretations with the theme of the Adhyāya and Pāda where they occur, their freedom from redundancy (*agatārthatā*), the nature and extent of admissibility of *adhyāhāra*, regard for *anuvṛtti, āvṛtti, lakṣaṇā jñāpaka* and other technical devices, exegetical principles and aids permitted in the interpretation of aphoristic texts, in arriving at a correct pattern of interpretation of the Sūtras. How these principles can be seen to be fully implemented in his own line of interpretation of the Sūtras has been demonstrated in the commentaries of Trivikrama Paṇḍita, Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha and in the glosses of Vādirāja, Raghūttama, Rāghavendra, Satyanātha and others from which the relevant data have been collected and coordinated in my exposition.

The feasibility of settling the broad pattern of thought and interpretation ingrained in the Sūtras thro' a consistent application of the aforesaid exegetical principles cannot be allowed to be called into question by a vain scepticism whether a philosophical work like the Brahmasūtras is the work of a single author and even then, if it can be admitted to be constructed on a strictly scientific basis of organized thought and whether its division of Adhyāyas and Pādas rests on a well-knit scheme. It is an insult to the intelligence of a Pāṇini or a Bādarāyaṇa to suggest that his work is not entitled to the distinction of being recognized as a well-knit scientific treatise. It may be that different commentators have explained the Sūtras and their scheme of topics in different ways. But they can all be judged on their merits, if one has the patience and the equipment to carry out the task. The lack of them gives no right to the sceptic to deny the title to systematic thinking to the Sūtrakāra. Irrespective of their difference of approach, the great Bhāṣyakāras have all been conscious of the well-knit character of the Brahmamīmāmsāśāstra and have tried to make it clear whenever required.

Even a bird's eye view of the Sūtras will bear out the fact that their author is a Bhedavādin. The wording of the opening Sūtra itself: *Athāto Brahmajijñāsā* proves this by calling upon the Jīvātman to investigate "Brahman",—thereby giving a broad hint that the investigation is not to be of his own self *as* "Brahman" but of a Being other than his own self and far greater than his own self: *Adhikam tu bhedanirdeśāt* (B.S.ii, 1, 23), designated as "Brahman". This is confirmed by the definition of B. given in the next Sūtra as the author of the origin, sustenance and dissolution of the world of matter *and Souls*. For, it will not do to forget that the 'universe', whose author B. has been stated to be, comprises not only the world of matter but of the world of souls as well (Cf. B.S. i, 2, 9). The corollary of the Sūtrakāra's definition is thus unmistakably against the thesis of identity of Jīva and B: *Jīvo*

brahmaiva nāparaḥ as posited by S. The definition speaks for itself:

अतो जीवैक्यमपि स निराचक्रे जगद्गुरुः (M. *AV* i, 1, 2).

It is in keeping with the acceptance of the distinction between Jīva and B. for all time as the corner-stone of his philosophy that Bādarāyaṇa denies any rights of participation or partnership in the cosmic responsibilities of B. to the released Souls also, in Mokṣa: *Jagadvyāpāravarjam* (iv, 4, 17). Thus the first and almost the last Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa between themselves seal the fate of the doctrine of Jīva-brahmaikya. Other relevant details pertaining to this question from Adhyāyas III and IV will have to be considered in their proper contexts.

While other commentators have more or less taken it for granted that the term "asya" in B.S.i, 1, 2, has been used exclusively in the sense of the world of matter, M. alone reflects the mind of the Sūtrakāra properly in bringing the world of Souls also under its purview, right from this Sūtra onwards. It needs no argument to show that as a Mokṣaśāstra, Bādarāyaṇa's work should naturally be more intensively concerned with the life and destiny of the Souls than with the routine of the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world of matter by B. This shows how well M's interpretation of the Sūtra: *Janmādyasya yataḥ* (i, 1, 2) reflects the full intention of the Sūtrakāra in explaining the compound "Janmādi" in terms not only of the three acts of creation, sustenance and dissolution but of the still more important acts of control, obscuration, bondage, enlightenment and release of Souls and how again Sṛṣṭi and Samhāra comprehend the creation and withdrawal of dream objects, how obscuration includes *mūrcchā* and Mokṣa includes the state of Suṣupti by upalakṣaṇa,—all of which are shown to be brought under the dispensation of B. in the first four adhikaraṇas of the second Pāda of Adhyaya III. It is for this reason that M. assigns a separate *adhi.* to Jāgradavasthā (besides dream and Suṣupti) to bring it also under the impulsion of B. by opting for the reading: देहयोगाद् वासोऽपि (iii, 2, 6) instead of देहयोगाद् वा सोऽपि of S. and others, which, by the way, is syntactically rather discordant with *'tirohitam'* in the preceding Sūtra. This shows a keener perception of the Sūtraākra's purpose in this part of the Sādhana-Adhyāya to bring out the supreme power and majesty of B as the source of impulsion in respect of each and every one of the states in the lives of Jīvas:

(जाग्रदादि) सर्वावस्थाप्रेरक ब्रह्म

with a view to fostering the spirit of love and devotion to such a Being in heart of the Jīvas: भक्तिरस्मिन् पाद उच्यते भक्त्यर्थं भगवन्महिमोक्तिः

(M. *BSB.* iii, 2.1).

The amplification of the definition of B. in i, 1.2 to include *niyamana jñāna, ajñāna, bandha and mokṣa* has the full support of the internal evidence of the Sūtras:

अन्तर्याम्यधिदैवादिषु तद्धर्मव्यपदेशात् (i, 2, 18)
अक्षरमम्बरान्तधृतेः (*i*, 3, *10*) सा च प्रशासनात् (*i*, 3, 11)
तन्निष्ठस्य मोक्षोपदेशात् (i, 1, 7) मुक्तोपसृप्यव्यपदेशात् (i, 3, 2)
पराभिध्यानात्तु तिरोहितं ततो ह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययौ (iii, 2, 5)

In one word, then, this amplification epitomizes the entire philosophy of Theism of Bādarāyaṇa. With the same cogency, M. has shown how the first and the second Adhyāyas of Bādarāyaṇa's work are in the nature of systematic elucidation of the twin concepts of Sarvaguṇapūrṇatvam and Nirdoṣatvam implicit in the content and meaning of the term "Brahman" applied to the object of the pholosophical inquiry initiated by Bādarāyaṇa in his opening Sūtra.

The third Pāda of Adhyāya II is of absorbing interest to philosophy. For the largest number of adhi-s here is devoted to the Jīvātman. His genesis, dimension, and agency, his relation to B., the obscuration of his Svarūpānanda by 'Bhāvarūpa-Ajñāna' in the state of bondage and its manifestation in release by the grace of B. and his intimate and indissoluble *bond of relationship with B. as its Aṁśa and Pratibimba* are some of the topics raised and discussed here. The conclusions are arrived at after going thro' a wealth of arguments advanced for and against each position. The question of the Jīva's agency and its dependence on B. taught in the Sūtras (ii, 3, 33-42) raises the great problem of freewill and determinism in moral philosophy. The dialogue which Vyāsatīrthā enters into in the Kartṛtvādhi (ii, 3, 33-42) with the Viśiṣṭādvaitic position (PP. 262-68) will be found to be a masterpiece of philosophical argumentation, in presenting the pros and cons for arriving at a just and equitable *solution of the problem.*

M.'s commentary finds it necessary to reconstitute many of the adhikaraṇas here in a different way from S. and R., in order to fruitfully discuss many vital problems of Vedanta philosophy such as the synthesis of the Bheda and Abheda Śrutis on the basis of the principle of "*Tadguṇasārattvtāt tadvyapadeśaḥ*", in the Pṛthagadhikaraṇam (ii, 3, 28-29). The Sūtra '*Adṛṭāniyamāt* (ii, 3, 51) and the two others following it are similarly reconstituted into a fresh adhikaraṇa to discuss the equally important problem as to how and why the Jīvas who are all Pratibimbas of the same Brahman differ intrinsically from one another. The question is the same as agitated St. Augustine (354-430 A.D.) into asking "Whence came I to will evil and nill good; who set

this in me and ingrafted in me this plant of bitterness, seeing that I was made of my most sweet God" (in His image)? M.'s answer to this is given in terms of his concept of Anādisvarūpayogyatābheda' which is the pivot of his doctrine of Svarūpabheda among souls.

The first half of this Pāda deals with the genesis of material principles like Ākāśa, Ap, Tejas etc., and their Laya in B. M's commentary on this Pāda develops the distinctive theory of the genesis of eternal verities like space, time, Jīva and Prakṛti thro' "Parādhīnaviśeṣāpati". The existence of eternal (uncreated) tattvas like these is one of the fundamental presuppositions of Vedāntic thought (cf. *Nityo nityānām Jñājñau dvāvajau* (*Svet. Up.* vi.13; i, 9) and this has got to be harmonized with another of its fundamental presuppositions admitted in the Śruti and the Sūtra that everything in finite reality has its genesis from B: स इदं सर्वमसृजत (*Taitt. Up.* 11.6) जन्माद्यस्य यतः (B.S. i.1.2).

This baffling problem is solved by M. with the theory of 'Eternal Creation' of all eternal substances and principles in the sense of "Parādhīnaviśeṣāpati". This is another of his remarkable contributions to philosophic thought and Vedantic cosmogony. The readers' attention is invited to the concurrent details of this new theory and its exposition (PP. 127-35).

The truth of the statement made on P.x of the Preface to Vol. I that "tho' each of the schools of traditional interpretation has endeavoured to establish its own complete harmony with the Sūtras, the march of thought in the history of the Vedānta has made it possible for the tradition sponsored by M. and his commentators to enter more incisively and in greater detail than the other traditions of interpretation upon a critical and comparative examination of its own and other traditions of interpretation of the Sūtras, and that the most impressive work in this direction has been done by Vyāsatīrtha in his *TC.* can be seen here by going thro' his examination of S's interpretation of the Utkrānty-adhi. (PP. 230-43) and of the Kartṛtvādhi (PP. 252-68) and of the Amśādhi. according to S. and R. (PP. 281-92). It will be seen that barring the Asambhavādhi (ii, 3, 9), the entire third Pāda is taken up with the history of the "Aparatattvas" comprising the world of matter *and souls*, comprehended by the term "*asya*" in i, 1, 2.

In the last Pāda of Adhyāya II, M's commentary draws pointed attention to the special significance attaching to the way in which the Sūtrakāra has brought out the dependence of the Adhyātmic principles so intimately connected with the microcosm, on the Supreme B. It has been shown (See Vol. I p. 56) that the root cause of the Jīva's bondage

a process of *manana*. Such critical reflection as the process of their *manana* would impose on us is sure to be rewarding in its results. As Vyāsatīrtha has so aptly put it, it is not by licking the outer surface of sugarcane that we can taste and enjoy its sweetness but by squeezing it between the teeth and slowly imbibing every particle of its juice. No disrespect to the sugarcane is intended thereby:

न ह्रीक्षुलेहनेनैव ज्ञात इक्षुरसो भवेत् ।
न चेक्षुदण्डं निष्पीड्य लब्धो नेक्षुरसो भवेत् (*T.C.* i.i.4)

I am deeply thankful to Professor Ninian Smart for the honor he has done me in commending this volume to readers in India and in the West with his handsome Foreword.

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8th Aug., 1974.

KEY TO DIACRITICAL MARKS

ā	आ	t	त्
ī	ई	th	थ्
ū	ऊ	d	द्
r	ऋ	dh	ध्
ḷ	लृ	n	न्
k	क्	p	प्
kh	ख्	ph	फ्
g	ग्	b	ब्
gh	घ्	bh	भ्
ṅ	ङ्	m	म्
c	च्	y	य्
ch	छ्	r	र्
j	ज्	l	ल्
jh	झ्	v	व्
ñ	ञ्	ś	श्
ṭ	ट्	ṣ	ष्
th	ठ्	s	स्
ḍ	ड	ḥ	ह्
ḍh	ढ्	jña	ज्ञ
n	ण्		

ABBREVIATIONS

A.Ā.	Aitareya Āraṇyaka
A.B.	Aitareya Brāhmaṇa
AC	Abhinavacandrikā (Satyanātha)
adhi.	adhikaraṇa
Ait. Up.	Aitareya Upaniṣad
AV	Anu-Vyākhyāna (Madhva)
B	Brahman
BD	Bhāṣyadīpikā (Jagannātha Tīrtha)
B.G.	Bhagavad Gītā
B.S.	Brahma Sūtra
B.T.	Bhāgavata Tātparya (Madhva)
Bhāg	Bhāgavata
Bṛh. Up.	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
BSB	*Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*
C	Commentary
Chān. Up.	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
GB	Gītā Bhāṣya
GBṭ	Gītā Bhāṣya Ṭīkā (Jayatīrtha)
GT	Gītā Tātparya (Madhva)
HDSV	History of Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature
J	Jayatīrtha
Kauṣ. Up.	Kauṣītakī Upaniṣad
M	Madhva
Mah.N.Up.	Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad

Mahop.	Mahopaniṣad
Mbh.	Mahābhārata
Mbh. T.N.	Mahābharata Tātparya Nirṇaya (Madhva)
Māṇḍ. Up.	Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad
Muṇḍ. Up.	Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad
NS	Nyāya Sudhā (Jayatīrtha)
NSG	Nyāyasudhā Gurvarthadīpikā (Vādirāja)
NSP	Nyāyasudhā-Parimala (Rāghavendra)
NSSVC	Nyāyasudhā-Śeṣavākyārthacandrikā (Keśava)
NV.	Nyāya Vivaraṇa (Madhva)
NVB	Nyāyavivaraṇa Bhāvabodha (Raghūttama)
Nym	Nyāyāmṛtam (Vyāsatīrtha)
Ny.S.	Nyāya Sūtras (Gautama)
Pāṇ.	Pāṇini (Aṣṭādhyāyī)
PMS	Pūrvamīmāmsā Sūtras (Jaimini)
PP	Pramāṇa-Paddhati (Jayatīrtha)
Q	Quoted in (by)
R	Rāmānuja
Raghu. TPB.	Raghūttama: Tattvaprakāśikā-Bhāvabodha
Rāgh. TPB.	Rāghavendra: Tattvaprakāśikā Bhāvadīpa
S	Śaṁkara
STC	Śeṣatātparyacandrikā (Raghunātha Tīrtha)
Śvet. Up.	Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad
T.Ā.	Taittirīya Āraṇyaka
Taitt. Up.	Taittirīya Upaniṣad
TB	Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa
Taitt. S.	Taittirīya Samhitā
TC	Tātparyacandrikā (Vyāsatīrtha)
TCP	Tātparyacandrikā-Prakāśa (Rāghavendra)
TD	Tattvapradīpa (Trivikrama Paṇḍita)
TDP	Tantradīpikā (Rāghavendra)
TP	Tattvapraksikā (Jayatīrtha)
TPG	Tattvaprakāśikā Gurvarthadīpikā (Vādirāja)
TS	Tattva-Sankhyāna (Madhva)
TSṭ	Tattvasamkhyānaṭīkā (Jayatīrtha)
TT	Tarkatāṇḍava (Vyāsatīrtha)
VTN	Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya (Madhva)
VTNṭ	Viṣṇutattvanirṇayaṭīkā (Jayatīrtha)
Up.	Upaniṣad
Up. Kh.	Upādhi Khaṇḍana (Madhva)

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON THE COMMENTATORS

[Notes on Śaṃkara, Vācaspati, Amalānanda, Rāmānuja, Sudarśana Sūri, Madhva, Trivikrama Paṇḍita, Jayatīrtha, Vyāsatīrtha, Vādirāja, Raghūttama, Rāghavendra and Jagannātha Tīrtha have been given in Vol. I].

1. **Traivikramārya Dāsa** (c. 1380-1440) was the grandson of the celebrated Trivikrama Paṇḍita of *Tattvapradīpa*-fame. He is the author of *Ānandamālā*, the earliest known commentary on M.'s *Aṇubhāṣya* which is a bare summary in outlines of the topics of adhikaraṇas of the Brahmasūtras as interpreted by him in his major commentaries on them. The *Ānandamālā*, in its turn, is a very brief but luminous commentary drawing out the suggested thoughts behind the measured words of the original, which has been described as teeming with ideas. It gives us rare glimpses of the panoramic vistas of thought that flash forth from the measured words of the original (Vide his commentary on *Ākāśādi samastam ca*). His text has some variant readings from the vulgate text. His other works are glosses on the *Kaṭha* and *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣads.*

2. **Satyanātha Tīrtha** (1648-74) was sixth in succession from Raghūttama Tīrtha (1557-96) on the Pīṭha of the Uttarādi Mutt. He was a powerful and prolific writer and a noted controversialist in logic and theology. Nine of his works have come down to us. The most important of these are (i) *Abhinavacandrikā* and (ii) *Abhinavatāṇḍava.* The former, utilized here, is a gloss on J.'s *TP* and covers all the four Adhyāyas of the B.S. The scope of the work is confined to the recapitulation of the Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta of each adhikaraṇa according to Madhva's interpretation as elucidated by J. and their clarification and solving of certain textual difficulties (introd. ver. 11). Except in the first adhi. (i, 1, 1) Satyanātha does not enter into any criticism of the

PĀDA III

* From Page 203 to P. 349 an error in the numbering of the Chapters has inadvertently crept into the body of the Volume. The numbering should be corrected to read as hereinafter given.

PĀDA IV

III. SĀDHANA-ADHYĀYA

PĀDA I

द्वितीयाध्यायद्वितीयपादस्य सूत्रपाठः

* रचनानुपपत्तेश्च नानुमानम्
प्रवृत्तेश्च
पयोऽम्बुवच्चेत् तत्रापि
व्यतिरेकानवस्थितेश्चानपेक्षत्वात्

* अन्यत्राभावाच्च न तृणादिवत्

* अभ्युपगमेऽप्यर्थाभावात्

* पुरुषाश्मवदिति चेत् तथापि
अङ्गित्वानुपपत्तेः

* अन्यथानुमितौ च ज्ञशक्तिवियोगात्
विप्रतिषेधाच्चासमञ्जसम्

* महद्दीर्घवद्वा ह्रस्वपरिमण्डलाभ्याम्
उभयथापि न कर्मातस्तदभावः
समवायाभ्युपगमाच्च साम्यादनवस्थितेः
नित्यमेव च भावात्
रूपादिमत्त्वाच्च विपर्ययो दर्शनात्
उभयथा च दोषात्
अपरिग्रहाच्चात्यन्तमनपेक्षा

* समुदाय उभयहेतुकेऽपि तदप्राप्तिः
इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वादिति चेन्नोत्पत्तिमात्रनिमित्तत्वात्
उत्तरोत्पादे च पूर्वनिरोधात्
असति प्रतिज्ञोपरोधो यौगपद्यमन्यथा
प्रतिसंख्याप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधाप्राप्तिरविच्छेदात्
उभयथा च दोषात्
आकाशे चाविशेषात्
अनुस्मृतेश्च

* नासतोऽदृष्टत्वात्
उदासीनानामपि चैवं सिद्धिः
नाभाव उपलब्धेः
वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत्

* न भावोऽनुपलब्धेः
क्षणिकत्वाच्च
सर्वथानुपपत्तेश्च

* नैकस्मिन्नसंभवात्
एवं चात्माकार्त्स्न्यम्
न च पर्यायादप्यविरोधो विकारादिभ्यः
अन्त्यावस्थितेश्चोभयनित्यत्वादविशेषात्

* पत्युरसामञ्जस्यात्
    संवन्धानुपपत्तेश्च
    अधिष्ठानानुपपत्तेश्च
    करणवच्चेन्न भोगादिभ्यः
    अन्तवत्त्वमसर्वज्ञता वा

* उत्पत्त्यसंभवात्
    न च कर्तुःकरणम्
    विज्ञानादिभावे वा तदप्रतिषेधः
    विप्रतिषेधाच्च

तृतीयः पादः

* न वियदश्रुतेः
    अस्ति तु
    गौण्यसंभवात्
    शब्दाच्च
    स्याच्चैकस्य ब्रह्मशब्दवत्
    प्रतिज्ञाहानिरव्यतिरेकाच्छब्देभ्यः
    यावद्विकारं तु विभागो लोकवत्

* एतेन मातरिश्वा व्याख्यातः

* असंभवस्तु सतोऽनुपपत्तेः

* तेजोऽतस्तथा ह्याह

* आपः

* पृथिव्यधिकाररूपशब्दान्तरादिभ्यः

* तदभिध्यानादेव तु तल्लिङ्गात् सः

* विपर्ययेण तु क्रमोऽत उपपद्यते च

* अन्तरा विज्ञानमनसी क्रमेण तल्लिङ्गादिति चेन्नाविशेषात्
    चराचरव्यपाश्रयस्तु स्यात्तद्वचपदेशो भाक्तस्तद्भावभावित्वात्

* नात्मा अश्रुतेर्नित्यत्वाच्च ताभ्यः

* ज्ञोऽत एव
    युक्तेश्च

* उत्क्रान्तिगत्यागतीनाम्
    स्वात्मना चोत्तरयोः
    नाणुरतच्छ्रुतेरिति चेन्नेतराधिकारात्
    स्वशब्दोन्मानाभ्यां च

अविरोधश्चन्दनवत्
अवस्थितिवैशेष्यादिति चेन्नाभ्युपगमाद् हृदि हि
गुणाद्वा आलोकवत्

* व्यतिरेको गन्धवत्तथा च दर्शयति

* पृथगुपदेशात्
तद्गुणसारत्वात्तु तद्व्यपदेशः प्राज्ञवत्

* यावदात्मभावित्वाच्च न दोषस्तद्दर्शनात्

* पुंस्त्वादिवत्त्वस्य सतोऽभिव्यक्तियोगात्
नित्योपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गोऽन्यतरनियमो वान्यथा

* कर्ता शास्त्रार्थवत्त्वात्
विहारोपदेशात्
उपादानात्
व्यपदेशाच्च क्रियायां न चेन्निर्देशविपर्ययः
उपलब्धिवदनियमः
शक्तिविपर्ययात्
समाध्यभावाच्च
यथा च तक्षोभयथा
परात्तु तच्छ्रुतेः
कृतप्रयत्नापेक्षस्तु विहितप्रतिषेधावैयर्थ्यादिभ्यः

* अंशो नानाव्यपदेशादन्यथा चापि दाशकितवादित्वमधीयत एके
मन्त्रवर्णात्
अपि स्मर्यते
प्रकाशादिवन्नैवं परः
स्मरन्ति च
अनुज्ञापरिहारौ देहसंबन्धाज्ज्योतिरादिवत्
असन्ततेश्चाव्यतिकरः
आभास एव च

* अदृष्टानियमात्
अभिसन्ध्यादिष्वपि चैवम्
प्रदेशादिति चेन्नान्तर्भावात्

चतुर्थः पादः

* तथा प्राणाः
गौण्यसंभवात्
प्रतिज्ञानुरोधाच्च

* तत्प्राक् श्रुतेश्च

* तत्पूर्वकत्वात् वाचः

* सप्त गतेर्विशेषितत्वाच्च

  हस्तादयस्तु स्थितेऽतो नैवम्

* अणवश्च

* श्रेष्ठश्च

  न वायुक्रिये पृथगुपदेशात्

* चक्षुरादिवत्तु तत्सहशिष्ट्यादिभ्यः

  अकरणत्वाच्च न दोषस्तथा हि दर्शयति

* पञ्चवृत्तिर्मनोवत् व्यपदिश्यते

* अणुश्च

* ज्योतिराद्यधिष्ठानं तु तदामननात्

  प्राणवता शब्दात्
  तस्य च नित्यत्वात्

* त इन्द्रियाणि तद्व्यपदेशादन्यत्र श्रेष्ठात्

  भेदश्रुतेः
  वैलक्षण्याच्च

* संज्ञामूर्तिक्लृप्तिस्तु त्रिवृत्कुर्वत उपदेशात्

* मांसादि भौमं यथाशब्दमितरयोश्च

  वैशेष्यात्तु तद्वादः तद्वादः

(द्वितीयाध्यायः समाप्तः)

AVIRODHA-ADHYĀYA

PĀDA II

INTRODUCTION

The second Pāda removes opposition to the Samanvaya of Śrutis in B. from schools of thought hostile to the Vedānta. Such "Smṛtis" on which these schools are based and the reasonings employed by them have been discredited in general terms in the previous Pāda and under the Sūtra: *Itareṣām ca anupalabdheḥ* (ii, 1, 2). Here, the Sūtrakāra takes the trouble of examining the main tenets of each of these schools and exposing their defects. The purpose of criticizing them is not their extirpation. For different ways of thinking are bound to persist among men tho' they may not all of them be the correct ways of thinking. The object of refutation of hostile schools is simply to help the true and sincere seekers of truth eligible for Divine grace and Mokṣa to shake off any lingering doubts[1] about the correctness of the Sūtrakāra's position as already established. For, these hostile schools of thought tho' associated with the names of individuals like Kapila and Kaṇāda hail back to immemorial antiquity thro' successive inheritance of thought from earlier thinkers. They have thus a continuity of tra-

1. अनादिकालतो वृत्ता समया हि प्रवाहतः ।
न चोच्छेदोऽस्ति कस्यापि समयस्येत्यतो विभुः ।
तथापि शुद्धबुद्धीनामीशानुग्रहयोगिनाम् ।
सुयुक्तयस्तमो हन्त्यागमानुगताः सदा ।
इति विद्यापतिः सम्यक् समयानां निराकृतिम् ।
चकार निजभक्तानां बुद्धिशाणत्वसिद्धये । (*AV.* ii, 2.1)
न साङ्ख्यादिसमयसमुच्छेदार्थोऽस्य प्रयत्नः येनोक्तदोषः स्यात् । किंनाम, केषाचित् पुंसां तैस्तैः समयैरुपाहितानामज्ञान-संशयविपर्ययानामागमसहिताभिर्युक्तिभिः तत्त्वज्ञानमुत्पाद्यापनेतुमिति (*NS.* p. 316b)

dition and claim a measure of authority, logical strength and irrefutability equal to the Vedas themselves. Their rival influence has, therefore, to be curbed and guarded against. Their protagonists vie with one another in pressing their claims to acceptance with great perseverance. Weak minds are likely to be swayed by their arguments. Students of Vedānta have, therefore, to be well-equipped to expose their fallacies to themselves and stand firm in their convictions.

The hostile schools reviewed in this Pāda fall into two groups: (i) Haituka or rationalist and (ii) Pāṣaṇḍa or heretical. The Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya, Yoga and Cārvāka schools are Haituka. The Cārvāka, tho' it accepts only Pratyakṣa and rejects inference as an independent source of knowledge in establishing its tenets, is counted as a rationalist school as it has to make free use of reason in discrediting the views of its opponents. To that extent it concedes the validity of inference as an approximation to truth.[2] The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāmkhya-Yoga are fundamentally rationalistic tho' accepting the authority of Śruti; for they give only a secondary importance to Śruti. Tho' the Cārvāka is the worst enemy of Theism, its non-acceptance of the validity of inference as a means of proof precludes it from being brought under the scope of the analogical extension of the principle of refutation embodied in *Itareṣām cānupalabdheḥ* (ii, 1, 2). Hence, priority of attention is given to the Sāmkhya, in the refutation of hostile schools.[3] There is also poetic justice in doing so; for the atheistic Sāmkhya pits its metaphysically independent Matter as the cause of the world against the Vedāntin's metaphysically independent Supreme Sentient principle—B.[4]

There are, according to M., twelve *adhi.s* in this Pāda. The first six—with the exception of the third, form one group directed against Haitukas proper. Of these again four *adhi.s*, excluding the sixth, refute different shades of Sāmkhya thought. The third *adhi.* refutes the Cārvāka school *between two shades of Sāmkhya thought.* The propriety of *sandwiching the Cārvāka* in this way has been made clear, earlier. (Vol. I, p. 46). *The sixth adhi.* refutes the Vaiśeṣika *school.* The last six *adhi.s* are refutations of heretical schools. Of these again *adhi.s* 7-10 refute the schools of Buddhism and Jainism. The last two refute the Vaidika-Pāṣaṇḍa schools of Śaiva and Śākta.

2. यद्यपि चार्वाकमते युक्तिर्न प्रमाणं तथापि लोकव्यवहारोच्छेदभिया धूमादिज्ञानानन्तरं वह्न्यादिज्ञानं सम्भावनारूपं यथादेन च तस्य प्रामाण्याभिमान इत्यगीकृतत्वेन तस्यापि युक्तिमत्त्वात् (Raghū *TPB.*)

3. इतरेषां चानुपलब्धेरिति न्यायस्याविषयत्वेन च प्रथमं निराकर्तुमनर्हत्वात्, आदौ साङ्ख्या निराकार्याः (*TC.* p. 902-b)

4. स्वतंत्रचेतनवादिनः स्वतन्त्राचेतनवादिनि विरोधस्य चात्यन्तिकत्वात् (*TD*)

The sequence of thought in the arrangement of the first five *adhi.s* is as follows. There are two broad divisions of Sāṁkhya thought—one committed to the causality of pure insentient matter (Prakṛti) and the other in which Prakṛti associated with a sentient principle is regarded as the cause—the term 'cause' applied to insentient matter being understood in the sense of having the power of self-directed transformation. Of these, the first one is diametrically opposed to the Vedāntic view that Universal causality belongs, by right, to the One Supreme sentient principle called God or B. In the second, we have a further sub-division according as this sentient principle associated with the insentient is identified with the God of religion and philosophy or with the individual Puruṣa of the Sāṁkhya. In the former view, the God of religion and philosophy is supposed to act merely as a favoring factor in the causality of Prakṛti. His status is thus subordinated to Matter. However, as this particular view concedes some sort of a place to God in causation, it is given precedence over the other view in which Puruṣa is substituted for Īśvara and discussed immediately after the school which makes pure insentient matter the cause. The other view in which Puruṣa is associated with Prakṛti admits of two shades—Puruṣa as the sentient principle being assigned a subordinate role or a prominent one in the partnership, as the case may be.

The third *adhi.* is devoted to the frank atheism of the Cārvāka school which takes up the extreme position that neither insentient Prakṛti as such nor Prakṛti associated with God need be accepted as the cause of the world, as there is no proof of the existence of either of them and God moreover can have no physical body with whose help He could act as creator and that, therefore, we may as well recognize with the Cārvāka that our own physical bodies endowed with the capacity to develop sentiency from within are the cause of the world. The sixth *adhi.* examines the contention of the Tārkikas that their Siddhānta is entitled to acceptance as it is free from the defects which beset the earlier views. It is pointed out that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Siddhānta is open to a different set of objections. The remaining six adhikaraṇas refute in order the (four) schools of Buddhism and Jainism, the Śaiva and the Śākta schools.

CHAPTER 1

INSENTIENT PRAKṚTI INCAPABLE OF SELF-INITIATED ACTIVITY

1. *Racanānupapattyadhikaraṇam.* (ii, 2.1-4)

This *adhi.* refutes the atheistic Sāmkhya view that insentient Prakṛti is the independent creative principle which has brought the world into existence. The term *racanā* in the opening Sūtra is to be understood in the sense of self-initiated activity.[1] The last word anumānam' there may be read as *ānumānam* or *anumānam.* The former reading would suggest the manner in which insentient Prakṛti has been arrived at in Sāmkhya philosophy as the final source of all evolution while remaining itself uncaused,—by a piece of reasoning that all the evolutes of Prakṛti go back upon their respective causes which are of homogeneous essence with their effects till we reach the Mūla-Prakṛti which, for fear of a regress in reasoning, has to be admitted as being the uncaused cause of all else.[2]

Thus, the opening Sūtra embodies two ideas: (i) The principle of Prakṛti inferentially established by the Sāmkhya as the final source of the world cannot be so accepted; for, an insentient principle like Prakṛti cannot in the nature and fitness of things have any self-initiated activity (*racanā*).[3] (ii) It would not be of any use for the Sāmkhya philosopher to establish by reasoning that evolutes like Mahat have a

1. स्वतंत्रप्रवृत्तिर्हि रचना नाम (*TD*)

2. महदादिकार्यं स्वसदृशकारणकं, कार्यत्वात् घटवत् । कार्यं घटादि किंचित्कारणादुत्पन्नमिति परंपरया महत्तत्वाख्यकार्यमपि किंचित्कारणादुत्पन्नं, तच्च कारणमनवस्थाभिया अनुत्पन्नमेव इत्यव्यक्तसिद्धिः (Vādirāja—*NSG*)
Also कश्चिदर्थः प्रकृतिरेव (Vācaspati on *Sāmkhya Kārikā* 3.)

3. अनुमानं न जगत्कर्तृ; अचेतनस्य (स्वतःप्रवृत्तिरूप) रचनानुपपत्तेः

cause of similar nature; or have material causes of their own; or have to be referred to an independent cause in the end. For all this is accepted by the Vedāntin too who posits God or B. as the independent cause in question and Prakṛti as the material cause of all the evolutes.[4] Thus, while the first way construing the Sūtra rules out the possibility of the world being produced by insentient Prakṛti accepted as an independent principle, the second shows the impossibility of doing away with God or B. as the intelligent prime mover and make insentient Prakṛti itself the sole and independent cause of the world. For, the inference in respect of unintelligent Prakṛti being the sole independent cause of the world is completely barred by the absence of self-initiated activity in Prakṛti. This point is brought out in the second Sūtra: *Pravṛtteś ca.*[5]

There, it is shown that self-initiated activity is the distinguishing characteristic of a sentient principle and that no such power can be attributed to an insentient principle like Prakṛti. To put it briefly, Pravṛtti or exertion is an activity (*kriyā*). An activity cannot be conceived of without relation to a volition or a desire to act on the part of the agent of the action and only an intelligent being can be said to possess and exercise a volition.

In this context, M. has shown in his *AV.* that it would be a contradiction of thought to ascribe the power of self-initiated activity to the insentinent.[6] Tho' independence (*svātantrya*) is not the same as sentiency (*caitanya*), the fact remains that independence is understood in terms of one's being able to act according to one's own will or wish.[7] There is no point in the objection that insentiency is not the absence of wish or will but the absence of consciousness and that there is no contradiction in holding the insentient to be capable of having the power to wish or to will. It is consciousness that gives birth to a will or a wish. That which has no consciousness cannot, therefore, entertain a wish. In order to entertain a wish it must necessarily be a Cetana or a sentinent principle.[8] The Sāmkhya Prakṛti being *ex hypothesi* acetana cannot be credited with a will or a wish to create the world, by self-transformation.

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4 अनुमानरचनाया अनुपपत्तेः दुष्टत्वादित्यर्थः । महदादिकं सकारणकं, सोपादानकारणकं; स्वतन्त्रकारणकं वेति रचनाया सिद्धसाधनत्वात् इति (Ragh. *TDP*)

5. प्रवृत्तेश्च (*BS.* ii, 2.2) चेतनस्य स्वत प्रवृत्तिदर्शनाच्च (*M. BSB.*) चेतनस्येति सावधारणम् (*BD*)

6. स्वतन्त्रवृत्तोरचना सा चैवाचेतने कुतः ? अचेतनत्व स्वातन्त्र्यमिति चात्मप्रमाहतम् (*AV.* ii, 2. *adhi.* 1)

7. स्वेच्छानुसारितामेव स्वातन्त्र्य हि विदो विदुः (*ibid*)

8. कुत इच्छा अचेतनस्य, सेच्छं चेत्किमचेतनम् ? (*AV.* ii.2.*adhi*.1)

Sāmkhya psychology has no doubt tried to make out that the will or the wish is an attribute of the mind and comes to be mistakenly ascribed to the self thro' want of discrimination (*vivekāgraha*), due to their intimate association. This is opposed by M. He takes his stand on the judgment of the Sākṣī "I wish to...." which makes it clear that the wish or the will to do something is a property of the thinking self. It cannot be ascribed to *two agencies*—the mind and the soul, of which the former is to be regarded as its real locus—the later being spoken of as agent with reference to the act of willing due to superimposition engendered by inability to discriminate between them (*vivekāgraha*) on account of their intimate association. *'Aham icchāmi'* (I have a wish) is a synthetic judgment of the Sākṣī. It must, therefore, be accepted as arising from a clear awareness of the two elements: the wish and the entertainer of that wish—viz. the "I".[9] Driving the Sāmkhya contention to a *reductio ad absurdam* M., argues in his AV. that if such judgments of the Sākṣī are to be dismissed as the outcome of want of discrimination (between the mind and the soul) followed by a transference of what goes on in the mind to the soul, one may expect a pot and a cloth to suffer from a similar transference of their natures as they have no mutual discrimination.[10] If it is contended that it is only where two things have a clear perception of their own respective natures followed by a further want of discrimination of their mutual distinction that there is a possibility of mixing them up and room for transference of attributes and that as the first condition is not fulfilled in the case of the pot and the cloth, the threatened contingency will *not* arise, it would be easy enough to point out that as the mind is *per se* unintelligent (Jaḍa) it cannot lay claim to any self-awareness. Thus, the first condition required for transference of natures or attributes remains unfulfilled with reference to it. How then can there be any scope for transfer of attributes from the mind to the self and description based on such transference (*anyonyadharma-samsargavyavahāra*)?

It is further pointed out by M. that our judgments of Sākṣī such as 'this is *my* mind' shows that there is clear awareness of the distinction (*bhedagraha*) between the mind and our own selves. Since such a clear awareness of their distinction is present, there can be no talk of absence of discrimination between them or consequent transference of attributes—making the wish or the will presented in the judgment "I wish" an attribute of the mind instead of the soul's.[11] There is thus no sub-

9. इच्छाम्यहमिति ह्येव निजानुभवरोधतः । अचेतनेच्छापगता (*ibid*)
10. • • • • यदि भेदाग्रहोऽत्र च । कथं स न घटस्य स्यात् • • • • (*AV.* ii. 2. *adhi.* 1)
11. • • • • मनो मे इति भेदतः । मनसोऽपि गृहीतत्वात् • • • • (*AV.* ii. 2. Adhi. 1)
मे मन इति मनसोऽपि भेदेन गृहीतत्वात् नात्मना भेदाग्रहः स्यात् । तथाच, भेदाग्रहनिमित्तो 'अहमिच्छामि' इति व्यवहार इत्यसत् । किं त्वनुभवनिमित्त एव । अत एव नान्तःकरणधर्मस्यात्मन्यारोप इत्यपि युक्तम् । (*NS.* p. 323).

stance in the contention of Sāmkhya philosophy that an insentient principle like the Prakṛti can have a will or a wish to create the world by transforming itself.

The third Sūtra *Payoṁbuvac cet tatrāpi* sets aside the objection based on common experience that water flows of its own accord and milk curdles by itself. It is pointed out that even in these cases, the activity is caused by the Supreme Being, as we understand from the Śrutis. "All the rivers abide by the command of the Akṣara—those issuing from the snowy mountains, some flowing to the east and some to the west". "Because of Him, milk becomes curd". Following S., Radhakrishnan observes, in this connection, that '*in a general way*' the *flow of water etc. is dependent on the intelligent principle of B. which is* present everywhere" (The *Brahmasutra*, p. 368). This does not satisfy M. to whom the "*Śāstradṛṣṭi*" as S. acknowledges it (see his C. on BS. ii, 2.3) is the only adequate explanation and right perspective to adopt —not as a reluctant concession to philosophical opinion but *in all earnestness and truth*.[12]

The *agency of Īśvara in respect of every kind of activity in the* world including the flow of water and the curdling of milk having been conceded as coming within the scope of the Sūtrārtha in ii, 2, 3 by S. himself, the 'non-existence apart from' (*vyatirekānavasthiti*) referred to in the next Sūtra can readily be seen to point to the same Īśvara as the countercorrelate of the *vyatireke* in question.[13]

The last Sūtra *Vyatirekānavasthiteśca anapekṣatvāt* thus concludes the discussion by pointing out that other instances such as the movement of iron filings towards the magnet do not upset the position established in Sūtra 3. For as proclaimed in the Śruti, the fact remains that not the slightest movement or activity can take place, far or near, *anywhere in the world except as willed and caused by the* Supreme Being. This holds true in respect of sentient creatures themselves and *ipso facto* of all insentient principles. This makes the Sāmkhya view attributing self-initiated activity to insentient Prakṛti unworthy of acceptance by every thoughtful person.

12. Belvalkar (*Brahmasutras with C. of S.* II.2. Poona. 1938. pp. 70-71. Notes) finds S. hardly convincing in the manner of his appealing to the agency of Īśvara.
13. Cf. तृतीयसूत्रप्रकृतेश्वरस्य व्यतिरेकप्रतियोगित्वेन * * * * (TC. p. 906)

CHAPTER II

SEŚVARA-SĀMKHYA REFUTED

2. *Anyatrābhāvādhikaraṇam* (ii, 2, 5)

The Seśvara-Sāmkhya holds that as grass and other vegetation are produced from the earth duly favored by the rains, so the world is produced by its own intrinsic potency (*kṣetraśakti*) with reference to the evolution of Mahat etc. with the favor of God. Unlike the atheistic Sāmkhya, this type of Sāmkhya makes room for Īśvara as a contributory factor, while assigning the more prominent and vital role in production to the intrinsic *Kṣetraśakti* of insentient Prakṛti itself. Tho' ostensibly admitting Īśvara, this type of Sāmkhya virtually reduces the status of God to that of a mere auxiliary force or a contributing factor in drawing out what is contained in the womb of Prakṛti—the power to germinate and evolve which is conceived to be intrinsic to it and in no sense derived, sustained or ontologically dependent on the Deity.[1]

Such a position falls very much below the expectations of genuine Theism in which God or B. has to be all in all—not merely as externally controlling things but by being immanent in everything . It is only by His immanence that the nature and potentialities of Jīva, Prakṛti, Kāla, Svabhāva, etc., are what they are. This fundamental doctrine of Vedāntic Theism is elucidated by M. in his interpretation of this Sūtra

1. That such a view is not unknown to Indian philosophical thinking may be gathered from an almost identical position adumbrated by S. in his C. on *B.S.* ii, 1.34, where he maintains that the position of God is analogous to that of rain. As rain is the common cause of the production of rice, barley and other crops while the difference between the crops is due to the various potentialities lying hidden in the respective seeds. These potentialities of the seeds do not owe their being to the rain. They belong to them in their own right. The extension of this principle to Prakrti is implied in the term Tṛṇādivat in the Sūtra *Anyatrābhāvācca na tṛṇādivat* (ii, 2.5).

which has, therefore, been regarded by him as constituting a fresh adhi. coming to grips with an important phase of Sāmkhya thought which later crystallized itself into the Seśvara-Sāmkhya of Patañjali.[2]

Thus, by connecting the opening word "*anyatra*" (=elsewhere than) of this Sūtra with the concept of Īśvara to which the whole argument of *Racanānupapatti* naturally leads by its immanent dialectic, we are able to arrive at the most natural interpretation of this adhikaraṇa-Sūtra, as a refutation of the Seśvara-Sāmkhya view which withholds from Īśvara the supreme position which due to Him. The actual interpretation of the wording of the Sūtra would be: As no other principle in the world has any power or potentiality in its own right—independently of God or B.,[3] it cannot be held that insentient Prakṛti evolves the world by its own intrinsic capacity with God acting as a contributory factor like the rain which helps the field to produce grass and other vegetation by its own fertility of the soil and the seeds.[4] Insentient Prakṛti cannot, therefore, be accepted as being capable of any kind of self-directed evolution by virtue of its own intrinsic potentiality. Nor can God be assigned the role of a mere contributory factor (*anugrāhakamātram*) in the process of Prakṛtic evolution. We have, therefore, to go definitely *beyond these two positions.* We have to accept that the intrinsic capacity of Prakṛti to evolve the other principles is itself derived (eternally) from the Supreme Being and is not independent of It—either for its existence or functioning. This would immediately

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2. Cf. 'अन्यत्र क्वापि शक्तिर्न स्वातन्त्र्येणेश एव हि। शक्तीस्ताः प्रेरयत्यज. तदधीनाश्च सर्वदा ।।
सत्ताप्रधान पुरुषशक्तीना च प्रतीतयः प्रवृत्तयश्च ता. सर्वा नित्यं नित्यात्मना यत' ।।
यथानित्यतयानित्यं नित्यशक्त्या स्वयेश्वरः
नियामयति नित्य च 'न ऋते त्वत्' इति श्रुते ।
स्वभावजीवकर्माणि द्रव्यं कालश्रुतिक्रिया' । यत्प्रसादादिमे सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया ।
इति श्रुते नं सत्ताद्या अपि नारायण विना । तत्पतञ्जलिविन्ध्यादेर्मतं न पुरुषार्थदम् ।।
(*AV.* ii, 2. adh. 2)

3. Commenting on the Śruti: यच्च किंचिज्जगत्सर्वं दृश्यते श्रूयतेऽपि वा अन्तर्बहिश्च तत् सर्वं व्याप्य नारायणः स्थितः ।। cited by M. in his C. on this Sūtra the TD explains: तत्सर्वं देशतः कालतो गुणतः शक्तितश्च व्याप्य स्थित' । अन्तर्बहिश्च तद्देशे तद्रहितदेशे च व्याप्तः तत्काले तद्रहितकाले च तद्मूर्तैः तदमूर्तैर्गुणैः शक्तिभिश्च युतः । ब्रह्मणोऽन्यत्र जगतः सृष्ट्यादेः तच्छक्त्यादेश्चाभावात्, नानुग्राहकत्वमात्रं तस्य; किंतु जगदुत्पादकत्वादिकमुपादानादिशक्तिप्रदत्वं चास्तीति (ii, 2.5)

4. Belvalkar both misunderstands and misrepresents M.'s position here, when he says that M. directs this adhi. against the Seśvara Sāmkhya which admits a God "but regards Him only as the efficient or '*nimitta-kāraṇa*' of the world" (*Op. cit.*, p. 72 Notes). The point of dispute in this *adhi.* according to M. is *not* whether God is to be accepted as the *nimittakāraṇa* or not; for M. also subscribes to the view that B. is only the *nimittakāraṇa* and not also the material cause. The disagreement with the Seśvara Sāmkhya, however, arises over the vital *issue that it does not give Īśvara the pre-eminent position* as *Sattāpratītipravṛttinimittam* in respect of all finite reality including Prakṛti and Puruṣas.

place the Supreme Being on a far higher pedestal than that of being a *mere auxiliary or a contributory factor in the work of Prakṛti.* The same principle applies to the *bījaśakti* of Puruṣas to the extent it may be recognized by the Sāmkhya in its own way. These points have been *fully elucidated by J. in his NS. under the present adhi.*[5]

5. या जगदुपादानं सा प्रकृतिरेवोपादानत्वशक्तिमतीति ब्रूते; न तु वेदवादिन इव तामपि शक्तिमीश्वरायत्ताम्। शरीरेन्द्रियादिसंबन्धेनोत्पत्तौ या शक्तिः सा बीजशक्तिः, जीव एव तद्वानिति ब्रुते; न तु तदीयां बीजशक्तिं तत्त्ववादिन इव भगवदधीनाम्। ***प्रधानपुरुषयोः तदीयानां शक्तीनां च सत्ता स्वरूपं प्रतीतयः सर्वाः प्रवृत्तयश्च सर्वदा तदधीना एव (*NS.* pp. 329-30b)

CHAPTER III

CĀRVĀKA REFUTED

3. *Abhyupagamādhikaraṇam* (ii, 2.6)

This *adhi.* is a refutation of the Materialistic Cārvāka school. The Cārvāka contends that the criticism against the Sāmkhya Prakṛti, that an insentient principle like Pradhāna cannot be credited with self-initiated activity in evolving the world, would *not* apply to *his* position. For, while denying the existence of a God as completely as the atheistic Sāmkhya, the Cārvāka siddhānta holds that our physical bodies are endowed with the power of consciousness (*vijñāna*) which is formed therein by the peculiar combination of the four elements which go to constitute the body.[1] This consciousness perishes with the body. With the elements given and the bodies endowed with developing consciousness, the creatures may themselves be conceived to be the creators of the world in the course of the history of the world. This is sufficient to eliminate God.[2] As the bodies themselves are endowed with consciousness, while they last, no objection can be taken to the Cārvāka's way of explaining how the world has come into existence, on the ground that an insentient principle cannot have self-initiated activity. Nor is there any possibility of conflict with the Śruti; for the Cārvāka does not accept its authority.[3]

1. Very little of the original literature of the Cārvāka school has come down. In the circumstances, credit must be given to J. for giving us the following from what appears to have been a standard work on the system:
पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुरिति तत्त्वानि । तत्समुदाये शरीरेन्द्रियविषयसंज्ञा । तेभ्यश्चैतन्यं मदशक्तिवत् विज्ञानम् ।
(*NS.* p. 331)
2. Cf. अन्तरेणापीश्वरं पूर्वपूर्वस्मादुत्तरोत्तरोत्पत्तिसंभवात् *** अदृष्टार्थ एव नास्तीति, कुतो जगदीश्वरः, कुतस्तरां जगत्कारणत्वमिति (*TP.* ii, 2.6)
3. मा भूदचेतनस्य कर्तृत्वम् । शरीरस्य चेतनत्वेन कर्तृत्वापत्तेरीश्वरवैयर्थ्यात् । न च सांख्य प्रतीव श्रुत्यादिबाधो वक्तुं युक्तः । तस्याप्रामाण्याङ्गीकारात् इत्यभ्यधिकाशंकया पूर्वपक्षोत्थानादनन्तरसंगतिरिति भावः
(Raghu. *TPB.* ii.2.6)

The Pūrvapakṣa of the Cārvāka is thus brought up by the Sūtrakāra by way of an *adhikāśaṁkā* over the conclusion reached in the opening *adhi.* against atheistic Sāmkhya and is refuted in this *adhi.* We have thus a reasonable ground for disposing of the Cārvāka objection here, as has been done by M.

Without going into M.'s reasons for giving a different interpretation of this Sūtra, Belvalkar observes that "M. is *most peculiar* (italics mine) in making a new adhikaraṇa of this Sūtra, which he directs against the Cārvāka" (*Op. cit.*, p. 72 Notes). He is evidently satisfied with S.'s way of treating this Sūtra as a continuation of the attack on the Sāmkhya system. To S. this Sūtra raises the objection that "even accepting the spontaneous activity of insentient Prakṛti, such activity would be wanting *in a purpose*".[4] *This is open to the following* objections: The words "*arthābhāvāt*" (on account of the absence of a purpose on the part of Prakṛti) in the Sūtra, as interpreted by S. would be sufficient to convey the intended refutation of the Sāmkhya, without the superfluous preamble: *Abhyupagame 'pi* (even admitting the spontaneous activity of Prakṛti).[5]

The word '*arthābhāvāt* embodies a reason. Sūtra no. 6 being a constituent part of the first *adhi.* itself comprising ten Sūtras from 1-10, (according to S.) the reason *arthābhāvāt* in Sūtra 6, should stand connected with some conclusion (*sādhya*). We are thus entitled to ask what precisely is the conclusion which this *hetu* is intended to establish? Will it stand connected with the conclusion expressed in Sūtra 10, by the words "*asamañjasam*—that for want of a purpose on the part of the activity of Prakṛti, the system is unsatisfactory? Or, will it stand connected with the conclusion reached in Sūtra 2, that for want of purpose, the activity of Prakṛti would become untenable? Neither can hold. The former will recoil on the Sūtrakāra himself, as he has been *interpreted by S. under Sūtra ii, 1.33,—where it has been con*fessed that no purpose can be made out for B.'s creation of the world.[6] If the reason in Sūtra 6 is connected with what is made out in Sūtra 2 (*Pravṛttyanupayatteḥ*) it would conflict with the "acceptance" (*abhyupagama*) given to the activity of Prakṛti in the preamble[7] to Sūtra 6.

4. यद्यपि नाम स्वाभाविकीमेव प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिमभ्युपगच्छेम, तथापि दोषोऽनुषज्येतैव; अर्थाभावात्
(S. *BSB.* ii, 2.6)

5. अभ्युपगमेऽपीत्येतावतो वैयर्थ्यात्। 'अर्थाभावाच्च' इत्येतावतैव पूर्णत्वात् (*NS.* p. 331b)

6. तथापि नैवात्र किंचित् प्रयोजनमुत्प्रेक्षितुं शक्यते (S. *BSB.* ii, 1.33) अपि च, नेयं पारमार्थिकी सृष्टिः, येनानुयुज्येत प्रयोजनम्। न हि, द्विचन्द्रालातचक्रगन्धर्वनगरादिविभ्रमाः समुद्दिष्टप्रयोजना भवन्ति
(*Bhāmatī*. ii, 1.33)

7. किं चार्थाभावेन किं साध्यम्? साङ्ख्यमतस्यासामञ्जस्यं वा? प्रकृतेः प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तिर्वा? नाद्यः; व्यधिकरणत्वात्। कथं चिदेकाधिकरणतापादनेऽपि स्वमतेनानैकान्त्यात्। न द्वितीयः; अभ्युपगम (वाद) विरोधात्। तस्मान्नायं सूत्रार्थः (*NS.* p. 331b)

In an *abhyupagamavāda* we do not *repudiate what has been conceded but use it to draw out some other point.* In the present case, however, the very acceptance of self-directed activity of Prakṛti will have to be repudiated by the force of the reasoning *arthābhāvāt,* if from it we conclude that Prakṛti cannot have such activity. This makes the *abhyupagama* meaningless. The best thing for S. would have been to discard the preamble and simply argue *arthābhāvād asamañjasam* or *arthābhaāvāt pravṛttyanupapattiḥ* for what they are worth. But the Sūtra *contains* the words *abhyupagame 'pi,* which is not properly accounted for, in his interpretation.

The Cārvāka prides himself on his ultra-rationalism in religion, philosophy and ethics. It is natural to expect this brand of rationalism also to be examined in the present Pāda, which is devoted to a systematic examination of anti-Vedāntic schools. *It is the absence of examination of this system in this Pāda and not its presence or inclusion here by a thoughtful commentator that should cause surprise to any one.* What should really have struck Dr. Belvalkar as "most peculiar", in this connection, *is* S.'s *not* discussing the Cārvāka school *here* and *doing so* under III, 3, 53-54, instead, where it is *out of place.*

The Sūtra: *Abhyupagame 'pyarthābhāvāt* (ii, 2.6) shows the untenability of the Cārvāka view in the light of its own fundamental presuppositions. To put it bluntly, the system stands virtually without a subject-matter for its Śāstra and a goal[8] in consequence of some of its own admissions.

The Cārvāka does not accept any supersensuous realities or values like God and soul, merit and demerit, heaven and hell. He admits only sense-perception (Pratyakṣa) as Pramāṇa and rejects the validity of inference and Āgama. He believes that the physical body itself is endowed with the power of *Caitanya* which is produced in the body by the peculiar nature of the combination of the elements constituting the body.

In the circumstances, this system cannot accept anything which lies beyond the range of the senses as the subject-matter of its Śāstra or its goal. The subject-matter presented by this philosophy may be intended either for the enlightenment of the founder or for the benefit of his disciples. As nothing beyond the range of sense-experience is accepted, whatever is taught by the founder in his Śāstra must have been

8. The term *artha* in the Sūtra has been interpreted in the sense of both *Viṣaya* (subject-matter) and *prayojana* (goal or objective): अभ्युपगमेऽप्यर्थाभावात् इति तृतीयाधिकरणसूत्रेऽर्थशब्देन न केवलं प्रयोजनमभिप्रेतं, किंतु विषयोऽपि (*TC.* p. 905b)

realized by him already thro' his own sense-experience. That cannot, therefore, be a source of information or enlightenment to him thro' the Śāstra; for Śāstra is that which gives information not known thro' other sources. The system cannot claim to have any supersensuous objectives to be realized by its study by others; for nothing beyond the senses is accepted. What is within the reach of the senses of everyone needs no Śāstra to expound it.

The Cārvāka has, therefore, to adopt a negative approach and say that his Śāstra has for its subject matter the non-existence of *dharma*, *adharma* and other supersensuous values. Tho' the non-existence of these things is borne out by the evidence of perception itself, the brains of most men are muddled by the false propaganda of religionists and the age-old superstitious ideas fostered by them about the existence of God, soul, *puṇya, pāpa, svarya, naraka,* etc. Humanity has to be rescued from this quagmire of religious beliefs. When disillusioned by the Cārvāka, people will be free from the incubus of religion and shake off their inhibitions and engage freely in the pursuit of wealth and the enjoyment of life.

Granting that this may be so, the attainment of these objectives would depend on the establishment of these ideals as the subject matter of the Śāstra. But the Cārvāka has to make it clear whether the Śāstra expounds these tenets in an authoritarian way, as the deliverances of an Āgama or by establishing them with reasonings. He does not recognize any Āgama or the validity of reasoning. How then can his Śāstra carry conviction? It will not do to put in that Śāstra merely disarms the objections of Religionists against the non-existence of supersensuous values preached by the Cārvāka. When these objections are disarmed by the Cārvāka-Śāstra, sense-experience will be competent to reveal the subject matter in its own true light! But the difficulty would be that the objections cannot be silenced without making an authoritative statement to the contrary or adducing convincing reasons to rule out the objections. For an objection is in the nature of a doubt or is due to a misapprehension. It can only be set at rest by creating a better understanding which comprehends facts in a different light, and not by repeatedly asserting the same thing. That can only be done by giving cogent reasons to convince the doubter. But the Cārvāka has no faith in reason.[9]

9. J. argues that the denial of *dharma* etc. may lead to disastrous results: न च धर्माद्यभावबोधनद्वारा लोकोपकारः । तदभावज्ञाने परस्परहिंसादिना अपकारस्यैव प्राप्तेः (*TP.* ii, 2.6)

Thus, in consequence of its own presuppositions, the Cārvāka system is precluded from having a proper subject matter or a goal worth recognizing. The Sūtra makes it clear that not only according to its critics but even by its own admissions, as shown above, the system turns out to be devoid of a proper subject matter and a goal .What it may have to say, in these circumstances, against the possibility of God being the author of the Universe is not entitled to any consideration.[10]

10. अतो न तद्विरोधो विष्णोर्जगत्कारणत्वस्य (*BD*)

CHAPTER IV

PURUṢOPASARJANA-PRAKṚTIKARTṚTVAVĀDA UNTENABLE

4. *Puruṣāśmādhikaraṇam* (ii, 2, 7-8)

There are two other shades of Nirīśvara-Sāṁkhya which remain to be disposed of.[1] One of them invests Acetana-Prakṛti itself with the power of evolution by the presence (*sānnidhya*) of Puruṣa. The influence which the Puruṣa exercises by his mere presence is part of the agency of Prakṛti and does not fall outside it. It is in this way that this view differs from position assigned to Īśvara as a favoring factor acting externally, in the Seśvara-Sāṁkhya—already noticed. The illustration of the man fetching a piece of stone elucidates how insentient Prakṛti itself in contact with Puruṣa starts evolving the world.

This theory too cannot get over the difficulty in attributing self-initiated activity to a purely insentient principle like Prakṛti—notwithstanding the vicinity of Puruṣa. For, in point of actual fact, the theory wants to make out that it is Acetana-Prakṛti that performs the function of evolution—the Puruṣa acting merely as an *Upasarjana* contributing nothing but his merest vicinity (*sānnidhya*). But the fact remains that agency in the real sense of the term is impossible without consciousness

1. Dr. Belvalkar (*Op. cit.*, Notes p. 75) is wrong in saying that the two shades of Sāmkhya thought refuted in adhi-s 4 and 5 by M. are part of the Seśvara-Sāmkhya school. *They are not.* Only the one refuted in adhi. 2 is Seśvara-Sāmkhya. The rest refuted in adhi-s 1, 4 and 5 are all Nirīśvara. Read: साङ्ख्यमतमपि केवलाचेतनकर्तृत्वचेतनसहिताचेतनकर्तृत्वाभ्यां द्वेधा। इह च कर्तृत्वं नाम स्वतः प्रवृत्तिमत्त्वम्। तत्राद्यं वैदिकस्य स्वतन्त्रचेतनकर्तृत्वस्याचेतनस्यविशेष्यस्यैवानङ्गीकारणात्यन्तविरोधीत्याद्याधिकरणे तन्निरासः। द्वितीयमपि साङ्ख्यमतं गुणभूतेश्वरानुगृहीतप्रधानकर्तृत्वेन, जीवसहितप्रधानकर्तृत्वेन चेति द्वेधा। तत्र यद्यपि निरीश्वरं द्वितीय सेश्वरादाद्यादतिविरोधि, तथाप्याद्यस्य सेश्वरस्य ** द्वितीयाधिकरणे निरासः अनन्तरं जीवसहितस्य प्रधानस्य कर्तृत्वमपि जीवस्योपसर्जनत्वप्रधानत्वाभ्यां द्वेधा *** (*TC.* p. 903b)

(*jñāna*) volition (*icchā*) and effort (*prayatna*). It should be obvious that it is only the intelligent self which acts thro' the body and makes it perform such acts as fetching a stone. The example does not prove the agency of the purely unintelligent body as against the intelligent self. It has already been made clear that every activity—great or small, is in reality inspired by the Supreme Being (*Na ṛte tvat kriyate kimcana āre*).

As the Sāmkhya is more a rationalist (*Haituka*), the next sūtra uses reason to rebut his position by pointing out that it offends the logic of experience to make the Puruṣa a nominal or secondary factor instead of the prime agent. This conclusion here in regard to the active agency of the Jīvātman does not conflict with the philosophical position of Theism that God is the primary source of all agency. By showing here that any attempt at belittling the the agency of the Puruṣa and transferring it to the physical body (and to insentient Prakṛti in the end) would be opposed to experience and Śāstra, the Sūtrakāra is merely seeking to emphasize the fact, all the more clearly, that any attempt at tampering with the absolute agency of the Supreme Being in the larger context of cosmic evolution and transferring it to insentient Prakṛti by the Sāmkhya is opposed to Yogipratyakṣa, anumāna and Āgama alike.

CHAPTER IV

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CHAPTER V

PRAKṚTYUPASARJANA-PURUṢAKARTṚTVAVĀDA UNTENABLE

5. *Anyathānumityadhikaraṇam* (ii, 2, 9-10)

· This adhi. deals with the type of Nirīśvara-Sāmkhya which reverses the position of Prakṛti and Puruṣa as conceived in the allied system just examined. Here Prakṛti occupies the subordinate position and Puruṣa takes the chief role in the evolution of the world. This reversal of positions between Prakṛti and Puruṣa has been referred to by the words: *anyathānumitau* (even if the reasoning is reversed).

The argument of the Sāmkhya here is that by making the Puruṣa the chief actor, the difficulty of the other school is surmounted. At the same time, as the Puruṣa has no activity in Suṣupti and other states, the active assistance of Prakṛti is proved to be indispensable for him. Given these two, then, God can be eliminated from the field of cosmology.

This is refuted by the words: *Jñaśaktiviyogāt*—'because the sentient principle here (viz. the Puruṣa) will be without the requisite power to become connected with Prakṛti without a physical body of his own (and operate Prakṛti). The Sāmkhya has to make it clear if, in assigning the major role in creation to Puruṣa here, he confers unlimited powers on him. If he does, it should be possible for Puruṣa to do without Prakṛti. If Puruṣa (*Jñaḥ*) has *not* got unlimited powers (*śakti*), there will be need for accepting an Īśvara, at least for purposes of activising Prakṛti.

In any case, it can only be by his active impulsion that Puruṣa can energize Prakṛti and make it serve as his Upasarjana. But as the

Puruṣa is admitted in this view to be powerless in himself, the impulsion will have to be provided by some other source. Moreover, it is *not by its mere presence or loose contact with Puruṣa that Prakṛti comes* to serve the Puruṣa as his Upasarjana. In that case, it should do so even in Suṣupti and Pralaya. *It is, therefore, only in the sense of* serving as a means of knowledge, object of enjoyment and place of residence that Prakṛti can serve the Puruṣa as Upasarjana. In this sense, what is Upasarjana will have to be suitably adapted to his needs by an agent. But as Puruṣa here is powerless to do this, the impulsion to make him do so must come from elsewhere. It cannot come from Prakṛit itself—as, being in the nature of an instrument, object of enjoyment or place of residence for the Puruṣa, it cannot act as its own instru*ment in making itself impelled to serve the Puruṣa as Upasarjana.* That would involve the defect of self-depedence. If it should be impelled towards this end by some one else, that some one, if he is another Puruṣa, would be as powerless as the first one and would need to be impelled by another to impel Prakṛti—and so on endlessly. To avoid this difficulty, Puruṣa will have to be vested with the supreme power of directing the evolution of Prakṛti. That will make him the Supreme Being or Īśvara Himself. The Sāmkhya would thus be forced to accept Īśvara.

Interpretation of Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja

According to S. R. and others, Sūtras 1-10 constitute one *adhi.*, refuting the atheistic Sāmkhya Siddhānta that insentient Prakṛti by itself designs and evolves the world without being guided and supervised by a sentient principle. However, as there are several distinctive types of Sāmkhya thought, *they deserve to be taken into account. It is not fair to ignore any of them and lavish all the attention on only one of them at the risk of needless repetition of the same points of criticism, for want of better ones.* We have seen how each of the four Sāmkhya adhikaraṇas dealing with its different shades of thought and claiming in succession to be free from the defects pointed out of its predecessor call for refutation. There is sufficient justification, therefore, to distribute the ten Sūtras into distinctive adhikaraṇas.[1]

The *purpose of refuting* the Sāmkhya *is to* uphold the *causality* of B. instead. But is that possible for S. in any straight sense of the term?

1. Belvalkar (*Op. cit*, Notes p. 75) observes that as Sūtra 10 seems to be the final flourish of attack, we cannot distribute Sūtras 1-10 into more than one *adhi.* The last Sūtra can, however, be understood as *a general criticism of all four shades of Sāmkhya thought* which constitute a sub-division (*avāntarapeṭikā*) within the larger section (*mahāpeṭikā*) of refutation of Haituka schools. By the same token of 'final flourish' (See the wording of Sūtras 4 and 17). Belvalkar should agree that Sūtra 4 indicates the conclusion of an adhikarana.'

His real B. is the Nirviśeṣa-Cinmātra. It cannot become the *author* of the Universe. Neither can It be the deluded one seeing a world projected before it, in terms of creation. It cannot be the one who spreads a delusion before others like a Magician—as has been shown in earlier contexts. If "causality" of B., which the Sūtrakāra is at pains to establish, is merely being the substratum of the illusory appearance of the world, *even an insentient principle* like Prakṛti *can pass the test.* If causality should mean transformation of nature or condition, an Acetana principle like Prakṛti can lay better claim to it. Except in the sense of authorship of the world with conscious effort, the term *racanā* in the opening Sūtra will offer a real difficulty in interpretation. Authorship in the sense of putting forth conscious effort will be equally unthinkable in the case of the Nirviśeṣa-B.

If S. could satisfy his conscience that B.'s authorship of the Universe means only that the world is superimposed on pure consciousness or is the creation of B. qualified by Avidyā and antaḥkaraṇa, the Sāmkhya can also get away with the contention that Caitanya is superimposed on Prakṛti by absence of realization of its difference from Prakṛti and that there is real activity in Prakṛti when it becomes qualified by Puruṣa and that in this way both sentiency and agency can be reconciled wtih acetana-Prakṛti.

Sūtrātha

According to S., the second Sūtra means insentient Pradhāna cannot be the cause because of the impossiblity of its possessing activity,—the word anupapatteḥ being understood here from the previous sūtra. This is merely a repetition of what has been established in the first Sūtra itself.[2] We may naturally expect the Sāmkhya to hit back against the criticism: *Racanānupapatteḥ* that the Vedāntin's pure consciousness would also be incapable of activity and that, therefore, the criticism against the Sāmkhya Prakṛti will not stand. It would be incumbent on the Siddhāntin to counter this objection *in the body of Sūtras itself*. There is no reason to miss this opportunity of giving a suitable reply to this pertinent objection of the Sāmkhya and silence it by taking one's stand on valid *anubhava* which confirms the agency of the intelligent self. Instead of answering this objection *in the words of the Sūtra: Pravṛtteśca*, S. has recourse to a parenthetical discusssion of the point raised by the Sāmkhya. This could have been

2. R. avoids this repetition by combining the two Sūtras into one and laying stress on the guidance of an intelligent being as the basic condition of activity being caused in an insentient principle, by the latter part (*pravṛtteś ca*) [illegible] (*Śrībhāṣya*)

dispensed with by a forthright interpretation of the second Sūtra itself, as emphasizing the point that only an intelligent being is capable of self-directed activity—thus knocking down the Sāmkhya Pūrvapakṣa.

The idea that only a Cetana is capable of self-initiated activity to guide the insentient is absolutely necessary for purposes of meeting the further Pūrvapakṣa in the next sūtra (*Payo'mbuvac cet tatrāpi*) as admitted by S. himself, in his own interpretation.[3] That being so, it would be proper to enunciate the principle that all self-directed activity has necessarily to originate in a sentient being and *have it spelt out in the second Sūtra* so that it can run on and clinch the issue of *Payo'mbuvac cet* in the next Sūtra instead of looking about for support from Inference in one's favor.[4]

The redundancy of Sūtra 2 (as explained by S.) cannot be got over by the explanation that *racanā* stands for self-transformation of the causal stuff of Prakṛti in the form of effects, while *pravṛtti* signifies the passing out of the three guṇas of Prakṛti of their own accord from their original state of equipoise and their entering into a state of mutual subordination and superordination.[5] For, the same interpretation has been given by S. under the Sūtra *Aṅgitvānupapatteḥ* (ii, 2.8) which makes *that Sūtra* redundant in the light of no. 2. For all these reasons, it seems best to accept the position that the second Sūtra should be interpreted so as to directly lay down that all self-directed activity has to originate in a Cetana alone,—as M. has done.

In Sūtra 3, S. and R. have not done adequate justice to the distinctive point underlying the two illustrations. Instead of explaining them in more or less the same way that "the cow's milk flows for the benefit of the calf and water flows for the benefit of mankind", it would have been more pertinent and thoughtful to have distinguished the purposes of the two illustrations from the Pūrvapakṣin's point of view,[6]—to the effect that the *transformation of milk* into curds or cream is intended to illustrate that the transformation of Pradhāna into Mahat etc. is independent of the intervention of the agency of any sentient being, while the

3. पयोऽम्बुनोः चैतन्याधिष्ठितयोरेव प्रवृत्ति (S. *BSB.* ii, 2.3)
4. इत्यनुमिमीमहे (S)
5. Cf. आस्ता तावदियं रचना। तत्सिद्धयर्थं या प्रवृत्तिः साम्यावस्थानात् प्रच्युतिः ** (S) रचनाया प्रवृत्ते. सकाशात् भेदमाह–'रचनाभेदा' इति। कार्यगतविन्यासविशेषा इत्यर्थः (*Kalpataru*)
6. It is evidently for this reason that M. has given a new orientation to the illustrations of milk and water used in this Sūtra. It deserves to be noted in this connection that while the illustration of milk appears in the *Sāmkhya-kārikā* in a different set-up (as explained by S.) the other one is *not* to be met with there and S. himself has thought it fit to refer it to the Śruti, where its interpretation in the light of the Siddhānta position is fully supported.

illustration of the *water's flowing* is intended to illustrate the other point of the possession of self-initiated activity by Pradhāna for undergoing such a transformation of its nature.

The fourth Sūtra *Vyatirekānavasthiteś cānapekṣatvāt* has been rendered by S. as follows: "There being no other principle beyond (Pradhāna as the cause of activity), it cannot need (any other accessory to become active. This will lead to the contingency that it would always be transforming itself in equal or unequal measure)."[7] This involves a good deal of importation (*adhyāhāra*) of the large number of words shown in brackets. R's interpretation also resorts to such excessive importation:—(If the transformation of Pradhāna takes place without being guided by the Supreme Being's will) there will be (the adverse consequence of the state of Pralaya) which is different (from creation) not existing.[8] As Prakṛti does not depend (on any other, there will be creation for ever (*Vedāntadīpa*).

S's assumption that there is no other factor which regulates the transformation of Prakṛti is not correct; for the Sāmkhya recognizes that diversity of Karma and Vāsanās persist in the primordial state of Prakṛti which must naturally have their own impact on the evolution, when it takes place. The *Bhāmatī* tries to explain this away by suggesting that when confronted with *adharma-vāsanās* Pradhāna is restrained from bringing about a happy environment and similarly when *dharma-vāsanās* are confronted with *adharma,* corresponding condition is created. This does not do away with the fact that reverse influences shape the nature of Pariṇāma.

Instead of such devious approaches, it would be much more to the point to take 'Brahman' itself as the antecedent correlative (*pratiyogi*) of the apartness (*vyatireka*) spoken of in the Sūtra—especially after the clear acceptance of the agency of the Supreme Being under the preceding Sūtra *Payombuvaccet tatrāpi*, by all the commentators.[9] In the circumstances, the meaning of Sūtra ii, 2, 4, as given by M. seems to be quite to the point and it is not clear why Belvalkar wants to ignore it, without discussing it on its merits.

7. यथा पुनः साम्येनावतिष्ठमाना प्रधानम्। न तु तद्व्यतिरेकेण प्रधानस्य प्रवर्तकं निवर्तकं वास्ति (*S*)
इत्यागन्तोरपेक्षणीयस्याभावात् सदा साम्येन परिणमेतैव वैषम्येण वा; न त्वस्य कादाचित्कः परिणामभेद उपपद्येत
(*Bhāmatī*)

8. इतरथा सत्यसङ्कल्पाधिष्ठानानपेक्षपरिणामित्वे सर्गव्यतिरेकेण प्रतिसर्गावस्थानवस्थितिप्रसङ्गाच्च
(*Śrībhāṣya*)

9. योऽप्सु तिष्ठन् इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यस्तत्रापि ब्रह्माधिष्ठानम् (R. *Vedāntadīpa*) शास्त्रं च, योऽप्सु तिष्ठन्, एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्ग्यः प्राच्योऽन्या नद्यः स्यन्दन्ते इत्येवंजातीयकं, समस्तस्य लोकपरिस्पन्दितस्य ईश्वराधिष्ठितत्वं श्रावयति (S)

The explanation of *Payombuvat* as we have it from S. and R. leads to a conflict with the position taken by the Sūtrakāra according to these commentators in explaining the same illustration adverted to earlier in Sūtra ii, 1, 24. There, the transformation of milk has been cited as taking place of itself without external impulsion. S's explanation that this has been intended from the worldly point of view while *here* in Sūtra ii, 2, 3 the position has been defined from the Śāstric point of view, exposes the Sūtrakāra to the fallacy of having given an illustration under ii, 1, 24 which is in reality and from his own Siddhānta point of view, destitute of the major term.

Sūtra 5, as interpreted by S. and R. has no new point to establish. It merely cites a few more instances of grass eaten by the cow being converted into milk and others of its kind. But once the principle that behind all the apparently self-directed activities and changes noticed in insentient things, there is invariably the indisputable presence of the agency of a sentient being has been categorically established under ii, 2, 3, there is no need to discuss any more instances in all seriousness. Otherwise, there can be no end to such a discussion. Instead of making the Sūtrakāra flog the dead horse of Nirīśvara-Sāṁkhya, in this way, it would indeed be more purposeful to let him turn to some other important school of Sāṁkhya such as the Seśvara-Sāṁkhya, for criticism under ii, 2, 5.

We have already seen with reference to S's interpretation of ii, 2, 6, that to accept the self-directed activity of Pradhāna and reject it in the same breath on grounds of the purposelessness of such activity involves his interpretation in a self-contradiction of argument. If the intention here is to make out that by acting in this purposeless way the Sāṁkhya-Prakṛti would be laying bare its own indiscretion and want of prudence, that would not in any way offend its *amour propre;* for Pradhāna is by hypothesis *insentient.*[10]

The other analogies of the lame and the blind man or the magnet and the iron, cited in the interpretation of Sūtra 7 can all be comprehended under Sūtra 3 and do not call for any separate discussion as the principle by which they are to be explained by the Siddhāntin is the same.

The interpretation of the next Sūtra is *redundant* as it has already been established by S. under Sūtra 2, that the original disturbance of the three guṇas of Prakṛti from the condition of equipoise, which is

10. प्रवृत्तिमभ्युपगम्य प्रयोजनाभावेन पुनः प्रवृत्तिनिरासे विरोधात्। अप्रेक्षावत्वापादने च प्रधान इष्टापत्तेः (TC. p. 907)

essential for the creative manifestation of the world cannot be due to the unintelligent Pradhāna itself[11] and the same argument is put up by him again under this Sūtra also that Pradhāna cannot be active as the three guṇas abide by themselves in the original state without standing in the relation of principal and subordinate. Unless this balance is disturbed there can be no change and without external impulsion the guṇas will not change their state of equilibrium.[12]

Sūtra 9 has been interpreted by S as refuting the plea that the difficulty of bringing about the necessary disturbance in the equipoise of the guṇas and securing a relation of principal and subordinate among the guṇas can be overcome in a suitable way by taking advantage of the unsteady and unpredictable nature of the guṇas which may enter into a relation of mutual inequality even while they are in a state of equilibrium. The Siddhāntin rejects this plea (of *anyathānumāna*) by reiterating his main criticism that as Pradhāna is without intelligence (*Jñāśaktiviyogāt*), its qualities cannot afford to have any such power of self-initiated activity or change.[13]

But this impossibility of the qualities of Pradhāna assuming *aṅgāṅgibhāva* relationship because of their intrinsic insentiency having been well-established in at least three earlier Sūtras (Nos. 2, 4 and 8) the question cannot be reopened by raising a feeble explanation in terms of *anyathānumiti* in Sūtra 9 in order to revive the same old Pūrvapakṣa of Nirīśvara-Sāmkhya and refute it again. The impossibility of meeting the Vedāntic objection of *Aṅgitvānupapatti* against the Nirīśvara-Sāmkhya satisfactorily has been frankly admitted by the *Bhāmatī*.[14] That being so, there is no point in reviving the dead Pūrvapakṣa and attacking it again by repeating the criticism already urged twice before in Sūtras 1 and 2 that insentient principles have no power to do anything.[15] The interpretation of the term '*Jña*' as 'intelligence' (*Jñāna*) is unusual.

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11. Cf. आस्तां तावदियं रचना, तत्सिद्ध्यर्थं या प्रवृत्तिः साम्यावस्थानात् प्रच्युतिः सत्त्वरजस्तमसां अङ्गाङ्गिभावरूपापत्तिः विशिष्टकार्याभिमुखप्रवृत्तिता, सापि नाचेतनस्य प्रधानस्य स्वतन्त्रस्योपपद्यते (S. *BSB*. ii, 2, 2)
12. इतश्च न प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिरुपपद्यते यद्धि सत्त्वरजस्तमसामन्योन्यगुणप्रधानभावमुत्सृज्य साम्येन स्वरूपमात्रेणावस्थानं सा प्रधानावस्था। तस्यामवस्थायामनपेक्षरूपाणां स्वरूपप्रणाशभयात् परस्परं प्रत्यङ्गाङ्गिभावानुपपत्तेः (S. *BSB*. ii, 2, 8)
13. तस्मात् साम्यावस्थायामपि वैषम्योपगमयोग्या एव गुणा अवतिष्ठन्त इति। एवमपि प्रधानस्य ज्ञशक्तिवियोगाद्रचनानुपपत्त्यादयः पूर्वोक्ता दोषास्तदवस्था एव (S. *BSB*. ii, 2.9)
14. अङ्गित्वानुपपत्तिलक्षणो दोषस्तावत् न भवद्भिः शक्यः परिहर्तुमिति वक्ष्यामः। अभ्युपगम्याप्यस्य दोषत्वमुच्यत इत्यर्थः (*Op. cit.* ii, 2.9)
15. बहुसूत्रोक्तदोषाणामनुचित परिहार कल्पीकृत्य रचनानुपपत्तेरित्यनेनोक्तस्याचेतनत्वादरचयितृत्वस्य पुनरुक्तिरयोगात् (*TC*. p. 905b)

Sūtra 10 has been taken by S to dismiss the Sāmkhya on account of certain alleged discrepancies in the writings of the Sāmkhyas regarding the number of the sense-organs, the manner of evolution of certain principles and such other details. Such discrepancies are also to be found in the Vedāntic sources.[16] The Sāmkhya also could explain them in the same way as the Vedāntin would explain such discrepancies. They do not, therefore, call for a censure. It is evidently for this reason that R. does not make an issue of this, in his interpretation of this Sūtra, against the Sāmkhya but talks of other inconsistencies of Sāmkhya metaphysics.

Belvalkar lays undue emphasis on the point that these ten Sūtras should be taken as constituting a single adhikaraṇa as Sūtra 10 seems to be the final flourish of the attack which makes it clear that we cannot distribute the Sūtras 1-10 into more than one adhikaraṇa. But he fails to see that if the ten Sūtras as read by S. are to be treated as coming under a single adhikaraṇa, the objection raised by S. under the Sutra: *Puruṣāśmavad iti cet tathāpi* (ii, 2, 7) would hardly be admissible immediately after it has been established in ii, 2, 6 that the activity of Pradhāna is purposeless and therefore impossible.[17] It is evidently because R. was alive to the force of this objection that he has shifted Sūtra 7 from its present position and read it earlier as No. 5.

There is thus sufficient reason to regroup the Sūtras into different adhikaraṇas and give them a better deal.

16. क्वचित् सप्त प्राणाः सकीर्त्यन्ते, क्वचिदष्टौ *क्वचिन्नव **क्वचिदेकादश (S. *BSB*. ii, 4.5)

17. न ह्यभ्युपगमेऽपीत्यनेनार्थाभावे उक्ते, पुरुषाश्मवदित्यनेनान्धपङ्ग्वादिदृष्टान्तशका सगता (*TC*. p. 908)

CHAPTER VI

REFUTATION OF VAIŚEṢIKA DOCTRINES

6. *Vaiśeṣikādhikaraṇam* (ii, 2.11-17)

The *adhi.* removes opposition to Vedānta philosophy from the doctrines of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. The Pūrvapakṣin claims that as his school readily assigns to God a prominent position in the creation of the world, it is free from the defects which mar the other systems criticized earlier. Nevertheless, there are certain deficiencies in the conception of God and of causation, in this school. This school believes that God has only eight sovereign attributes which are necessary for a Creator: eternal knowledge, will and activity, number, dimension, severality, conjunction and disjunction.[1] This goes against the conception of B. as possessed of infinite perfections as established in the opening Adhyāya. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of God is too narrow and unphilosophical in some other respects also. It denies to God even the most essential attribute of bliss not to speak of other equally important ones which fall outside its list of tewnty-four qualities.[2] Its theory of atomic genesis is also vitiated by certain gratuitous assumptions and reservations which are open to question.

According to the Vaiśeṣikas, eternal substances like the four kinds of atoms, the Jīvas, time and space continue to exist in Mahāpralaya along with the non-eternal principles like merit and demerit, the poten-

1. Cf. यावदुक्तोऽष्टगुण इति नैयायिकाः (Udayana: *Kusumāñjali*. i.). उपर्युक्तैरष्टभिरेव गुणैरीश्वरो भवतीति (*NS.* p. 234)

2. ईश्वरोऽष्टगुण इति तदनुपपन्नम्। चतुर्विंशतिसंख्याता गुणानामभावात्। तत्रापि केषांचिदीश्वरेऽनुपपत्तेः। सेयम्। गौणसंख्यासंख्यानां गुणानां भावात्। परेषामीश्वरेऽपि केषांचित् अनुपपत्त्यभावाच्च (*NS.* 234)

cies of Karma pertaining to the souls. We have also to concede the existence of generality, particularity, inherence and negation. At the end of this period, there arises in the mind of the Supreme Being a desire to create the manifold world. As a result of this, the potencies of merit and demerit imbedded in the selves become activised. Impelled by the Will of the Lord and coming into contact with the selves which are the repositories of varying kinds of unseen merits and demerits of past lives, the atoms which have been existing apart from one another, till then, start getting homogeneously attracted to one another and form dyads. A similar combination of these dyads produces triads (*tryaṇuka*) and four of these produce quaternaries (*caturaṇuka*). Beyond this stage, the compounds are formed by an indefinite number of such atomic units according to the exigencies of combination.

The Vaiśeṣikas believe in 'Asatkāryavāda' that an effect being absolutely different from its cause has no sort of pre-existence in the cause, as the Satkāryavādins do. It is, therefore, conceived that qualities and activity come to be generated in the substances only the next moment after their production (and not simultaneously with the production of the effect). Three types of causes are distinguished in this system—the material or intimate (*samavāyi*), the non-intimate (*asamavāyi*) and the efficient (*nimitta*) which is external to the substances. Substances constitute the intimate causes of their products. Qualities like color, taste, etc. number, dimension and conjunction constitute non-intimate causes. The efficient causes comprise everything else that is necessary for the production of the effects. Their sphere is very wide —including the general ones like God, His Will, knowledge, and activity, time and space. The special ones vary according to the nature of the effects concerned.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that the four kinds of atoms which are the basic material causes possess certain distinctive primary qualities which are eternal. The earth-atoms possess the quality of number, severalty, magnitude and weight, the water-atoms have the qualities of color, taste, touch, number, fluidity etc. and so on in respect of the others.

The Vaiśeṣika conceives of the simple atom as spherical and partless. It possesses the one dimension known as pārimāṇḍalya or *aṇutva*. It is, therefore, incommensurable. The binary (*dvyaṇuka*) where two atoms form a line is a compound of two dimensions—one of them incommensurable and the other very short (*hrasva*). If two binaries are placed in such a way as to form the four corners of a square plane, there would be a compound of two parimāṇas *only* but both of them

the binaries are present in their abodes only because they cannot help being there (*avarjanīyasannidhi*) and not necessarily in a causal capacity. The same thing may be true of the parimāṇas of *mahattva* and *dīrghatva* present in the *tryaṇukas*—which need not, therefore, be accepted as Asamavāyikāraṇas.

The Vaiśesika holds there is good reason to make the exception. The dimensions of the simple atoms and of the binaries are imperceptible—as both kinds of atoms are *anudbhūtarūpasparśavat*—i.e. whose color and touch are not fully manifested. If such dimensions are accepted as the non-intimate cause of the production of the *parimāṇa* of the binaries and ternaries respectively, there will arise the adverse consequence of the effects of the ternaries and quaternaries and the antyāvayavis formed out of them all becoming imperceptible.

This objection of the Vaiśeṣika has *not* been taken into account and given a suitable reply in S's interpretation of the present Sūtra. The reason for this very probably is that S's chief interest here lies in accepting the exception made by the Vaiśeṣikas and turning it to the advantage of his own theory of causation where the Cetana—B. is regarded as the transforming cause of the material world. We shall see later that S's way of separating this Sūtra from others *following* it and constituting it into a separate *adhi.* in self-defence of Brahmakāraṇatvavāda by making a clever use of a dogma of the Vaiśeṣikas is out of place in the context of refutation of other systems, which is the theme of this Pāda.

M. on the other hand sticks to the theme of this Pāda in interpreting the present Sūtra as a part of the entire *adhi.* comprising Sūtras ii, 2, 11-17. The opening Sūtra is treated as a virtual repudiation of the concept of Asamavāyikāraṇa under guise of challenging one of the cherished dogmas of the school, in regard to the theory of atomic genesis. Sūtra no. 13 lays the axe at the root of the category of Samavāya and thereby the conception of Samavāyi-kāraṇa as such. Sūtra 12 falling between the two exposes the difficulties of pure Logical Realism in sustaining the role of God as *nimittakāraṇa.*

The contention of the Vaiśeṣika that if the parimāṇas of the atoms and binaries are taken to produce similar parimāṇas in their effects, there will arise the contingency of all the grosser effects becoming imperceptible is easily met. If this objection simply means that even the larger effects of the atoms and the binaries may have to be described as atomic or small or minute it is not a serious objection. For our standards of judging things as large or small, gross or minute are not

absolute but only relative.[10] The ordinary six-footer may be called a giant as compared with a Lilliputian.[11] If the Vaiśeṣika means by 'the production of similar *parimāṇas*' from the *aṇu*, or the binary or the ternary, *absolute similarity*, it is not there even between the bigness of the ternary and the bigness of the quaternary.[12] How then does he maintain the causal relation between these two parimāṇas?

The position of the Vaiśeṣika that the *parimāṇa* of the *dvyaṇuka* and the tryaṇuka are alone produced by the number of the atoms and the dvyaṇukas respectively is illogical. Since the parimāṇas of the aṇus and the dvyaṇukas, satisfy the definition of 'Asamavāyikāraṇa', we should expect both of them to produce their respective effects—viz. the parimāṇas concerned, uniformly. If in spite of their satisfying the definition of 'Asamavāyikāraṇa', we have to invest the number of atoms in their cases with the power of producing the parimāṇa in their effects, the production of *parimāṇa* in the quaternaries etc. may all be similarly attributed to the number of atoms everywhere, uniformly. There need not be a double standard or criterion—one for the stage upto the ternaries and another beyond. These inconsistencies are sufficient justification to reject the concept of Asamavāyikāraṇatva of guṇas in any manner[13] and opt for Pariṇāmavāda in which the material causes themselves endowed with their own specific qualities transform themselves into different effects possessed of those qualities.[14] Thus, the first Sūtra is tantamount to a refutation of the concept of Asamavāyikāraṇa in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.

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10. पारिमाण्डल्यादेरारम्भकत्वे सर्वकार्याणामणुत्वप्रसंग इति चेत्; तत्किमिदमणुत्वम्? तच्छब्दवाच्यत्वम्; तदत्यन्तसदृशपरिमाणत्वं वा? आद्ये, नास्ति हानिः। द्वितीये महत्वस्याप्यनारम्भकत्व स्यात्। नहि त्र्यणुकादिपरिमाणमत्यन्तसदृशम्। सकेतमात्र त्वप्रामाणिकमिति (*TP.* ii, 2.11)

11. स्यादय विरोधो यदि रूपे नीलत्वपीतत्ववत्, परिमाणेऽणुत्वमहत्त्वादिजातियोगः स्यात्; न चैवम्। प्रमाणाभावात्। किंतु, यथा त्र्यणुकादिषु महत्त्वमेकजातीयमेवोत्कर्षापकर्षवत् परेणागीकृतं; यथा चाणुत्वं परमाणुद्व्यणुकयोः, एवं परिमाणावान्तरजातिरहितमेव सर्वद्रव्येषूत्कर्षापकर्षवद्वर्तते। तथा च एकत्र द्रव्ये वर्तमान परिमाणं द्रव्यान्तरवत्युत्कृष्टपरिमाणापेक्षया अणुत्वमित्युच्यते, तदेव द्रव्यान्तरवर्तिनोऽपकृष्टपरिमाणापेक्षया महत्त्वमित्युच्यते। एवञ्च कुतो विरोधः? यथा खल्वेकमेव द्रव्य द्रव्यभेदापेक्षया सनिकृष्ट विप्रकृष्ट चोच्यमान न विरोधास्पदम्। अत एव प्रत्यक्षाप्रत्यक्षत्वविरोधोऽप्यपास्तः। तयो महत्त्वादिमात्रनिमित्तत्वे हि स स्यात्। न चैवम्। किंतु, पुरुषाणामिन्द्रियपाटवापाटवनिमित्तः अन्यथा, मन्दविलोचनेनापि त्र्यणुकमपलभ्येत (*NS.* p. 341)

12. नहि त्र्यणुकादिपरिमाणमत्यन्तसदृशम्। सकेतमात्रं त्वप्रामाणिकमिति (*TP.* ii, 2.11)

13. इदमिह वक्तव्यम्– द्व्यणुकादिपरिमाणेऽसमवायिकारणलक्षणमस्ति, न वेति। आद्ये, असमवायिकारणलक्षणसद्भावेऽपि त्र्यणुकपरिमाण द्व्यणुकादिपरिमाणजं न भवेच्चेत्, तदा त्र्यणुकादिगतान्महत्त्वतो, दीर्घत्वाच्च नो भवेदेव चतुरणुकादिपरिमाणमिति शेषः। यदि समवायिकारणप्रत्यासन्नत्वादिसद्भावेऽपि नासमवायिकारणत्व तदेदमतिव्यापकत्वादलक्षणं स्यात्। तथा च न तथाभूतस्यापि महत्त्वादेरसमवायिकारणत्वं स्यात् इति। द्वितीयेऽपि, किं समवायिकारणप्रत्यासत्तिर्नास्तीति, उत, सामर्थ्यावधारणम्? नाद्यः समवेतत्वस्य प्रमितत्वात्। न द्वितीयः, अनन्यथासिद्धनियतपूर्वभावित्वेन हि सामर्थ्यमवधारणीयम्। तच्चास्ति द्व्यणुकादिपरिमाणे। एवमपि न चेत् तत त्र्यणुकपरिमाणादिजन्म, तदोक्तप्रसग एव (*NS.* p. 340b)

14. यद्यपि, परिणामवादिनां नाय पन्थाः, किंतूपादानानि स्वगुणयुक्तानि तथाविधकार्यतामापद्यन्त इति, तथापि परमतमाश्रित्य परस्येद दूषणाभिधानमिति (*NS.* p. 340)

The *TPB* of Raghūttama points out that even tho' the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika enumeration of the three kinds of causes begins with the Samavāyikāraṇa, Bādarāyana has sufficient reason to begin his refutation with the Asamavāyikārana. There will be no need for a separate refutation of Asamavāyikāraṇa, if Samavāyikāraṇa is first refuted. For by definition the Asamavāyikāraṇa is the one present in the Samavāyikāraṇa by Samavāya relation, and would stand rejected by the rejection of Samavāyikāraṇa *itself. But, then, that would take away the* opportunity of exposing the illogicality of the distinction drawn by the Vaiśeṣikas within the Asamavāyikāraṇa itself where only one kind of *parimāṇa is allowed to function as asamavāyikāraṇa* and another is excluded from doing so.[15]

After this refutation of asamavāyikāraṇa, the Sūtrakāra turns to the concept of Nimittakāraṇa as applied to God, in the Vaiśeṣika system and refutes it. This is done by referring to the impossibility of creation by God. We are led up to this by the reference to the origination of the effects like dvyaṇukas and tryaṇukas brought up by the reference to their parimāṇas of *mahat dīrgha* etc. The concepts of samavāya and samavāyikāraṇa are refuted in the third sūtra. The refutation of the three kinds of causes thus puts the Vaiśeṣika theory of creation and causation out of court.

Sūtra 2 goes into the difficulties to which the Vaiśeṣika theory of the world's creation by God is exposed. The Vaiśeṣika admits the states of creation and dissolution. It is God's will that induces motion in the static atoms at the time of creation. If this will to set the atoms in motion is eternal, we have to concede that if Pralaya is to have any place and meaning in Vaiśeṣika metaphysics there is no movement of the atoms then, notwithstanding the eternal will of God to set the atoms in motion. Why then should there be motion in the atoms at other times? To avoid this difficulty, if it is held that God's will is not eternal, there must be something else which has given birth to it. We know of no such other source. It cannot have been produced by an earlier will and that by a still earlier one and so on. For, God is known to be endowed with an eternal will thro' the Śrutis and this is admitted by the Naiyāyika too. It will not do, therefore, to make His will non-eternal. Moreover, if what produces God's will does not need God's will to be born, other effects also may not need it to be born. Thus, irrespective of its being eternal or non-eternal, the Naiyāyika will

15. यद्यपि परकीयनिर्देशानुसारेण समवायाभ्युपगमादिति सूत्रस्य प्राथम्यं भवेत्, तथाप्यस्य प्राथम्ये समवायिकारणनिरासे, तदन्तर्गतासमवायिकारणमपि निरस्तमेवेति पुनस्तन्निराकरणस्यानावश्यकत्वे, परिमाणविशेषाणामसमवायिकारणत्वाव्यवस्थितत्वं न दूषितं स्यात् । अतस्तत्प्रदर्शनाय आरम्भिकप्रामाणिकत्वप्रदर्शनाय आदौ सूत्रेऽसमवायिकारणवैषम्यनिराकरणम् (Raghu. *TPB*. p. 231)

find it difficult to make God's will the efficient cause in creation.[16] The Vedāntic position is not open to such difficulties. For the Vedāntic B. is conceived as endowed with the inscrutable power of accomplishing the unaccomplishable (*acintyādbhutaśakti*), while the God of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has *but eight guṇas of which acintyādbhutaśakti is not one.* The Śrutis speak of the supreme power and wonderful natural attributes of Divinity.[17] The Vedānta recognizes natural distinguishing aspects (*Viśeṣas*) in Time pertaining to Creation and Dissolution. Such 'Viśeṣas' are *ex hypothesi* endowed with the intrinsic capacities of being manifest (*abhivyakta*) or remaining in a potential condition (*śakta*) according to exigencies as determined by God's will—thus eliminating the risks of overlapping. This covers the activisation of *adṛṣṭas* at the appropriate time to originate creation. It is these Viśeṣas in Time along with God's will that are the efficient cause of creation and Pralaya. To the Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, the differentiation in Time as time of creation or period of dissolution has to be brought about by the conditioning factor of those events' taking place. This would naturally bring about an irremediable mutual interdependence; for without creation first taking place, the time-element cannot be distinguished by it and unless the specific time-element is already there creation cannot be conceived as taking place *in it.*[18]

The next Sūtra: *Samavāyābhyupagamācca sāmyād anavasthiteḥ* refutes the conception of intimate cause (*samavāyikāraṇam*) by exposing the fallacies involved in the relation of Samavāya itself. The Vaiśeṣikas posit the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) between cause and its effect, between a substance and its attributes, whole and parts, Viśeṣa and Viśeṣins to account for these differing elements being grasped in a Viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva relation. The *dvyaṇaka* for example, as the product of the *paramāṇus*, inheres in its cause by the relation of Samavāya. Such a relation is deemed to be absolutely necessary to connect them as in the opinion of the Vaiśeṣika the cause and effect, substance and its quality, whole and part are absolutely different from each other. It may also be remembered that according to the Vaiśeṣikas, the effect is produced *de novo* and has no pre-existence in any form and also that

16. उभययापि न कर्म, अतस्तदभाव· (*BS.* ii, 2.12)
ईश्वरेच्छाया नित्यत्वानित्यत्वरूपप्रकारद्वयेऽपि परमाणुषु क्रिया न सम्भवति। अतः परमाणुषु क्रियाभावात् तदभावः। परिमाणसनिधापितद्वयणुकादिकार्याभाव इत्यर्थः (*TDP*)

17. वैदिकेश्वरस्य तु वेदेनैव सर्वशक्तित्वोक्ते : (*M. BSB.* ii, 2.12)
सत्यामपीश्वरेच्छाया कार्यनुत्पादादेः सर्वस्य ईश्वराचिन्त्याद्भुतशक्तित एवोपपत्तेः। सा च, 'परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी' इत्यादिश्रुतिसिद्धा (*TP.* ii, 2 12)

18. स्वत एव काले विशेषाङ्गीकृतेश्च (*M. BSB.* ii, 2.12) अस्माभिः काले स्वाभाविकसृष्टिकालादिविशेषाणामङ्गीकृतत्वेन तदुपपत्तेः। परेण पुनः सृष्ट्याद्युपाधित एव कालविशेषस्याङ्गीकृतत्वात्, सृष्टिमन्तरेण सृष्टिकालानुपपत्तिः सृष्टिकालमन्तरेण तदनुपपत्तिः इत्यन्योन्याश्रयापातादिति भावः (*TP.* ii, 2.12)

a substance when produced remains without qualities for the first moment of its production.

The Sūtrakāra lays his finger on the weak point in this theory of Samavāya. It is called in to explain the correlation between Guṇa and Guṇi etc., in terms of their Viṣṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva. Now, Samavāya relation also is admitted to be absolutely different from the cause and the effect, substance and quality etc. which it connects and is itself conceived in terms of *Viśesaṇaviśeṣyabhāva* to them: *Mṛdghaṭayos samavāyaḥ*. By the same logic then, *samavāya* also should have to be related to the relata (the substance and quality, etc.) from which it is absolutely different, by another *samavāya* and that again by a still another and so on *ad infinitum*.[19]

There is, however, no justification to go in for a series of Samavāyas like this when the first link of Samavāya is itself not satisfactorily established. The regress of samavāyas can be avoided by investing the substance, or the cause or the whole, as the case may be, with the capacity of linking itself with the effect, the quality or the part without standing in need of the luxury of a Samavāya. It cannot be said that Samavāya itself may be given the self-linking power as it is in the nature of a relation whose function it is to relate others. The argument is inconsistent. Conjunction is also a relation. But the Vaiśeṣika insists upon holding that it is related to the things it conjoins by Samavāya relation. He would not give it the right of self-linking. There is, however, no need to fear that if substances, themselves are invested with self-linking capacity towards their qualities etc. the latter could not be perceived as distinguished from them. Tho' not ontologically different from their substances, the qualities (parts, etc.) are capable of being apprehended and described as distinct from the substances by the power of Viśeṣas. It is thus best to abandon the concept of Samavāya which leads to an *anavasthā* and regard the substance, cause or whole to be able to link itself with its quality effect, or part, without indenting upon 'Samavāya'.

The next Sūtra makes out that it would be impossible for the Vaiśeṣika to avert the contingency of production for ever, without a break for Pralaya. For the material cause of production of the world viz. the atoms are eternal. God's will which is the efficient cause is also eternally present. Production is conceived in the system as the acquisition of Samavāya-relation with existence by things which are non-existent before (*asatas sattāsamavāyo janiḥ*). As Samavāya is by hy-

19. कार्यकारणादीनां समवायसंबन्धाङ्गीकारात्, तस्य च भिन्नत्वात्, समवायान्तरापेक्षायामनवस्थितिः
M. BSB. ii, 2.13)

pothesis one and is eternally present and as the other causes are also equally eternal, there is nothing to prevent production from going on for ever by *asat* securing *sattāsamavāya* thro' the atoms and other existents.[20] The Vaiśeṣika cannot plead that tho' the other causes are there in Pralaya too, the *asamavāyikāraṇa* (viz. conjunction) is not there and that explains non-production in Pralaya. But there is no reason why conjunction should not take place when the other causes are all ready.[21] It cannot be that activity in the atoms which is to be made possible by the awakening of unseen merit (*adṛṣṭa*) is not there and hence no production takes place in Pralaya. The function of adṛṣṭa is merely to bring about the fulness of causal complements. When this is already there, as in this case, *adṛṣṭa* cannot, by its absence, hold up the production of things.[22]

The Sūtrakāra argued till now conceding the eternality of atoms. The present Sūtra: *Rupādimattvācca viparyayo darśanāt* challenges the uncreatedness of atoms on the ground of their having physical characteristics[23] like color, taste, smell and touch. These characteristics are incompatible with eternality and are generally found in things non-eternal.

The next Sūtra goes to show that the Vaiśeṣika cannot argue that tho' possessing physical characteristics like color and smell the atoms are to be accepted as uncreated as they are partless. The presumption that they are partless can itself be disproved on the basis of their having physical characteristics.[24] However, if the Vaiśeṣika would accept that atoms are created, he will have to indicate the material cause from which they are produced. Since no material cause can be found for the production of atoms, the genesis of the dvyaṇukas and others would also be unaccounted for.[25] On the other hand, if atoms are taken to be eternal and uncreated, then, the other causes like God's will and Samavāya being always there, nothing that exists can be looked upon as impermanent. Such a position cannot be accepted by the Vaiśeṣika

20. नित्यत्वाच्च परमाणूनां समवायस्य च, तस्यैव अनित्वांगीकारात् नित्यमेव कार्यं स्यात्। अन्यथा न कदाचित् (M. BSB. ii, 2.14).
21. असमवायिकारणसयोगाद्यभावान्नेति चेन्न। तदनुत्पत्तावपि कारणाभावात् (TP. ii, 2.14)
22. तदसमवायिकारणकर्माद्यभावस्य चानुपपत्तेः अदृष्टस्य च बाह्यसामग्रीसत्त्वे स्वाभावापराधेन कार्यनिरोधकत्वादर्शनात्। न चैवं वैयर्थ्यम्। सामग्रीसपत्तावुपयोगात् (TP)
23. भौतिकत्वेन, रूपादेर्विशेषणात्नेशादो व्यभिचारः (TDP)
24. न चावयवित्वादिना विशेषः। रूपादिमत्त्वादेव तत्सिद्धेः (TP. ii, 2.16)
25. अस्त्वनित्यत्वं परमाणूनां, किं बाधकमित्युक्तमिति चेन्न। तथा सति परपक्षे तत्समवायिकारणाभावेन तदुत्पत्त्यभावाच्च न द्व्यणुकादिकार्योत्पत्तिरिति भावः (TP. 11.2.15)

himself. The last Sūtra concludes by pointing out that the dogmas of the Vaiśeṣikas are opposed to the Śrutis and Smṛtis[26]

Śamkara's Interpretation.

S. (and following him Bhāskara) treats this Sūtra as a defence (*pratisamādhāna*) by the Sūtrakāra of his own view that disparity in nature between cause and effect is no bar to the acceptance of a material-cause-and-effect relation between B. and the world. Such an interpretation of this Sūtra is inconsistent with the theme of the present Pāda, which is one of refutation of doctrines of hostile systems. According to S.'s own showing, the objection against a sentient like B. being accepted as the material cause of an insentient world resting on the ground of want of Sārūpya or Sālakṣaṇya (affinity of nature) between them has been *set at rest after having been examined threadbare in at least two earlier adhikaraṇas*—the *Adṛśyatvādhi.* (1.2. 21-23) and *Na Vilakṣaṇatvādhi.* (ii.1.4-11)[27]

Dr. Belvalkar makes a vain bid to dislodge the Sūtra: *'Mahaddīrghavad....'* as "a later addition".[28] He also suggests that "had this Sūtra been placed *after* ii, 1.6 nobody need have raised any objection" (*Op. cit.* p. 84). But he fails to see that while the illustrations cited (according to S.) under ii, 1.6 are accepted from the worldly point of view, the details of atomic genesis of the world including the exceptions thereunder claimed by the Vaiśeṣikas cannot lay claim to any such general acceptance and for this reason they cannot be used as competent illustrations to support one's position.[29] Moreover, having rejected the theory of atomic genesis, according to S. himself under i, 4.28, with repeated emphasis, the Sūtrakāra would be cutting a sorry figure by trying to save his skin by calling to aid the very same theory in ii, 2.11. The interpolation theory is the last resort of logical bankruptcy and it need not detain us.

Referring to R.'s criticism of S.'s way interpreting this Sūtra (ii, 2.11) Belvalkar has observed that "R forgets that there are certain weak points in his own interpretation" (p. 85). But then, R.'s failure to

26. प्रकृतेर्महान् महतोऽहङ्कारोऽहंकारात् क्रमेणाकाशादीनि, महाभूतानीत्येनाभ्युत्थादिश्रमिद्धा प्रक्रियामपहाय वाय्वादीनां चतुर्णामन्योन्यानपेक्षैव सृष्टिर्युगपद्भेणाभिहिता। विनैव बाधकाभावाद् वायुर्वायोरग्निरित्यादिश्रुति भाक्तो स्वीकृता। अत्यन्तासत एव च जनिरङ्गीकृता। सर्वापि सृष्टिः समवाय्यादिकारणत्रयाधीनाभ्युपगता। तत्र समवायिकारणं समवायाप्रामाणिकत्वादयुक्तम्। अत एवासमवायिकारणमपि, तदधीननिरूपणत्वाच्च तल्लक्षणस्य (*NS.* p. 351b)

27. तत्रादौ तावत् योऽणुवादिना ब्रह्मवादिनि दोष उत्प्रेक्ष्यते स प्रतिसमाधीयते (S. *BSB.* ii. 2.11)

28. *Brahmasutras of Badarayana* (ii, 2) with C. of S. ed. with E.T. Notes: Dr. S.K. Belvalkar, Poona, 1938 p. 84

29. Cf. लौकिकपरीक्षकाणां यस्मिन्नर्थे बुद्धिसाम्यं स दृष्टान्तः (*Ny. S.* I, 1.25)

interpret the Sūtra correctly does not render S.'s interpretation of it necessarily correct. There may very well be a third possibility. We fail to see why Belvalkar should not have turned to explore M.'s interprepration of the Sūtra which is entirely free from the weak points of R.'s interpretation, and is *not* open to the other charge of "such repetition in other places" (*Op. cit.* p. 85).

In any case, if removal of objections against the soundness of one's own view (*svapakṣadoṣaparihāra*) has to be accomplished on the basis of analogies, they should at least be logically sound ones. The analogy chosen breaks down in its application within the framework of the very system from which it is drawn. How can such an analogy give staying power to the Siddhānta? It does not follow that "S.'s interpretation being the earliest now extant is likely to have hit the real purpose of the Sūtra" (*Op. cit.* p. 86). Interpretations old or new have to be judged only on their merits and not on considerations of antiquity.[30] There is everything to commend M.'s interpretation of the Sūtra in question as a straight and simple refutation of one of the doctrines of the Vaiśeṣika system—the doctrine of Asamavāyikāraṇa and its application to the theory of atomic combination and genesis. This involves no problem of interpolation or of relevancy of the Sūtra in its present position.

There is no basis for Belvalkar's assumption that "Bhāskara who follows S. in the interpretation of the Sūtra thus, as it were, answers Rāmānuja" (*Op. cit.* p. 85). It is true enough that Bhāskara follows this interpretation of S:

वैशेपिकप्रक्रियामाश्रित्य कार्यकारणयोर्वैलक्षण्यमस्तीति प्रदर्शनार्थमिदं सूत्रम् ।

(Bhāskara *BSB*, ii, 2, 11). But Belvalkar is utterly mistaken in his assumption that Bhāskara, as it were, answers Rāmānuja". The fact is that Belvalkar has misquoted Bhāskara and has visited his own misunderstanding of the real meaning of his original on the innocent Bhāskara. He would not have fallen into this error if he had paid attention to the details of the other interpretation of the Sūtra which Bhāskara has taken the trouble to quote from an unidentified source, in his Bhāṣya: "Some others explain this Sūtra as follows—Just as a longer rope is produced by two shorter ones strung together or just as by rolling into one two small balls of clay a larger ball of clay is produced, even so the world may originate from B."[31] And this he (Bhāskara) proceeds to criticize in the following words—

तदयुक्तम । न विलक्षणत्वादिति तत्रैवोक्तत्वात् पुनरुक्तमिदं प्राप्नोति ।

30. Cf. पुराणमित्येव न साधु सर्वम् (*Kālidāsa*).
31. यथा ह्रस्वाभ्या ग्रथिताभ्या रज्जुभ्या दीर्घरज्जुरारभ्यते यथा परिमण्डलाभ्या मृत्पिण्डाभ्या एको महानारभ्यत इति केचिद्व्याचक्षते (*ibid*)

himself. The last Sūtra concludes by pointing out that the dogmas of the Vaiśeṣikas are opposed to the Śrutis and Smṛtis[26]

Śamkara's Interpretation.

S. (and following him Bhāskara) treats this Sūtra as a defence (*pratisamādhāna*) by the Sūtrakāra of his own view that disparity in nature between cause and effect is no bar to the acceptance of a material-cause-and-effect relation between B. and the world. Such an interpretation of this Sūtra is inconsistent with the theme of the present Pāda, which is one of refutation of doctrines of hostile systems. According to S.'s own showing, the objection against a sentient like B. being accepted as *the material cause of an insentient world resting on the ground of want* of Sārūpya or Sālakṣaṇya (affinity of nature) between them has been *set at rest after having been examined threadbare in at least two earlier adhikaraṇas*—the *Adṛśyatvādhi.* (1.2. 21-23) and *Na Vilakṣaṇatvādhi.* (ii.1.4-11)[27]

Dr. Belvalkar makes a vain bid to dislodge the Sūtra: '*Mahaddīrghavad....*' as "a later addition".[28] He also suggests that "had this Sūtra been placed *after* ii, 1.6 nobody need have raised any objection" (*Op. cit.* p. 84). But he fails to see that while the illustrations cited (according to S.) under ii, 1.6 are accepted from the worldly point of view, the details of atomic genesis of the world including the exceptions thereunder claimed by the Vaiśeṣikas cannot lay claim to any such general acceptance and for this reason they cannot be used as competent illustrations to support one's position.[29] Moreover, having rejected the theory of atomic genesis, according to S. himself under i, 4.28, with repeated emphasis, the Sūtrakāra would be cutting a sorry figure by trying to save his skin by calling to aid the very same theory in ii, 2.11. The interpolation theory is the last resort of logical bankruptcy and it need not detain us.

Referring to R.'s criticism of S.'s way interpreting this Sūtra (ii, 2.11) Belvalkar has observed that "R forgets that there are certain weak points in his own interpretation" (p. 85). But then, R.'s failure to

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26. प्रकृतेर्महान् महतोऽहंकारोऽहंकारात् क्रमेणाकाशादीनि, महाभूतानीत्येताश्रुत्यादिप्रसिद्धां प्रक्रियामपहाय वाय्वादीनां चतुर्णामन्योन्यानपेक्षैव सृष्टिर्व्युत्क्रमेणाभिहिता। विनैव बाधकमाकाशाद् वायुर्वायोरग्निरित्यादिपञ्चमी भाक्ती स्वीकृता। अत्यन्तासत एव च जनिरंगीकृता। सर्वापि सृष्टिः समवाय्यादिकारणत्रयाधीनाभ्युपगता। तत्र समवायिकारणं समवायाप्रामाणिकत्वादयुक्तम्। अत एवासमवायिकारणमपि, तदधीननिरूपणत्वाच्च तल्लक्षणस्य (*NS.* p. 351b)

27. तत्रादौ तावत् योऽणुवादिना ब्रह्मवादिनि दोष उत्प्रेक्ष्यते स प्रतिसमाधीयते (S. *BSB.* ii, 2.11)

28. *Brahmasutras of Badarayana* (ii, 2) with C. of S. ed. with E.T. *Notes:* Dr. S.K. Belvalkar, Poona, 1938 p. 84

29. Cf. लौकिकपरीक्षकाणां यस्मिन्नर्थे बुद्धिसाम्यं स दृष्टान्तः (*Ny. S.* i, 1.25)

interpret the Sūtra correctly does not render S.'s interpretation of it necessarily correct. There may very well be a third possibility. We fail to see why Belvalkar should not have turned to explore M.'s interprepration of the Sūtra which is entirely free from the weak points of R.'s interpretation, and is *not* open to the other charge of "such repetition in other places" (*Op. cit.* p. 85).

In any case, if removal of objections against the soundness of one's own view (*svapakṣadoṣaparihāra*) has to be accomplished on the basis of analogies, they should at least be logically sound ones. The analogy chosen breaks down in its application within the framework of the very system from which it is drawn. How can such an analogy give staying power to the Siddhānta? It does not follow that "S.'s interpretation being the earliest now extant is likely to have hit the real purpose of the Sūtra" (*Op. cit.* p. 86). Interpretations old or new have to be judged only on their merits and not on considerations of antiquity.[30] There is everything to commend M.'s interpretation of the Sūtra in question as a straight and simple refutation of one of the doctrines of the Vaiśeṣika system—the doctrine of Asamavāyikāraṇa and its application to the theory of atomic combination and genesis. This involves no problem of interpolation or of relevancy of the Sūtra in its present position.

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30. Cf. पुराणमित्येव न साधु सर्वम् (*Kālidāsa*).

31. यथा ह्रस्वाभ्यां प्रथिताभ्यां रज्जुभ्यां दीर्घरज्जुरारभ्यते यथा परिमण्डलाभ्यां मृत्पिण्डाभ्यां एको महानारभ्यत इति केचिदाचक्षते (ibid)

"This is not tenable. For this will be a repetition of what has been established already in Na vilakṣaṇatvād *** (ii, 1, 4-11)". Bhāskara then has a fling at the commentator or commentators who have advanced this interpretation that by assigning such a futile interpretation to this Sūtra, these worthies are pulling down the Sūtrakāra from his high pedestal as a consummate logician to the level of a pious Śrotriya (reciter of Vedas) who cannot rise above repetitions:

एवं वर्णयद्भिः सूत्रकारस्य श्रोत्रियत्वमापादितम् । तस्माद्यथोक्त एवाभिप्रायः ।

By some alchemy of his own, Belvalkar has transformed this passage of Bhāskara into:

न विलक्षणत्वादिति तत्रैवोक्तत्वात् पुनरुक्तमिदं प्राप्नोतीत्येवं वर्णयद्भिः सूत्रकारस्य श्रोत्रियत्वमपोदितम् (p. 85)

"Those who contend that this is rendered superfluous by what has been stated under *Na Vilakṣaṇatvāt* are depriving the Sūtrakāra of his right as a "Śrotriya". In doing so, Belvalkar has added an "इति " to "प्राप्नोति and changed the expression "आपादितम्" used by Bhāskara into "अपोदितम्" on his own responsibility. This is unforgivable. No wonder the whole point of Bhāskara's subtle humor has been lost upon Belvalkar!

Not content with misquoting Bhāskara and getting into a tragicomedy of errors, Belvalkar commits another fallacy in dealing with a passage from Amalānanda's *Kalpataru* in connection with the same point. He writes—"Among the Advaitic commentaries, the *Kalpataru* alone goes into the question raised by this Note and the solution offered is that introducing in this manner Svapakṣavyavasthāpana in the midst of Parapakṣanirākaraṇa merely shows that the latter is not to be regarded as an end in itself for a text designed to convey instruction and secure salvation" (Notes p. 86).

The passage from the *Kalpataru* is a clarification of the opening words in S's c. on the Sūtra—

प्रधानकारणवादो निराकृतः । परमाणुकारणवाद इदानी निराकर्तव्यः ।

The *Kalpataru* raises the issue here as to how far it lies within the objective of this Śāstra whose aim is the pursuit of true knowledge to indulge in a refutation of other systems like Sāmkhya or Vaiśeṣika. It answers it by saying that it is necessary to refute hostile systems in order to establish the true nature of B. as taught in the Śrutis:

तत्त्वज्ञानप्रधानस्यास्य शास्त्रस्य परमतनिरासपरत्वाभावात् "निराकृतो, निराकर्तव्य" इति च भाष्यनिर्देशायोगमाशंक्याह–यथैवेति । श्रौतब्रह्मसिध्द्यर्थं तन्निरास इत्यर्थः (*Kalpataru ii, 2. 11*)

Neither the question raised by the *Kalpataru* in the above passage nor the answer it gives to it has anything to do with "the question raised

by this Note" (of Belvalkar). Nor does this passage of the *Kalpataru* contain the solution offered by it to "the question raised by this Note". The passage merely answers the point that it is necessary to refute other systems in order to stablize the truth as established by the Śrutis.

The *Kalpataru* does offer its own solution of the question raised in the Note and as it were answer the criticism of R. But that solution is different from the one imagined by Belvalkar. He has needlessly confused himself by ignoring the punctuation mark at the end of the word **likhitaḥ* in the opening sentence of the *Kalpataru* (as given in the Nirnayasagar edn. of the text and reading the words *"Tattvajñāna ......"* concurrently with it and further separating the words *"Nirākṛto nirākartavyaḥ"*......"from what precedes it.

The real defence of S's position in interpreting the Sūtra *Mahaddīrghavad* as a vindication of Brahmavāda in the context of Parapakṣanirasana is thus presented by the *Kalpataru* (which is entirely different from the one fancied by Belvalkar): Amalānanda says that tho' the rightful place for removal of objections brought against Brahmavāda on grounds of disparity of nature (*vailakṣaṇya*) between B and the world is in the first Pāda itself, still *the Sūtrakāra is tempted by the possibility of finding an intermediate connection suggested by the refutation of the Sāmkhya*[32] in ii, 2, 1 where one of the arguments urged by the Siddhāntin was that in as much as the created objects in the world do not in their own nature and constitution share the characteristics of pleasure, pain and dulness which are the manifestations of the three guṇas of Prakṛti, they cannot be put down as products of Prakṛti.[33] In keeping with such a criticism of the Sāmkhya by the Siddhāntin, a similar objection may be raised by the Vaiśeṣika here against Brahmavāda itself that the material world cannot be the product of sentient B. as it does not show any of the specific characteristics of B. such as its sentiency.

The objection that the material world cannot be a product of B. because of the disparity of their natures has been fully discussed and set at rest according to S. in the *Na Vilakṣaṇatvādhi.* (ii.1.4-11) and earlier still, in no uncertain terms. The matter has been settled once for all. There is no point in reopening the issue, however tempting the pleasure of thrashing a dead horse may be.

32. यद्यप्यस्य स्वपक्षदोषपरिहारस्य स्मृतिपाद एव सगतिः, तथापि यदि प्रधानगुणानन्वयात् जगन्न तत्प्रकृतिकं तर्हि ब्रह्मविशेषगुणानन्वयान्न तदुपादानकमित्यवान्तरसंगतिलोभादिह लिखितः (*Kalpataru* ii, 2.11)

33. अन्वयाद्यनुपपत्तेश्चेति चशब्देन हेतोरसिद्धिं समुच्चिनोति। नहि बाह्याध्यात्मिकानां भेदानां सुखदुःखमोहात्मकतयान्वय उपपद्यते। सुखादीनामान्तरत्वप्रतीतेः, शब्दादीनां चातद्रूपप्रतीतेः (S. *BSB.* ii, 2.1)

A little reflection would show that as all the seven sūtras (ii, 2.11-17) are directed against the doctrinal details of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, they should be grouped under a single *adhi.*—unlike the critique of the different schools of Buddhism which call for two distinctive *adhi.* s in S.'s interpretation. Here, in Sūtra ii, 2.11 no such doctrinal difference within the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system is involved. S. should therefore have treated all the seven Sūtras here as one *adhi.*, even as he has done in respect of the ten Sūtras dealing with Nirīśvara-Sāmkhya.[34]

He has clearly stated in his Bhāṣya that the theme of the first Pāda is removal of logical defects in the Sūtrakāra's own Siddhānta and that *of the second Pāda is refutation of hostile schools.*[35] *But in introdu*cing the Sūtra ii, 2.11 and treating it as a separate *adhi.* he says, at the outset the logical defect which has been urged by the Atomist against the Brahmavādin is met.[36] This violates the theme of the Pāda as given by himself.

Apart from this contextual inconsistency, the logical objection to B.'s causality of the material world on the ground of disparity of their natures (*Vailakṣaṇya*) has already been set at rest in ii.1-11. There, according to S. himself, it has been established that a direct material-cause-and-effect relation is perfectly valid and maintainable between an out and out sentient Being like B. and an utterly insentient effect like the world,—notwithstanding this violent opposition in their natures. And this was backed by analogies such as the production of scorpions from cowdung and of hairs and nails from the living being—analogies which are 'universally accepted' by critics and laymen alike. It seems then to be nothing more than an exercise in superfluity to start one more *adhi.* in this Pāda to revive and dispose of the same objection, albeit in self-defence, resting it now on what is obviously a *less fundamental kind of difference* (in parimāṇa between cause and effect) which further has *no acceptance except in a dogma of the Vaiśeṣikas.*[37]

Coming to the actual details of the interpretation of this Sūtra as given by S., there seems to be no justification for including a reference to parimaṇḍala at all after "hrasva." *For parimaṇḍala-parimāṇa is not* admitted to produce any parimāṇa in its turn by the Vaiśeṣikas. As

34. उभयोरपि तादात्म्यनियामकत्वात् विज्ञानतुल्यत्वाद्योरिव देहात्मत्वमेवभेदस्याद्भवनात् सांख्याधिकरणानामिव एकाधिकरणत्वस्यैव न्याय्यत्वात् । (*TC.* p. 909b)
The reader should note that in M's interpretation four Sāmkhya-adhikaraṇas have been recognized on the basis of distinctive differences in their doctrine.
35. इदानीं स्वपक्षे स्मृतिन्यायविरोधपरिहारः प्रधानादिवादानां च न्यायाभासोपबृंहितत्वम् (S. *BSB.* ii, 2.11)
36. तत्रादौ तावदणुवादिना ब्रह्मवादिनि दोष उत्प्रेक्ष्यते, स प्रतिसमाधीयते (S. *BSB.* ii, 1.1)
37. न हि तत्र मातापितृवैलक्षण्यवत्कार्यकारणयोर्वैलक्षण्यमात्रं वृश्चिकगोमयादिदृष्टान्तेषु सर्वलौकिकपरीक्षकसम्मतेषु उक्तेष्वपि, विजातीयमात्रयोः तद्भावे परमाणुवर्णितं दृष्टान्तान्तरमात्र वक्तुं अधिकरणान्तरं युक्तम् ।
(*TC.* p. 909)

mahat and *dīrgha* are different in kind from *hrasvaparimāṇa* from which they are produced, the requisite illustration is complete in itself between them. If parimaṇḍala is to be brought into the picture, it should be provided in the Sūtra with a counterpart in the causal chain. As the Sūtra stands worded, there is nothing to which '*parimaṇḍala*' can be similarly connected by way of emphasizing a similar *vaisādṛśya* in respect of its supposed effect. To get over this difficulty the *Bhāmatī* has suggested that the expression *vā* in the Sūtra is to be understood as expressive of a comparison, referring to the production of non-parimaṇḍala (parimāṇa) from *parimaṇḍala* which is to be used to justify the similar possibility of acetana-world being produced from Cetana B.[38] This will give us two distinct illustrations of heterogeneous production: (i) of *mahat-dīrgha* from *hrasva* and (ii) aparimaṇḍala (or dvyaṇuka-dimension) from *parimaṇḍala*. But then, in keeping with this re-distribution of the terms, we should expect the Sūtra to be commensurately worded as:

Mahaddīrgha-aparimaṇḍalavat hrasvaparimaṇḍalābhyām.[39]

If somehow the same idea is to be read into the present wording, it would lead to an awkward break up in the syntactic connection of the two terms in the cpd. *hrasvaparimaṇḍalābhyām*. The first member of this cpd will have to go with *mahaddīrgha* (vat) to embody a proposition while the second member *aparimaḍṇala not given* as a constituent part of the cpd mahaddīrghavat and which has, therefore, to be put up from outside to give us the second proposition: Parimaṇḍalād aparimaṇḍalavat.[40] Even this cumbersome interpretation will not be able to give material support to the 'Vedāntic' view of Cetana B. being the material-cause-of the world—which is what S. seeks to gain; for there is no material-cause-and-effect relation accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas in respect of the different *parimāṇas* in question operating as *asamavāyi-kāraṇas*.[41]

In any case, there is real causation in the theory of atomic heterogenesis of the Vaiśeṣikas while there is *no true causation at all in S.'s Vivartavāda*. The trouble taken to force the Sūtra to serve as a defence of 'Vedānta' doctrine is thus in vain.[42] Lastly, in S.'s interpre-

38. वाशब्दश्चार्थेऽनुक्तसमुच्चयार्थं .— यथा द्व्यणुकमणु ह्रस्वपरिमाण परिमण्डलात्, परमाणोरपरिमण्डलं जायते, एव चेतनात् ब्रह्मणोऽचेतनं जगन्निष्पद्यत इति सूत्रयोजना (*Bhāmati*)
39. तर्हि, कार्यकारणयोर्वैजात्यस्फोरणाय ह्रस्वप्रतियोगित्वेन महद्दीर्घपदमिव परिमण्डलप्रतियोगित्वेनापरिमण्डलपदं प्रयुज्य 'महद्दीर्घापरिमण्डलवत् ह्रस्वपरिमण्डलाभ्याम्' इति सूत्रणीयम् (*TC*. p. 909)
40. यथान्यासपक्षे हि समासैकदेशस्य "ह्रस्व"स्य 'महद्दीर्घा" न्वय: "परिमण्डल"स्य तु वाशब्दसमुच्चितापरिमण्डलान्वय इति क्लिष्टम् (*TC*. p. 909)
41. यद्यपि परमाणुद्व्यणुकादिपरिमाणानि तार्किकमते विजातीयानि, तथापि न तेषामुपादानोपादेयत्वम् । (*TC*. p. 909)
42. किंचाय दृष्टान्तो विवर्तप्रतिकूल: (*TC*. p. 909)

tation the entire proposition which the Siddhāntin is driving at—(the dārṣṭāntika), viz.: "(similarly) there is the production of the insentient world from the sentient B." has to be supplied by *adhyāhāra* to complete the sense of the Sūtra. An interpretation which can do without such a wholesale adhyāhāra, is certainly preferable, apart from the other reasons already given.[43]

Saṁkara's Paramāṇujagadakāraṇatvādhi. (ii. 2.12-17)

According to S. the next Sūtra: *Ubhayathāpi na karma atas tadabhāvaḥ* (ii, 2.12) controverts the possibility of the conjunction and disjunction of atoms so as to originate creation or dissolution of the world.[44] The Vaiśeṣika is asked to say if (i) the action required to bring about the *conjunction of atoms resides in them or not; (ii) whether unseen* merit (*adṛṣṭa*) which impels the atoms to combine inheres in the atoms themselves or in the Ātmans.[45] After pointing out the difficulties which *prevent the Vaiśeṣikas from accepting any of the alternatives, it is argu*ed that in view of these difficulties (iii) there cannot be any action of the atoms either for purposes of bringing about their conjunction in order to create the world or for purposes of disjoining them to bring into existence the state of Pralaya.[46]

Some at least of the alternatives raised in the above criticism of the Vaiśeṣika views seem to be not in order. The question of not accepting action as residing in the atoms ought *not* to have been raised as it is accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas that action resides in the atoms. The question whether *adṛṣṭa* inheres in the atoms is equally unwarranted as it *is admitted by the Vaiśeṣikas that it inheres in the Atman.*[47] *S.'s point* that *adṛṣṭa* cannot operate unless guided by a sentient being by which he means the Ātman of the Vaiśeṣikas, is not also to the point; for it is admitted by them that *adṛṣṭa* is guided by Parameśvara[48] and not by the Jīvas. The alternative interpretation of the Sūtra that without an original cause of movement or disjunction there cannot be any conjunc-

43. अपि च तव 'चेतनात् ब्रह्मणोऽचेतनं जगत्' इति दार्ष्टान्तिकोऽप्याहार्यः, मम तु, न (*TC.* p. 909)
44. परमाणूनामाद्यस्य कर्मणः कारणाभ्युपगमेऽनभ्युपगमे वा न कर्मातस्तदभावः तस्य द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेण सर्वस्याभावः (*Bhāmatī*)
45. अथवा, यदणुसमवाय्यदृष्टमथवा क्षेत्रज्ञसमवायि (*Bhāmatī* ii, 2.12)
46. यथा चादिसर्गे निमित्ताभावात् संयोगोत्पत्त्यर्थं कर्म नाणूनां संभवत्येवं महाप्रलयेऽपि विभागोत्पत्त्यर्थं कर्म नैवाणूनां संभवेत् ••निमित्ताभावाच्च स्यादणूनां संयोगोत्पत्त्यर्थं विभागोत्पत्त्यर्थं वा कर्म (S. *BSB.* ii, 2.12)
47. आद्येऽनभ्युपगमपक्षस्य, द्वितीये परमाणुगतत्वपक्षस्य चात्यन्तासंभवित्वात् (*TC.* p. 910)
48. ब्राह्मेण मानेन वर्षशतान्ते ••संसारखिन्नानां निशि विश्रमार्थं सकलभुवनपतेर्महेश्वरस्य संजिहीर्षासमकालं सर्वात्मगतादृष्टानां वृत्तिनिरोधे सति ••पुनः प्राणिनां भोगभूतये महेश्वरसिसृक्षानन्तरं सर्वात्मगतवृत्तिलब्धादृष्टापेक्षेभ्यः तत्संयोगेभ्यः पवनपरमाणुषु कर्मोत्पत्तौ ••• (*Praśastapāda Bhāṣya.* p. 48)
अदृष्टमीश्वराधिष्ठितमिति हि तन्मतम् (*TC.* p. 910)
आपाद्योपपत्तेरपि तन्मताननुसारित्वेन अन्यतरासिद्धेरवर्जनीयत्वात् (Ragh. *TCP.* p. 911b)

tion of atoms for purposes of creation or their disjunction for purposes of dissolution (*pralaya*) cannot be given to the Sūtra as it stands worded. Such an interpretation would require the Sūtra to be differently worded, in some such form as: *Ubhayārthakarmābhāvaḥ*.

The Sūtra *Nityam eva ca bhāvāt* (ii.2.14) has been explained by S. as follows: The atoms may be conceived as essentially active or non-active or both or neither. If essentially active, there will be perpetual creation and no dissolution. If non-active, there will be perpetual quietus and no creation. Their being both is impossible and self-contradictory. If they are neither, their activity and non-activity will have to depend on an operative cause. Such causes as unseen merit being in permanent proximity to the atoms, permanent activity would ensue. If they are not operative causes, the result would be permanent non-activity. For these reasons, the Atomist position is untenable.

The interpretation is wide of the mark. There is no clear evidence of reference to alternatives in the wording of this Sūtra as there is in *Ubhayathā ca*...ii, 2.12 or 23. A similar refutation of the causality of B. or of Avidyā spread over the four alternatives is equally possible. The interpretation is also obliged to import (*adhyāhāra*) the words *pravṛtteḥ* and *nivṛtteḥ* after "*nityameva*" and read into the simple term "*bhāvāt*" in the Sutra, the idea of "undesirable consequence": bhāva-(*prasangaḥ*).[49] These defects are avoided in M.'s interpretation where the words *nityam eva bhāvāt* stand connected with the concept of the nityatva of Samavāya and the possibility of effects continuing to be produced for ever on that account.[50]

Under the Sūtra: *Ubhayathā ca doṣāt* (ii.2.16) S. criticizes the Vaiśeṣika doctrine as follows: Among the four elements of earth, water, fire and air, there is a decreasing number of qualities of smell, taste, color and touch. There is consequently an increasing degree of fineness in them in the descending order. If this is true of their specific atoms also, some atoms will possess more numerous qualities than others. This will increase or decrease the dimension as the case may be and they will thus cease to be 'atoms.'

The criticism assumes that increase or decrease in the number of qualities possessed is necessarily concomitant with a corresponding increase or decrease in dimension. This is not always so. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika God and Ātman are both '*Vibhu*' in dimension but the Ātman

49. Cf. नित्यमेव प्रवृत्तेर्भावात् प्रलयाभावप्रसंगः नित्यमेव निवृत्तेर्भावात् सर्गाभावप्रसंगः (S. *BSB*. ii, 2.14)
50. 'समवायस्य' इत्यस्ति। सत्तासमवायो जनिरिति परैरंगीकृतत्वात्, समवायस्य च नित्यमेव भावात्, सर्वं नित्यं जनिमत् स्यात् (*TPD*. ii, 2.14)

CHAPTER VII

VAIBHĀṢIKA AND SAUTRĀNTIKA SCHOOLS OF BUDDHISM REFUTED.

7. *Samudāyādhikaraṇam* (ii, 2.18-25).

The adhi. is directed against the Sarvāstivāda school of Buddhism represented by the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas. They are 'realistic' schools of Buddhism with this difference that while the former accepts the independent existence of mind and matter, the latter holds that the existence of external objects is inferred thro' their mental presentation. Both are agreed in holding the world of mind and matter to be essentially momentary (*kṣaṇika*). Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda (the theory of momentariness, Santānavāda (doctrine of ceaseless flow) and Saṅghāta- (or Samudāya) vāda or doctrine of aggregates are the different names by which this school is known.

According to this school, the world of experience is constituted by five *Skandhas*: Rūpa, Vijñāna, Vedanā, Samjñā and Samskāra.[1] Rūpa-skandha is the world of objects, sense organs etc. formed by the atoms of the four elements of earth, water, fire and air. The internal world is constituted by *nirvikalpajñāna* (bare sensation) *Vedanā* (feelings of pleasure and pain) *Savikalpakajñāna* (conceptual knowledge) and *Saṁskāra* (impressions)[3] The so-called Self is nothing but a series of

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1. रूपविज्ञानवेदनासंज्ञासंस्काररूपेणावस्थितं यत्तु जगत् परमाणुसमुदायमात्रम्। (*TP.* ii, 2.18)
2. रूपपदेन पृथिव्यप्तेजोवाय्वाख्यभूतानि तत्तद्व्यवहारावलम्बनपरमाणवश्च गृह्यन्ते (*TPG.*)
3. निर्विकल्पकं ज्ञानं विज्ञानम्। वेदना दुःखम्। सुखं तु दुःखाभाव एव। अतिरेकाभावे तदेव दुःखवत्त्वात् वेदनाशब्देनोच्यते। सविकल्पकं ज्ञानं संज्ञा। संस्कारः समनन्तरप्रत्ययाख्या स्मृतिः। इदं च चतुष्टयमान्तरम्। (*TPG.*)

fleeting ideas and does not fall outside the momentary.[4] The system reduces all external reality to a mere aggregation of momentary atoms in constant flux. There is no such thing as a stable entity or a permanent whole, anywhere, as distinct from the fleeting series of atoms.[5] M. accordingly describes this school as Paramāṇupuñjavāda.

There is thus in this school no such thing as the production of a whole (*avayavi*) thro' internal development of constituent elements (*pariṇāma*) or thro' 'atomic combination' in the Vaiśeṣika' sense. The aggregation of atoms by itself gives rise, thro' false imagination, to the notion of a 'whole' (*avayavī*) its unity and stability. There is no need to suppose that momentariness would negate 'reality'; for to be real is to be necessarily momentary in order to be causally efficient. For the real is what is causally efficient—the unreal is what is causally inefficient. This efficiency is the efficient thing itself (*svalakṣaṇa*).[6]

The continuous flux gives rise to the appearance of aggregates[7] which go on thro' the sheer force of Kāla and Karma without needing an intelligent moulder. The objection that if the atoms are momentary the production of others in the succeeding series cannot take place is not a serious one; for this school accepts production without a material cause (*nirupādānasṛṣṭi*)[3] even as Śūnyavāda accepts the possibility of illusions without a real substratum (*niradhiṣṭhānabhrama*).

The opening Sūtra: *Samudāya ubhayahetukepi tadaprāptiḥ* exposes the weak points in this theory—viz. the illogicality of the very conception of an aggregation of atoms if such aggregation does not give us a new whole. It would be impossible to think of an aggregate being formed out of a single atom. It must necessarily be an aggregation of two or more atoms getting close together. But then, we cannot conceive of them as aggregate unless they have come together and they

4. आत्मा ज्ञानसन्ततिरेव, न ततोऽतिरिक्त इति भावः (*TPG.*)

5. अणुसमुदाया एव गोघटादिबोधबोध्या, न तु तदरिक्तोऽवयवी नामास्ति (*NS.* ii, 2.18)

6. क्षणिकत्वे सत्त्व न स्यादित्यत आह—एतदेवेति। अर्थक्रियाकारित्वं हि सत्त्वम्; तच्च क्षणे क्षणे स्वसदृशसस्थानान्तरकरणेन कुर्वद्रूपत्वे सत्येव स्यात्। अतः क्षणिकत्वमेव सत्त्वमित्यर्थः (*TPG.* p. 80)

7. परमाणुसमुदाय एव गोघटादिप्रपञ्च, न त्ववयवी कश्चिदस्ति (*NS.* p. 390).
अणुसमुदाया एव गोघटादिबोधबोध्या. ननु, तदतिरिक्तोऽवयवी नामास्ति, येन क्षणिकता विरुध्येत. (*NS.* p. 389b)

8. एतेन परमाणूनां क्षणिकत्वे उत्तरक्षणे परमाणूत्पत्तौ उपादानाभावात् पुनः परमाणूत्पत्तिरनुपपन्नेति परास्तम्। निरुपादानसृष्टेरभ्युपगतत्वेन, उपादानाभावस्यादोषत्वात् (*AC.*)

cannot be said to have come together without forming an aggregate. There is interdependence here.[9]

On the other hand, if the aggregation is conceived as subsisting in several atoms even as they lie isolated in space, such aggregation being conceivable at all times, it should be open to us to speak of created things existing for ever with no prospect of their dissolution (*pralaya*) —which is recognized by the Buddhist. This difficulty can only be overcome by admitting that the objects which we come to know thro' our concepts of reality are not merely the random aggregation of atoms but real organized wholes over and above the fleeting atoms of which they are supposed to be constituted. This will deal a deathblow to the doctrine of Kṣaṇabhaṅga.

The second Sūtra: *Itaretarapratyayatvād iti cenna utpattimātranimittatvāt points out that it is not possible for the* Kṣaṇabhaṅgavādin to escape the fallacy of interdependence or the contingency of there being a never-ending series of aggregates[10] in the event of the aggregates being formed every moment, either from coordinated atoms or from uncoordinated (i.e. isolated) ones.

Opting for the second alternative of momentary aggregates being formed out of disconnected atoms sprawled in space, the Kṣaṇabhaṅgavādin may put in that tho' the atoms may be there lying isolated from one another, they come to be grasped as aggregates of different kinds, only when there arises an interrelated perception of them as constituting a group.[11] *Such a coordinated perception depends on what is*

9. मिलितानेकतः समुदायसिद्धिः, समुदाये सति मिलितानेकत्वसिद्धिरित्युभयोर्मिलितानेकत्वसमुदाययोः कार्यकारणयोः परस्पराश्रयभावापातात् (*BD*)
The expression *ubhayahetuka* admits of being explained as (i) *anekahetuka* as distinguished from *ekahetuka* or in terms of (ii) *samuditānekahetuka* or (iii) *Viralānekahetuka*. The *TD* explains *ubhayahetuka* as *dvyādihetuka*—an aggregate presupposes two or more constituents. The idea of *ekahetuka* is implied by the force of *api* after *ubhayahetuka* and the objection based on it has been introduced only formally by way of Vikalpa. The *AC*, however, suggests a reason for its being raised परस्यानुपपन्नभाषित्वेन, युक्तमेवाय ब्रवीतीति नियमाभावात् प्रश्नः (p. 328)
The *TDP* says the *ubhaya* has been advisedly used in the Sūtra to emphasize the point that no aggregate can be conceived of without the juxtaposition of at least two avayavas one of atom *a* and the other of atom *b* to form the smallest aggregation—the process repeating till we reach larger aggregations: उभयेर्युक्ति. उभावयवौ यस्य मेलनस्य तदुभयं इति समुदितानेकत्वरूपमिलितत्वलाभाय (*TDP*. ii, 2.18)
It also cites another interpretation of the Sūtra explaining the term *ubhayahetuka in terms of two alternatives, leaving out the question of ekahetukatva, as* posed in the Bhāṣya, altogether:
केचित्, मिलिता विरलाश्चेत्युभये अणवः । तदुभयहेतुकत्वेऽपि समुदाये तदप्राप्तिः । तदपि सन्निहित समुदायो बुद्धिस्थमपरत्वोऽप्यत्वं । पक्षद्वयस्यापि सूत्र एव निरास इत्याहुः (*TDP*)
10. सर्वदा समुदायत्वम् (M. BSB. ii, 2.19)
11. सर्वदा विद्यमानेऽपि समुदायः परस्परापेक्षया व्यवह्रियत इति चेन्न (M. *BSB*. ii, 2.19)

known as *Itaretarapratyaya*[12] or *Apekṣābuddhi*. There is no compulsion that such *apekṣābuddhi* should be arising constantly. It arises only when the percipient *takes it into his head to visualize the scattered* atoms and comprehends them in a group. The aggregates last as long as the *apekṣābuddhi* lasts and vanish when it ceases. Thus creation and dissolution are accounted for in Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda, without hitch. In the state of Pralaya, herė is no nearness of atoms which is also a necessary condition for the operation of *apekṣābuddhi*.[13]

The latter half of the Sūtra shows how the difficulties raised cannot be so easily got over by appealing to *Itaretarapratyaya*. The very idea of the percipient having an *itaretarapratyaya* (mutually coordinated knowledge) of the atoms by bringing them together in a group or aggregate is impossible in Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda.[14] For, as soon as the atoms are grouped into an aggregate they will go out of existence according to Kṣaṇabhaṅga.[15] The percipient too is equally momentary *(kṣaṇika)*. How then will it be possible for such a percipient to see the different atoms, form them into an aggregate by putting them into a group as a '*cow*' or a '*pot*' by exercising *apekṣābuddhi* and make use of such knowledge to carry on purposeful activities based on such data? Moreover, the exercise of the *apekṣābuddhi* by a percipient requires the prior perception of the atoms in their separatness, the rise of the *apekṣābuddhi* embracing them as this is 'one,' this is 'one' and so on, and the conversion of such knowledge into a judgment referring to the aggregate as 'a cow' or 'a pot'. All these should be referred to the *same atoms* and should have the *same percipient* as locus of such a knowledge. These are impossibilities in Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda—where the atoms which constituted the aggregate are no longer there when the *apekṣābuddhi* steps in and tries to embrace them in a Samudāya. The percipient who might have witnessed the atoms, separately, is not and cannot be the same one as will be exercising the *apekṣābuddhi* about them, in Kṣsaṇabhaṅgavāda. There can thus be no coordination between the

12. This term has been explained as follows:—
इतरसहितमितरत् इतरेतरत् तस्य प्रत्ययः तद्विषयापेक्षाबुद्धिः इतरेतरप्रत्ययः (*BD*)

13. सदातनत्वेऽपि समुदायस्य वित्तिव्यवहारयोरभावेन प्रलयोपपत्तेः। न च विद्यमानत्वे व्यवहारभावोऽपि कुत इतिवाच्यम्। व्यवहारादेरिद चेदचेति परमाणुपरस्परापेक्षानिबन्धनत्वात्। परस्परापेक्षा च परमाणुना सामीप्यापेक्षा। न चास्ति प्रलये सामीप्यमतो नोक्तदोष इति भावः (*TP*. ii, 2.19)

14. It will be seen that Apekṣābuddhi holds the key to the recognition of the *Samudāya* as such in Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda. The *TDP* rightly points out that the expression *Itaretarapratyaya* has been used in the Sūtra to bring out clearly the precise nature of this Apekṣābuddhi. This is done in order to show how it rests *on coordination of two or more* atoms placed in close proximity to one another:
इतरेतरेत्युक्तिः अपेक्षाबुद्धिस्वरूपोपदर्शनाय। तदपि अन्योन्यसाहित्यरूपसामीप्यहेतुका सेति सूचयितुम्।

15. एकं कार्यमुत्पाद्य तस्य विनिष्टत्वात् परस्परप्रत्यय', तदपेक्षया व्यवहार इति न युज्यते
(M. *BSB*. ii, 2.19)

old and the new percipients.[16] Thus, *apekṣābuddhi* can neither arise nor be transmitted to the new self. The attempted explanation is thus doomed to failure.[17]

If, to avoid these pitfalls, the Buddhist should concede for argument's sake, that the atoms which come to be embraced into an aggregate are not destroyed but continue to exist, then there will be the other awkward *contingency of an endless series of fresh aggregates arising.* For, the Buddhist holds that when the cause is there, the effect must needs be there. As the causes viz. the atoms are present they will go on producing fresh aggregates *ad libitum* with the result that one may expect the whole potter's shed to be filled in a trice with myriads of pots without any effort on his part.[18]

Granting for argument's sake that aggregated atoms can be produced from unaggregated ones, the previous Sūtra had drawn *attention to* the main difficulties which stand in the way of such Samudāyas being recognized as such and intelligent responsive activity (*vyavahāra*) being based on such recognition.

Sūtra 3 turns to demolish the very possibility of such a production of unlike effects (*visadṛśakāryotpatti*). The dogma of the Kṣaṇikavāda is: *Uttarotpade ca pūrvanirodhaḥ.* This is committed to the position *that the cause is capable of producing only* a like effect: *Kāraṇasya sadṛśakāryajanana eva sāmarthyāt.* Having produced such an effect, the cause ceases to be. This leaves no room for the production of an unlike effect (*visadṛśakāryotpatti*). For the production of an aggregation of atoms (*samudāya*) from unaggreagted ones would be a case of production of an unlike effect: *Visardṛśakāryotpatti* or *viśeṣakāryotpatti,* which is barred by the Buddhist dogma.[19]

16. विरलाहि परमाणवो मिलितपरमाणूनुत्पादयन्ति । ते च पुरुषेण दृश्यन्ते । ते च एकैकं कार्यमुत्पाद्य नश्यन्त्येव, तेऽप्येवम् । तथाच, कथं द्रष्टुः परस्परापेक्षा ततो व्यवहारादि कथं घटेत ? न ह्यन्यत्र दर्शनमन्यत्र परस्परापेक्षा अन्यत्र व्यवहारादीति युज्यते (*TP.* ii, 2.19)
क्षणिकवादे एकैककार्योत्पादेनैवामूनां नाशात्, आदौ दर्शनं, ततोऽपेक्षाबुद्धिः ततः समुदायविषयवित्तिव्यवहारा- वेक्ष्य सर्वं न युक्तमिति, कदापि समुदाये वित्तिव्यवहारौ न स्यातामिति भावः (*TP.* ii, 2.19)
17. विषयवदात्मनोऽपि क्षणिकत्वमुपेत्य परमाणुदर्शनमपेक्षाबुद्धिः समुदायवित्तिव्यवहारौ इत्येतेषां एकविषयत्व- मिव एकाधिकरणत्वमपि न युक्तमित्यर्थः (Ragh. *TPB.*)
18. अथ विरलपरमाणुभ्यो जाता मिलितपरमाणवः स्थायिनः. अतो युक्तो व्यवहार इत्यत आह– (*TP*)
कारणे सति कार्यं भवत्येव इति हि तस्य नियमः (M. *BSB.* ii, 2.19)
तथाच, अल्पतरकालेऽप्येकस्मात् घटात् कुलालशालापूर्तिप्रसंग इति भावः (*TP*)
19. एवं समुत्थं कार्यमुत्पाद्य तस्य विनष्टत्वान्न विसदृशकार्योत्पत्तिः । अतश्चासंयुक्तयोः परमाण्वोर्न संयुक्तावुत्पत्य- भावात् । न चानिन्द्रियसंयोगिनः कारणादिन्द्रियसंयोगी कार्यमुत्पद्येत । न चाज्ञानात् विज्ञानम् । न चा- व्यवहारपदात् व्यवहारपदम् । न चेन्द्रियास्यासंयोगिनः संयोगि । न चाज्ञातुरात्मनो ज्ञाता स्यात् । ज्ञानमेव न नास्तीति चेत्; तर्हि अज्ञानाज्ञानात्मजान कुत एतत्? (Trivikrama, *TD.* ii, 2.19)

The terms *pūrva* and *uttara* in the Sūtra: *Uttarotpāde ca pūrvanirodhāt* refer to the cause and the effect. The 'effect' is further understood in the sense of a 'like effect' (*sadṛśakārya*) consistent with the law of the cause being capable of producing only a like effect. The locative in *uttarotpāde* is understood in the first instance as a *Viṣayasaptamī* meaning that the cause being capable of producing only a like effect, the production of an unlike effect (i.e. the *Samudāya*) from loose atoms cannot be sustained.[20] To establish this point the text of M.'s bhāṣya: *Kāryotpattāveva kāraṇasya vināśacca na viśeṣakāryotpattiḥ* (ii.2.20) is suitably split into halves (i) (*Sadṛśa*)—*Kāryotpattāveva kāraṇasya* (*sāmarthyat*) *na viśeṣkāryotpattiḥ* and (ii) *Kāraṇasya (sadṛśamekam kāryam utpādya) vināśacca na viśeṣakāryotpattiḥ*. The latter half is intended to counter another defence of the Kṣaṇikavādin.

He may plead for instance that notwithstanding the general rule *that a cause produces only a like effect, it may, after doing so, again produce an unlike effect.* The Sūtra and the latter part of the Bhāṣya point out how this is impossible, as the cause in producing its (like) effect, in the first *instant*, ceases to be effective thereafter: *Pūrvanirodhāt.* In this interpretation, the locative form *uttarotpāde* (in the Sūtra) is to be understood in the sense of a locative absolute, as pointed out by the *BD*.[21]

In his AV. M. has shown how it is not easy for the Kṣaṇikavādin to explain the production of an unlike effect, such as a *samudāya*, from unaggregated atoms. The Buddhist argues, however, that the point is that a cause is merely competent to produce an effect. Whether the effect would be a like one or an unlike one would depend on unseen merit (*adṛṣṭa*) and other auxiliaries.[22]

M. says that this affords no real solution. The question can still be repeated with reference to the *adṛṣṭas* and the auxiliaries themselves[23] as to how they acquire this capacity of (i) producing an unlike effect; (ii) obstructing the production of a like effect; or (iii) in some cases, both. The question is bound to arise in this case whether the preceding moments of *adṛṣṭas* were capable of conferring similar power

20. कार्यशब्दः सदृशकार्यपरः। विषयसप्तमीयम्। सामर्थ्यादिति शेषः। न तु विसदृशकार्योत्पत्तौ। अन्यथा घटात् पटोत्पत्तिप्रसंग इत्येवशब्दार्थः (*BD*).

21. अत्र पक्षे उत्तरोत्पाद इति सतिसप्तमी (*BD*).

22. कारणं कार्यजननस्वभावमेव, अदृष्टादिसहकारिसमवधानात्तु तत्सदृशं विसदृशं वा जनयिष्यतीति (*NS.* p. 392)

23. अत आह——अदृष्टमपि तस्यैव विशेषापादकं कुतः?
यस्य कस्यापि यत्किंचिद्विशेषमुपपादयेत्॥ (*NS.* p. 392)

on subsequent *adṛṣṭakṣaṇas* or not? If they were *not* capable, the present one also cannot legitimately possess such a power. If it is contended that tho' itself produced from an *adṛṣṭakṣaṇa* incapable of possessing such a special capacity, *this particular adṛṣṭakṣaṇa* is endowed with such a capacity because of auxiliary factors, the question will have to be repeated with reference to these auxiliaries themselves. If the auxiliaries are taken to derive such a capacity from other (earlier) auxiliaries, the same question can be raised about the earlier ones and of still earlier ones.[24]

The partiality of the unseen merit in conferring the power of producing an unlike effect on a particular cause in the series of atomic flow cannot be satisfactorily accounted for. If the receding series of unseen-merit-moments have also the power of conferring the capacity of producing unlike effects on the atoms, we should expect the aggregation (*samudāya*) to have emerged much earlier than it does.[25]

If the unseen merit confers such a capacity on every cause and not only on a chosen particular, then unlike effects would be emerging from *all causes*. The result would be vagarious. When atoms of the pot are aggregating, all the atoms in the world would be undergoing aggregation and give rise to the appearance of aggregations everywhere.[26]

It is only Kṣaṇabhangavāda that is open to such antinomies. The Vedāntic position which believes in the stability of the cause and the effect has no such difficulty to face. For, unlike Kṣaṇabhangavāda, the doctrine of Sthiratva recognizes that causal relation is governed by the laws of inherence and modification of the effect. But it is a vain bid for Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda which envisages a complete destruction of the cause or the causal moment to establish such a relationship between two moments or momentary atoms.[27]

24. अत्रादृष्टग्रहणं सहकारिमात्रस्योपलक्षकम्। अदृष्टमपि विशेषस्याद्ये विसदृशकार्यजनकत्वस्य, द्वितीयेऽन्यतर प्रतिबन्धस्य, तृतीये युगपज्जनकत्वस्यापादकं कुतः? तथाहि—पूर्वपूर्वतरादृष्टक्षणविशेषानापादकास्तदापादका वा? आद्ये तु, अस्यादृष्टक्षणस्य विशेषापादकत्वं न सिद्ध्यति; कारणाभावात्। विशेषानापादकादृष्टक्षणजन्योऽप्ययमदृष्टक्षणः सहकारिबलात् विशेषमापादयिष्यतीति चेन्न। सहकारिष्वप्यस्य साम्यात्। अत्रापि सहकार्यन्तरानुसरणे गौरवात् (*NS*. p. 392b)

25. *विशेषापादकमप्यदृष्टं किं विवक्षितस्य कारणस्यैव विशेषमापादयति, कारणमात्रस्य वा? नाद्यः, नियामकाभावात्।* [illegible] (*NS*. p. 392)

26. यदि कारणमात्रस्य विशेषापादकमदृष्टमङ्गीक्रियते तदा सर्वेषामपि कारणानां विशेषमुत्पादयेत्। तथा च, सर्वेषामपि मेलनं स्यात् न कुत्राप्यमिलितपरमाणुसद्भावः भवेत्। तदा च युगपत् सर्वसमुदाया दृश्येरन् इति (*NS*. 392-393b)

27. समर्थितं स्थिरवादे पक्षे [illegible] समवेतं दर्शनाकारेण परिणतं वा, तत्र कारणं कार्यं चेति नियामकसद्भावेन कार्यकारणभावव्यवस्थापनं सति, तदुत्पादकत्वस्योपपत्तेः। क्षणभङ्गवादे तु, पूर्वोत्तरक्षणयोर्निरन्वयनाशोत्पादयोः कार्यकारणभावव्यवस्थापनमेव नास्ति; समवायपरिणामयोरभावात्। तथा च, क्व कस्योत्पादकं कल्प्यताम् इति (*NS*. p. 393b)

The Kṣaṇabhaṅgavādin holds further that new and newer atoms go on producing an endless procession of effects every moment. For, existence is efficiency and efficiency is change. Reality is motion or change. It is instantaneous and kinetic. Only ceaseless change exists and goes on for ever. There is nothing enduring (*sthira*) for more than a second. The fourth Sūtra: *Asati pratijñoparodho yaugapadyam anyathā* refutes this contention.

The view that production goes on every moment is to be examined on the following lines: Does it signify that an effect is produced even after the cessation of the cause? It would seem improper to regard that which is produced even after the cessation of what was said to have caused it, as its 'effect' in any straight sense of the term. On the other hand, if it is held that the effect is produced when the cause is also present, it would be equivalent to saying that the cause which comes into being in the first moment—according to the Kṣaṇikatvavādin—endures till the point of time when the effect emerges into being. This will confer a life of at least two moments on the cause, which is *not* acceptable to the Kṣaṇabhaṅgavādin. If a 'momentary' cause can keep alive for *two* moments, there is no reason why it should be destroyed in the subsequent moments. It would thus be competent to produce a further effect in the subsequent moment and that another and in the next subsequent moment that again another and so on,—with the result that the effects of all those 'causes' and the effects galore of those 'effects' would come to have a simultaneous existence.[28] In such a predicament, one may expect to find the potter's shed filled to capacity with hundreds of pots within a short space of time. The Kṣaṇabhaṅgavādin cannot avoid this by suggesting that the cause comes into existence in the first half of the second and becomes efficient in the second half and dies. The theory of Kṣaṇabhaṅga does not admit of self-divisibility of Kṣaṇas.[29]

28. क्षणिकस्य द्विक्षणावस्थाने तदुत्तरस्य विनाशकारणाभावात् पुनस्तस्मात् कार्योत्पत्तयः स्यु तेभ्यश्च तथेति सर्वकार्याणां यौगपद्यं स्यात् (*TP*. ii, 2.21)
तत्समानभाविनामशेषकार्याणां एकक्षणावस्थानरूपं यौगपद्य स्यात्। तच्च प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धमिति भाव:
(Raghu. *TPB.*)
क्षणिकत्वेनाङ्गीकृतस्य द्विक्षणावस्थानाङ्गीकारे, तदुत्तरत्र तृतीयादिक्षणेषु विनाशकारणाभावात् तृतीयादिक्षणेष्वप्यवस्थानमङ्गीकर्तव्यम्। ततश्च, पुनस्तस्मात् कार्योत्पत्तयः स्युः। कारणे सति, कार्यं भवत्येवेति नियमात्। तेभ्य. कार्येभ्यश्च तथा कार्योत्पत्तयः स्युरिति 'सर्वकार्याणां' कारणकार्याणां, कार्यकार्याणां च यौगपद्य एकस्मिन्काले-ऽवस्थानं स्यादिति (*AC*. p. 329)

29. कारणे विनष्टे कार्यमुत्पद्यते चेत्, तत्कार्यमिति प्रतिज्ञाहानिः। तत्काले कारणमिति चेत् विनाशकारणाभावात् यौगपद्यं सर्वकार्याणाम् (M. *BSB*. ii, 2.21)
तथाहि—कारणे विनष्टे कार्यमुत्पद्यते; विद्यमाने वा? नाद्यः। यस्मिन्विनष्टे यदुत्पद्यते तस्य तत्कार्यत्वेऽनिप्रसङ्गात्। न द्वितीयः। एकस्मिन्क्षणे स्वयमारमान सम्भवा कार्योत्पत्तिक्षणेऽपि तस्यावस्थाने कारणस्य द्विक्षणिकत्वप्रसङ्गात्। द्विक्षणावस्थाने, तदुत्तरत्र विनाशकारणाभावात्, पुनस्तस्मात् कार्योत्पत्तय स्युः। तेभ्यश्च तथेति सर्वकार्याणां यौगपद्यं स्यात्। न च क्षणार्धे समुत्पन्नं क्षणार्धे कार्यमुत्पादयतीति युक्तम्। क्षणस्य पूर्वमध्यापरकलाविकलत्वाभिलापादिति भावः। (*TP*. ii, 2.21)

The next Sūtra: *Pratisaṅkhyāpratisaṅkhyānirodhayor aprāptir aviśeṣāt* (ii, '2.22) refutes the concept of destruction in Kṣaṇabhangavāda which speaks of two types of destruction—the transcendental (*apratisankhyā*) and the empirical (*pratisankhyā*). The first is the natural process of decay which goes on in nature, unnoticed and imperceptibly without affecting the continuity of the flow of things. This has been designated by M. as *nissantānanāśa* which has been explained by J. as *santānam antareṇa yaḥ pratikṣaṇavināśaḥ*. The other is the conscious destruction of things where the continuity is broken (*sasantānanāśaḥ*)—as when a pot is shattered to pieces by hitting it with a stick. According to the Kṣaṇikavādin, causation and destruction go on every moment without break. As the cause must needs be at the moment *of the coming into being of the effect and as the same moment* will be the moment of the cessation of the effect, in Kṣaṇabhanga, the cause *as existing at the moment of cessation of the effect* will have to be efficient still and produce another effect and that another for the same reason and so on with the result that the so-called momentary destruction could never take place.[30]

It is also held by the Kṣaṇikavādin that the atoms get dissociated every moment and get together again. This *dissociation (viralībhāva)* is their destruction and their coming together (*puñjībhāva*) is production of the effect (*samudāya*). As it is the same atoms that form and break up the Samudāya every moment, their existence at the time of the disruption of the samudāya must be conceded. Otherwise, it will be impossible to bring about their aggregation (*punjībhāva*) at the next moment. In this predicment,' there will be a constant regrouping (*puñjībhāva*) alone going on. There will be no room for an interval of loosening *(viralībhāva). In this way, the concept of sasantānanirodha* also will not bear scrutiny.[31]

The concept of Pratisamkhyānirodha is untenable, from another point of view also. To speak of its destruction, the existence of an object like a pot must be granted at the time of destruction. If it exists, it (i.e. the atoms of which it is an aggregate) will necessarily have to produce another effect (of aggregated atoms). In the circumstances, it

30. प्रतिक्षणं कारणं कार्यं निर्वर्त्य नश्यतीति वक्तव्यम्। तत्र, स्वकार्यवियोगकाले कारणं सदेवेति कार्यमुत्पादयेत्। कारणे सति कार्यं भवत्येवेति नियमाभ्युपगमात्। तदुत्तरमनन्तरं चैवमिति कथं प्रतिक्षण नाशो युज्येत ?
(*TP.* ii, 2 22)

31. विरलपरमाणवो निबिडतया पुञ्जीभूय कार्यकराः भवन्ति। इदमेव समुदायस्य कार्यजनकत्वं नाम, नान्यत्। त एव च क्षणे क्षणे तत्र तत्र विरलीभवन्ति पुनः पुञ्जीभवन्ति च। तत्र तेषामेव विरलीभावो नाशः, पुञ्जीभावस्तु उत्पत्तिरिति परस्य हृदयम्।
इदं चानुपपन्नम्—तेषामेव परमाणूनां विनाशाय स्वकार्यवियोगकाले सत्त्वं वक्तव्यम्। अन्यथा, कार्यकारणभावायोगात्। ततश्च निबिडपुञ्जीभावाख्यकार्यकारित्वस्य कार्यजनकत्वनियमात्, पौनःपुन्येन निबिडत्वमेव स्यात्। विरलतायाः कदापि नावसर इति न ससन्ताननाशोपपत्तिरिति (*TPG.* p. 81)

will not be possible for the Kṣaṇikavādin to speak of the destruction of the series at any time. If the series is unreal, the units composing the series would also be unreal. We cannot speak of the units as part of a series if the series itself is to be regarded as unreal. Moreover, the Kṣaṇikavādin will have to state clearly if, in his opinion, the aggregate is the same as its constituents or something other than or different from them. It cannot be the same. For the atoms are invisible while the aggregation is visible. If it is different, it will be an admission of the existence of a 'whole' as distinguished from the constituents which will be damaging to the interests of Kṣaṇikavāda. If the aggregate is false, the idea of distinct objects arising out of such aggregation would be without a factual basis. If the atoms themselves are the factual basis of the aggregation, the object would have to remain imperceptible as the atoms are supersensuous. Being many, it would be difficult to account for their perception as a single entity.[32]

The next Sūtra: *Ubhayathā ca doṣāt* (ii.2.23) examines the argument based on Arthāpatti in support of the doctrine of momentariness of unique praticulars (dharmas). The Kṣaṇabhaṅgavādin believes that to be real is to be causally efficient. Such causal efficiency can but last for one second. If in the first second itself the cause does not cease to exist after producing a like effect, there will be the undesirable contingency of an endless production of effects. To prevent this contingency, it has to be admitted that a thing exists only for one moment. The Sūtra refutes this argument of Arthāpatti in support of Kṣaṇikatva of things.

The Kṣnabhangavādin will have to answer the question whether the law of causation propounded by him: *Asmin sati idam bhavati* or *Kāraṇe sati kāryam bhavatyeva* is true or not. If it is true, the effect will have to be there in that second when the cause is also present. Like the right and the left horns of an animal emerging at the same time, it may not be possible to affirm, in such a case, that the one is the cause of the other. If the principle of *Kāraṇe sati kāryam bhavatyeva* is not true, as the cause does not possess causal efficiency at the given point of time, it would cease to be "real" within the meaning of being *arthakriyākāri*. Once it forfeits *arthakriyākāritva*, it will cease to be *kṣaṇika* too.

32. नाप्यन्य'। सतो हि घटस्यात्यन्तिको नाशः। अतोऽसौ सत्त्वात् कार्यमुत्पादयेदेव; कारणे सति कार्यं भवत्येवेति नियमात्। तत्कार्यं चैवमेवेति कथं सन्तानोच्छेदावसर इति भावः। सन्तानो नित्य एवेति चेन्न। प्रलयानुपपत्तेः। विविक्ततया प्रलयोपपत्तिरिति निरस्तम्। सन्तानस्य नित्यत्वे क्षणिकत्वविरोधः। अवास्तवत्वान्नासौ क्षणिक इति चेन्न। सन्तानिनामपि तथात्वप्रसगात्। नहि सन्ति सन्तानिनो, न सन्तान इति युक्तम्। एनेन समुदायस्यावास्तवत्वं परास्तम्। समुदायोऽपि समुदायिमात्रम्? तदतिरिक्तो वा? नाद्य', विरोधात्। द्वितीये, स एवावयवी। अवास्तवत्वे घटादिबुद्धीनां निरालंबनत्वापातात्। परमाणव एवालंबनमिति चेन्न। तेषामनेकत्वात्; अतीन्द्रियत्वाच्चेति (*TP.* ii, 2.22)

The next Sūtra: *Pratisaṅkhyāpratisaṅkhyānirodhayor aprāptir aviśeṣāt* (ii, '2.22) refutes the concept of destruction in Kṣaṇabhanga-vāda which speaks of two types of destruction—the transcendental (*apratisankhyā*) and the empirical (*pratisankhyā*). The first is the natural process of decay which goes on in nature, unnoticed and imperceptibly without affecting the continuity of the flow of things. This has been designated by M. as *nissantānanāśa* which has been explained by J. as *santānam antareṇa yaḥ pratikṣaṇavināśaḥ*. The other is the conscious destruction of things where the continuity is broken (*sasantāna-nāśaḥ*)—as when a pot is shattered to pieces by hitting it with a stick. According to the Kṣaṇikavādin, causation and destruction go on every moment without break. As the cause must needs be at the moment of the coming into being of the effect and as the same moment will be the moment of the cessation of the effect, in Kṣaṇabhanga, the cause *as existing at the moment of cessation of the effect* will have to be efficient still and produce another effect and that another for the same reason and so on with the result that the so-called momentary destruction could never take place.[30]

It is also held by the Kṣaṇikavādin that the atoms get dissociated every moment and get together again. This dissociation (*viralībhāva*) is their destruction and their coming together (*puñjībhāva*) is production of the effect (*samudāya*). As it is the same atoms that form and break up the Samudāya every moment, their existence at the time of the disruption of the samudāya must be conceded. Otherwise, it will be impossible to bring about their aggregation (*puñjībhāva*) at the next moment. In this predicment, there will be a constant regrouping (*puñjībhāva*) alone going on. There will be no room for an interval of loosening (*viralībhāva*). In this way, the concept of *sasantānanirodha* also will not bear scrutiny.[31]

The concept of Pratisamkhyānirodha is untenable, from another point of view also. To speak of its destruction, the existence of an object like a pot must be granted at the time of destruction. If it exists, it (i.e. the atoms of which it is an aggregate) will necessarily have to produce another effect (of aggregated atoms). In the circumstances, it

30. प्रतिक्षणं कारणं कार्यं निर्वर्त्य नश्यतीति वक्तव्यम्। तत्र, स्वकार्यवियोगकाले कारणं सदेवेति कार्यमुत्पादयेत्। कारणे सति कार्यं भवत्येवेति नियमाभ्युपगमात्। तदुत्पत्त्यनन्तरं चैवमिति कथ प्रतिक्षण नाशो युज्येत ?

(*TP.* ii, 2.22)

31. विरलपरमाणवो निबिडतया पुञ्जीभूय कार्याकारा भवन्ति। इदमेव समुदायरूपकार्यजनकत्वं नाम, नान्यत्। त एव च क्षणे क्षणे तत्र तत्र विरलीभवन्ति पुनः पुञ्जीभवन्ति च। तत्र तेषामेव विरलीभावो नाशः, पुञ्जीभावस्तु उत्पत्तिरिति परस्य हृदयम्।
इदंचानुपपन्नम्—तेषामेव परमाणूनां विनाशाय स्वकार्यवियोगकाले सत्त्वं वक्तव्यम्। अन्यथा, कार्यकारणभावायोगात्। सतश्च निबिडपुञ्जीभावाख्यकार्याकारत्वरूपकार्यजनकत्वनियमात्, पौनः पुन्येन निबिडत्वैव स्यात्। विरलतायाः कदापि नावसर इति न ससन्ताननाशोपपत्तिरिति (*TPG.* p. 81)

will not be possible for the Kṣaṇikavādin to speak of the destruction of the series at any time. If the series is unreal, the units composing the series would also be unreal. We cannot speak of the units as part of a series if the series itself is to be regarded as unreal. Moreover, the Kṣaṇikavādin will have to state clearly if, in his opinion, the aggregate is the same as its constituents or something other than or different from them. It cannot be the same. For the atoms are invisible while the aggregation is visible. If it is different, it will be an admission of the existence of a 'whole' as distinguished from the constituents which will be damaging to the interests of Kṣaṇikavāda. If the aggregate is false, the idea of distinct objects arising out of such aggregation would be without a factual basis. If the atoms themselves are the factual basis of the aggregation, the object would have to remain imperceptible as the atoms are supersensuous. Being many, it would be difficult to account for their perception as a single entity.[32]

The next Sūtra: *Ubhayathā ca doṣāt* (ii.2.23) examines the argument based on Arthāpatti in support of the doctrine of momentariness of unique praticulars (dharmas). The Kṣaṇabhaṅgavādin believes that to be real is to be causally efficient. Such causal efficiency can but last for one second. If in the first second itself the cause does not cease to exist after producing a like effect, there will be the undesirable contingency of an endless production of effects. To prevent this contingency, it has to be admitted that a thing exists only for one moment. The Sūtra refutes this argument of Arthāpatti in support of Kṣaṇikatva of things.

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Being thus checkmated by the futility of the *arthāpattipramāṇa* in establishing *kṣaṇikatva*, the Kṣaṇabhaṅgavādin turns to an inferential argument to establish his thesis. The argument is—whatever is is momentary like the flame of a burning fire.[33] The Sūtra *Akaśe cāviśeṣit* (ii, 2.24) counters this inference by pointing out that it is open to us to infer that things are *not momentary* but stable, like Ākāśa: *Yat sat tad akṣaṇikam; yathā ākāśaḥ.* The Pūrvapakṣin thinks that as the flame shows the presence of contrary attributes (*viruddhadharmādhikaraṇam*) like increase and decrease in the range and intensity of heat and light, it can be inferred to be a series of different flames and not one. The Siddāntin shows that the increase and decrease in the range and intensity of heat and light in a burning lamp does not necessarily militate against its oneness. The relation between the flame and its different stages of burning is one of *bhedābheda*.[34] The unity of the flame is established by recognition (*pratyabhijñā*). In any case, unlike the flame, Ākāśa shows no evidence of any internal change or modifications (*pariṇāmabheda*).[35] That ākāśa is not subject to any internal modifications is granted by the Buddhist theory itself which holds that the two forms of destruction Pratisaṅkhyā and Apratisaṅkhyā and Ākāśa are eternal and not colored by Vāsanās (*asaṁskṛtam*).[36] It is not possible for the Buddhist to infer Ākāśa to be '*Kṣaṇika*', as it is other than the Pañcaskandhas. The inference of unreal momentariness from the predicate of existence will thus be open *to the fallacy of Prakaraṇasama.* The Buddhist cannot contend that Ākāśa does not possess any reality. If reality is causal efficiency, the atoms which the Kṣaṇikavādin holds to be real cannot afford to have true causal efficiency as has been shown, in various ways, in the foregoing discussions.

The Buddhist theory reduces Ākāśa to mere absence of occupying bodies (*mūrtadravyas*).[37] But M. points out in his *AV.* that this cannot be. *The conception or perception of an abhāva* is always with reference to its locus or *dharmi* and countercorrelative (*pratiyogi*). But Ākāśa is presented to our knowledge without reference to these cor-

33. मा भूदर्थापत्त्या क्षणिकत्वसिद्धिः । 'यत् सत् तत् क्षणिकं, यथा दीपादि; सन्तश्चामी भावा' इत्यनुमानेन सेत्स्यति (*TP.* ii, 2.24)

34. *This holds true of other examples such as a flowing river, the ripening fruit, the body passing thro' different stages of growth:*
देहदीपनदीवारिफलादीनां पृथक् स्वतः ।
भेदाभेदौ परिज्ञेयौ (M. *B.T.* xi, 22.4

35. क्षणिकतासाधकस्य परिमाणभेदादेरत्राकाशेऽभावाच्च (*NS.* p. 395b)

36. Cf. 'आकाशो द्वौ निरोधौ च नित्यं त्रयमसंस्कृतम्' (Q. *NS.* p.

37. आवरणाभावमात्रमाकाशमिति (S. *BSB.* ii, 2.22)



relatives. It cannot, therefore, be treated as an *abhāva*.[38] Our experience reveals Ākāśa to be an entity (*bhāvarūpa*).

The last Sūtra: *Anusmṛteś ca* (ii, 2.23) brings the evidence of recognition (*pratyabhijnā*) to refute the theory of the momentariness of things and of the experiencing self. Acceptance of the stability and meaningfulness of life, its values and objectives is founded on consolidated human experience. Recognition plays a large part in the organization and consolidation of our experiences. It cannot be dismissed outright as illusory. Only such of them or part of them as are definitely disproved and set aside by more powerful evidences can be discarded as misplaced. If recognition-judgments, inspite of their being *not* sublated by more powerful evidences, are to be branded as illusory, even the perception of differences in the intensity and range of the flames (*viśeṣadarśana*) in a burning lamp, on which the Kṣaṇikatvavādin himself takes his stand, in discrediting the judgment of its oneness in and thro' the different stages of burning may be open to doubt: *Pratyabhijñāyā bhrāntitve viśeṣadarśanasyāpi bhrntitvam* (M. *BSB.* ii.2.25).[39] The perception of variations of refulgence of light in a lamp is capable of being reconciled with the unity and oneness of the flame as pertaining to its different stages.[40] The relation of the flame to the variations of its glow is one of difference and identity (*bhedābheda*). Hence the recognitive judgment is not falsified by the perception of different stages.[41] Clarifying the Siddhānta position J. writes in his *NS* that where the content of the recognitive judgment, is the identity of a given thing or person as he or it was, and as he or it is, at the time of recognition, only the emphatic element in the judgment: 'I am indeed He (that was)'—*sa eva aham*, 'This is *verily* that (*Tad eva idam*)' does *not* hold true. The identity of the given person or thing which has gone thro' different states is true enough. And that is enough to establish the stability (*shtiratva*) of the thing in question which is the purpose of the recognitive judgment. Where the content of the re-

38. सधर्मिप्रतियोगित्वमभावस्य नियामकम् ।
तौ विना न ह्यभावश्च क्वचिद्दृष्टः कदाचन ॥
अधर्मिप्रतियोगित्वमाकाशस्यावगम्यते ॥ (*AV.* ii, 2.24)
For further details see *NS.* p. 395-96 b.
किञ्च, मूर्ताभावमाकाश वदता यो धर्मी तस्योच्यते स एवास्माकमाकाश इति नाम्न्येव विवादोऽवशिष्यते । वक्ष्यते चैतत् वियदधिकरण इति (NS. p. 396 b)

39 बाधकं विनापि भ्रान्तित्वकल्पने, दीपादौ क्षणिकत्वसाधकतयोक्तपरिणामभेदादिदर्शनस्यापि भ्रान्तित्वं स्यादविशेषादिति शेषः । (*BD*)

40 द्वितीये, दीपादिविशेषणदर्शनस्य भ्रमत्वप्रसग इति भावः । विरुद्धधर्माध्यासो बाधकमिति चेन्न । तस्य कालादिभेदेनोपपत्तेः । नहि तादृशेऽन्यत्वमस्मत्सम्मतम् । अन्यथा, एकक्षणेऽपि भावभेदप्रसगात् । एतेन प्रदीपोऽपि व्याख्यातः (*TP.* ii, 2.25)

41. Cf. दीपेऽपि प्रागणोरिव दीपस्य क्रमेण वृद्धयाद्यावस्थाविशेष एव जायते; न तु मध्ये मध्ये नाशोऽपि । अतो न प्रदीपोऽपि दृष्टान्त इति सूचितम् । (*TPG.* p. 82)

cognitive judgment is the relation of a given person or a thing with two distinct periods of time or conditions etc., there the affirmation of identity and the emphasis laid on it (by the particle *eva*) are both true.[42]

Another ingenious argument of the Kṣaṇikavādin is disposed of by J. in his *NS*. The Kṣaṇikavādin argues that in cognizing that a given thing exists at a given time, perception may be taken to establish the reality of that thing only with reference to that (present) moment and not its relation to an earlier or a future moment. *Is not this sufficient evidence of the momentariness of things?*[43] Reviewing this argument, J. asks—what is it that the Kṣaṇikavādin means to convey by describing things as 'momentary'? Is it simply that the given thing exists at a given moment? If that be so, there is nothing detrimental to the *Sthiratva* (stability) of the thing in that.[44] If the meaning is that the thing comes into existence and is also destroyed at the same moment, we have to point out that it is jumping to an unauthorized conclusion.

For to go by evidence, perception reveals that the thing perceived is existing at the time. It does not comprehend the thing as originating or getting destroyed at the given moment itself or that the given thing does not survive at the next moment or moments. The point is this. Even tho' perception cognizes a thing as existing at the given point of (present) time, its existence at an earlier point of time and a future one are not comprehended by perception. *Such existence is beyond the* scope of perception.[45] The prior and the future existence of the thing can be established by inference or other valid evidences. Apart from inference, it is within the competence of the Sākṣī to cognize the uncontradictable existence of things in the three periods of time by knowing their present existence.

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42. ननु, भवन्मतेऽपि प्रत्यभिज्ञा भ्रान्तिरेव । परिणामवादे पूर्वोत्तरवस्तुनो भेदाभेदाङ्गीकारात् । तदेवेदमिति च प्रत्यभिज्ञयात्यन्ताभेदस्यावगाहनात् । उच्यते—यदि हि पूर्वोत्तरकालभाविनोरभेदः प्रत्यभिज्ञानविषयोऽङ्गीक्रियते, तदा सावधारणस्य प्रत्याभिज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वेऽपि, "तदिदम्" इति तु न भ्रमः । तेनैव स्थायित्वसिद्धेः । यदा तु कालादिद्वयसंबन्धो विषयः तदा सावधारणमपि न भ्रम इति । (*NS.* p. 394)
तद्देशकालविशिष्टविशेष्याभिन्नमिदं विशिष्टमिति विशिष्टद्वयस्यैकविशेष्याभिन्नत्वेन विशेष्याभेदसद्भावात्, तन्निमित्तकविशिष्टद्वयाभेद एवात्राभिमतो न तु, विशिष्टद्वयस्य साक्षादभेदः । विशिष्टद्वयस्य विशेष्येण सहाधारवद्द्रव्यभावितया भेदाभेदवत्वेन विशिष्टद्वयस्याभेदायोगात् । तथाच, विशेष्येण सहाभेदस्यापि सत्वात् तन्नांशे प्रमात्व, भेदव्यावर्तकावधारणांशे तु भ्रमत्वम् ** 'तेनैवेति' अवधारणशून्येनैव प्रत्यभिज्ञानेनेत्यर्थः । न भ्रम' इति तदवधारणस्य कालादिसंबन्धस्यविशेषणायोगव्यवच्छेदकत्वेन धर्मिभेदनिषेधकत्वाभावादिति भाव ।
(*NS. Śeṣavākyārthacandrikā.* ii, 2. adh. 7. p. 62)
43. ननु, प्रत्यक्षं क्षणिकतामर्थानामवगमयति । तद्धि वर्तमानतावबोधकत्वेनार्थस्य वर्तमानमात्रक्षणसंबन्धिनीं सत्तामवगाहते; न पूर्वोत्तरक्षणसंबन्धिनीमपि । तत् कथं क्षणिकत्वमर्थानामप्रामाणिकमिति ? (*NS.* p. 393)
44. उच्यते—किमिदं क्षणिकत्वं नाम ? किं क्षणसंबन्धित्वम् ? किं वा क्षणमात्र एवोत्पत्तिविनाशवत्वम् ? यद्वा क्षणान्तरासंबन्धित्वे सत्येकक्षणसंबन्धित्वम् ? आद्यस्त्विष्ट एव; स्थायिनोऽप्यर्थस्य एकक्षणसत्तास्वीकारात् (*NS.* p. 393)
45. योग्यानुपलम्भस्यैवासत्त्वावगमकत्वात् । न च पूर्वोत्तरकालवर्तिता प्रत्यक्षयोग्या (*NS.* p. 394b)

Moreover, tho' perceptions are limited to the present, a recognition judgment like 'this is that' is able to comprehend the existence of a given thing at the present moment *and in the past.*[46] The Kṣaṇikavādin would fain dismiss the identity of a thing thro' recognitive judgment as a case of similarity mistaken for identity of being. But even to perceive the similarity between two momentary things, the perceiver of the previous and the present moments *must be the same.* But as the perceiver too is *as momentary* as the moments themselves, to the Kṣaṇikavādin, how can he form a judgment that *recognitive judgments of identity are false* and that there is *only similarity between the flash of moments?* The formation of such a judgment would require the transference of the impression (*saṁskāra*) left by the first perception to the next one. But as the cause and the effect belong to two different moments here, the former cannot transfer its potencies to the latter and without such transfer the similarity too cannot be established.[47] Kṣaṇikavāda is, therefore, an exercise in futility.

Thus, as interpreted by M. the first Sūtra of this *adhi.* refutes the doctrine of Buddhist Kṣaṇikavāda that the basis of our normal Vyavahāra (commerce of life) centering on our perception of objects is only a passing aggregation of atoms and not the presence of stable entities. The second Sūtra reviews the attempted defence of the theory of aggregation and shows how the objections brought up against it in the opening Sūtra cannot be got over even if we concede the possibility of the cause producing unlike effects. The next one points out the impossibility of maintaining the view that the cause produces such unlike effects in Kṣaṇikavāda. The fourth Sūtra criticizes the theory that things are produced and destroyed every moment. The next one shows the untenability of the theory of two-fold destruction held by the Kṣaṇikavādin. The sixth Sūtra knocks down the presumptive reasoning (*arthāpatti*) in support of the momentariness of things advanced by the Kṣaṇikavādin. The last one shows how the famous inference put forward by him *Yat sat tat kṣaṇikam yatha pradīpaḥ* in invalidated by our recognition-judgments about the stability of things.

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46. अस्तु वा आद्यः पक्षः। कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षस्य वर्तमानमात्रग्राहित्वेऽपि तदेवेदमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञालक्षणस्य तदभावादिति (*NS.* p. 394b)

47. पूर्वदृष्टस्य वस्तुन उत्तरकालेऽभावाद्धि तदेवेदमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञा भ्रान्तिः कल्प्यते। पूर्वद्रष्टुरुत्तरकालमभावे कथं तत्सदृशमिदमिति तत्सादृश्यप्रतीतिः, तदेवेदमिति भ्रान्तिश्च स्यात्? अप्रतीतौ सादृश्यस्य, सादृश्यात् प्रत्यभिज्ञेति दुरुक्तं स्यात्! नच क्षणभगुरः पुरुषो प्राच्यपाश्चात्यैक्यविषया प्रत्यभिज्ञा भ्रान्ति जानीयात्। कथं च भिन्नकालीनस्य कारणस्य संस्कारार्पकत्वं कार्ये स्यात्? येन, सादृश्यसिद्धिराशास्यते? क्षणविनाशिनोऽसख्या भावाः, तत्सादृश्यहेतवः संस्काराः, तत्सन्तानाश्चेति गरीयसीयं कल्पना। किं चैकसन्तानसंस्काराणां मिथः सादृश्यमन्तरेण तन्निमित्तं वस्तुसादृश्यं नोत्पद्येत (*TD.* ii, 2.25)

Interpretations of Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja.

S. and R. treat the ten Sūtras (ii.2, 18-27) as one *adhi.* directed against the Sarvāstivādins and agree largely in their interpretation of the Sūtras. R., however, reads a greater part of the second Sūtra differently[48] from S. and M. He also devotes the ninth Sūtra (*Nāsato adṛṣṭatvāt*) specially to the refutation of the Sautrāntika view that an object of cognition—which being *momentary is no longer in existence* when the cognition arises, transfers its form to the cognition and only on that basis is the object to be inferred.

Thus in S.'s interpretation only two schools of Buddhism the Sarvāstivāda (ii.2.18-27) and Vijñānavada (ii, 2.28-32) get refuted in the Sūtras. The Śūnyavāda is left out. R. devotes only the last Sūtra: *Sarvathānupapateśca* to a summary disposal of Śūnyavāda.

Looking, however, to the brilliant exposition given by the *Bhāmatī* of the ascending order of merit in which the Sarvāstivāda, Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda stand in relation to one another,[49] it is incredible that so important a school of Buddhism should have been passed over, by the Sūtrakāra as S. would have us believe. His reluctance to admit a separate adhi. for the refutation of Śūnyavāda consistent with its preeminence is, to say the least, intriguing. His interpretation of Sūtras ii, 2.26-27 as criticizing what in the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika schools virtually comes to the same thing as the acceptance of the position that the world springs from a non-entity,[50] misses the fact that the Śūnyavāda which *explicitly* maintains the causality of Asat has a better claim to be dealt with in the Sūtra: *Nāsato adṛṣṭatvāt* than what can only be *read into Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda by implication.*[51] It is thus difficult to agree with S. that the Śūnyavāda has *not* been considered worthy of direct confrontation in the Sūtras.

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48. इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वादुपपन्नमिति चेन्न; सघातभावानिमित्तत्वात् ।

49. Cf. तत्र ये हीनमतयस्ते सर्वास्तित्ववादिनस्तदाशयानुरोधात् शून्यतायामवतार्यन्ते । ये तु मध्यमास्ते ज्ञानमात्रास्तित्वेन शून्यतायामवतार्यन्ते । ये तु, प्रकृष्टमतयः तेभ्यः साक्षादेव शून्यतात्वं प्रतिपाद्यते । यथोक्तं बोधिचित्तविवरणे–

देशना लोकनाथानां सत्त्वाशयवशानुगाः ।
भिद्यन्ते बहुधा लोके उपायैर्बहुभिः पुनः ॥
गभीरोत्तानभेदेन क्वचिच्चोभयलक्षणा
भिन्नापि देशनाभिन्ना शून्यताद्वयलक्षणा ॥ इति ॥ (*Bhāmatī* ii, 2.18)

Cf. also शून्यवाद एव हि सुगतमतपराकाष्ठा (*Śrībhāṣya* ii, 2.30)

50. इतश्चानुपपन्नो वैनाशिकसमयः । यतः स्थिरमनुयायिकारणमनभ्युपगच्छतामभावात् भावोत्पत्तिरित्यापद्येत । **तत्रेदमुच्यते– 'नासतोऽदृष्टत्वात्' इति (S. *BSB.* ii, 2.26)

51. Cf. अवश्यनिरसनीयस्य शून्यवादिना स्वयमेवाङ्गीकृतस्यासत्कारणत्वस्य निरासप्रसङ्गे, वैभाषिक (सौत्रान्तिक) मतेऽर्थादापन्नस्य निरासायोगात् (*TC.* p. 917)

The opening Sūtra has been interpreted by S. as follows: There is no possible explanation of the aggregates which make up the empirical self. The material aggregates are unintelligent. They cannot unite themselves with the psychic phases. The lighting up of intelligence is dependent on the prior existence of a body. There is no intelligent principle such as an enduring self in the capacity of a ruler or enjoyer who could be said to have brought about their aggregation.[52] According to R. the very momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) of the atoms and of the elements makes it impossible to have an aggregation.[53]

It will be seen that in both these intrepretations, the reason for the impossibility of the formation of the aggregates (*samudāyāprāpti*) *is not shown to be embodied in the wording of the Sūtra.* It has to be thought of extraneously. This contrasts unfavorably with M.'s interpretation in which the meaning given to the terms: *Ubhayahetuke 'pi tadaprāptih* carries within itself the reason why the Samudāya cannot be[54]—without having to import the reason externally,—such as the *Kṣaṇikatva* of the atoms and the Skandhas or the absence of an intelligent self acting as Saṁhantā (as with S. and R.)

There seems also to be no special reason or propriety in using the expression *api* in the Sūtra and for giving *samudāya* and *ubhayahetuka* if the point to be made is simply this that the said aggregation cannot be accomplished without the acceptance of a conscious principle like the self or conceding the stability of the atoms and the elements —as S. and R. have held.[55] A less circuitous pronouncement such as *Ubhayahetukasamudāyāprāptiḥ* would have met their requirements— as in the case of the other Sūtra: *Pratisaṅkhyāpratisaṅkhyānirodhāprāptiḥ....*" (ii, 2.22). The fact that the Sūtrakāra has chosen a different mode of expression, here, shows that he is pursuing a different line of criticism altogether.

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52. योऽयमुभयहेतुक उभयप्रकार· समुदाय परेपामभिप्रेतोऽणुहेतुकश्च भूतभौतिकसहतिरूप. स्कन्धहेतुकश्च पचस्कन्धीरूप., तस्मिन्नुभयहेतुकेऽपि समुदायेऽभिप्रेयमाणे तदप्राप्तिः, ममुदायाप्राप्ति । समुदायायिनामचेतनत्वात् । चित्ताभिज्वलनस्य समुदायसिद्ध्यधीनत्वात्; अन्यस्य च कस्यचित् चेतनस्य भोक्तु प्रशासितुर्वा, स्थिरस्य सहन्तुरनभ्युपगमात् । (S. *BSB.* ii, 2.18)

53. योऽयमणुहेतुक· पृथिव्यादिभूतात्मकसमुदायः, यश्च पृथिव्यादिहेतुकः शरीरादिविपयरूपः समुदायः तस्मिन्नुभयहेतुकेऽपि समुदाये तत्प्राप्तिः जगदात्मकसमुदायोत्पत्तिः नोपपद्यत इत्यर्थः । परमाणूना पृथिव्यादिभूताना च क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमात् । (*Śrībhāṣya* ii, 2.17)

54. समुदाये एकैकहेतुके विरोधः । एकस्मात् समुदाय इति व्याहतेः । उभयहेतुकत्वपक्षेऽपि ममुदाये, विरलोभयहेतुके समुदाय. सदा स्यात् । मिलितोभयहेतुकेऽन्योन्याश्रयः इति युक्तिः सूत्रारूढा (*TC.* 915b).

55. तयात्वे ** समुदाये उभयहेतुके इति सप्तम्यो., अपिशब्दस्य, तदप्राप्तिरित्यत्र तच्छब्दस्य च व्यर्थत्वात् (*TC.* 915b)

The reasons given by S.[56] and R.[57] for the non-formation of the aggregates in their interpretation of the first Sūtra are sufficient to stifle the objection raised by them, in the next Sūtra. Turning to S. first, the plea of the formation of aggregates thro' nescience, *Saṁskāra, Vijñāna, name, form, etc. acting in an incessant chain of causes and* effects revolving like a water-wheel cannot stand any chance (as a Pūrvapakṣa to introduce the second Sūtra) when it has been made clear in the first Sūtra itself that without a permanent intelligent being which could unite the material aggregates and the psychic elements no aggregate can be thought of.[58] As the emergence and functioning of ignorance, *samskāras* etc. would themselves be dependent on the presence of such a psycho-physical being, it would be premature to *think of their interplay in an endless chain of successive* cause and effect relationship in the absence of such a being.[59]

As for R., having made it clear in the first Sūtra itself that no aggregation of atoms or Skandhas is possible on account of universal momentariness of things, no further plea of successive interaction to keep a Samudāya going can be raised with any show of reason.[60]

S. and R. have further to take the expression '*pratyaya*' used in the second Sūtra in the sense of coming in touch with the complement of causes[61] instead of in its more widely accepted sense of cognition (*jñānam*). *If the phrase itaretarapratyaya is presumed to be a refer*ence to the famous doctrine of Pratītyasamutpāda in Buddhist philosophy, there is no reason why the Buddhist term itself, which by the way has one syllable less than the term used in the Sūtra viz. *itaretarapratyaya,* should have been passed over. There is no need to introduce that concept in Sūtra *18* as the argument based on Pratītyasamutpāda *is specially met in the third Sūtra of the adhi.*[62] *The argument* of Sūtra 20 that at the time of the production of the subsequent thing the antecedent has already ceased to be also renders the last part of

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56. समुदायभावानुपपत्तिरित्यर्थः। कुतः? समुदायिनामचेतनत्वात् *** अन्यस्य च कस्यचित् चेतनस्य भोक्तुः प्रशासितुर्वा स्थिरस्य संहन्तुरनभ्युपगमात् (S. *BSB.* ii, 2.18)
57. उभयहेतुकोऽपि समुदायः क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमात् उक्तेन न्यायेन न सिद्ध्यतीत्यर्थः (R. *Vedāntadīpa.* ii, 2.17)
58. नहि संहन्तुश्चेतनस्याभावात् संघातो न युक्त इत्युक्ते त्वदुक्तमविद्यासंस्कारजरामरणशोकादीनां अन्योन्यहेतुहेतुमद्भावेन पूर्वापरीभूततया घटीयन्त्रवदनिशमावर्तमानत्वरूपमितरेतरप्रत्ययत्वं शङ्कार्हम्। (*TC.* p. *915b*)
59. अविद्यादिप्रतीतिव्यवहाराणां संघातसिद्ध्यधीनत्वेन, तस्यैवासम्भवेऽन्योन्यहेतुकत्वशङ्का दूरापास्तेति भावः (*TCP.* p. 915)
60. तथा, क्षणिकत्वादणूनां संघात एव नोपपद्यत इत्युक्ते, पुनः कथमन्योन्यहेतुहेतुमद्भावरूपेतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वं शङ्कार्हम्? (*TCP.* p. 915)
61. प्रत्ययो हेतूनां समवायः। हेतुं हेतुं प्रति अयन्ते हेत्वन्तराणीति। तेषामयमानानां भावः प्रत्ययः समवाय इति यावत् (*Bhāmatī*)
62. क्षणभङ्गवादिनः पूर्वोत्तरक्षणयोः हेतुफलभावो न शक्यते संपादयितुम्। (S. *BSB.* ii, 2.20)

the next Sūtra, which according to S., threatens the Kṣaṇikavādin with the consequence of simultaneous existence of cause and effect (in case the effect is to be produced when the cause is present) redundant. For, the consequence of not accepting the cessation of the cause when the effect is produced would be the simultaneous existence of cause and effect.[63]

S. and R. interpret Sūtra 22 as refuting the nature of the two kinds of cessation as utter annihilation. From the wording of the Sūtra it does not appear that it is concerned with anything more than the possibility of any destruction as such. The character of the cessation —whether *utter or residual* does not seem to be the point at issue. In his criticism of the Buddhist view, S. argues that there can be no destruction without a residual element. This obliges us to import the idea of the destruction being non-residual for purposes of criticism.[64] This may recoil on Advaita philosophy wherein the destruction of Mūlāvidyā is conceived as an utter destruction without leaving a residue (*niranvaya*).

Under Sūtra 23 S. raises the question: Does the destruction of nescience etc., accepted by Buddhism take place in consequence of right knowledge or of its own accord (without the need of knowledge)? The first alternative would lead to the abandonment of the Buddhist doctrine that all destruction takes place without an ascertainable cause. In the second case, instruction in the noble eightfold path would be unnecessary.[65]

The criticism seems to be wide of the mark. S.'s own Bhāṣya shows that the destruction of ignorance etc. is brought under Pratisaṅkhyānirodha by the Buddhist. It is only Apratisaṅkhyānirodha which is looked upon as a natural process of destruction which goes on every moment with no assignable cause except that it is in the nature of things to be momentary.

R. has a different interpretation of this Sūtra. If utter destruction of whatever is Sat is accepted (*Yat sat tat kṣaṇikam*), the whole world would be plunged into the void at the end of the first moment of existence. The world of objects originating the next moment from such

63. 'यौगपद्यमन्यथा' इत्यस्य 'उत्तरोत्पादे च पूर्वनिरोधात्' इति तृतीयेन गतार्थता। तथापि, 'अन्यथा यौगपद्यं स्यात्' इति विपक्षे बाधकविवक्षा विना उत्तरोत्पादे पूर्वनिरोधस्यासिद्धेः (*TC.* p. *915*)

64. नहि भावाना निरन्वयो निरुपाख्यो विनाशः संभवति (S. *BSB*. ii, 2.22)

65. योऽयमविद्यादिनिरोधः प्रतिसङ्ख्यानिरोधान्तःपाती परपरिकल्पितः स सम्यग्ज्ञानाद्वा सपरिकरात् स्यात्? स्वयमेव वा? पूर्वस्मिन् विकल्पे निर्हेतुकविनाशाभ्युपगमहानिप्रसंगः। उत्तरस्मिंस्तु, मार्गोपदेशानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गः (S. *BSB*. ii, 2.23)

nothingness would share the same fate.[66] As there is no alternative or antithesis considered in this interpretation, the Sūtra should more properly have been worded as *Tathā ca doṣāt* instead of *ubhayathā ca doṣāt.* Two clear alternatives or antithetical positions would be required to justify the use of *ubhayathā* in this Sūtra, as elsewhere (See ii, 2.11; 15).

The seventh and the eighth Sūtras have been treated as establishing different propositions by S. and R. The first one according to both refutes the Buddhist position that Ākāśa is non-definable in the same way as the two kinds of cessation.[67] The next Sūtra is taken by S. to establish the stability (*sthiratva*) of ego-consciousness by appealing to the evidence of memory. If ego-consciousness were only momentary and different at each moment, memory cannot be explained. The subject cognizing a thing and the subject remembering it must be the same.[68] R. takes *anusmṛti* in the sense of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) and utilizes this Sūtra to establish the stability of external objects[69] on its evidence.

After the refutation of Kṣaṇikatva of everything in the realm of matter and spirit, from different angles, it seems far more probable that both these Sūtras were intended—as may be seen from the conjunctive *ca* (in Sūtra 25) to round off and conclude the discussion with two powerful arguments establishing the stability (and non-momentariness) of *the world of objects and of the experiencing selves alike.* Such an interpretation would have the advantage of dispensing with the need to *import separate predicates* for each of the propositions in the Sūtras 24 and 25 viz.: Ākāśa is *not non-definable*; the conscious self *is not momentary.*[70] S. has unnecessarily restricted the scope of the Sūtra: *Anusmṛteśca* to the establishment of the *permanence of the experiencing subject alone,* in view of the need to coordinate perception and memory as belonging to the same person. Instead of narrowing down the scope of this Sūtra, in this way, it would help to establish at one stroke the stability and permanence (*sthiratva*) of the world of objects as well as of the experiencing *selves to understand*

66. उत्पन्नस्य तुच्छतापत्तो हि पश्चातुच्छादुत्पद्यमानं जगत् तुच्छात्मकमेव स्यात् अतः तुच्छादुत्पत्तिः तुच्छतापत्तिश्च न सम्भवतः (*Vedāntadīpa.* ii, 2.22)
67. आकाशे चायुक्तो निरूपाख्यताभ्युपगमः । प्रतिसंख्याप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधयोरिव वस्तुत्वप्रतिपत्तेरविशेषात् (S. *BSB.* ii, 2.24)
68. वैनाशिक उपलब्धुरपि क्षणिकतामभ्युपेयात् । न च सा संभवति; अनुस्मृतेः । सा चोपलब्ध्येककर्तृका सती संभवति (S. *BSB.* ii, 2.26).
69. पूर्वप्रस्तुतं वस्तुनः स्थिरत्वमेवोपपाद्यते (*Śrībhāṣya.* ii, 2.24)
70. सप्तमाष्टमयोः क्षणभंगविरोधिस्थायित्वरूपैकसाध्यान्वयस्याष्टमस्थचशब्दानुगुणस्य संभवे पृथक् साध्याध्याहारायोगात् (*TC.* p. 917b)

anusmṛti[71] in the broad sense of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) in terms of (i) *Sa eva aham* (I am the same self indeed) and (ii) *Tad eva idam* (This is indeed that) according to the given data. This advantage ought not to have been thrown away,[72] in any sound criticism of Buddhist Kṣaṇikavāda, which is *as hostile* to the permanence (*sthiratva*) *of the world of matter* as of the souls.[73]

It is doubtful if S., whose philosophy merges ego-consciousness in Suṣupti and recognizes its loss therein, can afford to make the same ego the locus of the memory and the direct experience of Suṣupti. In Dṛṣṭsṛṣṭivāda' of Advaita, at any rate, recognitive judgments will have to forfeit their validity. In such a predicament, there can be no effective refutation of Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda. If Dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda should stand by Pratyabhijñā and concede that objects *do exist even when they are not perceived by us*, they cannot be treated as '*mithyā*'.

Sūtras 26 and 27 are also treated by S. and R. as part of the Samudāyādhikaraṇam. We have already seen how there is a better case for constituting Sūtras 26-29 beginning with *Nāsato adṛṣṭatvāt* into a fresh *adhi.*, directed against so important a school of Buddhism as the Mādhyamika, instead of as a refutation of *an echo of Śūnyavāda breathed into the Kṣaṇikavāda of the Vaibhāṣika-Sautrāntika schools.*

Although S. speaks in his introductory remarks under this Sūtra of the Kṣaṇikavādin's being forced to admit *Abhāvād bhāvotpatti* by elimination of other alternatives,[74] it is clear from the instance of hare's horn not being able to produce anything, cited by the *Bhāmatī* in this context,[75] that S. and Vācaspati are using the term 'Abhāva' in their interpretation of this Sūtra in the sense of 'Asat' or 'nothing'—the equivalent of Śūnya. If it is, however, contended that they are only discussing the question of production of the positive (*bhāva*) from the negative (*abhāva*), the reason put forward by the Sūtrakāra to repudiate such causation viz. that "such a genesis is not observed"

71. If only memory had been intended to be referred to there is no need to use the preposition *anu.*
72. But see Dr. Radhakrishnan's halting remark in this connection: "*Whatever may be said with regard to objects*, there can be no doubt with reference to the conscious subject." (The *Brahmasutra*, p. 382).
73. 'स एवाहम्' 'तदेवेदम्' इत्यात्मानात्मसाधारण्येन प्रत्यभिज्ञानेन विप्रतिपन्नस्य सर्वस्य स्थायित्वस्य साक्षात् साधनसंभवे (स्मृत्यनुभवयोः सामानाधिकरण्यान्यथानुपपत्त्या) आत्ममात्रस्थायित्वसाधनस्यायोगात् । (*TC.* p. 917b)
74. इतश्चानुपपन्नो वैनाशिकसमयः यतः स्थिरमनुयायिकारणमनभ्युपगच्छतामभावात् भावोत्पत्तिरित्येतदापद्येत (S. *BSB.* ii, 2.26)
निरपेक्षत्वात् कार्योत्पत्तौ पुरुषकर्मवैयर्थ्यम् । सापेक्षतायां च, क्षणस्याभेद्यत्वेनोपकृतत्वानुपकृतत्वानुपपत्तेः अनुपकारिणि चापेक्षाभावादक्षणिकत्वप्रसङ्गः । सापेक्षत्वानपेक्षत्वयोश्चान्यतरनिषेधस्यान्यतरविधाननान्तरीयकत्वेन प्रकारान्तराभावात् नास्थिरात् भावात् भावोत्पत्तिरिति क्षणिकत्वपक्षेऽर्थादभावात् भावोत्पत्तिः परिशिष्यत इत्यर्थः (*Bhāmatī*. ii, 2.26)
75. तदेतदुच्यते–'नासतोऽदृष्टत्वात्' इति । नाभावात् कार्योत्पत्तिः, कस्मात्? अदृष्टत्वात् । नहि शशविषाणाङ्कुरादीनां कार्याणामुत्पत्तिः दृश्यते (*Bhāmatī ibid*)

will be *out of place.* For we *do* find that *not* carrying out prescribed or obligatory religious acts produces sin (*Pratyavāya*) and *failure* to detect special features in a given thing gives rise to erroneous knowledge.[76] Sūtra 26 and 27 are therefore best understood as part of refutation of Śūnyavāda *proper* rather than of its distorted echo from Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda. S.'s interpretation of Sūtra 27 that if existence *should* spring from non-existence, even lazy and inactive people would reap benefits without putting forth effort—that a husbandman would grow crops without cultivating the field; that a weaver would have a finished piece of cloth without taking the trouble of weaving[77] is sure to recoil on the Dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivādins among his own schoolmen. In any case, *to say that effortless* ones may *stand to* reap benefits is *to say that they* do not deserve them. But vagaries do occur sometimes and we do find in the world sometimes that persons who have not toiled for a thing reap the benefits instead of those who have actually toiled. It would, therefore, be more pertinent to interpret the Sūtra as making an *āpādana that if Śūnya were accepted as the cause (of the world) one may expect* such fictitious things like a skyflower or the *'seventh rasa'* which are incapable of being thought of as fit to be pursued or abandoned, to produce fragrance or to give delectation to the tongue.[78] Thus construed, the Sūtra will be in a position to directly knock down Śūnyavāda and establish that only the Sat (real) which is stable and enduring can be the cause of anything.[79]

The Kṣaṇabhaṅgavādin holds that the effect is produced only when the cause, given as real (*sat*) but momentary (*kṣaṇika*), is disintegrated. There seems to be no justification in this view for the *reductio ad absurdum* with which S. seeks to confront him by arguing that if existence should spring from non-existence persons would be able to realize their goals and objectives without putting forth any effort in the direction. It is not proper therefore to connect the *Sūtra Udāsīnānām*...with the refutation of the Sarvāstivāda school of Buddhism. This itself is sufficient evidence that Sūtras 26-27 are directed against an uncompromising Śūnyavāda.

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76. यदि तु 'नासत' इत्यत्राभावस्य कारणत्वं निषिध्येत, तदा 'अदृष्टत्वात्' इति हेतुरयुक्त'। विहिताकरणविशेषादर्शनादीनां प्रत्यवायभ्रमादिहेतुत्वदर्शनात्। (*TC.* p. *917*)
77. यदि चाभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिरभ्युपगम्येत, एवं सत्युदासीनानामनीहतामपि जनानामभिमतसिद्धिः स्यात्। अभावस्य सुलभत्वात्। कृषीवलस्य क्षेत्रकर्मण्यप्रयतमानस्यापि सस्यनिष्पत्तिः स्यात्। (S. *BSB.* ii, *2.27*)
78. असत: कारणत्वे उदासीनाना हेयोपादेयबुद्धिवर्जिताना खपुष्पादीनामपि मकाशात् कार्यसिद्धि.। चशब्दात् न चेदन्यत्रापि (i e बौद्धाभिमशून्यादपि) न स्यात्, अविशेषात् (M. *BSB.* ii, 2.27)
   The term हेयोपादेयबुद्धिवर्जितानाम् has been explained by J. as हेयोपादेयबुद्धिविषयतावर्जितानाम् *and accordingly* used as a *hetugarbhaviśeṣaṇa.*
79. Read: किंचैवमीहाभावेऽपि कार्योत्पत्तौ बाधकमुक्तं स्यात् नत्वमन कार्योत्पत्तौ। तत्र चेष्टापत्ति', क्वचिदनीहमानानामपि दृष्टसिद्धेः। ततो वरमुदासीनशब्देन हेयोपादेयबुद्ध्यविषयखपुष्पादीन् लक्षयित्वा, तेभ्यः कार्यसिद्ध्यापादनम्। तेन कारणत्वस्य साक्षात् सिद्धेः। (*TC.* p. 918b)

CHAPTER VIII

REFUTATION OF ŚŪNYAVĀDA

8. *Asadadhikaraṇam* (ii.2.26-29)

This *adhi.* is directed against the Mādhyamikas or the Śūnyavādins who hold that the world is an appearance of Śūnya conceived as non-dual, without aspects (*nirviśeṣa*), self-luminous, free from limitations and beyond thought and speech. The world of pluralities is a play of Śūnya projected by Saṁvṛti, or the principle of illusion. Our experiences of the world are in the nature of an error (*vikalpa*) lasting so long as Saṁvṛti clouds the vision. When Śūnyatā is realized, all these appearances cease like dream-phenomena.[1]

Śūnyavāda is opposed to the reality of the world of Pañcaskandhas. The Pūrvapakṣa thus arises by contending that the earlier discussion whether things are stable or momentary is futile. The Śūnyavādin also flatters himself that his theory is free from the defects of Paramaṇupuñjavāda.[2]

The Śūnyavādin no doubt looks upon Śūnya as a reality (*tattvam*) or *Tathatā*. It may, therefore, be felt to be unfair on the part of the Vedāntin to equate it with *Asat* or the void. It deserves to be noted, however, that the definition of Śūnya as *bhāvābhāvapratiṣedhātmakam*

1. नित्यं निर्विशेषमद्वितीयं स्वयं प्रकाशमपास्तगुणदोषं वाङ्मनसागोचरं शून्यं जगत्कारणं माध्यमिका मन्यन्ते। तत्संवृत्या प्रत्ययमात्रविनिवेशिन्या विलासरूपोऽयं भेदप्रपञ्चो न तत्त्वतो विद्यते। तत्सृष्टिरपि विकल्परूपा यावत्संवृति संव्यवहारमात्रनिर्वाहिणी, निवर्तते स्वप्नवदेव शून्यात्मप्रतिबोधे समूलं समुपशाम्यतीत्येतन्मतम्
(*TD.* ii, 2.26)

2. पञ्चस्कन्धात्मकस्य प्रपञ्चस्य सत्त्वे, क्षणिकत्वस्थायित्वचिन्ता। तत्सत्त्वमेव नास्ति। कुतस्तत्क्षणिकत्वादिचिन्तावसर इति पूर्वपक्षोत्थानादनन्तरसङ्गतिः (Raghu. *TPB.*)
अत्र नये परमाणुपुञ्जवादोक्तदोषोऽत्र नेति प्राप्तं शून्यमतं निरस्यते (*Ragh.* TDP.)

given in the standard works of Śūnyavāda[3] is the same as the definition of *Asat* viz. *bhāvābhāvavilakṣaṇam.*[4]

The opening Sūtra: *Nāsato adṛṣṭatvāt* points out according to M. that Śūnya cannot be accepted as the cause of the world as it is pure non-being (*asat*) devoid of all attributes (*sarvadharmavikalarūpāsattvopetam*) including activity (*kriyā*). For nowhere in our experience is causation seen to take place from pure non-being. It is only the Sat (being) that is capable of producing something as an effect.[5] The term adṛṣṭatvāt in the Sūtra stands not only for want of evidence of perception but of other Pramāṇas like inference which derive their sanction from Pratyakṣa.[6]

The Śūnyavādin, however, may press forward with another argument. Tho' the direct method of inference may not be able to establish the casuality of *Asat* for want of an illustratiin in support, it may be possible to establish Śūnya as the cause by a process of indirect reasoning (*sāmānyotodṛṣṭānumāna*). For by applying the dialectic of

अन्तर्भावितसत्त्वं चेत्कारणं तदसत्तत : ।
नान्तर्भावितसत्त्वं चेत्कारणं तदसत्तत: ।।[7]

(Śrīharṣa: *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, 1. p. 55. Chouk-Skt Ser (1914) the concept of cause will be reduced to non-being.[8]

This ingenious argument of the Śūnyavādin is overthrown by the Sūtra: *Udāsīnānam api caivam siddhiḥ* (ii.2.27) by means of a *re-*

3. तत्र लक्षणं भावाभावप्रतिषेधात्मकं शून्यताया:
(Sthiramati's C. on *Madhyāntavıbhāgasūtra*. C.O.S. 24. p. 38)

4. शून्यं सदिति परेणांगीकारेऽपि सर्वधर्मराहित्ये सति असत्त्वमवर्जनीयमित्यापाद्यदूषणमिद इति ध्येयम्
(Ragh. *TPB* ii, 2 27) Vide:
अत्र सर्वत्र शून्यस्यासत्त्वमापाद्य दूषणाभिधानमिति द्रष्टव्यम् (*NS*. p. 401)
Also *TPG*. p. 83, *AC*. p. 334.

5. अत: सर्वविशेषविनिर्मुक्तत्वेन गगनकुसुमसमानात् शून्याज्जगतो भावो जन्म नोपपद्यते । सतो भवत: कार्यस्य क्वचित् असतो जनिर्न दृष्टा यत: (*NS*. p. 401)

6. प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानोपजीव्यत्वात् । अतोऽनुमानाद्यभावस्यानुक्तावपि लाभात्, 'अदृष्टत्वात्' इत्येवोक्तम्
(*NS*. p. 402b)

7. "The seed does not become the cause of the sprout merely *as seed* but as having existence. This means before operating as cause it has no existence as there would be no point in ascribing further existence to what is already existing. If existence is not part of the cause, but stands outside the cause, it would mean the cause has no existence of its own. Either way, the cause is reduced to non-existence." (Tr.).

8. कारणस्य हि सत्त्वे निषिद्धेऽसत एव जन्म सेत्स्यतीति आशक्यानुमानाना तर्कप्रतिघातं वक्तु सूत्रम् उदासीनानाम्' इति (*NS*. p. 402b)
Rāghavendra in his *Parimala* has a different explanation of the opening words here: स्वप्नकार्यं प्रति यत्कारणं तद्दृष्टान्तेन कारणत्वहेतुना आदिकालीनकारण मस्त्रेत्यनुमानेन सत्त्वे निषिद्धे, कार्यस्य कारणजन्यत्वनियमादसत एव जन्म सेत्स्यतीत्यर्थ: (*NSP*. p. 338b)

9. Note that the expression हेयोपादेयबुद्धिवर्जितानाम् in M.'s bhāṣya is to be understood in the sense of हेयोपादेयबुद्धिविषयतावर्जितानाम् as explained in the *TP*. The *TD*. of Trivikrama explains *udāsīna* as हेयोपादेयबुद्धिविषयत्वात् उद्गत्यासीनानाम्

ductio ad absurdum that if Śūnya or non-being were to be accepted as causally efficient, one may expect other fictitious things like a sky-flower which are incapable of being made the object of pursuit or avoidance, to be able to fulfil certain ends.

The Śūnyavādin may, however, put in that his position that Śūnya is the cause of the world holds good only with reference to primordial creation and *not* with the subsequent *developments in the world of* Saṁvṛti where there is of course a recognizable dependence on time, place material, agent, etc.[10] With admirable resourcefulness M. uses the same Sūtra *Nā sato dṛṣṭatvāt* to refute this attempted defence. The last word in the Sūtra is accordingly read as '*dṛṣṭatvāt*' without the negative—the whole Sūtra meaning that the agent, material cause, time, place and other factors must be inferred to be the causes with reference to primordial creation also, in the same way as in regard to the subsequent stages.[11]

The Śūnyavādin still makes a desparate attempt to discomfit the Sadvādin by arguing that the cause cannot be accepted as Sat; for Sat must necessarily be above all change, but causation without change is impossible. There is, however, no difficulty in conceiving of Asat as cause when it comes to be misapprehended on account of Saṁvṛti as the world of phenomena. For Śūnyavāda is not interested in making Śūnya the transforming cause (*pariṇāmikāraṇa*) of the world. The world according to the Śūnyavādin is only a 'Vivarta'—an appearance of Śūnya. Do we not find it appearing as 'silver' in our illusions? The larger world of experience is also, in the same way, an appearance of Śūnya. Where then is the point of the *reductio ad absurdum*[12] brought up in Sūtra 27?

This is refuted by the next Sūtra: *Nābhava upalabdheḥ* (ii.2.28) by pointing out that our perceptions of the reality of the world cannot be treated as illusory experiences like the perception of silver in shell. For, in that case we have a right to ask how it is that such perceptions (of the reality of the world) are *not* sublated within our own experience. It is an accepted principle that the ascertainment of the

10. नन्वादिसृष्टावेव शून्यात् कार्योत्पादं ब्रूमो न सर्वदा–अन्यदा तु, कर्त्रादिकारणगणादेव। अतो नातिप्रसङ्ग इत्यत आह– (*NS.* p. 402)

11. ना पुरुषः सत. आदिकालीनस्य कार्यस्य कर्तानुमातव्यः। कुतः? दृष्टत्वात्। अधुनातनानां कार्याणां पुरुषकर्तृत्वस्य निश्चितत्वात्। इति प्रथमसूत्रं प्रकारान्तरेण व्याख्यातं भवति। सूत्रभाष्ययोः पुरुषग्रहणमुपादानाद्युपलक्षणम्। (*NS.* p. 402)

12. सर्वमेतद्दूषणं यदि शून्यतत्त्वात् परमार्थतो मृदो घट इव जगदुत्पद्येत। न चैतदस्ति। सर्वनिषेधात् शून्यमेव जगदाकारेण विवर्तत इत्यभ्युपगमात्। नहि शून्ये जगदध्यस्तमित्यतोऽयं दोषप्रसरः। असत एव रजताकारेण प्रतीयमानत्वादित्याशङ्कां परिहरन् सूत्रं पठित्वा व्याचष्टे–नाभाव उपलब्धेरिति। (*TP.* ii, 2.28)

illusoriness of a particular cognition rests upon the fact of its being sublated. If such ascertainment is to be made merely on the ground of its being a piece of cognition (*pratyayatvāt*) without reference to having a sublating cognition, it should be possible for every one of us to recognize the perception of silver in shell to be an illusion at the very outset of our falling into such an error, and even without having a sublating cognition.

Like the drowning man catching at a straw, the Śūnyavādin now turns to illusory experiences like the perception of snake in the rope and dreams which are generally supposed to be unreal. The next Sūtra *Vaidharmyācca na svapnādivat* (ii.2.29) answers these points.

Our experience shows that there has been no cognition sublating our perception of the reality of the world. Even in regard to our dreams, it is the aspect of the dream-objects being of the waking state itself (*jāgrattvapratīti*) at the time of dreaming, that comes to be sublated when we wake up from the dream and not the other features of the dream as a distinct experience of objects created by Vāsanās under certain psychosomatic conditions.[13]

The Śūnyavādin's objection that there is no certainty that our perceptions of the reality of the world will *not* be invalidated by a sublating cognition of Śūnya at some distant future is easily met. The evidence of continuous human experience of ages has a right to be accepted in this respect. To indulge in a frivolous piece of reasoning that this universal awareness of the reality of our life and the world in which we live may be disproved by another perception in future would only recoil on the Śūnyavādin. For the sublating cognition also would be open to sublation by the same token which would rehabilitate the original perception of the reality of the world. This is not merely an argument for argument's sake. Our faith in and convictions about the reality of our life and of the world we live in, are based on non-contradiction, continuity and coherence of data. It is only such of our experiences as are found to be discrepant in some detail that can be rejected as misconceived.

The Śūnyavādin is sure to play his last card: Śūnya is indeed the sublation of the world's reality. It is the ultimate and absolute truth. It cannot be placed in the category of the imaginary as it does not come within the range of empirical perception. It is thus impossible to conceive of its sublation. It will therefore remain the only unsublated and

13. For M.'s views on the nature and constitution of objects seen in dreams see his C. on the *Sandhyādhikaraṇam* (B. S. III. 2.1-4).

unsublatable truth. The world being open to perception and, therefore, *possibly imaginary*, its awareness can be held to be sublatable.

This is all a perversion of logic and the established connotation of the terms real and imaginary. The real is that which is established by Pramāṇas and the imaginary *is* that *which is not so established.* But the Śūnyavādin is a law unto himself in that he seeks to get away with characterizing the world whose existence is borne out by the Pramāṇas as something imaginary and concluding that the perception of its reality is sublated and sublatable and maintaining that the Śūnya which is outside the pale of anybody's experience is *not* imaginary and that it remains unsublated and unsublatable.

M. and his commentators have made it clear elsewhere that the contradiction of dreams is only in regard to a specific aspect of theirs, *of being felt to be the waking state* and *not to the dream-experience* or the phenomenon as a whole.[14] Hence, the illustration of the dream is not competent to establish the unreality of the world. Nor does the experience of the world's *reality admit* of *partial sublation* as in the case of dreams or of total sublation as in the case of the perception of snake in the rope.[15]

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14. यदन्यथात्वं जाग्रत्त्वं सा भ्रान्तिः (M. *BSB.* iii, 2.3)
प्रतीत स्वप्नविषयाणां जाग्रत्पदार्थत्वमेव बाध्यत इति तत्प्रतीति र्भ्रान्तिरस्तु। न स्वप्नप्रतीतिरिति भावः (*TP*)

15. न चैकदेशभ्रान्तित्वेन सर्वभ्रान्तित्वम्। अतः साध्यविकलः स्वप्नदृष्टान्तः। न च तज्जाग्रत्त्ववत् रज्जुसर्पवद्वा मिथ्यात्वं वाच्यम्। तस्य नेदं जागरितं, नायं सर्पः इति विपरीतप्रमाणेनाभावानुभवात्। न चात्र तादृश प्रमाणमस्ति (*TD.* ii, 2.29)

CHAPTER IX

REFUTATION OF VIJÑĀNAVĀDA

9. *Anupalabdhyadhikaraṇam* (ii, 2, 30-32)

This *adhi.* is a refutation of Buddhistic Idealism or Vijñānavāda which holds that consciousness is the only reality and truth and that external objects have no existence outside our consciousness.[1] This is supposed to be an improvement on Śūnyavāda, where the cause as such is pure non-being (*asat*). The term *bhāva* in the opening Sūtra (*Na bhāvo anupalabdheḥ*) is thus intended to draw attention to the positive nature of the cause, in support of the Pūrvapakṣa of the present *adhi.*[2] According to M. and his commentators, this term has been advisedly used in the Sūtra to denote the acceptance of consciousness as the only reality in Vijñānavāda. J. points out that *bhāva* is to be taken as standing for anu-bhāva < anubhava i.e. 'awareness'—the function of the upasarga being the manifestation of the sense already immanent in the root.[3]

Briefly, the Vijñānavāda position is this. Consciousness manifests itself in the form of the individual subject or ego and of the various mental states and the so-called external sense data (*viṣayavijñapti*).

1 ज्ञानमेव ज्ञेयाकारं, न ज्ञेयं नाम ज्ञानाद्भिन्नमस्तीत्यर्थः (*NS.* p. 410)

2. अत्रापि सूत्रे कर्तृसाधनभावशब्देन सद्रूपं ज्ञानमुच्यते। विज्ञानवादे ज्ञानादन्यस्यासत्वात्। ज्ञानमित्यनुक्त्वा, 'भाव' इत्युक्तिस्तु, नासतोऽदृष्टत्वात् इति शून्यवादिन प्रत्युक्तो दोषो नास्माकमिति पूर्वपक्षोत्थानार्थमिति द्रष्टव्यम् (*TC.* 519b)

3. भवतेरनुभवार्थत्वात्। उपसर्गा हि धातुलीनस्यार्थस्य व्यजका एव (*NS.* p. 410)
The *TC* cites another interpretation which derives *bhāvaḥ* from the root *bhū* taken in the sense of "thinking" on the authority of Bopadeva's *Kavikalpadruma:* भूङ् प्राप्तौ भूक् शुद्धिचिन्तयोः (Ver. 64d) (Ragh. *NSP.* 344)
Also: ककारानुबन्धश्चुरादिण्यन्तत्वज्ञापनार्थः। कर्तरि पचाद्यच् (*TCP.* 919b)

The nature of consciousness is to shine forth. Since the forms of sense data such as blueness shine forth in consciousness, they are to be explained in terms of consciousness itself.[4] This principle of our becoming aware of the act of knowledge and of the content of our knowledge simultaneously is known as *Sahopalambhaniyama.*[5] If consciousness and its objective content are essentially *distinct,* it should be open to us *to be aware of the one apart from the other.*

These arguments are fallacious. If the Vijñānavādin means that objects of consciousness are superimposed on thought, it stands refuted by the argument already advanced against Śūnya-vivartavāda, that things are experienced as having an existence of their own. Notwithstanding the Vijñānavādin's contention, our experience shows that we perceive objects as different from consciousness. This cannot be treated as a misapprehension, as there is no sublating cognition to the contrary. If the non-difference between consciousness and its object is to be established by inference based on Sahopalambhaniyama, it would lead to a fallacy of interdependence.[6] For the inference would be valid only when it is estabished that the perception of difference between consciousness and its object is an error-ridden one. And only when the non-difference between consciousness and its object is established by the said inference can the perception of the difference between consciousness and the object be discredited. Moreover, there is a patent conrtadiction between the proposition of identity of consciousness and its object and the reason viz. their simultaneous perception; for the notion of simultaneity or togetherness has meaning only in respect of two or more *different* things.[7]

The other argument:—
Whatever shines forth must be consciousness;
As for example 'knowledge'.
The content of consciousness such as 'blueness' shines forth.
Therefore, blueness and such others must be of the essence of consciousness.

is also without substance.[8] If 'shining forth' means to become the object of consciousness, the reason (viz. becoming the object of consciousness) would be absent in the instance cited in support of the infer-

4. ज्ञानं हि प्रकाशते। तेन प्रकाशमानत्वस्य ज्ञानत्वेन व्याप्तौ सिद्धाया, नीलादेरपि प्रकाशमानस्य ज्ञानत्वसिद्धिरित्यर्थः (*NS.* p. 410)
5. 'सहोपलम्भनियमादभेदो नीलतद्धियोः
भेदश्च भ्रान्तिविज्ञानैर्दृश्यतेन्दाविवाद्वये' ।।
6. अनुमानस्यैव बाधकत्वे स्फुटमितरेतराश्रयत्वम् (*TP.* ii, 2.30)
7. सहोपलम्भादभेद इति प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वोः विरोधश्च । साहित्यस्य भेद एवोपपत्तेः (*TP.* ii, 2.30)
8. न च, यत्प्रकाशते तद्विज्ञानम् । यथा ज्ञानम् । प्रकाशन्ते च नीलादय इति युक्तम् (*TP.* ii, 2.30)

ence. The instance cited is 'knowledge' and *it cannot be conceded by* the Buddhist or the Logician that knowledge becomes or can become an object of its own awareness.[9] The proposition that whatever shines forth in *this* sense must be consciousness is clearly defective for the antecedent non-existence of knowledge (*jñānaprāgabhāva*) and the Saṁvṛti which is accepted as a "covering" of pure consciousness in Buddhism tho' accepted as objects of knowledge, cannot be regarded as "consciousness" as they are opposed to the very nature of knowledge or consciousness.'[10] If 'shining forth' means being of the nature of consciousness, it is yet to be proved that objects of knowledge are of the nature of 'knowledge'.[11]

The next Sūtra *Kṣaṇikatvācca* (ii.2.31) adduces another reason to refute the position of the Vijñānavādin *that the objects of our consciousness are of the very nature and essence of consciousness and non-*different from consciousness. It has been established already that objects of consciousness are stable (*sthira*) and not momentary. The acts of consciousness on the other hand are momentary. Consciousness is internal. Objects are external.[12] There cannot be any identity between the two. The last Sūtra: *Sarvathānupapatteśca* (ii.2.32) rounds off the critique of the various schools of Buddhism emphasizing that they bristle with numerous other defects of doctrine and are opposed to the conclusions established in the Śrutis and Smṛtis.[13]

Saṁkara's and Rāmānuja's Intervretation.

S. treats the five Sūtras beginning with *Nābhava upalabdheḥ* (ii. 2.28) as one *adhi.* directed against Vijñānavāda. According to R. the first three Sūtras beginning with *'Nābhāva....' are one adhi. directed* against Vijñānavāda. The Sūtra: *Kṣaṇikatvācca* (ii.2.31) is *not read* by R. after '*Na bhāvo....*' and *Sarvathānupapatteśca* forms a new *adhi.*

We have seen how *the* Sūtras नासतोऽदृष्टत्वात् and उदासीनानामपि *are better understood* as a *refutation* of full-fledged Śūnyapariṇāmavda instead of being tagged on to the *Samudāyādhikaraṇa* as a refutation of the echoes of Sautrāntika doctrine. After Śūnyapariṇāmavāda, it is

9. 'प्रकाशत' इति विज्ञानविषयत्वाभ्युपगमे स्ववृत्तिविरोधेन, दृष्टान्ते साधनाभाव: (*TP.* ii, 2.30)
10. अज्ञाने व्यभिचारश्च (*TP.* ii, 2.30)
नच ज्ञानाभावादिरपि ज्ञानम्! विरोधादिति भाव: (*TC.* p. 919)
11. प्रकाशमानत्वाभिप्रायेऽसिद्धिरिति (*TP.* ii, 2.30)
12. अत्र क्षणिकत्वाक्षणिकत्वलक्षणविरुद्धधर्माध्यासं भेदहेतुं वदता आन्तरबाह्यत्वादिरनेको विरुद्धधर्मसंसर्गं उपलक्षितो बोध्य: (*NS.* p. 411b)
13. प्रमाणाभावात्। सर्वश्रुतिस्मृतियुक्तिविरुद्धत्वाच्च नैते पक्षा ग्राह्या: (M. *BSB.* ii, 2.32)
श्रुत्यादिकमुक्तं वक्ष्यमाण च द्रष्टव्यम्। एतच्चाधिकारिणं प्रति (*TP.* ii, 2.32)

natural to expect a refutation of Śunyavivartavāda in the three Sūtras beginning with *Nābhāva upalabdheḥ*.

Sūtras II, 2, 28-29 as interpreted by S. establish the reality of the external world. This would affect S.'s own position about the reality of the external world. It may be put in, however, that to the Vijñānavādin the process whose constituting elements are the act of knowledge, the object of such knowledge and the result of knowledge—is an altogether internal one—whereas to the Advaitin the object perceived and its attributes, tho' *mithyā*, have an existence and reality outside the mind and that, therefore, there is nothnig against the Advaitic position here. Looking, however, to the wording of the Sūtra, we have to conclude that it is intended to refute nothing less than the *mithyātva* of external objects. If the intention of the Sūtra was to deny the position of the Vijñānavādin, the appropriate wording for it would be: *Na jñānam anupalabdheḥ* and not as we have it. If the Sūtrakāra held the world to be *mithyā* (or *anirvacanīya*) he could *not* have contrasted its experience with that of the dream state; for the dreams too are *anirvacanīya* (to the Advaitin). If the difference in status (*vaidharmya*) of the waking state from dreams upon which the Sūtrakāra has taken his stand here, is only with reference to the waking state and its experiences not being liable to sublation *during the 'Vyavahāradaśā* (phenomenal state) the position of the Vijñānavādin too cannot be refuted; for according to him, also, neither the world nor the perception of objects and their properties *as existing outside the mind is sublated during the Samvṛtidaśā*.[14]

Moreover, in Vijñānavivartavāda, it is consciousness as the substratum of all phenomena that appears as external objects, which have no real existence. This is S.'s position too.[15] It may be that to the Vijñānavādin the objects *as such* are '*asat*' while to the Advaitin they are '*sadasadvilakṣaṇa*'. But how does this justify their being contrasted with dreams which are also *Sadasadvilakṣaṇa*, in their status? It has to be conceded by both the schools that irrespective of external objects being *asat* or *sadasadvilkṣaṇa*, they come to be perceived as 'Sat', and there is no non-existence (*asattva*) other than absence of existence (*sattva*).[16] The kind of differentiation from total non-existence which finds expression in being eligible to become an object of immediate per-

14. Cf. "It will not be correct to argue that the Sūtrakāra is here establishing the phenomenal reality of the world *Vyāvahārikasatyatva*, for the Buddhists do not deny it". (S. Radhakrishnan, *The Brahmasutra*. p. 385).
15. विज्ञानविवर्तं इति मतेऽधिष्ठानभूतज्ञानस्य मिथ्याभूतबाह्यार्थात्मना धीः तत्वतो बाह्यार्थाभावश्च द्वयोः सम एव (*TC*. p. 920)
16. ननु तस्यार्थोऽत्यन्तासन्। मम तु, सदसद्विलक्षण इति चेन्न। तथापि स्वप्नवैधर्म्योक्त्ययोगात्। सत्वानुभवविरोधस्योभयत्र साम्यात्। सत्त्वाभावादन्यस्यासत्त्वस्याभावाच्च (*ibid*. p. 920)

ception and having causal efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*) known as *Sāmvṛtikasatyatva is admitted in both the schools.*[17] *Both agree in denying any higher truth* (*pāramārthikasattva*) *to the external world.*[18] For these reasons, the refutation of Bāhyārtha-asattvavāda in S.'s interpretation of these Sūtras is not convincing.

The next Sūtra: *Na bhāvo 'nupalabdheḥ* (ii.2.30) is interpreted by S. as refuting an attempted explanation by the Vijñānavādin that even without external objects the variety of our ideas given in experience can be accounted for, with the help of Vāsanās or mental impressions. The weak point in this argument is laid bare by the Sūtra by showing that the existence of these Vāsanās has been made impossible by the non-perception of external objects—whose very existence has been denied by the Vijñānavādin.

The argument is no doubt correct. But there is nothing in the wording of the Sūtra to suggest that such a line of interpretation is really intended by the Sūtrakāra. *For, it involves the importation* (*adhyāhāra*) *of the very subject of the proposition intended to be moved*—viz. the Vāsanās. The other point is that the reason (viz. *anupalabdheḥ*) in the Sautra syllogism is not directly connected with the subject of the proposition. It has to be obliquely connected with *another subject* (viz. the *arthas* or external objects) *which has to be supplied.*[19]

If objects do not exist externally, they cannot be perceived. Unless they have been perceived Vāsanās cannot be born and be lodged in the mind. This is S.'s criticism against the Vijñānavādin's attempt to explain the variety of our ideas without accepting the existence of external reality.[20] It follows from this that 'existence' (*sattvam*) of objects determines their perception. *This would make the perception of* things as impossible in (Bāhyārtha)—*Anirvacanīyavāda* as in (Bāhyārtha)—asattvavāda. The criticism against Vijñānavāda in respect of Vāsanās would recoil on S.[21]

17. अपरोक्षधीविषयत्वार्थक्रियाकारित्वादिरूपस्य सावृतिकसत्त्वरूपस्य चासद्वैलक्षण्यस्य परमतेऽपि भावात् (*ibid.*)

18. परमार्थसत्त्वादिरूपस्य च तस्य त्वन्मते ऽप्यभावात् । (*ibid.* p. 920)

19. न भावो (वासनानां) अनुपलब्धेः (बाह्यानामर्थानाम्) (S. *BSB.* ii, 2.30)
This contrasts unfavorably with M.'s line of interpretation: न (जगत्) भाव:, तथानुपलब्धे. in which the subject of the Sautra proposition is "the world" (जगत्) given in the preceding Sūtra (वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत्) and is, therefore, secured without *adhyāhāra*. The fact that R. also does not take up the question of Vāsanās for discussion shows that its introduction into the body of the Sūtra is not obligatory.

20. अर्थोपलब्धिनिमित्ता हि प्रत्ययं नानारूपा वासना भवन्ति । अनुपलभ्यमानेष्वर्थेषु किंनिमित्ता विचित्रा वासना भवेयुः ? (S. *BSB.* ii, 2.30)

21. असत्त्वेनानुपलब्धिं वदता, लाघवेन सत्त्वमेव उपलब्धौ तंत्रमिति वक्तव्यतया, अनिर्वाच्यपक्षेऽपि दोषसाम्यात्
(*TC.* p. 921b)

The Sūtra *Kṣaṇikatvācca* (ii.2.31) is used by S. to repudiate the position of the Vijñānavādin that ego-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) can be the abode of Vāsanās as the former is itself momentary.[22] It would appear to be more satisfactory to utilize this Sūtra for the refutation of an exclusive tenet of Vijnānavāda that objects of knowledge have no existence except as forms of knowledge by showing that while objects of knowledge are permanent (enduring or *sthira*')—as established in ii.2.25—their awareness is shortlived (kṣaṇika) and that for this reason the two cannot be the same—than to use it for showing that Vāsanās cannot be enduring in an abode which is itself momentary. *That* is an objection which is applicable with equal force and propriety to some other schools of Buddhism also such as the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika and *not exclusively to Vijnānavāda*. As the objection is raised *in the context of Vijnānavāda*, the interpretation given to the Sūtra should be such as would be applicable *only* to Vijnānavāda and not to other schools also. S.'s interpretation fails to satisfy this requirement.[23]

22 आलयविज्ञान नाम वासनाश्रयत्वेन परिकल्पित, तदपि क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमात् न वासनानामधिकरण भवितुमर्हति (S. *BSB*. ii, 2.31)

23 विज्ञानवाद्यसाधारणस्यार्थो ज्ञानाकार इत्यस्य दूषणसंभवे, क्षणिकत्वप्रयुक्तसस्काराभावस्य बौद्धमतसाधारणस्य उक्तययोगात् (*TC*. p. 921b)

CHAPTER X

REFUTATION OF JAINISM

10. *Jainādhikaraṇam* (ii.2.33-36)

Jain philosophy is a realistic relative pluralism. Its ontological hypothesis tries to combine contradictory elements into a general theory. There are seven modes of predication applicable to all reality viz. (i) *is* (ii) is not; (iii) is and is not; (iv) is indescribable in terms of iii; (v) is and is other than what is; (vi) is not and is other than what is not; (vii) is and is other than is and is not.

The reason given for putting together these contradictory positions into an omnibus theory is said to be the desire to avoid the defects to which the exclusive association of reality with any one of the different predications may lead.[1] But there seems to be no justification for resorting to seven different modes of predication in dealing with reality. It would be adequate to have only two modes of predication—is and is not. For, everything exists in its own milieu and does not exist in the milieu of another. A thing is positive in its own essence and negative from the point of view of another's essence. A thing is permanent as substance and impermanent in terms of its different states of becoming. In its essence, it is one but both different and identical with reference to its properties. The exigencies of predication with reference to different conditions or standpoints in which a thing may be placed or from which it may be looked at or described can thus be adequately met in terms of is and is not. It does not appear, therefore, to be necessary to go

1. Cf. अन्योन्यपक्षप्रतिपक्षभावाद्यथा परे मत्सरिणः प्रवादाः ।
नयानशेषानविशेषमिच्छन् न पक्षपाती समयस्तथा ते ॥
(Hemacandra: *Anyayogavyavacchedadvātriṃśikā* Ver. 30).

beyond the first two modes of predication in dealing with our experience of reality.

The Jain theory tries to justify the acceptance of a system of sevenfold predication on the ground that it is in a position to include all possible approaches to reality and at the same time rise above the defects to which any exclusive adherence to any one point of view is prone. In other words, Saptabhaṅgī combines the advantage of each point of view while being free from the defects of any exclusive leaning or preference to any one of them. For different theorists like the realists and the nihilists have laid bare the defects of one another's ontological theories.

The argument is unsatisfactory. For, if at the time of accepting the first position, the other positions are also admitted, it would expose the Syādvādin to all the defects inherent in every one of the other positions, which have been laid bare by the Asadvādin, the Sadvādin and others. There is no escaping these defects by claiming that the different positions are not taken up at one and the same time but only one after the other and that, therefore, there is no mutual conflict in accepting and rejecting the various positions alternatively.

The protagonists of the different positions which the Syādvādin seeks to combine in his theory do not concede that the proofs on which each of them has been arrived at as the final view admits of being accommodated in other ways also. By accepting the corretness of each position as made out by its protagonist, the Syādvādin would be obliged at the same time to reject them on account of the defects which each of the theorists has been quick to point out in the others' views. For the advocate of each position besides marshalling evidence in favor of his view has also laid bare the defects in the other views. The acceptance of each of them in turn would necessitate the acceptance of the defects pointed out therein by the others. The Anekāntavādin would thus find himself in the unenviable position of being attracted and repelled at the same time by the merits and defects of the different positions which he seeks to combine in his theory. Anekāntavāda will thus be unsustainable irrespective of the predications being made alternatively or all together. Apart from this, if all the seven predications are taken conjointly, the third one will not be distinguishable from the first and the second one.

No sensible philosopher would care to deny that things undergo change by efflux of time or due to other factors. It is hardly necessary then to formulate an Anekāntavāda of this type, if the intention is mere-

ly to emphasize that things are subject to change of state or condition. As a believer in Jīvas and Pudgala, the Jain philosopher should only have confined himself to refuting Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda, Satkāryavāda in its absolute sense and absolute difference between the thing and its varying states—instead of putting forward a theory of multiple-nature of reality conceived in a scheme of seven-point relativity of predications.[2] If it comes to that there is no reason to limit these modes of predication to seven. One can very well think of quite a few other possibilities.[3] Mallisena in his *Syādvādamañjarī* maintains that only these seven modes of predication are possible and rules out others:

विधिनिषेधापेक्षप्रकारापेक्षया प्रतिपर्यायं वस्तुन्यनन्तानामपि सप्तभंगीनामेव संभवात् ।

(*Op. cit.* p. 145, *BSPS.* LXXXIII.)

It is however interesting to note that the commentary of Keśavācārya called *Śeṣavākyārthacandrikā* on Jayatīrtha's *Nyāyasudhā*, while commenting on his remark referred to above gives six further modes of predication of relativity:

1. सत्त्वे सति असद्विलक्षणत्वम्
2. सत्त्वे सति सदसद्विलक्षणत्वम्
3. असत्वे सति सद्विलक्षणत्वम्
4. असत्वे सति सदसद्विलक्षणत्वम्
5. सदसत्वे सति सद्विलक्षणत्वम्
6. सदसत्वे सति असद्विलक्षणत्वम्

इत्यादीनामनेकेषां प्रकाराणां संभवादिति भावः

(*Śeṣavākyārthacandrikā* ii, 2. p. 110).

The second Sūtra: *Evam cātmākārtsnyam* refutes the Jain theory regarding the size of the soul. The Jainas believe that the soul has *no intrinsic size of its own* other than the dimension of the body it tenants at any time. And it pervades the entire body it lives in. This explains its ability to set different parts of the body in motion and experience the pleasure and pain derived thro' different parts of the body.

This leads to various difficulties. If, in order to account for the various activities of the body and the experience of pleasure and pain, the soul is credited with the size of the body it tenants, it would be

2. यदि धर्मेण वा, रूपभेदेन वानेकप्रकारत्वं, तदा नायमनेकान्तवादः समर्थनीयः । सर्वैरपि वादिभिरङ्गीकारात् । नहि कोऽपि वादी पदार्थानां कालतो रूपतश्चावस्थाविशेषैश्चानेकरूपत्वं नाङ्गीकरोति, यं प्रति अनेकान्तवादावतारः समर्थ्येत । केवलं क्षणभङ्गो वात्यन्तमसत्कार्यवादो वा, अवस्थावदवस्थयोरत्यन्तभेदो वा निराकरणीयः । अथानेकान्तवादमवतारयता धर्मभेदेन, सदा रूपाभेदेनैव सर्वप्रकारकत्वमित्येव वक्तव्यम् । तथा च व्याघातानिस्तारः इति (*NS.* 413b).

3. अपि चैवमपि सप्तभङ्गीस्वीकारो निर्मूल एव । न ह्येवंवादिनो वादिनः प्रसिद्धाः । सम्भावनया तत्स्वीकारे च, न सप्तत्वनियतिः । संभावनाकोटेस्तु निःसीमत्वात् । (*NS.* 412b).

equivalent to saying that a soul now living in the body of an ant would be having only that dimension. When such a soul passes into the body of an elephant in the course of its transmigration, it will not be able to occupy the whole body of the elephant. It could not thus bring about the activities in all parts of the elephant's body. Conversely, the soul in an elephant's body when obliged by the law of Karma to pass into the body of an ant would find that its size would be far in excess of the ant's body.[4] In either case, the soul cannot be tied down to the size of the body it tenants. It must be conceived as having an independent dimension intrinsic to its being, as in the Vedānta.

The Jain philosopher may come forward with a plausible defence that what he means by saying that the soul has the same dimension as the body it tenants is that the size of the soul is not an unalterable one but that it will vary in relation to the body it is called upon to occupy. This view is refuted in the next Sūtra *Na ca paryāyādapy-avirodho vikārādibhyaḥ* (ii.2.35).

The consequence of such an explanation would be that the soul whose dimensions are thus subject to fluctuation would be reduced to impermanence and thus forfeit all chances of entering the released state.[5]

If, then, the soul has a dimension in Mokṣa, it can only be as possessing a body therein, for without a body there is no possibility of its possessing a dimension according to the Jain theory.[6] The question would then arise if this body of the soul in the state of Mokṣa is eternal or non-eternal. If it is to be regarded as non-eternal, it would be subject to destruction and that would jeopardize the permanence of the Jīva. On the other hand, if this body in Mokṣa is to be taken as permanent, the earlier bodies also in the state of Samsāra would also as bodies be entitled to be regarded as permanent.[7] That in turn would annul the prospect of Mokṣa for ever. For, Mokṣa is impossible with-

4. एवं तर्हि पिपीलिकाशरीरस्थः तत्परिमाण एव स्यात् । तथा च तस्यैव कर्मवशात् गजगर्दभादिशरीरप्राप्तौ तत्र पूर्णता न स्यात् । ततश्च न सर्वशरीरचेष्टा इति भाव. । गजादिशरीरस्थस्याणुशरीरप्राप्तौ अतिरेकः स्यात ततश्च शरीरपरिमाणत्वभग इत्यपि द्रष्टव्यम् (*TP*).
Note that according to M.'s *Bhāsya*, the term अकात्स्न्यम् in the Sūtra admits of two meanings: *apūrnata* and *atireka* to suit the different examples of the elephant and the ant.

5 तत्तच्छरीरस्थस्य तत्तत्परिमाणमिति न मन्तव्यम्; विकारित्वादनित्यत्वप्रसक्तेः (M. *BSB*. ii, 2.35) तेन चानिर्मोक्षप्रसगात् । तथाच शास्त्रवैयर्थ्यापातादिति भावः (*TP*).

6. देहाभावे स्वतो जीवे जैनैः परिमाणानगीकारेण, देहस्याप्यावश्यकत्वात् (Vadirāja *TPG*. p. 86)

7. किं मोक्षे जीवस्य परिमाणमस्ति न वेति । न तावत् द्वितीयः । परिमाणाभावे स्वरूपाभावापत्तेः । नहि परिमाणशून्य द्रव्यमस्ति । अतो मोक्षे परिमाणमभ्युपगन्तव्यमेव । तथा सति, तस्य शरीरमन्तरेणानुपपत्तेः, मोक्षेऽपि शरीरमुररीकरणीयं प्रसज्येत । तच्छरीरमनित्य नित्य वा ? नाद्यः, ससारसमानधर्मतापातात् । न द्वितीयः यथात्मा देहश्च इत्युभयं नित्य तर्हि इदानीतनशरीरैः किमपराद्धम् ? तेषामपि नित्यत्व स्यात्, शरीरत्वाविशेषात् इति भावः (*TP*)

out the destruction of physical embodiment which has been the source of so much misery.[8]

The permanence of the Jīva is also similarly to be used as a hypothetical argument leading to the same adverse consequence (*prasaṅga*) of the permanence of the bodies in the state of Samsāra and the annulment of Mokṣa for ever. This is shown by the use of the expression *Ubhayanityatvāt* in the Sūtra.[9] (ii, 2, 36)

8. एवं दुःखहेतुसांसारिकदेहध्वंसासंभवेन मोक्ष एव न स्यात् इति सूत्राक्षरयोजना सूचिता (*TPG*. p. 86)

9. The Bhāṣya text does not explicitly state that the expression ubhaya in the Sūtra is to be taken in the sense of the soul and the body (in the *prasaṅga* posed). This leaves room for commentators like Vādirāja to interpret it in *terms of the physical* body of the released soul and its *parimāṇa* as *āpādakas* and their further consequence of making the physical bodies in the embodied state and *their* parimāṇas also equally permanent with the result that Mokṣa would be absolutely ruled out:

प्राकृतपरिमाणयोर्नित्यत्वे देहत्वाविशेषात् परिमाणत्वाविशेषाच्च मोक्ष एव न स्यादिति (op. cit. p. 86).

The *TP* of J. is however clear that we are to understand by *ubhayanityatva* the permanence of the Jīvas and the permanence of their physical bodies in the released state. This is intended to be used as an *āpādaka*. This will con-confront the Jaina philosopher with the consequence of his having to accept likewise, the permanence of the physical bodies of the souls in their transmigratory career. That would cut at the root of the doctrine of Śarīraparimāṇatva of the Jīvas. J. has explained in his *TP* only one aspect of the argument as to how the permanence of the body in the released state would lead to such an adverse consequence. He has not explained how the other aspect of the permanence of the soul would likewise lead to the same predicament.

Satyanātha Tirtha, author of the *Abhinavacandrikā* is the only commentator who has taken the trouble to elucidate the second aspect of the argument in terms of Prasaṅga, which has been passed over by many other glossators, as to how precisely the acceptance of the permanence of the self has also been used by the Sūtrakāra (as an *āpādaka*) to confront the Jaina position with the undesirable contingency of having to accept the permanence of the bodies of souls in the state of Samsāra, which would naturally deprive them of Mokṣa for ever. His elucidation of this point is original and arresting and is worth quoting in the original:

उभयग्रहणं शक्यमकर्तुम्– मोक्षशरीरनित्यत्वस्यैव सांसारिकशरीरे नित्यत्वापादकतया, तस्यैव वक्तव्यत्वेन, आत्मनित्यत्वस्यैव तदनापादकत्वेन तस्यावक्तव्यत्वादिति चेदुच्यते– अत्र सांसारिकशरीराणां नित्यत्वं द्वेधा *आपाद्यते– यदि मोक्षशरीरं नित्यं स्यात् तर्हि शरीरत्वाविशेषात् इदमपि शरीरं नित्यं स्यात्।* तथा, यद्यात्मा नित्यः स्यात्, तर्हि सांसारिकं शरीरं नित्यं स्यात्। अन्यथा, एतत्परिमाणनाशेन आत्मनाशापत्त्या, मुक्त्यभावप्रसंगादिति। अत एव, नित्यत्वापादकयोः शरीरात्मनित्यत्वयोः समुच्चयार्थश्चशब्दः।

Abhinavacandrikā, ii, 2, p. 339).

In his *AV*, M. has given us another interpretation of the entire Sūtra. This interpretation confronts the Jaina philosopher with two undesirable contingencies of having to accept (1) the self itself as impermanent in so far as it undergoes change in its voyage from Lokākāśa to Alokākāśa in attaining release and (2) the world itself as permanent like the self, if changes not involving complete extinction of such properties of the thing as last as long as the thing itself endures are considered to be in keeping with the permanence of the thing in question. The *TDP* of Rāghavendra Tirtha introduces the outlines of this interpretation of the Sūtra from the *AV* as an additional interpretation, after giving the interpretation as found in M's *B.S.B.*

सूत्रान्तरं तु,–अनन्ता चात्मपरिमितिः मध्यलोकमितिनियता मुक्त्यवस्था तत्सांख्य विकारात् तदुपात्ते विकारवत्त्वमनात्मत्वापत्ति स्यादिति पूर्वपक्षानुवादः। न केवलं परिमाणपर्यालोचनेति भावः। एवमपि सत्य निग्रहे, उभयनित्यत्वात्–आत्म-प्रपञ्चयोः द्वयोरपि नित्यत्वाभावात्। विकारित्वमात्रस्य त्वया अनभ्युपगमात्, विकारविशेषस्य च नाशरूपत्वेन त्वयानङ्गीकारादिति भावः। अत्र प्रपञ्चस्यापि नित्यत्वादिति वाच्ये, 'उभयं' इत्युक्तिः न्यायसाम्यसूचनार्था (*TDP*. ii, 2 36) This interpretation in the *AV* applies to the text of the Sutra excluding the last word अविशेषात् which has been interpreted as refuting some other doctrines of the Jainas.

The latter argument is presented as follows: If the soul is to be accepted as permanent (*nitya*), its body in the state of Samsāra should also have to be accepted as permanent. Otherwise, with the loss of Parimāṇa of the Sāmsāric body, when it perishes, the soul too (which cannot exist without a bodily Parimāṇa) will have to perish. There would then be no soul to survive in Mokṣa. In this way, the permanence in Mokṣa, of both the body and the soul conceived from the Jaina angle could be used as implicants necessitating the permanence of their Sāmsāric bodies as the implicates. This will naturally upset the Jain theroy that the Parimāṇa of souls goes on changing with the change of their bodies.

Śaṁkara's and Rāmānuja's Interpretation

S. and R. state in their interpretation of the opening Sūtra that it is absurd to think of the same thing as possessed of such contradictory attributes as being real, unreal, both real and unreal, etc. This does not prevent S. from holding that the world is indescribable in terms of Sat and Asat. If we drop the last three stages in Syādvāda which are superfluous, we have the familiar concept of S.'s Anirvacanīyatā.

His rendering of the second Sūtra *Evam ca ātmākārtsnyam* is: Just as the seven modes of predication with reference to the same thing are untenable,—likewise there arises the (contingency of) non-pervasiveness of the soul. This way of connecting *evam* is not proper. The untenability of the Jain doctrine about the size of the soul would not follow analogically from the untenability of Saptabhaṅgī. It has to be shown that the doctrine of the soul's size contains within itself its own seed of defect which is brought out by the words *ātmākārtsnyam*. It is thus the details of the doctrine that represent the implicant (*āpādaka*) in the hypothetical proposition while *ātmākārtsnya* represents the implicate (*āpādya*). What "*evam*" does is just to call up the implicant to our minds.[10] S. says that in view of the Jain doctrine that the soul is of the size of the body it would follow that it is *not* of infinite extension but limited and hence noneternal like jars and other things. If, as it appears from this, the main intention of the Sūtrakāra is to show that the soul in Jainism would become non-eternal, it could have been done in a less circuitous way by showing that to invest the soul with the same dimension as that of the body would make it non-eternal, without referring to the intermediary step of *akārtsnyam*.[11] This shows that the defect which the Sūtrakāra wants to point out here is not the

10. जैनमतप्रसंगसनिधापितदेहपरिमाणत्वरूपापादकसूचनाभावेन न्यूनत्वात् (*TC.* p. 922)
11. देहपरिमाणत्वेनैवानित्यत्वापादनसंभवे, मध्ये आत्माकार्त्स्न्यापादनवैयर्थ्याच्च (*TC.* p. 923b)

non-eternality of the soul lying outside the meaning of *akārtsnyam* but what is contained in it—viz. the non-entireness or insufficiency or incompleteness of the soul.

The last Sūtra here: *Antyāvasthiteścobhayanityatvād aviśeṣaḥ*[12] (ii.2.36) has been explained by S. as follows: If the final size of the Jīva as found in the released *state is considered to be permanent*, his two other sizes—viz. the initial one at the commencement of transmigration and the middle one would also have to be accepted as permanent. This misses the point that as Samsāra is beginningless, it would not be permissible to speak of the initial and intervening stages or conditions of it. The expression *ubhaya* in *ubhayanityatvād* in the Sūtra has, therefore, to be connected with the soul and the body and the Prasaṅga-argument worked out accordingly.[13]

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

According to R. the term *'ubhayanityatvād'* in the Sūtra refers to the permanence of both the Jīva and his *parimāṇa* in the released state, which if accepted would upset the position of the Jainas that the Jīva is of the size of the body he animates, in Samsāra. While the soul's permanence of dimension in Mokṣa has been used by R. to upset the Jaina theory of its being of the size of its changing bodies in Samsāra, he has *not* shown how the permanence of the soul *as such* is to be used for showing that it leads to a similar predicament.[14] This deficiency in R's interpretation has been made good by *M's interpretation of Ubhayanityatvād* as referring to the permanence of the soul and the permanence of *its* body *in the released state* as *the Jaina* would have it. We have already shown how each of these positions upsets the *Jaina doctrine* that the *soul* is of the *size* of the body it animates in Samsāra.

12. M. reads the last word here as *aviśeṣāt*
13. परिमाणाभावे, स्वरूपाभावप्राप्त्या, अन्त्यपरिमाणस्थितेः, तदर्थत्वेन शरीरस्थितेः, उभयनित्यत्वादविशेषेण सर्व-शरीरनित्यत्वं स्यात् (M. *BSB*. ii, 2.36)
14. Evidently, it is for this reason that Rāghavendra finds R's interpretation of 'ubhayanityatvād' inadequate: 'एतेनोभयनित्यत्वात् जीवपरिमाणयोरुभयोर्नित्यत्वादिति भेदाव-द्योतनमसंगतम् इति सूचितम् । 'अन्त्यावस्थितेः' इति सूत्रे परिमाणमात्रनित्यत्वस्यैव उक्तत्वेन जीवनित्यत्वस्याप्रसक्तेरित्याशयेनेति भावः' (*TCP*. p. 923b)

CHAPTER XI

THE PĀŚUPATA SCHOOL EXAMINED

11. *Pāśupatādhikaraṇam.* (ii.2.37-41)

The next *adhi.* is directed against the Pāśupata—the most important of the Vaidika-Pāṣaṇḍa schools. There are four different shades of this school—the Śaiva, Pāśupata, Kālamukha and Mahāvrata (or Kāpālika). The differences between the first two are philosophical.[1] Those between the last two are only in respect of the details of the practical code of Sādhanas—their rigidity or mildness.[2] The Śaiva school looks upon Īśvara as only the efficient cause of the world while the Pāśupata makes Him the material cause as well.[3] The Mahāvrata code is more rigorous than that of the Kālamukhas. The term Pāśupata is applied to all the four schools in its generic sense of owing allegiance to Paśupati.[4] The adhi. examines their main philosophical position—Pāśupati's authorship of the world.

The opening Sūtra *Patyur asāmañjasyāt* points out that it is not possible to accept Paśupati's authorship of the world as it is opposed to the evidence of the Vedic sources which show that he has only a subordinate position in the pantheon and is subject to various limitations such as dependence, birth, death, non-survival in Pralaya, and owing

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1. परप्रमेय एवास्ति विप्रतिपत्तिराद्ययोर्द्वयोः। उत्तरयोस्त्ववान्तरप्रमेये (Keśava, *NSSV.* ii, 2 37)
2. इति महाव्रतैरधिकारसाधनयोः सौलभ्यकथनात्
3. ईश्वरः कारणं भवति तथापि नोपादानम्; किंतु, निमित्तमेव ** इत्याद्यं मतम्। चैतन्यरूपः पशुपतिर्भवत्येव निमित्तकारणमुपादान चेति द्वितीयाना मतम् इति ॥ (ibid)
This is valuable information regarding the distinction in philosophical doctrine between the Śaiva and the Pāśupata schools. S. and R., however, in their commentary have represented all the Pāśupata schools as advocating the Kevalanimittakāranatva of Īśvara.
4. पशुपतेरिमे पाशुपताः।

his position to other's favor.[5] M. has brought together a number of these texts frme the *Ṛgveda*, the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* and other sources in his *BSB* and *AV*.[6]

The second Sūtra: *Sambandhānupapatteśca* makes out that Śiva cannot be the author of the world as he is said to be without a body by the Pāśupatas.[7] He cannot, thesefore, be connected with the world as its Maker. It may be objected by the Pāśupata that creatorship consists in one's being able to actuate the causal complements at one's disposal and not in the possession of a body.[8] But it will not be possible for a creator to actuate the causal complements at his disposal without putting forth necessary effort for the purpose. Effort cannot be put forth without willing and will has to proceed from knowledge. Knowledge is seen to arise when one has a body and is conscious of it as in his waking state. This is confirmed by the absence of knowledge of external objects when one is not conscious of his body when in suspended animation, deep sleep or in death.[9] It cannot be said that the body merely helps the birth of knowledge which is, however, produced by

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5. ***** पारतंत्र्यं बनिर्मृतिः ।
पराधीनपदप्राप्तिरजत्वं प्रलयेऽभवः ॥ (*AV.*)

6. यं कामये तं तमुग्रं कृणोमि । रुद्राय धनुरातनोमि (*RV.* X, 125, 5-6)
विदे हि रुद्रो रुद्रियं महित्वम् (VII.40.5)
एको नारायण आसीन्न ब्रह्मा नेशानो नाग्नीषोमौ । (*Mahop.*)
स्तुहि श्रुतं गर्तसदं युवानं ** मृळा जरित्रे रुद्र स्तवानो (*RV.* ii, 33.11)
रुद्रस्य त्वेष धनुरालिः शिर उत्पिपेष ( )
तव श्रिये मरुतो मर्जयन्त रुद्र यत्ते जनिम चारु चित्रम् । पदं यद्विष्णोरुपमं निधायि तेन पासि गुह्यं नाम गोनाम् ॥ (*RV.* v. 3 3)
घ्नाञ्छिश्नदेवानभि वर्पसा भूत् (*RV.* x, 99.3)
मा शिश्नदेवा अपि गु॰ ऋतं न॰ । (*RV.* vii, 21.5)
स रुष्टः स प्रसन्नो यद्रुष्टो यत्प्रसन्नः तस्माद्रुद्रसप्रसादावभूताम् । तेषां मध्यं वैष्णवं यश आच्छंत् ( )
यो भूतानामधिपतो रुद्रस्तन्तिचरो वृषा (*TB.* iii, 3.2.5b)
रुद्रोपयन्तम् । भूरेर्दातारं सत्पतिं गृणीषे (*RV.* ii, 33.12)

7. This is how J. has represented the Pāśupata view in his *NS.*: See
यदि पाशुपताद्यभित्येदमुच्यते, तर्हि, तस्याशरीरत्वस्यापि तत्र सिद्धमिति तदप्यङ्गीकार्यं स्यात् । तथा च, कर्तृत्वानुपपत्तिरिति (*NS.* 419b)
The *Abhinavacandrikā*, however, says that it is not to be taken that according to Śaivas, Śiva has no body at any time. What is meant is that as Śiva does not survive in Pralaya and takes birth only later, he acquires a body only later. He could not therefore act as creator in the beginning:
न ब्रूमो वयं सदातनमशरीरत्वं हेतुरिति, येनोक्तदोषः स्यात् । किन्त्वादिकालीनम् । 'न च तदप्यसिद्धम् । श्रुत्या उत्पत्तिश्रवणेन, उत्पत्तेः प्राक् अशरीरत्वस्याङ्गीकरणीयत्वात् (*AC.* ii.2. p. 340)
This does not seem to reflect the view of J. Udayanācārya refers in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* to Śiva's taking up a *nirmāṇakāya* during creation which supports the view that at other times Śiva is without a body, according to the Śaiva school.

8. ननु शरीरस्यापि कर्तृत्वे बाधकाभावात् व्याप्तिविधुरोऽयं प्रसङ्गः । कारकप्रयोक्तृत्वं हि कर्तृत्वम्; न शरीरित्वमित्यत आह–'देहिन' इति (*NS.* p. 419b)

9. सत्यम्–कारकप्रयोक्तृत्वमेव कर्तृत्वम्; न शरीरित्वमिति; तच्च न प्रयत्नेन विना सम्भवति । न चेच्छामन्तरेण प्रयत्नः; न च ज्ञानादिनेच्छा, न च शरीरादृते ज्ञानम् । देहिनामेव जाग्रतां ज्ञानदर्शनात् । अदेहिनां मुग्धमोहानां चादर्शनात् । ततः कर्तृत्वस्य व्यापकं शरीरं विनाश्यद् व्यावर्तमानं, तदपि व्यावर्तयतीति (*NS.* p. 419b)

the senses and the senses are no doubt connected with the body. But all this will be true only of knowledge at the empirical level. Paśupati has eternal knowledge. He can, therefore, afford to dispense with a body.[10]

This argument is fallacious. It may be argued in turn that as willing is needed only to put forth effort, one may as well do away with willing in the case of Paśupati as creator and conceive of him as having only eternal effort and eternal knowledge. Further, as knowledge itself is useful only to the extent of evoking the desire to put forth the necessary effort, one may as well do away with Paśupati's knowledge by doing away with his willing.[11] We have, therefore, to admit that doership needs all the three: willing, knowing and making the effort. These are invariably concomitant with possessing a body. We have, therefore, to come to the conclusion that without having a body of his own Paśupati cannot be conceived as creating the world. The objection that if it be true that actuation of the causal complements at one's disposal would be impossible for anyone without having a body of his own, we will have to admit another body to actuate our present body is without substance. For the same body would be sufficient to generate the impelling force necessary to actuate itself without requiring another body to do so.[12] It would thus be clear that doership is possible only when there is will, knowledge and effort exercised thro' a body of one's own. None of these factors can be dispensed with in formulating a proper concept of God's creatorship. Apart from this, the Pāśupata cannot claim Īśvara to be endowed with eternal knowledge except on the authority of the Pāśupata Āgamas. But the difficulty is that Paśupati cannot be established as endowed with eternal knowledge, without first establishing the validity of the Pāśupata Āgamas and unless he himself is first established as having eternal knowledge, the Āgamas spoken by Him cannot have any validity as the work of an omniscient being of eternal wisdom.[13]

The next Sūtra: *Karaṇavac cen na bhogādibhyaḥ* (ii.2.40) meets a further objection to the position taken in the second (and the third)

10 ननु, ज्ञानजन्मन्येव शरीरस्योपयोगः। ज्ञानस्येन्द्रियजन्यत्वात्। इन्द्रियाणां च शरीरसंयोगनियमात्। नित्यज्ञानश्च भगवान् शिव इति, किं तस्य शरीरेणेति? (*NS*. p. 419b)

11. एवं तर्हि, प्रयत्नजन्मन्येवेच्छोपयोगिनीति, नित्यप्रयत्नस्येच्छापि न स्यात्। तथेच्छोत्पत्तावेव ज्ञानमुपयुज्यत इति नित्येच्छस्य ज्ञानमपि न स्यात्। (*NS*. p. 419b)

12. शरीरप्रेरणेऽपरं शरीरं नास्तीति चेत्; न। तेनैव सशरीरत्वात् (*NS*. p. 419b)

13. कुतश्चास्य नित्यज्ञानसिद्धिः? आगमादिति चेन्न; परस्पराश्रयप्रसंगात्। सिद्धे ह्यागमप्रामाण्ये, नित्यज्ञानेश्वरसिद्धिः। तत्सिद्धौ चागमस्य तत्प्रणीतत्वेन प्रामाण्यसिद्धिरिति (*NS*. p. 419b)

Sūtra[14] that a creator cannot be conceived as creating anything without having a body of his own. If a potter or a weaver in common experience is seen to need a body of his own (and a standing ground, etc.) in order to be able to make a pot or weave a piece of cloth, it is because he is unable to directly actuate the causal complements with which he has to work except thro' his body and his limbs. But there is no need to look for a separate body of his own in the case of Paśupati.[15] *For the entire causal complement of the world stands in the position of a body to Him in that it is directly actuated by him just as a potter or a weaver directly actuates his body. It is in this sense that the Āgamas describe the Lord Śiva as "Viśvamūrti"—having the whole world for His body.* Even in the pre-creation stage of the world, there exist Prakṛti, Kāla and other eternal principles which Paśupati can actuate directly[16] as the potter actuates his causal complements thro' his body.

The Sūtra refutes this contention. If Paśupati should be taken to directly actuate the causal complements at his disposal, without a body, it would make him liable to undergo the experiences of pleasure and pain in consequence of such an actuation—as in the case of the potter or the weaver who directly makes use of his body for purposes of actuation of the causal complements of the pot or the cloth. If it is argued that it is only things that have accrued to oneself thro' one's own past Karma (like one's own body) which when directly actuated

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14. Sutra No. 40 has been read and commented upon by M. in his *AV.* between Sūtras 38 and 39 in order to show that it embodies a refutation of such arguments in his defence as the Pāśupata may put up against the points made by the Sūtrakāra in the two Sūtras 38 and 39 (by suggesting that Pāśupati could dispense with a separate body and a standing ground etc. in so far as the eternal causal complements themselves could serve in their stead). This has *been pointed out by J. in his NS.:*
नन्विदं सूत्रद्वयं व्युत्क्रमेण कुतो व्याख्यातम्? सबन्धानुपपत्त्यधिष्ठानानुपपत्त्योरुभयोरपि परिहारः करणवच्चे-दित्यनेन निरस्यत इति ज्ञापनार्थम्। यदि पत्त, यथाक्रममेव व्याख्यायेत, तदा सन्निहिताधिष्ठानानुपपत्तिपरिहारनि-रासकमेवेदं ज्ञायेत। व्युत्क्रमेण तूभयमध्ये व्याख्याने सत्युभयसबन्धि विज्ञायत इति (*NS.* p. 419-20b)
In the *Sūtrabhāṣya,* however, M. has followed the serial order of these Sūtras in commenting on them. He has, however, given a subtle hint there and in the *AV.,* that schematically Sūtra 40 fits in between 38 and 39: See:
अत एव भाष्ये, 'अधिष्ठानादिरूपम्' इत्युक्तम्। अत्र तु, देहादिवत्' इति (*NS.* p. 419-420b)

15. इदमेव जगत् तस्य करणवत् अधिष्ठानादिरूपम् (*MBSB.* ii, 2.40)
The full sense and implication of these words of M. have been clarified in the BD. as follows:—
इदमेवेति—मायादिकारकसमुदायरूपं जगदेवेत्यर्थः। न ततोऽन्यत् भूम्यादिकमित्यर्थः। अनेन, सूत्रे, यथा: इदमेव इति पदानुषङ्गो दर्शितः। 'करणवत्' करणमस्मदादिशरीरेन्द्रियादि। तद्वत् समानं भवति। साक्षात् प्रयत्नाधि-ष्ठेयत्वसाम्यात् (*BD.* ii, 2.40)
This is a good illustration of the depth of thought that generally lies concealed behind the few measured words of M.

16. मदुक्तम्—आगमेष्वपि शिवस्य कर्तृत्वानुपपत्तिरिति, तदसत्। कुलालादयो हि कर्तारो दण्डचक्रादिकं साक्षात्प्रयत्ने-नाधिष्ठातुमनीशानाः तदधिष्ठानाय साक्षात् प्रयत्नाधिष्ठेयं शरीरमपेक्षन्ते। अत्र तु शिव कारकचक्रमेव देहः स्यात्; साक्षात् प्रयत्नाधिष्ठेयं स्यात्। ततः किमपरेण शरीरेण? अत एव भगवान् विश्वमूर्तिरिति गीयते। न चादिसृष्टेः प्राक् कारकाभावः। मायादेरकार्ये विद्यमानत्वात्। अन्यथा, सृष्टयनुपपत्तिरिति. (*NS.* p. 419)

by oneself would cause the experience of pleasure and pain thro' such actuation, it may be answered back that there is clear evidence of logical concomitance that whatever is directly actuated by one is the outcome of his own Karma. Hence, if Paśupati is considered as directly actuating the causal complements (without a body of his own) he would necessarily have to be exposed to the pleasure and pain attendant on such participation and such a person cannot be given the high place of a Deity.[17]

The other Sūtra: *Adhiṣṭhānānupapatteḥ* (II.2.39) shows that Paśupati cannot be the author of the world as, at the time of creating it, he could not have had any standing ground.[18] The plea that the causal complements themselves can be treated as standing ground, body etc., has already been rejected as involving liability to experience of pleasure and pain.[19] The Pāśupata may, however, put in that only a person with a body would need a standing ground to support his weight but not Paśupati who is bodiless.[20] This can be countered with the objection that a person without a body would find himself divested of intelligence and doership as well and be reduced to the position of a piece of stone or a block of wood.[21] If the Pāśupata should say that tho' bodiless, at other times, Paśupati chooses to assume a body sportively for the time being to carry on his creative activity, the reply would be that it would expose him to the natural consequences of such an act —i.e. courting birth and death with the assumption of a body and abandoning it afterwards and liability to undergo pleasure and pain.[22] It would not be proper to maintain that a body does not cause pleasure or pain to its owner. It would follow from the very fact of one's having a body that he or she will have to go thro' the pleasures and pains[23]

17. यदि शिवस्य कारकग्रामः साक्षात्प्रयत्नाधिष्ठेय स्यात् तदा तस्य सुखदु.खानुभवलक्षणभोगहेतुः स्यात्। साक्षात् प्रयत्नाधिष्ठेयेऽस्मदादिशरीरे तथा दर्शनात्। कर्माजितस्यैव तथात्वमिति चेन्न। साक्षात् प्रयत्नाधिष्ठेयत्वेन तथाभावस्याप्यापत्तेः। भोगादिमतश्च नेश्वरत्वम्। अत शिवस्य भोगादिप्रसगात् नेयं कल्पना युक्तेति (*NS.* p. 419)

साक्षात् प्रयत्नाधिष्ठेयेऽस्मदादिशरीरे कर्माजितत्वदर्शनेन कारकग्रामस्य साक्षात्प्रयत्नाधिष्ठेयत्वेनैव सुखदु खानुभव-लक्षणभोगहेतुत्वस्यैव कर्माजितत्वस्याप्यापादनसभवेन व्याप्याभिमतव्यापकत्वान्न तस्योपाधित्वमित्याशयवानाह– "साक्षात्" इति (NSSVC. ii, 2. p. 128b)

18. पृथिव्याद्यधिष्ठाने स्थितो हि कुलालादि.कार्यं करोति। न चास्य तदस्ति (*M.BSB.* ii, 2.39)

19. ननु, कारकाणामेवाधिष्ठानत्व भविष्यति, मैवम्। साधिष्ठानस्य चेतनस्य भोगादिप्रसक्तेरुक्तत्वात् (*NS.* p. 420b)

20 ननु, शरीरं हि गुरुत्वात् प्रसक्तपतन तत्प्रतिबन्धाय स्पर्शवदधिष्ठानमपेक्षते। ईश्वरस्य तु, शरीरविधुरस्य किमधिष्ठानेन? (*NS.* p. 420b)

21 अदेहश्चेदसर्वज्ञ शिलाकाष्ठादिवत् सदा (*AV.* ii, 2.39)

22. उत्पत्तिनाशौ सुखदु खभोगश्च प्राप्यन्ते तद्गताः (*M.BSB.* ii, 2.40)

तद्गताः शरीरादिसमानकारकव्रातगताः, तदुपादानहाननिमित्ता इति यावत् (*BD.* ii, 2.40)

स्यदेतत्–न सर्वदा सदाशिवोऽशरीरः। किंतु, लीलया शरीराण्यपि गृण्हाति; ततो नाय दोषः। न च भोगादिप्राप्तिः लीलया गृहीतस्य विग्रहस्य तदहेतुत्वात् इत्यत आह– (*NS.* p. 420b)

23. मैवम्–शरीर न भोगायतनं चेत्यस्य व्याहतत्वात् शरीरत्वेनैव तदनुमानाच्च (*NS*)

which the possession of a body and doing things with its help will bring in its wake.

The last Sūtra: *Antavattvam asarvajñatā vā* (ii.2.41) demolishes the contention put forward by the Pāśupata in Sūtras 38 and 40 that *Paśupati can be conceived both as having a body and as not having a body*—*by driving him between the horns of a dilemma.*[24] *If* Paśupati has a body of his own, He will be a limited being *(antavān)* like any ordinary person. Such a person cannot be regarded as the author of the world. On the other hand, if He has no body He cannot also have knowledge. It would be out of the question for such a person to be *all-knowing*. As only an omniscient being can be the author of the world, Paśupati cannot be accepted as the author of the world.[25] Thus, in either case, Paśupati cannot be accepted as the author of the world.

Concluding the review of the Pāśupata position M. points out in his *AV* that these and other objections and criticisms are bound to be brought up against any school of thought which stakes its opinions on the authority of particular Smṛtis or Āgamas, *independently of Vedic authority*. The difficulty lies in this that the authority of these Āgamas is made to rest (in these schools) on their being the utterances of some *trustworthy person. However eminent such a person may be (as human or divine)*, he cannot be taken to be absolutely free from those imperfections which may affect the validity of his opinions and utterances.

The claims of Pauruṣeya Āgamas and Smṛtis to absolute validity as utterances of omniscient authors are, thus, retarded by the *fallacy* of interdependence.[26] *These points have already been fully established* in the *Smṛtyadhikaraṇa* and the *Na vilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa* (See Vol. I. pp. 328-37).

The Sūtrakāra's own position that B. is the author of the eightfold dispensations of the Universe *(Janmādyasya yataḥ) is not open to any of the objections which have been brought up by him against* (the authorship of) Paśupati or other gods. For B.'s authorship of the world rests on the authority of the Śrutis which are *apauruṣeyapramāṇa*.[27] The difficulties and the antinomies of reasoning brought up against Paśupati's

24. करणवच्चेदित्युक्त देहवत्त्वपक्षे, सकर्तृत्वोक्त तदभावपक्षे च, दोषान्तरेण निरस्यति—अन्तवत्त्वमित्यादिना (Ragh. *TDP.*)

25. देहवत्त्वेऽन्तवत्त्वम्। अन्यथा, ज्ञानाभावः। शरीरिण एव ज्ञानोत्पत्तिदृष्टेः (*M.BSB.* ii. 2.41)

26. आनुमानिकं हि नित्यं जगत्कर्तारं सर्वज्ञं सिद्धे तद्वचनीयत्वेन प्रमाणत्वेन निरूपितम्। निश्चिते च तत्प्रामाण्ये, तद्वक्तृत्वविशेषस्य सिद्धिरित्यन्योन्याश्रयतया दुरवधारणप्रामाण्यम् (*NS.* p. 420)

27. न चैवं श्रुतिप्रामाण्यम्। अपौरुषेयत्वेन कर्तृदोषाणां शङ्काकलङ्काभावे सति, तस्य निरपेक्षस्येव स्वतो निश्चितत्वात् (*NS.* p. 420)

authorship of the world would not operate against B.'s authorship of the world; for B. is free from any of the defects and shortcomings to which every other being is exposed. B. exists for ever in all its glory. It has inscrutable powers in its own right. It knows no birth and death. It has a body of supreme intelligence, bliss, and power with its own organs of sense and activity which are all of spiritual essence. M. has cited evidence of the Śrutis in support of these ideas.[28] The Sūtrakāra himself has elsewhere in his work emphasized some of these points.[29] That should suffice to prevent objections of the same kind as have been put forward against the Pāśupata and other positions from being brought up against B.'s causality of the Universe.[30]

Interpretations of Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja.

While S. directs this *adhi.* against the Pāśupata and several other schools like the Tārkika, the Seśvara-Sāmkhya and the Yoga which look upon God as only the intelligent and efficient cause or Author of the world and refuse to make Him its material cause also,[31] R. restricts it to the Pāśupatas.[32] According to S. the inadequacy (*asāmañjasya*) referred to in the first Sūtra, lies in the very conception of a creator-God within the framework of Kevalanimittakāraṇavāda, as it exposes God to the charges of partiality and cruelty in being responsible for the inequalities in His creations.[33] According to R. the inadequacy of the Pāśupata referred to in the first Sūtra lies (i) in its making an absolute distinction between the efficient and the material causes of the world instead of accepting their complete oneness in B.[34] and (ii) in its dis-

28. बुद्धिमनोऽङ्गप्रत्यङ्गवत्ता भगवतो लक्षयामहे बुद्धिमान्, मनोवान्, अङ्गवान् प्रत्यङ्गवानिति। 'यदात्मको भगवान् तदात्मिका व्यक्तिः। किमात्मको भगवान्? ज्ञानात्मक ऐश्वर्यात्मकः शक्त्यात्मक' इति। 'सद्देहः सुखगन्धश्च ज्ञानभाः सत्पराक्रमः।
ज्ञानज्ञान. सुखसुख. स विष्णुः परमो मत . ॥"
अविरोधो विरोधश्च मानेनैव हि गम्यते।
अत उक्तं समस्तं च वासुदेवस्य युज्यते ॥ (*AV.* ii, 2.adh.11)

29. श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्। आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि। सर्वोपेता च तद्दर्शनात्। विकरणत्वान्नेति चेत् तदुक्तम् (*BS.* ii, 1.23-32)

ब्रह्मवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात् (iii, 1.14)

30 नन्वीश्वरस्यापि कर्तृत्वं न युज्यते *** शरीरेन्द्रियादिविकलत्वाच्च न कर्तृत्वम्। न हि कश्चित् शरीरादिविकलः कर्तोपलब्धः। भूम्याद्याधारविधुरत्वाच्च *** इत्यय पूर्वपक्षोऽत्राधिकरणे निरस्यते (*NS.* ii, 1.28)

31 तस्मादप्रकृतिरधिष्ठाता केवल निमित्तकारणमीश्वर इत्यय पक्षोऽत्र प्रतिषिध्यते। सा चेयं वेदबाह्येश्वरकल्पनानेकप्रकारा। केचित् साङ्ख्ययोगव्यपाश्रयाः कल्पयन्ति *** माहेश्वरास्तु मन्यन्ते ** तथा वैशेषिकादयोऽपि (S.*BSB.* ii, 2.37)

32. इदानीं पशुपतिमतस्य वेदविरोधादसामंजस्याच्चानादरणीयतोच्यते (*R*)

33. किं पुनरसामञ्जस्यम्? हीनमध्यमोत्तमभावेन हि प्राणिभेदान् विदधत ईश्वरस्य रागद्वेषादिप्रसक्तेरस्मदादिवदनीश्वरत्वं प्रसज्येत। कर्मापेक्षित्वाददोष इति चेन्न; कर्मेश्वरयोः प्रवर्त्यप्रवर्तयितृत्वे इतरेतराश्रयदोषप्रसङ्गात् *** (S. *BBB.* ii, 2.37)

34. निमित्तोपादानयोर्भेदं, निमित्तकारणं च पशुपतिमाचक्षते (*R*)

torting the purity of the Vedic teachings about Sādhanas by the introduction of spurious and questionable elements.[35]

Looking, however, to the words: *Patyur asāmañjasyāt* of the opening Sūtra, it seems the Sūtrakāra is thinking of some inadequacy (*asāmañjasya*) pertaining to Paśupati himself *per se* i.e. his metaphysical status and position which stands in the way of his being accepted as the supreme *Jagatkāraṇa, as the Jijñāsya-Brahman of the Sūtrakāra has* been defined in Sūtra i, 1.2, rather than *to any inherent defect in the conception of a creator*-God or in *not* making Him the material cause also. This impression is confirmed by the smooth and natural way in which the subject of the proposition "Patyuḥ" in the wording of the opening Sūtra becomes connected in this interpretation without the importation of words like 'system' or 'doctrine' (*matam*) with the predicates of the *following* Sūtras *also*: [पत्युः] अधिष्ठानानुपपत्तेः । (पत्युः) अन्तवत्त्वमसर्वज्ञता वा

S.'s view that the *adhi.* is meant to refute the position taken by the Tārkika, Seśvara-Sāmkhya, the Yoga and the Māheśvara schools that Īśvara is *only* the efficient cause of the world and *not* the material cause does not seem to be well-founded. For there is no express denial of the distinction between the *nimitta* and *upādānakāraṇas* in the wording of any of the Sūtras of this *adhi.* or in the drift of their arguments. Nor is there any clear and categorical establishment of the identity of the *nimitta* and *upādānakāraṇas* in one and the same creator, in the wording of the Sūtras of this *adhi.*

S. and Vācaspati have tried to overcome this difficulty by suggesting that the criticisms here are not aimed at the Vedāntic B. established in the Śrutis as *nimittakāraṇa* (also) of the world but against those who have pledged themselves to be guided exclusively by reasoning in determining the nature of God's causality of the world.[36] But the futility of the approach to God thro' pure reason alone to the exclusion of Śruti has already been established by the Sūtrakāra in i, 1.3 and ii.1.11-12 and there can be no justification to reopen the issue here. Moreover, there is hardly any evidence to show that the Pāśupata is such an exclusive votary and admirer of Kevalatarka (pure reasoning) as to be made the Pradhānamalla among the advocates of Kevalatarka. From what we know of the Śaiva or Pāśupata schoolmen, they are pri-

35. तथा निःश्रेयससाधनमपि श्रुतिविरुद्धकल्पितमित्यादिकम् (R.BSB. ii, 2, 35)

36. परस्य तु दृष्टान्तबलेन कारणादिस्वरूपं निरूपयतां यथादृष्टमेव सर्वमभ्युपगन्तव्यमित्ययमस्त्यतिशयः (S.BSB. ii, 2.37)

आगमानपेक्षमनुमानं तु, दृष्टसाधर्म्येण प्रवर्तमानं दृष्टविपर्यये कुण्ठमपि विपर्ययम् (Bhāmatī ii, 2 38)

marily interested in their own Śaiva—"Āgamas" on whose supreme authority they seek to establish Śiva or Paśupati as the efficient cause alone of the world.[37] The Śaivas are in fact so jealous of the status of their Āgamas that they have not hesitated to claim for them an equality of status with the "Śrutis" or the apauruṣeya-Vedas of the Vedāntins.[38] This should suffice to make us hesitate to accept S.'s explanation that the Pāśupatas are being checkmated here with their own trump card of Kevalatarka in respect of their position that God is only the efficient cause of the world and not its material cause.

Apart from this, the thesis that B. is the undivided nimitta-cum upādāna cause (*abhinnanimittopādānakāraṇa*) of the world has already been established according to S.'s and R.'s own interpretation of the Sūtras, in the *Prakṛtyadhi.* (i.4.23-27) and in the Ārambhaṇādhi (ii.1.14-20). It would thus be superfluous to revert to the same topic again in this *adhi.* also. However, if the Sūtrakāra felt that the stand taken by the Pāśupata (and some other schools) that God is *not* and *cannot be* the material cause also of the world was important enough to call for a special refutation here, he should have shown us in his criticism of that position *what precisely will be the defects in their not making God the material cause also.* But what we actually find in the Sūtras here is something entirely different and unexpected—a ruthless criticism of Paśupati's role as a responsible and intelligent Creator (efficient cause) of the world. This is clear from the gist of S.'s attack on the role of Paśupati as a creator-God arraigning Him for his partiality and cruelty in creating a world of inequalities and misery:—"If the Lord assigns to different people different positions, He will be like any one of us, subject to hatred, passion and so on. If we say that these positions high, intermediate and low are determined by the merit and demerit of living beings, this leads to interdependence. To suggest that mutual dependence is beginningless does not solve the problem. If imperfections lead to activity, as the Nyāya Sūtra states, then even God who is active is imperfect"[39] and so on.

These inadequacies lay the axe at the root of a Creator-God or God conceived as *nimittakāraṇa.* They will apply with as much force to S.'s and the Sūtrakāra's own B. in its capacity as *nimittakāraṇa as to*

37. It will be seen that M. shows a better appreciation of the Śaiva position when he says:
शैवाद्यगमसप्राप्तदृष्टगेन फलेन तु । तद्वाक्योपमयान्यच्च *** (*AV.* i.1.3)
Cf. ननु, पशुपतेरपि एवमागमैरनुमानैश्च जगत्कारणताप्रतिपादितैव, ततः को विशेष इत्यत आह—श्रुतीति। पाशुपतादितोऽपि श्रुतीना प्रामाण्यस्य गुरुत्वात् (*NS.* p. 420)
38. वय वेदशिवागमयोर्भेदं न पश्यामः (Śrīkaṇṭha, *BSB.* ii, 2.38)
39. S. Radhakrishnan, *The Brahmasutras*, p. 390.

the God of the Pāśupatas. The additional role of being the material cause supposed to be given to B. in the Sūtrakāra's system will *not* in any way make it immune from these defects. The Sūtrakāra would be putting himself in a false and awkward position and catching a Tartar in the Pāśupata by waxing eloquent on the inadequacies of a creator-God. The defences of *anādikarma, karmasāpekṣatva,* etc. available to the Sūtrakāra in vindicating the personal equity of God in his own system would be equally available to the Pāśupata. In the circumstances, the Sūrtakāra should have left the role of God as nimittakāraṇa untouched and directed his attention to making out an equally good case for accepting God's material causality by refuting the Pāśupata's objections to such a conception. It serves no useful purpose to harp upon the same old objections which have been laid to rest in the *Na prayojanavattvādhi.* and the *Vaiṣamyanairghṛṇyādhi.* in II.1.32-37. To repudiate God's nimittakāraṇatva *is not the same as establishing His Upādānakāraṇtva* in addition.[40] It is not that easily or automatically achieved! S.'s approach to this *adhi.* is thus not satisfactory. If we cut out R.'s bringing up of the issue of nimitta and upādānakāraṇas here, we will be in a better position to appreciate the stand taken by M. that what disqualifies Paśupati and other gods from being recognized as Jagatkāraṇa is their metaphysical position of Pāratantrya. The text: *Eko* ha *vai Nārāyaṇa āsīn na Brahmā neśānaḥ* cited by R. here, elucidating *the asāmañjasya of* Paśupati *points in the same direction.*

The defects made out by S. in the Pāśupata doctrine with special reference to the *asāmañjasya* in accepting Paśupati as the creator of the world are in the nature of *adverse consequences which if accepted would* tarnish the image of God as such. These defects are such as would also naturally recoil on S.'s own (and the Sūtrakāra's own) position in accepting God or B. as the efficient cause of the world.[41] *It is evidently for this reason that R. has wisely refrained from raising them, in his turn.* The Pāśupata cannot be dislodged by arguments which boomerang on the Sūtrakāra. *If neither the inequalities in creation nor the acceptance of the distinction between the nimitta and the upādāna* causes of the world can thus be the gravamen of *asāmañjasya* of the Pāśupata, it has naturally to be sought and found elsewhere, in the finiteness and metaphysical dependence (*pāratantrya*) of Paśupati. That is what M. has done.

S. cannot say that as the Pāśupata cannot hope to rescue his God from the charges of partiality and cruelty in creating a world of gaping inequalities and cruelties, except by appealing, like himself, to the *anād-*

40. Cf. एकं सन्धित्सतोऽपरं प्रच्यवते ।

41. (बहुवादिनोऽस्य दोषस्य साम्यात्) स्वभावादकर्मवदस्मादृशहेतुप्रत्ययाभावात् (*TC.* p. 924)

itva of Samsāra, and by making God confer rewards and punishments according to the merits and demerits of creatures on the authority of the Śruti, he would be bound to accept the identity of the efficient and the material causes of the world in B. out of respect for the authority of the same Śrutis.[42]

For, in the light of the evidence on this question, discussed in the earlier contexts of the Sūtras (See Vol. I. pp. 186-87; 307-13; 347-51; 361-63; 372-79; 393-398), it cannot be taken for granted that the Śrutis and the Sūtras recognize B. as the material cause of the world. Apart from that, there is another difficulty. The Creator-God in S.'s system is neither the Nirviśeṣa-B. nor the Jīvātman but the Saguṇa-B. This Saguṇa-B. is, however, the projection of the Jīvātman's Avidyā. It would, therefore, be illogical to make the same Saguṇa-B. take into account the Karma of those very individual souls by whose Avidyā It has itself been projected and brought into being, in ordering *their* lives as we find them.[43]

Commenting on the second Sūtra here, S. writes that the Pāśupata and the other schools cannot establish a proper relation between God, souls and matter in order to sustain their view of God's creatorship of the world. This relation can be neither *Samyoga* (contact) nor *Samavāya* (inherence). Samyoga, (being *avyāpyavṛtti*), can only relate things which have parts and are not ubiquitous. But according to the Tārkika, Pāśupata and the Yoga schools, God, Souls and Matter are all of them infinite in extent and devoid of parts. The relation of inherence is based on *ādhārādheyabhāva* as between entities proved to be incapable of existing separately from each other, as substance and quality. Such a relation cannot be asserted bestween God and the Souls and matter.[44]

S. is satisfied that his own 'Vedāntic' position is free from such difficulties, as it accepts the relation between God and the world and Souls to be one of identity (*tādātmya*)[45] But then as there can be no relation of identity between Cetana and Jaḍa in any straight sense of the term, the *Bhāmatī* is forced to qualify S.'s statement by saying that the rela-

42. ननु, मम मते श्रुत्यनुसारेण कर्मसापेक्षत्वादीश्वरस्य रागाद्यप्रसग इति न स्वव्याघातः। परस्यापि तथा चेत् श्रुत्यनुसारेणोपादानतापि स्यादिति चेन्न (*TC.* p. 924)

४३. त्वन्मतेऽपि विशिष्टचिद्रूपस्येश्वरस्य जीवभ्रान्तिकल्पितत्वेन जीवकर्मापेक्षायोगात् (*TC.* p. 924)
निर्विशेषशुद्धस्याकल्पकत्वात्, आत्मनैव कल्पितत्वे आत्माश्रयात्, जीवभ्रान्तिकल्पितत्वेनेत्युक्तम्।
(*TCP.* p. 924)

44 न हि प्रधानपुरुषव्यतिरिक्त ईश्वरोऽन्तरेण सबन्ध प्रधानपुरुषयोरीशिता। न तावत् सयोगलक्षणः सबन्धः। प्रधानपुरुषेश्वराणा सर्वंगतत्वात् निरवयवत्वाच्च। नापि समवायलक्षणः। आश्रयाश्रयिभावानिरूपणात्
(S.*BSB.* ii,2.38)

45. ब्रह्मवादिन 'कथमिति चेत्; न तस्य तादात्म्यलक्षणसबन्धोपपत्तेः (S.*BSB.* ii,2.38)

tion of identity referred to by him is something indescribable—which can only be described as neither real nor unreal.[46]

This is not satisfactory. Anything *anirvacanīya* will have to be placed within the sphere of the erroneous. An all-knowing Creator-God can hardly be said to be entertaining erroneous notions in regard to its own relation to the world of matter and souls.[47]

If God is to actuate Matter and the Souls, He cannot do so through a relation of identity with them; for, nowhere is actuation of one thing by another seen to proceed from a relation of identity.[48] From S.'s point of view, the Sūtra *Sambandhānupapatteḥ* could have been dispensed with as the next one *Adhiṣṭhānānuppatteḥ* can as well accommodate within itself the criticism based on Sambandhānupapatti.[49]

Under the third Sūtra, S. argues that as the Pradhāna of the Pāśupatas and the Yogas and the atoms of the Tārkikas are not open to perception, God in these systems cannot be regarded as their activiser (adhiṣṭhātṛ) from without.[50] This criticism is unsustainable. For neither the atoms nor the Pradhāna has been or can be deemed to be imperceptible *to God Himself in any of these systems.* They are imperceptible only to the human eye. That is not relevant to the question before us.[51] This disposes of S.'s elucidation of the preamble: *Karaṇavat*[52] in Sūtra 40.

In his C. on Sūtra 39, S. makes it clear that according to the Pāśupatas, Pradhāna is the principle to be actuated and God is its actuator. The Sūtra seeks to refute God's authorship of the world. This is done by showing that in as much as Pradhāna and other principles are imperceptible (to God?) they cannot be actuated by Him. This is the same as saying He cannot actuate them. The proposition would thus be that God cannot be the creator of the world with the help of Pradhāna etc. as He cannot be their actuator. This way of arguing would expose one to the defect of *Sādhyāviśiṣṭatā*.[53]

46. तस्य मते अनिर्वचनीयतादात्म्यलक्षणसंबन्धोपपत्तेः । (*Bhāmati*)
47. सर्वज्ञस्येश्वरस्य स्वस्मिन् जगत्तादात्म्यभ्रमाभावात् । (*TC.* p. 924)
'सर्वज्ञस्य भ्रान्तत्वायोगात्' इति न प्रयोजनाधिकरणे भामत्युक्तेरिति भावः (*TCP.* p. 924)
48. तादात्म्यसंबन्धेनाधिष्ठानत्वस्य क्वाप्यदृष्टेश्च । (*TC.* p. 924)
49. अधिष्ठानानुपपत्तेरित्युत्तरसूत्रे एव प्रधानस्याधिष्ठेयत्वाभावसाधकानां अप्रत्यक्षत्वादीनामिवासंबन्धत्वस्यापि विवक्षितुं शक्यत्वेन एतत्सूत्रवैयर्थ्यात् । (*TC.* p. 924)
50. इतश्चानुपपत्तिः तार्किकपरिकल्पितस्येश्वरस्य । न ह्यप्रत्यक्षं रूपादिहीनं च प्रधानमीश्वरस्याधिष्ठेयं संभवति ।
(*S.BSB.* II, 2.39)
51. परमाण्वादेरीश्वरं प्रति प्रत्यक्षत्वाच्च (*TC.* p. 925)
52. अत एव करणवत्—यथा ह्यप्रत्यक्षं चक्षुरादिकरणं जीवोऽधितिष्ठति, एवमीश्वरोऽप्यप्रत्यक्षं प्रधानादीनि [illegible] [illegible] इति, अभिप्रायम् । ईश्वरं प्रति प्रधानादेरप्रत्यक्षत्वाभावेन [illegible] (*TC.* p. 925b)
53. कर्तृत्वानुपपत्तेः साध्यत्वेन, हेतुकरणायोगात् (*TC.* p. 925b)

In the last Sūtra, S. has tried to confound the Pāśupata and other Theists with a dilemma. Does the omniscient Lord of Creation know the measure of Pradhāna, the souls and of Himself or not? If He does, they all become limited. So when all the souls become released from Samsāra and Jaḍaṣṛṣti also ceases in consequence, God too will have to become *functus officio*[54] and cease to be God. We will then be landed in Śūnyavāda in the end. If God does not know the measure and the number of souls etc., He will cease to be all-knowing.[55]

The dilemma is easily rebutted. Assuming that all the souls get released some day, there will be no prospect of Śūnyavāda as threatened by S.; for the Cetanas will be surviving in release according to the Theists and the Jaḍas too will be there in essence though they may not bind the souls and God can surely continue to rule over them as before.[56] The prospect of Śūnyavāda is more likely to arise in S.'s own philosophy, where everything other than pure consciousness—i.e. to say Jīvas, Īśvara, the world of space, and time, the Vedas, the flow of anādikarma, creation and dissolution etc. have all to face sublation some day as they are all of them no more than "superimposed".[57]

Theism can certainly maintain that the number of souls is infinite and that God knows that it is so. Not knowing the exact numerical limit in respect of things which do not have a numerical limit cannot take away God's omniscience.[58] The *Bhāmatī* itself concedes the point.[59]

Nevertheless, Vācaspati has argued in support of S.'s interpretation that it is possible from the premise of the substantiality (*dravyatva*) of the Jīvas etc., to establish that there must be a limit to them, their number and so on.[60] But the premise that whatever has substantiality

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सर्वज्ञेनेश्वरेण प्रधानस्य पुरुषाणामात्मनश्च इयत्ता परिच्छिद्यते, न वा? उभयथापि दोषोऽनुषक्त एव। पूर्वस्मिन्
54. विकल्पे इयत्तापरिच्छिन्नत्वात् प्रधानपुरुषेश्वराणामन्तवत्त्वमवश्यभावि। **ततश्चेयत्तापरिच्छिन्नाना मध्ये ये
संसारिणः संसारान्मुच्यन्ते तेषां संसारोऽन्तवान्, संसारित्वं चान्तवत्। एवमितरेष्वपि क्रमेण मुच्यमानेषु संसारस्य
संसारिणां चान्तवत्वं स्यात्। प्रधानं च सविकारं पुरुषार्थं ईश्वरस्याधिष्ठेयं संसारित्वेनाभिमतं, तच्छून्यतायामी-
श्वरः किमाधितिष्ठेत्। प्रधानपुरुषेश्वराणां चान्तवत्त्वे सति आदिमत्वप्रसंग. आद्यन्तवत्त्वे च शून्यवादप्रसंगः
(S.BSB. ii, 2.41)

55. अथापरो विकल्पोऽभ्युपगम्यते, तत ईश्वरस्य सर्वज्ञत्वाभ्युपगमहानिरपरो दोषः प्रसज्येत (S.BSB. ii, 2.41)

56. सर्वमुक्तावपि चेतनानां जडानां च नित्यानां सत्त्वेन शून्यवादाप्रसंगात्। कार्याभावस्य चेष्टत्वात् (TC. p. 925b)

तव मत एव कल्पितस्य चिन्मात्रादन्यस्य ईश्वरादेः कालादेः वेदादेः कर्मसृष्टिप्रलयादिप्रवाहस्य च कदाचिन्निः
57. शेषनिवृत्त्यवश्यभावेन, शून्यवादापातात् (TC. p. 925b)
58. जीवादीनामसंख्यत्वेनाविद्यमानाया इयत्ताया अज्ञाने सार्वज्ञ्याहानेश्च (TC. p. 925)
59. यस्यान्तोऽस्ति तस्यान्तवत्वाग्रहणमसर्वज्ञतामापादयेत्। यस्य त्वन्त एव नास्ति तस्य तदग्रहणं नासर्वज्ञतामापा-
दयति। नहि शशविषाणाद्यज्ञानादज्ञो भवतीति भावः (*Bhāmatī* ii, 2.41)
60. प्रधानपुरुषेश्वराणामपि संख्याभेदवत्त्वमन्तवत्त्वं च द्रव्यत्वाद्वा, संख्यान्यत्वे सति प्रमेयत्वाद्वा अनुमातव्यम्।
ततश्चान्तवत्त्वमसर्वज्ञता वा (*Bhāmatī* ii, 2.41)

is numerically limited is not a conclusive one; for atoms by all accounts, are numerically infinite.[61] If in spite of this, we are to conclude that there must be a limit to the number of souls because they are substances and use that conclusion itself as a further premise to establish that such substances as have a limit set to their number and such other attributes must have an end (*antavat*), the argument can be turned with equal force against S.'s own Brahman which is numerically "one".[62]

Vācaspati would fain brush aside this criticism saying that unlike the Pāśupata and other schoolmen who depend on reasoning, the Vedāntin holds that the nature of his B. and its "oneness" etc., are known only thro' Śrutis and that this makes a vital difference.[63] In the light, however, of the Advaita Brahman's Svaprakāśatva (self-luminosity) defined in terms of अवेद्यत्वे सत्यपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वम् it is doubtful how far it would be maintainable that the nature of B. is directly *made known* by the Śruti.[64]

In S.'s interpretation of the concluding Sūtra: *Antavattvam asarvajñatā vā* (ii.2.41) one of the predicates *"antavattvam"* is connected with "Pradhāna, Jīvas and Īśvara" *imported* as the subject of the proposition. The other predicate *'asarvajñatā'* is then obliquely connected only with Īśvara (as suggesting that He would be losing His omniscience, in the event of the Pāśupata's accepting the other alternative of the dilemma with which he is confronted). This compares very unfavorably with the straight and simple way in which both the predicates (*antavattva* and *asarvajñatā*) are *directly connected with the same* subject *'Patyuḥ'* given in the opening Sūtra, in M.'s interpretation.[65]

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62. स्वमतापातकत्वाच्च (*TC* p. 925)
63. अस्माकं त्वागमगम्येऽर्थे तदाधिनविषयतया नानुमानं प्रभवतीति भावः (*Bhāmati* ii. 2 41)
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66. एतेन पूर्वत्र भोगादिभ्य इत्यनेनेश्वरस्य कर्मफलभोगप्रसंग उक्तः। ईश्वरस्य पुण्यपापरूपकर्मवत्वेऽङ्गीक्रियमाणे जीववत् सृष्टिसंहारास्पदत्वरूपान्तवत्वमसर्वज्ञता चापद्यत इति वाशब्दस्य चार्थत्वमुपेत्य, अन्तवत्वासर्वज्ञतयोरीश्वरे सामानाधिकरण्यं वदतां केषाचित् सूत्रार्थोऽपि प्रत्युक्त। वा शब्दे चशब्दार्थत्वस्यास्वारस्यात अन्तवत्त्वादित्येव पूर्तौ विशिष्यासर्वज्ञताग्रहणे प्रयोजनाभावाच्च। आपादकस्याध्याहार्यत्वाच्चेति (Ragh. *TCP*. p. 925)

67. सूत्रे, करणवत् इति मतुबन्त पदं भावप्रधानमनुवर्तनीयम्।

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(Ragh. *TCP*. p. 925)

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CHAPTER XII

THE ŚĀKTA SCHOOL EXAMINED

12. *Śāktādhikaraṇam* (ii.2, 42-45).

This *adhi.* is directed against the Śākta system which has intimate connection with the Śaiva. The Śāktas recognize Śakti, conceived as a female principle, as the sole 'creator' of the Universe. The school *is also known as Vāmamārga after its worship of the female principle*[1] with Tantric rites. The Śākta Āgamas are more commonly known as "Tantras".[2] Three shades of Śākta thought have been referred to M. in his AV., *the Mahāvāma, Madhyavāma and Aṇuvāma. J. informs us* that these also go by the names of Śākta, Śāmbhava and Āṇava schools.[3]

Śakti is all-in-all in the Mahāvāma school. She needs no partnership *with Śiva to be the creator of the Universe. The other two schools* make room for her alliance with Śiva to a greater or a less extent in the act of creation. There is thus propriety in considering this school *after the Pāśupata.*

The examination of the Śākta view of creation in this concluding *adhi.* of the *Sāmayapāda* assumes special significance from the point of view of the Theism of Bādarāyaṇa in which the Cit-Prakrti holds an important position as the Abhimāni-Devatā or presiding deity of Jaḍa-Prakṛti—This has been well-brought out by *M.* in *his C.* on the *Akṣa-*

1. *Cf.* वाम सौन्दर्यम् (Trivikrama *TD. i, 2.14*).
2. J. in his NS refers to the *Bhuvaneśvarī-Tantra, Tripurā-Tantra, Bhairavī-Tantra and Kubjikātantra of* the Śāktas.
3. शाक्ताश्च त्रिविधाः—महावामा, मध्यवामा, अणुवामाश्चेति. एत एव क्वचित् शाक्तशाम्भवाणवशब्दैरुच्यन्ते (*NS.* ii, 2.42. p. 424)

See: Jadunath Sinha: *A History of I. Phil.* Vol. III. p. 93.

rādhi., the Prakṛtyadhi. and other contexts.[4] While the Theism of Bādarāyaṇa can thus accommodate Śakti as Cit-Prakṛti, it cannot agree to Śakti taking the place of B. as the Supreme Cause of all (*Kāraṇa-kāraṇa*). The Sūtrakāra has, therefore, drawn attention to the obvious limitation of Śakti as a creative principle *as conceived by the Śāktas* that by its very nature as a female principle it would require to be impregnated by a superior principle[5]; for no origination of life is possible from a female principle without impregnation by a male principle.[6] Instances of production of progeny by the male without the participation of the female are exceptions of the rule.[7] But there is no example of the origination of life by the female without the dominant role of the male.[8] M. has evidently adhered to the biological terminology here as the Śākta cult had crystallized into the worship and glorification of the female principle in evolution, having lost sight of the subordinate role of Śakti as 'creative energy'. His point is that by hypothesis Śakti presupposes One who is competent to direct it. If Śakti itself is conceived as an intelligent principle, it can hardly be the material cause, as has been shown on earlier occasions. The Theism of Bādarāyaṇa needs to refute Śaktipariṇāmavāda as much as Brahmapariṇāmavādā.

The second Sūtra: *Na ca kartuḥ karaṇam* refutes the position of the Madhyavāma school which admits Sadāśiva as an adjunct (*upasarjanam*) to Śakti in such creation. But the position given to Śiva is most inadequate as He is conceived to be without a body and sense organs. And without a body, Śiva could not have the necessary knowledge to help Śakti. Śakti by herself cannot have the power to create the body of Śiva in order that He may be able to help her. If she has such power, she may as well create the whole world by herself without waiting to take Śiva's help. It cannot be that she takes Śiva's help to be able to create His body. *For Śiva himself, without a body of his own, cannot be of any assistance to her.*[9]

The Aṇuvāma school offers to rescue Śakti from this predicament by providing Śiva with a body, sense organs, supreme knowledge and

4. See Vol. I, pp. 227-31; 305-7.
5. Cf. त्व देव शक्त्या गुणकर्मयोनौ रेतस्त्वजायां कविरादधेऽजः (*Bhāg.* iii, 6, 28-29)
6 'उत्पत्त्यसंभवात्' (ii, 2.42) नहि पुरुषाननुगृहीतस्त्रीभ्य उत्पत्तिर्दृश्यते (*M.BSB.* ii, 2.42)
दृष्टा पुंभ्यः सदासृष्टिः स्त्रीपुंभ्यो वा विशेषतः (*AV.*) विशेषतः प्राचुर्येण (*NS.*)
7. अयं च दोषो न पुरुषेषु स्त्रीरहितपुरुषमात्रादपि द्रोणादीनामुत्पत्तिदर्शनात् इत्युक्तमसाधारणेति (*TPG.*)
8. सा हि क्वचित् पुरुषमात्रात्, क्वचित् पुरुषानुगृहीताभ्यः स्त्रीभ्यो दृष्टा न पुनः क्वापि केवलाभ्यः स्त्रीभ्यो दृष्टा येनोक्तव्याप्तेर्व्यभिचारः स्यात् (*NS.* 423)
9. देहवता हि शिवेनापत्योत्पत्तौ शक्तेः साचिव्यमाचरणीयम्। न विदेहेन। तस्य प्रलीनवत् इन्द्रियविज्ञानादि-विकलस्य तदनुपपत्तेः। न च शिवदेहोत्पत्तौ केवलाया. शक्तेः शक्तिरस्ति; प्रागुक्तदोषात्। अन्यथात्रापि तदो-पपत्तौ शिवाङ्गीकरणवैयर्थ्यापत्तेश्च। न च शिवसहितायाः। विदेहस्य साहाय्यकरणानुपपत्तेः
(*NS.* p. 423-424b)

powers. The Sūtra *Vijñānādibhāve vā tadapratiṣedhaḥ* (ii.2.44) points out that if the Śākta can confer *so much* on Śiva to make him an effective helpmate of Śakti, he could as well make him the Supreme Creator and join hands with the Pāśupata and dispense with Śakti *altogether* instead of claiming an independent status for Śakti and probably also for Śiva.[10] It would be unphilosophical to claim *the same status* for Śakti and Śiva. And Śiva himself has already been shown in the Pāśupata-*adhi.* to fall in the *category of asvatantra or finite reality.*[11] If all that Śakti ultimately stands for is the concept of a presiding deity over Jaḍa-Prakṛti, *she can safely be equated with Cit-Prakrti of the* Vedānta. But her jurisdiction over Jaḍa Prakṛti and the Jīvas would still be *subject to the Supreme B.*[12a] *With this Vedāntic orientation*, Śaktivāda can be acceptable.[12b]

The next Sutra: *Vipratiṣedhācca* is a general criticism of the deficiencies *of all the three shades of Śākta thought that they are all of* them in conflict with the teaching of Śrutis and Smṛtis.

M. is the first known commentator on the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa *to regard this adhi. as a refutation of the Śākta system.* This has been accepted by Nimbārka also; tho' his interpretation of the Sūtras here *differs in respect of several details and the complexion of the objections* raised. This is how Nimbārka renders the Sūtras: It is impossible that *the world can be produced from Śakti without Puruṣa. If you say* that Puruṣa is there in touch with Śakti, there is still no instrument—as all *instruments are produced only after* creation. If Śakti is endowed with

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10. यदि शक्त्यनुग्राहकस्येश्वरस्य, विज्ञानादिकरणमंगीक्रियते, तदा तेनैव जगदुत्पत्तिसंभवात्, व्यर्थं शक्तेरपि पृथक् कर्तृत्वांगीकरणं स्यात्। (*TP.* ii, 2.44) (द्वयोः समस्वातंत्र्यानुपपत्तेः)

11. तथाचानेन प्रकृतपाशुपतस्याप्रतिषेधः कृतः स्यात्; अनुमतमेव स्यात्। तच्च निरस्तमिति भावः (*TP.* ii, 2.44)

12a. This is how Vādirāja in his *TPG.* has understood the meaning of the *Bhāṣya:* यदि विज्ञानादिकरणं तस्यांगीक्रियते, तदा तत एव सृष्ट्याद्युपपत्तेरीश्वरवादान्तर्भावः (M).
Read:— विज्ञानादिभावे वा तदप्रतिषेधः' इति सूत्रस्य शक्त्यनुग्राहकस्येश्वरस्य च विज्ञानादिकरणं यद्यंगीक्रियते तर्हि, मम योनिर्महद्ब्रह्म। (*Gitā* XIV. 3) इति गीतोक्तेः अस्मदभिमतेश्वरवादान्तर्भावेन, ईश्वरादेव सृष्टिरित्युक्ता स्यात्। तच्चोक्तविधया श्रुतिस्मृत्यनुकूलत्वादुपपन्नतरम्। अतस्तदप्रतिषेधः। ईदृशशक्तिमतस्याप्रतिषेधः इति भाष्यस्यपदमहिम्नैव संभवदर्थान्तरमप्यनुसन्धेयम्। अन्यथा, तत एव सृष्ट्याद्युपपत्तेः, इति किमिति ब्रूयात्? (*TPG.* p. 87)
The *interpretation of the Bhāsya text as given* by J. according to Vādirāja is a possible alternative to silence the Śākta, if he should insist on not going beyond Śiva as the (joint) Creator.
टीकाकारास्तु—ईदृशजगत्कर्तुः पशुपतित्वमेवेपि परेण दुरभिमाने कृते, त्वमपि पाशुपतमते प्रविष्टोऽसीति भावेन सूत्रयोजनिकान्तरमाहुः (*TPG.* p. 87)

12b. It may be mentioned in this connection that J. has himself made a reference to 'Kevala-Śāktas' as distinguished from those who may be described as "Vaiṣṇava-Śāktas", within Vaiṣnava Theism itself. in his C. on *MGT.* (xii.2).
तद्गोच्यमाना भगवत्प्राप्तिः न केवलशाक्तेयानामिति भावेन मयीत्यादिकं श्रुत्यैव व्याचष्टे।
We have thus two different interpretations of *Tadapratiṣedhaḥ* in the commentorial tradition of M.'s Sūtrabhāṣya.

inherent knowledge etc., there is no objection, because thereby the Śākta will be coming over to the doctrine of B.". It will be seen that in Nimbārka's interpretation of the *adhi.* there is no awareness of a tendency in Śakta philosophy to seek rapprochement with Śaivism or forge an alliance of Śakti with Śiva to tide over the difficulties. M.'s interpretation brings to light these aspects of Śakitvāda in *its historical* development and highlights the Pūrvapakṣas by taking us thro' these ramifications within the Śākta theory of creation: such as Kevalāśaktikāraṇavāda, Śivopasarjana-Śaktivāda, and Śivaśaktisamānakāraṇavāda, and comes to grips straightway with the crux of the problem posed by the Śākta theory. Nimbārka himself touches the same point as M. but not so explicitly—when he says "It is not possible the world can be produced from Śakti *without Puruṣa*". Why? What is wrong with or wanting in Śakti? The answer can only be:

नहि पुरुषाननुगृहीतस्त्रीभ्य उत्पत्तिः दृश्यते (M.)

Saṁkara's Interpretation

S. sees in this *adhi.* a refutation of the Bhāgavata or the Pañcarātra doctrine of (i) Vyūhas[13] and (ii) the origination of the Jīvātman from Vāsudeva.[14] He has also stated that the Pañcarātra is hostile to the Vedic tradition *as may be seen from the way in which it is reported* in one of the Samhitās that "not having found the highest bliss in the four Vedas, Śāṇḍilya studied this Śāstra".[15]

However, as S. himself does not find anything to object in the Pañcarātra teaching about the supremacy of Nārāyaṇa and the ways of worshipping Him as set out in them[16] and as there is sufficient evidence

13. अथापि स्यान्नैते सकर्षणादयो जीवादिभावेनाभिप्रेयन्ते; किं तर्हि ईश्वरा एवैते सर्वे ज्ञानैश्वर्यशक्तिबलवीर्यतेजोभिरैश्वर्यधर्मैरन्विता *अभ्युपगम्यन्ते* *** तस्मान्नाय *यथावर्णित* उत्पत्त्यसमवदोषः प्राप्नोतीति– अत्रोच्यते। एवमपि तदप्रतिषेधः ** प्राप्नोत्येवायमुत्पत्त्यसभवो दोषः प्रकारान्ततरेणेत्यभिप्रायः (*SBSB.* ii, 2.44)

14. यत्पुनरिदमुच्यते–वासुदेवात् सकर्षण उत्पद्यते, संकर्षणाच्च प्रद्युम्नः प्रद्युम्नाच्चानिरुद्ध इति। अत्र ब्रूमः, न वासुदेव सज्ञकात्परमात्मनः सकर्षणसज्ञकस्य जीवस्योत्पत्तिः सभवति, अनित्यत्वादिदोषप्रसगात्। उत्पत्तिमत्वे च जीवस्यानित्यत्वादयो दोषाः प्रसज्येरन्। ततश्च नैवास्य भगवत्प्राप्तिर्मोक्षः स्यात्। कारणप्राप्तौ कार्यस्य प्रविलयप्रसंगात्। प्रतिषेधिष्यति चाचार्यो जीवस्योत्पत्तिम्– नात्माश्रुतेर्नित्यत्वाच्च ताभ्यः इति। तस्मादसगतैषा कल्पना (S *BSB.* ii, 2.42)

15. वेदप्रतिषेधश्च भवति– चतुर्षु वेदेषु पर श्रेयोऽलब्ध्वा शाण्डिल्य इदं शास्त्रमधिगतवान्' इत्यादिवेदनिन्दादर्शनात्। तस्मादसगतैषा कल्पनेति सिद्धम् (S.*BSB.* ii, 2.45)

16. तत्र, यत्तावदुच्यते, योऽसौ नारायणः परोऽव्यक्तात् प्रसिद्धः परमात्मा सर्वात्मा स आत्मानमनेकधा व्यूह्यावस्थित इति तन्न निराक्रियते। 'स एकधा भवति त्रिधा भवति' (*Chān.* vii, 26.2) इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः परमात्मनोऽनेकधाभावस्याधिगतत्वात्। यदपि तस्य आराधन तदपि न प्रतिषिध्यते। श्रुतिस्मृत्योरीश्वरप्रणिधानस्य प्रसिद्धत्वात् (S.*BSB.* ii, 2.42)

in the Purāṇas[17] and in the Mokṣadharma section of the Mahābhārata[18] of the Pañcarātra being held in high esteem, it would be reasonable to apply the principle of *Asati hyanumānam*[19] for accommodating those aspects of its teachings, which like the doctrine of Vyūhas and the genesis of the Jīva from Vāsudeva, belong to the domain of Pañcarātra theology and dogmatics. It is evidently for these reasons that the *Kalpataru* (C. on the *Bhāmatī*) prefers to adopt *a more deferential and conciliatory attitude than S. and Vācaspati towards these teachings of the Pañcarātras* which are the works of Nārāyaṇa himself. This is clear from the reasons given by the *Kalpataru* justifying the opening of a fresh *adhikaraṇa* for discussing the doctrines of the *Pañcarātra:*—They are the works of Nārāyaṇa himself. (i) His omniscience is established by the Vedas themselves (ii) He is not like Kapila or Patañjali—a mere *individual self* (but God Himself) *(iii) His teachings have not been* treated in the Purāṇas as having been intended to delude the undeserving, like those of the Buddha-Avatar.[20]

In view of these reasons, special deference is due to the teachings of the Pañcarātra. *However, there is this difference in status between* them. The Śrutis are the *breath of the Supreme* and, therefore, intrinsically valid. The Pañcarātras are *compositions* of Nārāyaṇa to which He has applied his mind. But in order to be vested with supreme authority, His intellectual equipment has to be viewed either in the light of remembrance in reproducing *the truths taught in the Vedas* as in the case of works like *Viṣṇu-Smṛti* or as partaking of the nature of direct perception of the truths because of His omniscience. In either case, the Śruti will have to be recognized as the basis of his remembrance or as the guarantor of His having direct knowledge of the truths thro' omniscience. *In the circumstances, any statement occurring in* the *Pañcarātras* to the effect that the Jīva is "produced" or "created", in conflict with the statements of the Śruti that the Jīvas have no beginning in time and are "uncreated" has necessarily to be subjected to

17. वेदेन पंचरात्रेण भक्त्या यज्ञेन चैवहि ।
दृश्योऽहं नान्यथा दृश्यो वर्षकोटिशतैरपि ।। *(Varāha Purāṇa, Lxvi, 19)*

18. पंचरात्रस्य कृत्स्नस्य वक्ता नारायणः स्वयम् । ज्ञानेष्वेतेषु राजेन्द्र सर्वेष्वेतद्विशिष्यते ।
पंचरात्रविदो मुख्या यथाक्रमपरा नृप । एकान्तभावोपगता वासुदेवं विशन्ति हि *(Mbh. xii. 337, 63: 67)*
इदं महोपनिषदं चतुर्वेदसमन्वितम् । सांख्ययोगकृतान्तेन पञ्चरात्रानुशब्दितम् ।
इदं श्रेय इदं ब्रह्म इदं हितमनुत्तमम् । ऋग्यजुःसामभिर्जुष्टमथर्वाङ्गिरसैस्तथा । *(Mbh. xii. 326, 100)*
भविष्यति प्रमाणं वै एतदेवानुशासनम् (*Mbh.* xii. 332, 37) ऋग्वेदो यजुर्वेद •• उपनिषदः श्लोका *(Brh. Up. iv, 5 11)*

19 विरोधे त्वनपेक्षं स्यादसति ह्यनुमानम् *(PMS. I. 3, 3)*

20. पञ्चरात्रकर्तुर्वासुदेवस्य वेदादेव सर्वज्ञत्वावगमनात् कपिलादिवज्जीवत्वाभावात् च, पञ्चरात्रस्य च पुराणादिषु बुद्धादिवचनवत् व्यामोहार्थत्वानवगमनात् न योगाधिकरणन्यायार्पणा *(Kalpataru, ii. 2.42)*
The reading of the last phrase प्रणीतत्वश्रवणात् in the printed text of the NS. Press Edn. (p. 573), is incorrect.

a *depreciation of sense* in order to be attuned with its Upajīvyapramāṇa. In other cases of such discrepancy or conflict of views involving Upajīvyapramāṇavirodha, whatever conflicts with the Śruti in Pauruṣeya-works has to be peremptorily dismissed as vaporings of delusion (*bhrāntam*). Such a treatment cannot, however, be meted out to the statements in the Pañcarātras referring to the creation of Jīva. This special consideration to be shown to them is due to the prestigious position which has got to be given to them out of regard for their author (कर्तृगौरव) *for reasons already* set forth.[21] Accordingly, the *Kalpataru* sums up the conclusion as follows:—

सिद्धान्तस्तु—

बुद्धिपूर्वकृतिः पंचरात्रं निश्वसितं श्रुतिः।
तेन जीवजनिस्तत्र सिद्धा गौणी नियम्यते ॥

अतः प्रमाणापहृतविषये गौणं तद्वचनम्; न तु भ्रान्तम्; पूर्वोक्तयुक्तेरिति[22] (*Op. cit.* ii.2.42)

The above Sangrahaśloka of the *Kalpataru* has been cited by Vyāsatīrtha in his *TC* (p. 928b). The prose passage cited above from the *Kalpataru* has been quoted by Rāghavendra Tīrtha[23] in his *TCP* (p. 928b).

Vyāsatīrtha's point in referring to the opinion of the *Kalpataru* in this context is to emphasize the fact at least *one leading commentator of the S. school has not seen eye to eye with S. and Vācaspati in denying validity to the Pañcarātras*[24] on the ground that they regard the Jivas as created *de novo* by Vāsudeva and are, therefore, opposed to the Śrutisiddhānta in this respect. If the Pañcarātras do really teach such a thing, they will richly deserve to be summarily rejected as a deluded teaching (*bhrāntam*). There will be no need for an Advaitic commentator like Amalānanda, in the circumstances, to put up any de-

21. In the words of the *Abhoga* (C. on *Kalpataru*) the reason already stated is:— (पूर्वोक्तयुक्तेरिति) तत्कर्तुः सर्वज्ञत्वावगमविरोधादित्यर्थः (*Kalpataru-Abhoga*. p. 534).
22. This is the emendation suggested by the Editor of the *Abhoga* with which I concur. The printed text of the *Kalpataru* reads: पूर्वपक्षयुक्तेः which does not fit in. The Ms. used for the edition seems to have had the reading पूर्वपक्षोक्तेः which is also *not* to the point or in keeping with the spirit of the *nigamana* (conclusion) न तु भ्रान्तम्। The emendation suggested by the Editor makes proper sense.
23. The printed text of Rāghavendra's *TCP* reads अतः प्रमाणावघृते विषये गौणं तद्वचनम्; न तु भ्रान्तम्।

    This goes against the grain of the argument as developed in the *Kalpataru* and appears to be due to a scribal error. The *Abhoga* too confirms the point that the original reading in the *Kalpataru* was प्रमाणापहृतविषये। This is clear from its further comment on the *Pratika:* 'अतः प्रमाणेति'। न च प्रत्यक्षवेदमूलकत्वात् कथं विषयापहार इति वाच्यम् *** (*Op.* cit. p. 534)
24. Rāghavendra Tīrtha brings out this implication of the position taken by the *Kalpataru:* भाष्यभामत्योरुक्तमप्रामाण्यमरोचमानः 'सिद्धान्तस्तु' इत्यादिना प्रमेयं संजग्राह। त श्लोकं पठति–बुद्धिपूर्वेति। (*TCP* .p. 928b)

fence of the Pañcarātra or protest against their dismissal as deluded teaching, and suggest instead that the statement of such a thesis should be interpreted in a liberal (figurative) sense: गौणं तद्वचनं, न तु भ्रान्तम् Why this soft corner for the Pañcarātras?

Vyāsatīrtha also points out that to say as does the *Kalpataru* that statements in the Pancarātra referring to the creation of the Jīva are to be understood in a figurative sense (*gauṇārtha*) will not make the Pañcarātra *invalid* on that account. We see from Sūtras such as *Gauṇyasambhavāt (ii.3.3) that when there is a prima facie* conflict between two Śruti texts one of them is explained in a figurative sense to avoid an irreconcilaole opposition, without at the same time belittling the *validity* of any one of them. Similarly, in the present case, the validity of the Pañcarātra and the *validity of the text therein which is taken* in a *gauṇa-sense will remain unaffected.*[26]

From the standpoint of the Śrutis, the objection taken by S. *against* the origination of the Jīvas from Vāsudeva would seem to be onesided. For, there are not wanting texts in the Śrutis referring to the 'creation' of the Jīvas from B. S. himself has cited one such text: सर्वं एते आत्मानो व्युच्चरन्ति "as referring to the genesis of the souls,[27] *in this C. on BS.* ii.3:17. He has, however, sought to explain such texts as pertaining to the souls' acquisition of *upādhis* in the form of bodies, sense organs etc.[28] as the Śrutis do not recognize any other kind of 'birth' viz. *abhūtvābhavanam*) for the Jīvas. There is no reason why the *origination of the* Jīva from Vāsudeva in the Pañcarātra, mentioned by S. could not be taken in the same sense of acquiring fresh upādhis of body and organs. For, we have equally clear and unambiguous evidence in the Saṁhitās of the Pañcarātra declaring the *Jīvas to be beginningless (anādi)*[29] and having no end (*ananta*). One such text has been cited by R. in his *Śrībhāṣya:*

अचेतना परार्था च नित्या सततविक्रिया।
त्रिगुणा कर्मणां क्षेत्रं प्रकृते रूपमुच्यते॥
व्याप्तिरूपेण सवन्धः तस्याश्च पुरुषस्य च।
स ह्यनादिरनन्तश्च परमार्थेन निश्चितः॥

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25. With this deferential note *contrast* S.'s तस्मादसङ्गतैषा कल्पना (*BSB.* ii, 2.42)

26. न वेदमेवाप्रामाण्यम्। 'गौण्यसम्भवात्' इत्यादौ श्रुतेरपि श्रुत्यन्तरविरोधेन गौणार्थताया वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् (*TC.* p. 923)

This foils the attempt to retrieve S.'s position from the *Kalpataru's faux pas.*

27. We have another in: यत. प्रसूता जगत. प्रसूती तोयेन जीवान् व्यससर्ज भूम्याम् (*T.A.* x, 1.1)

28 यदपि क्वचिदस्योत्पत्तिप्रलयश्रवणं, तदप्यत एवोपाधिसम्बन्धापेक्षम्। उपाध्युत्पत्त्यपेक्षितः तद्रूपेण च प्रलय इति (*SBS.* ii, 3.17)

29. "The Jivas are described as beginningless, infinite and as pure consciousness and bliss" (Dasgupta. *His. of I. Phil.* iii, p. 51 in the Chapter on the *Pañcarātras*).

30 प्राप्तिरूपेण V. l. as in *NS.* p. 429).

(*Paramasamhitā*, ii, 18-19)

and another by M. in his *AV:*

अनादिकर्मणा बद्धो जीवः संसारमण्डले ।
वासुदेवाज्ञया नित्यं भ्रमति * * * ॥

These are sufficient to show that the presumption that the Pañcarātra is committed to the theory of the creation of the Jīvas *de novo* by or from Vāsudeva is incorrect. The criticism of that doctrine made on the basis of such an assumption is therefore inadmissible.

The same holds true of the 'production of the mind from the Jīva (Saṁkarṣaṇa). Ś. says in his commentary on the Sūtra: *Na ca kartuḥ karaṇam* (ii.2.43) that an instrument is not seen to be produced from an agent. Here he seems to be thinking of their causal relation in terms of *upadānopādeyabhāva* or transformation. It is not necessary to understand it in such a way. An agent (*kartṛ*) can very well make an axe for himself and cut a piece of wood with it. If the point of the criticism is that a thing which is an instrument in a given act is not seen to be produced by (from) that same agent while he is functioning in the capacity of performing or originating the act in question,[31] the objection will not be applicable to the Pañcarātra view of the genesis of the mind. For in the Pañcarātra view also, the mind which is the instrument in the act of knowing or producing knowledge is not produced by the Jīva when he is actually acting in the capacity of a knower.[32]

S. has further argued that the Śrutis and Smṛtis refer to the origination of the mind only from the Supreme B. and not from the Jīvātman and that, therefore, the Pañcarātra view which derives the mind from the Jīva (Samkarṣaṇa) is unscriptural.[33] It may be pointed out that the Chān. Up. (vi.5.1) refers to the subtlest elements of the food eaten by the self every day being formed into the mind-stuff[34] This disposes of S.'s objection that the Śrutis do not support the view that the mind is fashioned by the self. The *NSSVC* makes it clear that the Pañcarātra view regarding the mind being fashioned by the Jīva has

31. The *Bhāmatī* concedes both these points: यद्यप्यनेकशिल्पपर्यवदातः परशुं कृत्वा तेन पलाशं छिनत्ति, यद्यपि च प्रयत्नेन इन्द्रियार्थमनःसन्निकर्षलक्षणं ज्ञानकरणमुपादायात्मार्थं जानाति
(*Bhāmatī* ii, 2.43)

32. यद्यपत्रे ज्ञानलक्षणक्रियाकरणस्य मनसो ज्ञातृत्वावस्थापन्नादेव जीवात् जन्मानभिधानादिति
(*NSSVC.* ii, 2. p. 143)

The same can be extended to cover the objection against the genesis of ahamkara from manas:
एवमभिमानरूपक्रियाया करणस्य मनोवृत्तिविशेषस्याभिमन्तृत्वावस्थापन्नादेव जननानभिधानाच्च न विरोधरूपो दोषः (*NSSVC.* ii, 2. p. 143)

33 न चैवंभूता श्रुतिमुपलभामहे (S.*BSB.* ii, 2.43)

34. अन्नमशितं त्रेधा विधीयते, तत्र यः स्थविष्ठो धातुः तत्पुरीषं भवति, यन्मध्यमः तन्मांसं, योऽणिष्ठः तन्मनः
(*Chan. Up.* VI, 5.1)

reference only to this kind of its quotidian build-up. It also answers an objection raised by the *Bhāmatī* in this connection.[35]

While the Pañcarātra doctrine of Jivotpatti can be explained in terms of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti in becoming clothed with physical body and senses etc., it is S.'s concept of Jīva that is really inconsistent with the permanence of the Jīva. For in S.'s philosophy, the Jīvātman implicated in Samsāra is the composite being *(viśiṣṭa)* and is *as such* impermanent. It is the 'pure self' (*śuddham*) obliquely indicated by the term Jīva that can *really* be treated as '*permanent*' *from the Advaita* point of view. But then this *pure being* that is so indicated by the expression "*Jīva*" *is not the* same as the empirical self *as such*.[36] It is irrelevant and immaterial to the permanence of the empirical self that pure consciousness is permanent.[37]

S. has argued that by admitting that the Jīva is created from Vāsudeva,. the Pancarātra would be making it impossible for the Jīva to survive in Mokṣa; for the effect is swallowed up in its cause when it gets back into it. The same difficulty will be there in his case also. For transmigration affects in S.'s philosophy, like the dirt on the mirror, the reflected self which is an impermanent and composite entity while the consciousness surviving in Mokṣa would be the pure one which is not, however, the one that is really undergoing transmigration. Thus the two states of transmigration and release will not stand correlated to the same individual.[38] Tho' the Jīva *qua* pure consciousness, delimited by Avidyā or as reflected therein, may be beginningless, the empirical ego circumscribed by *antaḥkaraṇa* has to be admitted in S.'s philosophy as being 'created' durnig each period of 'creation' and has further been treated as being 'born' every time the ego (*ahamartha*) emerges into waking life from deep sleep.[39]

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35. एतेन, यदुक्तं भामत्याम्—'सङ्कर्षणोऽकरणः कथं प्रद्युम्नाख्यं मनःकरणं कुर्यात्? अकरणस्यापि करणे निर्माणसामर्थ्याभ्युपगमे, कृतं करणनिर्माणेन। अकरणादेव सकलकार्यसिद्धेरित्येतत्सूत्राभिप्राय इति, तदपि निरस्तं भवति। न ह्यत्र मनसो जीवात् आदिकालीनजन्माभिप्रेतम्; अपि तु, सततमिह मनसो जीवाज्जनन तदेव। तत्र चाकरणत्वहेतुरसिद्ध एवेति भावः (*NSSVC.* ii, p. 143)

36. परमत एव विशिष्टरूपो जीवोऽनित्यः। जीवशब्दलक्ष्यं शुद्धं नित्यमिति चेत्। जीवपदलक्ष्यस्याजीवत्वेन जीवानित्यतातादवस्थ्यात् (*TC.* p. 923)

37. *Cf.* मयि नष्टेऽपि मत्तोऽन्या काचिज्ज्ञप्तिरवस्थिता।
इति तत्प्राप्तये यत्नः कस्यापि न भविष्यति॥ (R.*BSB.* i, 1.1)

38. त्वन्मते संसरणस्य दर्पणमालिन्यादिवदनित्यविशिष्टप्रतिबिम्बगतत्वेन, बन्धमोक्षयोर्वैयधिकरण्यदोषस्तत्रैव। (*TC.* p. 923)

39. अविद्यावच्छिन्नचैतन्यरूपस्य वा, तत्प्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यस्य वा जीवस्यानादित्वेऽपि, अन्तःकरणविशिष्टस्याहमर्थस्य प्रतिसर्गं प्रतिजागरणं चोत्पत्तेरहमर्थस्यैव च कर्तृत्वाभोक्तृत्वात् त्वन्मत एव कृतहान्यादिप्रसङ्गात् (*TC.* p. 923)

The other criticism regarding the production of the mind from Jīva will also recoil on the Advaita position. For according to S. the Śruti

अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि

attributes the fashioning of names and shapes after tripartition of the three elements of Tejobanna to the Supreme self which has established a rapprochement with the individual self by professing identity with it. This would entail the consequence that the mind and the other things are created from the Jīva-self. This would expose it to the same criticism of *Na ca kartuḥ karaṇam* as S. has levelled against the Pancarātra—that an instrument is not seen to be produced from or by the (same) agent.[40]

R. and M.[41] have both maintained that according to the esoterics of Pañcarātra theology, the words *Jīva, manas* and *ahaṁkāra* denote the Vyūha-forms of the Supreme Being and are not to be understood (exclusively) in the sense of the self, the mind and *antaḥkaraṇa*. Thus understood, the origination of Samkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha will mean the "apparition" (*prādurbhāva*) of those Divine Forms from one another as referred to and not the 'genesis' of that which did not exist before (*abhūtvā bhāvarūpotpattiḥ*). These words Jīva, Manas and Ahamkāra denote the forms of the Supreme Being; for the Supreme Being is the highest principle which governs the whole basis of application of names to things of finite reality.[42]

Referring to the other aspects of the Pañcarātra teaching criticized by S., Otto Schrader observes. "This doctrine seems to be gradually disappearing from the Samhitā literature—owing, we believe, to the difficulty of connecting *ahamkāra* with such an absolutely pure being as a Vyūha.[43] We have come across only a single passage which openly endeavours to explain the teaching in its entirety viz. the *Lakṣmītantra* (vi.9-14). The idea here expressed is that Samkarṣaṇa etc. are *as it were* the soul (Jīva), mind and organ of self-assertion of the playing (creating) Vāsudeva. But the original meaning of the doctrine must have been rather that the Vyūhas are something like tutelar dei-

40 एव जीवान्मनस उत्पत्त्यसम्भवदोषोऽपि परेषा पक्ष एव। तै: 'अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि' इत्यादिश्रुत्या ब्रह्मणो जीवरूपेणैव मनआदिजगत्स्रष्टृत्वस्य वक्तव्यत्वात् (*TC.* p. 928)

41. जीवमनोऽहङ्कारतत्त्वानामधिष्ठातारः सङ्कर्षणप्रद्युम्नानिरुद्धा इति तेषामेव जीवादिशब्दैरभिधानमविरुद्धम्। यथा आकाशप्राणादिशब्दैः ब्रह्मणोऽभिधानम्। (R.*BSB.* ii, 2.41)
***** साक्षाद्धरेःक्वचित्। सङ्कर्षणादिनाम्नैव नित्याचिन्त्योरुशक्तितः। व्यूह उक्तोऽन्यथानुच कथ दुष्टत्वमुच्यते? (Madhva *AV.* ii, 2.45)

42 This point has been fully brought out in the course of the Samanvayādhyāya.

43. The difficulty would be no less in the case of the material principle of mind. This cannot therefore be the explanation. Moreover, understood in the sense of adhiṣṭhātṛ—Forms of Brahman there will be no difficulty at all in any of the cases.

ties of the said principles. This is indeed the teaching of the *Viṣvaksena Samhitā* which declares (*loc. cit.*, pp. 125ff) about Saṁkarṣaṇa: "He is acting as the superintendant *of all the souls and* about Pradyumna: He is the superintendent of the mind. About Aniruddha no similar statement is made; still, being declared to be the creator of the Miśravarga, that is the souls dominated by *rajas* and *tamas* shows that He was actually looked at by the author of the Samhitā as the *adhiṣṭhātṛ* of *ahamkāra.* In the same Samhitā, the superintendence of Saṁkarṣaṇa is described as follows: Then Saṁkarṣaṇa the Divine Lord wishing to create the world made Himself superintendent of the principle of Life and severed it from nature and after having done so, *obtained the state of Pradyumna".*[44] (*Introd. to Pañcarātra,* pp. 39-40).

The very fact that S. has himself referred to this special interpretation of the Pañcarātra doctrine of the genesis of Saṁkarṣaṇa (Jīva) Pradyumna (Manas) and Aniruddha (Ahaṁkāra) in terms of manifestation of the Divine forms of those names shows that the doctrine was an integral part of Pañcarātra theology which had come down from very early times. There is reason to believe that the literature of the Pañcarātra included its own complement of Śruti texts of the Ekāyana Śakhā. The *Prakaṭārtha Vivaraṇa* C. on S.'s *BSB* has actually identified one such text cited by Ś. in his C. on II.2.44:

ईश्वरा एवैते सर्वे ज्ञानैश्वर्यशक्तिबलवीर्यतेजोभिरैश्वर्यधर्मैरन्विताः। वासुदेवा एवैते सर्वे निर्दोषा निरधिष्ठाना निरवद्याश्च as a *Pañcarātra Śruti.*

This aspect of Pañcarātra teaching cannot therefore be treated as hostile to the spirit of the teaching of the Śrutis. Among well-known Śruti texts also there are references to the numerous manifestations of the Supreme: अयं वै हरयोऽयं वै दश च सहस्राणि बहूनि अनन्तानि च (*Brh. Up.* ii.5.19)

अजायमानो बहुधा विजायते (*T.A.* iii.13.1b)
इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते
युक्ता ह्यस्य हरयः शता दश (*RV.* VI.47.18)

As may be expected, S. has set forth his objections to the manifestations of Vāsudeva being conceived as emerging from one another in the manner described. He writes: If these four manifestations are viewed as having the same attributes but not as constituting ane and the same being, it will lead to the fault of uselessly assuming more than One Supreme Being, as any one of these four could do the work

44. Cf. the phrasing in M.'s *Mbh. TN*: प्रद्युम्नतामुपगतः इतितो च देवो (I. 7)

of the rest. The assumption of four different Lords would conflict with the acceptance of Vāsudeva as the *only one Supreme Being.* It would be illogical to hold that all the four Forms have the same attributes and yet they spring from one another in a particular way. Unless there is some supereminence in that form which acts as the source of the other manifestations it will not be possible for the latter to have them as their source. The relation of cause and effect. presupposes some superiority or a speciality on the part of the cause over the effect'. The clay is for instance more extensive than its product the jar. Without a similar superiority or speciality we cannot speak of the Vyūhamūrtis emerging from their respective 'sources'. But the difficulty is that the Pancarātra dogma refuses to admit any difference founded on supereminence of the attributes of knowledge, power, etc. either between any of the Vyūhamūrtis or of all of them from the Para-Vāsudeva. They look upon every one of the Vyūha-forms as alter egos of the Supreme Vāsudeva without any distinction of attributes or power. S. also comes down upon the Pancarātra with one more criticism that there is no reason why these Vyūha-forms or manifestations should be *limited to four only.*[45] Under the concluding Sūtra he has also charged the Pancarātra with gross self-contradiction in treating the eminence of knowledge, ruling power, capacity, strength, valor and glory of the Lord as "qualities" (धर्माः) in some places and elsewhere as 'selves' or "Vāsudevas."[46]

It is surprising to find that R. who treats the last two Sūtras of this adhikaraṇa as a vindication of the Pancarātra doctrine should have *not replied to any of these objections of* S. *in his C.*—except the one of hostility to the Vedas. With his own belief that B. is different from its attributes (धर्मधर्मिभेदवाद), R. probably found it difficult to meet S.'s objection against the Pañcarātra position: गुणिभ्यः खल्वात्मभ्यो ज्ञानादीन् गुणान् भेदेनोक्त्वा, पुनरभेदं ब्रूते–*'आत्मान एवैते भगवन्तो वासुदेवा'* इति

(*Bhāmatī* ii.2.45)

His commentator Sudarśana has however attempted to answer these criticisms of S. regarding Guṇaguṇitvakalpanā etc. from R.'s point of view.

45. यदि तावत् परस्परभिन्ना वासुदेवादयः चत्वार ईश्वराः तुल्यधर्माणो, नैषामेकात्मत्वमस्तीति, ततोऽनेकेश्वरकल्पनानर्थक्यम्। सिद्धान्तहानिश्च–भगवानेवैको वासुदेवः परमार्थतत्त्वमित्यभ्युपगमात्। अथ एकस्यैव भगवतः चत्वारो व्यूहास्तुल्यधर्माणः तथापि तदवस्थ एवोत्पत्त्यसंभवः। नहि वासुदेवात् संकर्षणस्योत्पत्तिः संकर्षणाच्च प्रद्युम्नस्य प्रद्युम्नाच्चानिरुद्धस्य। अतिशयाभावात्। न ह्यसत्यतिशये कार्यं कारणमित्यवकल्पते। न च पञ्चरात्रसिद्धान्तिभिर्वासुदेवादिष्वेकस्मिन्सर्वेषु वा ज्ञानैश्वर्यादितारतम्यकृतः कश्चित् भेदोऽभ्युपगम्यते। न चैते भगवद्व्यूहाः चतुःसंख्यायामवतिष्ठेरन्। (S.*BSB.* ii, 2. 44)

46. विप्रतिषेधश्चास्मिन् शास्त्रे बहुविध उपलभ्यते गुणगुणित्वकल्पनादिलक्षणः– 'ज्ञानैश्वर्यशक्तिबलवीर्यतेजांसि गुणाः; आत्मान एवैते भगवन्तो वासुदेवा' इत्यादिदर्शनात्। (S.*BSB.* ii, 2.45)

As for M., we have already seen that he does *not concede* the point that the present adhi. has *anything to do with the Pañcarātra system or any of its doctrines in any manner.* All the same, he has taken the opportunity in his *AV* of showing the irrelevance and untenability of S.'s objections against its doctrines of Vyūha and Jīvotpatti.[47]

J. has given suitable answer to many of the foregoing objections of S. The Lord's manifestations are not different from one another in substance or in their attributes. There is no gradation (*tāratamya*) in their status. They are all equal to one another in every respect. They partake of the same unitary essence.[48] Thro' His inscrutable powers the Supreme Being (Vāsudeva) chooses to manifest Itself at Its own pleasure thro' various forms. Theirs *is a distinction of reference* and not of essence. Such a thing is rendered possible by the ontological category of Viśeṣa which is a *sine qua non* for bridging the gulf between substance and attributes and hold them in an integrated mould. Viśeṣa is implicit in the concept of B. as Saccidānandātmaka, where the trinity of *Sat cit* and *ānanda* cannot possibly be other than the essence of B. Viśeṣa has thus been very aptly defined by M. as:

भेदहीने त्वपर्यायशब्दान्तरनियामकः ।
विशेषो नाम कथितः सोऽस्ति वस्तुष्वशेषतः ॥

It is borne out by the Śruti:—

एकधैवानुद्रष्टव्यं नेह नानास्ति किंचन

This doctrine of unity in diversity has its *locus classicus* in the *Ahikuṇḍalādhikaraṇa* of the BS. (iii.2.28) and in the Śruti cited above.

S's *accusation of self-contradiction against* Pañcarātra philosophy in *respect of the Guṇaguṇibhāva* relationship between Vāsudeva and His *lordly attributes provides striking* evidence that the doctrine of Viśeṣas and Saviśeṣābheda was integral to the Pañcarātra conception of the Supreme B. in relation to its manifestations and attributes and that it has been preserved in its original form as handed down from its Upaniṣadic nuclei (Cf. *Neha nānāsti kimcana; Evam dharmān pṛthak paśyan ***; Ekadhaivānudraṣṭavyam; Satyam jñānam anantam brahma)* in M's philosophy of Brahman as a Saviśeṣa-personality with Viśeṣa acting as its self-linking pivot.

47. पंचरात्रनिषेधार्थमेतान्याचक्षते यदि । सूत्राण्यतिविरुद्धं तदत आह स भाष्ये ।
कथमेवात्र दोषः क उत्पत्तिर्नोऽत्र इत्यपि । इहोक्त्वा, न चामुत्रभावस्तत्रापि कथ्यते ।
अनादिकर्मणा बद्धो जीवः संसारमण्डले । वासुदेवाश्रया नित्यं प्रवर्तन्ते हि तद्वशः ।
सकर्षणादिनाम्नैव नित्याविर्भावकल्पितः । व्यूह उक्तोऽन्यथानुप कथ दुष्टत्वमुच्यते ?
पंचरात्रादिति श्रुतो द्वेषः शाण्डिल्यवर्तने ? दूषणं पञ्चरात्रस्य बौद्धानामपि न क्षमम् ॥

48. Cf. स आत्मन आत्मानमुद्धृत्यानन्देन विलासयति अपात्मैव भवति
(Śruti cited by *M. BSB.* i 1.9)

Given the inscrutable powers of the Lord there is no question of how He could be having only four Vyūhas. He could be *four or more* and yet manage to keep intact His oneness of essence and fulness of attributes.[49] S.'s objection that unless there is some supereminence in one form as distinguished from the other, there cannot be a causal relation between them may be true enough of empirical facts but it cannot be applied to facts connected with B. as we see from the Śruti:

पूर्णमदः पूर्णमिदं पूर्णात् पूर्णमुदच्यते
पूर्णस्य पूर्णमादाय पूर्णमेवावशिष्यते । (*Brh. Up.* v, 1, 1.)

His criticism that the manifestations of the Divine cannot be limited to four betrays ignorance of the teleology of the Vyūha-doctrine. The Pañcarātras, as pointed out by M., speak of four kinds of creation—Śuddha, Parādhīna-Viśeṣāpti, Kevala and Miśra. Śuddha-Ṣṛṣṭi is the emanation (*prādurbhāva*) of requisite forms of the Divine from the Mūlārūpa (original) without the least modification or change of qualities, body or organs. Its purpose is to resume the cosmological process after the prolonged period of Mahāpralaya. Accordingly, at the end of the period of Mahāpralaya the Supreme Being assumes out of His own free Will, His first manifestation as "Vāsudeva" thro' which He bestows the bliss of Mokṣa on the souls eligible to receive it then. At His Will, the goddess Lakṣmī who is ever-free, takes the form of 'Māyā' and places her services at His disposal. The Lord then assumes His second form of Saṁkarṣaṇa to direct the work of *Saṁhāra* in which He is followed by His consort manifesting herself as Jayā. The third form of the Lord as Pradyumna directs the process of the creation and evolution of the world with the 'Kṛti' form of Lakṣmī at His side. The fourth Vyūha form is Aniruddha whose sportive activity sustains (*sthiti*) the created world with Śānti as His consort.[50] Thus. the first four Vyūhas have a definite teleological purpose in view.[51]

49. S. himself asserts the possibility of numerous forms for B.: स एकधा भवति त्रिधा भवति इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्य परमात्मनोऽनेकधाभावस्याधिगतत्वात् । (S *BSB.* ii 2 42)
How then can be deny this power to Vāsudeva who he is prepared to concede with the Pañcarātra is the Paramātmā: तत्र यत्तावदुच्यते–योऽसौ नारायणः आत्मानमनेकधा व्यूह्यावस्थित इति तन्न निराक्रियते * * * (S.*BSB.* ii.2.42)

50. F.O. Schrader notes (*Op. cit.*, p. 38) how the statements in the Samhitās regarding the cosmic activities of the Vyūhas are of a somewhat contradictory nature. He notes that according to *Viṣvaksena Samhitā*, Samkarṣana takes away all this, Pradyumna creates the totality of moveable and immovable beings and Aniruddha with his Śakti supports and protects the whole world the infinite egg. This agrees with M.'s version in *Mbh. TN.*

51. See M. *Mbh. TN.* i.2-8.
According to F. O. Schrader the *Mahāsanatkumāra Saṁhitā* refers to Śanti as the Śakti (consort) of Samkarṣana. In the idiom of Pañcarātra theology, "Śakti" is personified as consort: शक्यत्वात् शक्तया भार्याः (M).

Besides this primary Vyūha, the Pañcarātra Samhitās speak of numerous other manifestations (the term Vyūha itself meaning a self-expression) assumed for the benefit of different Adhikāris at different times:

एकमूर्तिश्चतुर्मूर्तिरथवा पंचमूर्तिकः।
द्वादशादिप्रभेदो वा पूज्यते सज्जनैर्हरिः॥

(*MGT.* ix.11)

There is thus no question of the Vyūhas of the Supreme being limited to four only.

Leaving aside the arguments for or against the Vyūha doctrine and *Jivotpatti*, we may consider how far S.'s and R.'s interpretation of the Sūtras of this *adhi*. are commensurate with the wording of its Sūtras. If this *adhi*. had been intended to expose the logical and the philosophical untenability of the above-mentioned doctrines of Pañcarātra, as contended by S. (or to defend them against unfair criticism as R. would have it) the second Sūtra here *Na ca kartuḥ karaṇam* becomes unnecessary as the objections to the creation of the Jīva from Vāsudeva and of the mind from the Jīva could both be comprehended by the first Sūtra itself: *Utpattyasambhavāt*. If a separate Sūtra was deemed to be absolutely necessary to deal with the second point viz. *the origination of the mind from the Jīva, it should have been worded* more properly and pointedly as *Kartuśca karaṇasya*. That would achieve not only brevity and trenchancy by saving an ostentatious negative at the beginning but also the luxury of importing a (fresh) predicate *utpadyate*[52] or *utpadyamānam dṛśyate* (as in S.) when the predicate of the first Sūtra itself *utpattyasambhavāt* could be connected with *Kartuśca karaṇasya* with perfect ease and felicity. As a principle of Sūtra-interpretation, it is proper to avoid *adhyāhāra* where thro' association with a word from a previous Sūtra (*anuṣaṅga*) connec*tion is possible. The fact, therefore, that this Sūtra is worded as Na ca kartuḥ karaṇam*, instead, must show that it is intended to suggest a different topic for discussion.[53]

52. यन्मते 'उत्पत्त्यसम्भवात्' इति सामान्योक्त्यैव जीवोत्पत्त्यसंभववत् कर्तुः करणोत्पत्त्यसम्भवस्यापि विवक्षितुं शक्यत्वात् द्वितीयसूत्रवैयर्थ्यम्। किंच 'कर्तुश्च करणस्य' इत्येव सूत्रणीयम्। उत्पत्त्यसम्भवादित्यनेनानुषङ्गेणान्वयसम्भवात् (TC. p. 209 b)

53. यथान्यासपक्षेऽपि 'उत्पद्यते' इत्येतदध्याहार्यम्। अध्याहाराच्चानुषङ्गो ज्यायान् (TC. p. 209 b)
To avoid importation of a predicate R. tries to read the nom. *karaṇam* in the the Sūtra as a genitive: कर्तुः जीवात् करणस्य _मनसः उत्पत्तिर्न सम्भवति (मनसो ह्युत्पत्तिः श्रूयते) —*Vedāntadīpa*. ii 2.40
This is also a liberty taken with the wording of the Sūtra.

Coming to S.'s and R.'s interpretation of the third Sūtra, they strike us as cumbersome, on the face of it. For in order to sustain it, they have to import the expression संकर्षणादीनाम् (of Samkarṣaṇa and others) by adhyāhāra. This contrasts unfavorably with M.'s interpretation of the *adhi*. and the present Sūtra therein as a refutation of the Śākta doctrine—wherein the phrase *Vijñānādibhạve vạ* stands automatically connected with the word *Kartuḥ* understood from the proceding Sūtra (नच कर्तुःकरणम्) [54]

From S.'s point of view, the longwinded *Tadapratiṣedhaḥ* in the third Sūtra can safely be replaced by a simple word *Saḥ* signifying *utpattyasambhavaḥ*. In M.'s interpretation, on the other hand, this pharse is significantly used for more than one reason. Having conceded the plea of the Pāñcarātrika that the terms Samkarṣaṇa, and others are not to be understood in the sense of Jīva etc. but as Brahman, it would naturally follow that the Pāñcarātrika would view them as different manifestations of the same B. In the circumstances S. is not justified in *repeating* the objection of the impossibility of origination (उत्पत्त्यसंभवप्रतिपेधः). The arguments based on supereminence of cause and Tāratamya between cause and effect cannot be applied to the 'manifestations' (प्रादुर्भाव) of the Lord. Otherwise, S. himself could not, with propriety, speak of the Self becoming threefold, fivefold, sevenfold, a hundred and elevenfold and so on. The Upanisads themselves speak of B. as "bliss" itself and of "Brahman's bliss," as if the two are different. Why should it appear unaccountable to S. if the Pañcarātras sometimes similarly refer to strength, valor and glory of the Divine Forms and at other times speak of these qualities as the selfsame Vāsudevas?

When, after having gone thro' S.'s criticism of the Pañcarātra doctrnes of Vyūha and Jīvotpatti, one weighs the evidence let in by R and M. in respect of these impugned doctrines, one is constrained to admit that they were right in telling S. अनभिज्ञो भवान् भागवतप्रक्रियाया: (You are not correctly informed of the niceties of Bhāgavata theology). The way in which S. has exploited Śāndilya's innocent *arthavāda* in favor of the Pañcarātra-Śāstra, to their utter detriment and the vulnerable nature of most of his other criticisms[55] make us feel that he has been less than fair to the great Bhāgavata tradition. Among modern

54. तृतीयेऽपि मम, 'विज्ञानादिभाव' इत्यत्र द्वितीये प्रकृतस्य "कर्तुः" इत्यस्यान्वयः। तत्र तु, "संकर्षणादीनाम्" इत्यध्याहारः (*TC.* p. 939 b)

55. चतुर्योक्तस्तु विप्रतिपेधोऽसिद्धः। ज्ञानादीना गुणत्वेऽपि 'एव धर्मान् पृथक् पश्यन्' इत्यादिश्रुतिभिः स्वरूपत्वात्। अन्यथा 'आनन्दो ब्रह्म' 'आनन्दं ब्रह्मणः' इति श्रुत्योरपि विप्रतिपेध.स्यात् (*TC.* p. 929)

scholars R. D. Karmarkar has been the first to openly criticize S.'s stand in respect of this adhikaraṇa.[56]

Rāmānuja's Interpretation.

R. has gone halfway with S. in interpreting the first two Sūtras as embodying the objections to these two doctrines and the last two as answering them and vindicating the validity of the Pañcarātra system. This has been accepted by Thibaut as satisfactory; for "it would be natural to defend a doctrine which in spite of objections has to be viewed as the true one" (Introd. SBE. Vol. xxxiv. p. lii). If pressed to its logical conclusion, this finding of Thibaut would lead to the acceptance of the position that the Sūtrakāra was a Vaiṣṇava Theist who believed Viṣṇu-Vāsudeva to be the Supreme B. of the Vedānta. While this will add considerable weight to the manner in which the Supreme position of Viṣṇu-Vāsudeva has been shown by M. to be upheld in the Sūtras and woven into their texture right from the opening Sūtra *Athāto Brahmajijñāsa*[57] to the very end, followed by an appropriate place for the next important principle—the Śrītattva or Cit-Prakṛti also therein (iii.3.41; iv.2.7) it would still leave us wondering why R. should at all have agreed to implead the Pañcarātra, coming up with a solitary defence of the Vyūha doctrine without much relevance to Pāda-saṅgati. The validity of the Pañcarātra as part of the source— materials of Bādarāyana's system ought to have been affirmed in the third Sūtra itself of the Samanvayādhyāya devoted to the establishment of Svapakṣa or "the true view" of the Sūtrakāra—where it would be in place. We have seen how M. has done this[58] under BS. i.1.3.

Coming to the merits of R.'s *interpretation of the present adhi., it may be pointed out that he himself has shown by citing clear evidence from the Paramasamhitā and other Pañcarātra texts that the system*

56. "We think that this section is directed against the Śāktavāda and Keśava in *his second interpretation has explained* the Sūtras accordingly. It seems that Śaṁkara who wanted to discredit the Pañcarātra system first explained the section as refuting the system. The hurried manner in which he explains this *section*, the very weak arguments such as that abuse of the Vedas is found in the Pañcarātra system that are brought by him against the Bhāgavatas and the many doctrines held by the Bhāgavatas which Śaṁkara *is forced to admit* as not being taken up for discussion—all this clearly shows that Śaṁkara was not quite at ease in his explanation of this adhikarana". (R. D Karmarkar. *Comparison of the Bhāṣyas of S. R. Keśava Kashmiri and Vallabha on Some Crucial Sūt-as of Bādarāyana*, 1920. p 62.
    Dr. Belvalkar who thinks that "S.'s explanation of the Sūtras *falling* under this *adhi. is not*, after all, *so very objectionable*", (Op. cit., p. 206) has neither elaborated his point nor has he taken any notice of Karmarkar's views cited above.
57. *Cf.* स्वयं भगवता विष्णुर्ब्रह्मयेतत् पुरोदितम् । 'स विष्णुराह हि' इत्यते देवनाथस्य दर्शनात् ॥
    See also: M. C. on BS. i.1.1; 20, 22, 23, 24, 27; 2, 11, 23; 3, 8, 24.
58. See *Vol. I, pp.* 80-81 and f.n. 2 and 3.

fully recognizes the eternal and uncreated existence of the Jīvas and (Acit) Prakṛti and cannot, therefore, be found fault with as representing that the Jīvas are created by Vāsudeva and have, therefore, a beginning in time.[59] R. has also shown in his *Śrībhāṣya* that the genesis of Jīva-Saṃkarṣaṇa from Vāsudeva, of Manas-Pradyumna from Saṃkarṣaṇa and of Ahaṃkāra-Aniruddha from Pradyumna pertains to the *esoterics of the Pañcarātra doctrine of Vyūhas and has nothing to do* with the genesis of the Jīva, the mind and ahaṁkāra, as such.[60] The charge of hostility of the Pañcarātras to Vedic lore has also been laid to rest by R. as an unjustifiable distortion of a simple *arthavāda* of which parallels are not wanting in the Upaniṣads themselves.[61]

It would thus be clear that such irresponsible allegations against the Pāncarātra doctrines, arising from ignorance or misunderstanding of the esoteric aspects of its theology and dogmatics can hardly justify the luxury of a separate adhikaraṇa to repudiate or to defend them in a Pāda which is devoted exclusively to the refutation of a hostile system.[62]

The way in which S. himself has appropriated one Sūtra from the Vaiśeṣikādhikaraṇa (ii.2.11) as a separate *adhi.* for defending his Brahmavāda against a possible criticism of a particular position of the Vedāntin by the Vaiśeṣika[63] will *not* justify a similar attempt by R. here; for both are equally out of place from the point of view of strict Pādasaṅgati. As J. points out in his review of R.'s interpretation, the Sūtrakāra has already provided for the validity of the Vedāntic Smṛtis like the Pāncarātra in the Na Vilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa (ii.1.4-5) in the preceding Pāda of this Adhyāya.[64] If the real significance and purpose of that adhi. had been grasped, there would be no need at all for R. *to open a second line of defence of Pañcarātra here.*

59. विप्रतिषिद्धा हि जीवोत्पत्तिः तस्मिन्नपि तन्त्रे यथोक्त–परमसंहितायाम्–
'For Quotation See P. 110 *ante*. एव मवस्विपि संहितासु जीवस्य नित्यत्ववचनात् जीवोत्पत्ति· पचरात्रे प्रतिषिद्धैव (R. *BSB.* ii 2.42)

60 अत्र सकर्षणादीनामपि परस्यैव ब्रह्मण स्वेच्छाविग्रहरूपत्वात् 'अजायमानो बहुधा विजायत इति' श्रुतिसिद्धस्यैवाश्रितत्वात् स्वेच्छाविग्रहसंग्रहरूपजन्मनोऽभिधानात्। तदभिधापि शास्त्रप्रमाणास्याप्रतिषेध इति। तत्र जीवमनोऽहंकारतत्त्वानामधिष्ठातारः सकर्षणप्रद्युम्नानिरुद्धा इति तेषामेव जीवादिशब्दैरभिधानमविरुद्धम्। यथा आकाशप्राणादिशब्दैर्ब्रह्मणोऽभिधानम् (R. *BSB.* ii.2.41)

61. यच्च केषाचिदुद्घोष.–सांगेषु वेदेषु निष्ठामलभमान.शाण्डिल्य. पचरात्रशास्त्रमधीतवान् इति वचनात् वेदविरुद्धमेवेदं तन्त्रमिति, सोऽप्यनाघ्रातवेदवचसामनाकलिततदुपबृंहणन्यायकलापाना श्रद्धामात्रविजृंभितः। * *
यथा 'प्रात प्रातरनृतं ते वदन्ति पुरोदयाज्जुह्वति' * *
यथाच भूमविद्याप्रक्रमे नारदेन–"ऋग्वेद भगवोऽध्येमि * * (*Chān. Up.* vii, 1, 2)
इति वक्ष्यमाणभूमविद्याप्रशसार्थं कृतम् (R. *BSB.* ii.2.42)

62 पचरात्राप्रामाण्यशकायां प्राप्तायामेवहि तन्निरासाय प्रयासः सार्थकः स्यात्। न च व्यधिकरणानि दूषणानि तच्छंका प्रापयितुमीशते। न हि छलोत्तराण्येतावदधिकरण प्रयोजयन्ति (*NS.* ii.2. p. 428)

63. See Pages 40-45 *ante*.

64. See Vol. I, pp. 335-37.

R.'s way of construing the expression *Vijñānādi* in the phrase Vijñānādibhāve......(ii.2.44) as that which is of the nature of intelligence (*Vijñānam*) and is also the first cause of the world (*paramakāraṇam ca*) is roundabout.[65] The addition of *ādi* to vijñāna does not seem to reinforce the argument in any way. This word vijñāna, so far as we know, is not found used for B. anywhere else in the Śruti and the Sūtras. It is surprising that Thibaut should have failed to notice this point while observing that it appears to him that "the explanations of *Vā* and *tat* implied in R.'s comment are more natural than those resulting from S.'s interpretation" (*Op. cit.*, p. lii). Without the least circumlocution, the Sūtrakāra could have scored his point, as R. conceives of it, with a crisp answer: न; प्राज्ञत्वात् delivered with devastating effect in place of तदप्रतिषेधः ।

65. According to R. विज्ञानादि denotes B. in the sense that B. is of the nature of intelligence (विज्ञानम्) and is also the first cause (आदि) of the world: विज्ञानरूपं जगदादिभूतं च भवतीति विज्ञानादि ।
"सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः सम्भूत. * * इति ज्ञानस्वरूपस्य ब्रह्मणः परमकारणत्वप्रतिपादक—वेदान्तैककण्ठद्योतनार्थं च विज्ञानं चादि_चेति व्याख्यातम्
(Śrutaprakāśa).

PĀDA III

INTRODUCTION

The subject matter of this Pāda is removal of internal conflicts and contradictions in scriptural statements in respect of the Aparatattvas or inferior reals comprising the world of matter and souls viz. the *adhibhūta, adhidaiva* and *adhyātmic* principles and the Jīvas, which have their accredited places in Bādarāyaṇa's system under his technique of Samanvaya of Śāstra in B. on the basis of *Paramamukhyavṛtti* in B. (with Mukhyavṛtti elsewhere).[1] If such conflicts within the realm of the Aparatattvas are left unresolved, they are sure to impugn the said Samanvaya and weaken the Sūtrakāra's concept of B. as the sole author of the eightfold dispensations of the Universe and as the abode of infinite perfections. The various *adhi.'s* in this Pāda (and in the next) as interpreted by M. may be seen to converge smoothly on this main point and reinforce the majesty of B. postulated by the Sūtrakāra in the first four *adhi.'s*. It is only by making clear the *true nature and extent of the direct and the indirect dependence of every Aparatattva* on B. and the order and the manner of these processes that the Jijñāsu can be made to realize the full force and significance of Divine Majesty, as it is implicit in the Sūtrakāra's insistence on authorship of the Cosmos being admitted as an intrinsic attribute (*svarūpalakṣaṇa*) of B.[2]

1 समन्वयाध्याये सर्वश्रुतीनां 'कल्पनोपदेशात्' इत्यादिन्यायेन परममुख्यमुख्यवृत्तिभ्यामभ्युपगते परमात्मतदन्यरूपे अर्थद्वयेऽन्यतरस्मिन् जीवादिरूपेऽर्थेऽप्रामाण्यप्राप्तौ, परमात्मपूर्णगुणत्वाद्यर्थेऽप्याश्वासप्रसंगादित्यर्थः। तथाच, विरुद्धश्रुत्योः प्रामाण्याविरोधेन तयोरर्थव्यवस्थापनाय पादद्वयारंभो युक्तः (Ragh. *TPB.* ii.3.1)

2. ब्रह्मणोऽशेषजगत्कारणत्वनिश्चयो ह्यशेषजगत्स्वरूपनिर्णये, तस्य कार्यत्वादिनिर्णये च सति स्यात्। नान्यथा। न च तद्विषयाणां वाक्यानां मिथो व्याघाते तत्स्वरूपनिर्णयो भवति। अतोऽधिदैवादिवस्तुतत्त्वावधारणार्थं एवायं मिथो विरोधपरिहारः (*NS.* p. 430-31 b)

There are nineteen *adhis* in this Pāda. These can be brought under four units (*peṭikās*). The first unit of 3 *adhis* removes the conflict of Śrutis regarding the genesis (*utpatti*) of the chief *adhibhūta-tattva* viz. Ākaśa, and Mukhya-Prāṇa (and of Prakṛti, Kāla, etc. by *upalakṣaṇa*). The inquiry is incidentally extended to the Supreme Sat or B. even tho' it is not an Aparatattva. This is because there is a similar conflict of texts in respect of its 'origination' (from 'Asat') which has to be resolved at some stage and the present context is quite propitious for such inquiry.[3] The fourth, fifth and sixth *adhi.s* constitute a unit showing by resolving certain contradictions that while being the primary source of all origination in the world of adhibhūtas etc., B. acts thro' the medium of the latter in the origination of their evolutes. The seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth are connected with the similar contradictions in respect of dissolution and merger (*laya*). From the eleventh to the nineteenth *adhi.* the discussion centres on resolution of conflict of statements pertaining to the Jīvātman—his 'genesis', status, size, properties, agency and relationship to B.[4] As the number of topics connected with the Jīvātman are very many and important, M.'s Bhāṣya mentions him first, in indicating the Pādārtha:—

जीवपरमात्माधिभूताधिदैवेषु श्रुतीनां परस्परविरोधमपाकरोत्यनेन पादेन

(M. *BSB.* ii.3.1)

The scheme of adhi-s and the nature of their topics according to S and R will be clear from the discussion of their respective adhi-s.

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3. अनुत्पन्नत्वेन प्रसिद्धयोर्वियन्मरुतोरुत्पत्तिसमर्थनेऽनेनैव न्यायेनानादितया प्रसिद्धब्रह्मणोऽप्युत्पत्तिः स्यादिति शंकाया, स्मृतस्य ब्रह्मानुत्पादस्योपेक्षानर्हत्वात् प्रसंगसगत्या निरूपणमिति समाधानसंभवात् (Vādirāja *TPG.* p. 93)

4. एकादशमारभ्यैकोनविंशतिपर्यन्तानि जीवविषयत्वेनैका पेटिका। तत्राधिकरणनवकं यथाक्रम जीवस्य सादित्वा-गुत्वानेकदेहस्थितत्वेश्वरभिन्नत्वानन्तत्वज्ञानानन्दादिरूपत्वपरतंत्रकर्तृत्वेश्वरांशत्वतत्प्रतिबिंबत्वरूपप्रमेयनवकप्रति-पादकम् (*TC.* p. 986 b)

CHAPTER XIII

GENESIS OF AVYĀKṚTA-ĀKĀŚA

1. *Viyadadhikaraṇam* (ii, 3, 1-7)

The Sūtrakāra opens the Pāda with the resolution of the conflict of texts regarding the 'origination' (*utpatti*) of Ākāśa, the principal *adhibhūta-tattva*. As 'origination' marks the first stage of life, it takes precedence over other determinations. The discussion on Ākāśa is extended (by *upalakṣaṇa*) with true philosophical insight, to others like Jīva Prakṛti and Kāla and it is established that they too have their genesis from B.[1] The justification for such extension is clear. It would be unphilosophical to hold that Prakṛti, Kāla, etc. have no genesis whatsoever. The grounds of breakdown of promissory statement (*pratijñāhāni*), non-exclusion from the 'all' (*avyatireka*), being limited in power on account of liability to modification (*alpaśaktitvānumānād utpattimattvam*) etc. upon which the Sūtrakāra rests his argument for holding Ākāśa to be a created product are applicable to Prakṛti, Kāla and others, with the same force. As there is no separate *adhi*. establishing their genesis from B. in the Sūtrakāra's work, they have a right to be brought within the scope of the present *adhi*. The case is different with Mātariśvan, Jīva and others where a fresh *adhi*. is called for by reason of *adhikāśamkā*, in their cases, as will be seen later.[2]

1. वियत्पद नाकाशमात्रपर, किं नाम, 'अथ ह वाव नित्यानि पुरुषः प्रकृतिरात्मा काल' इत्यादिश्रुतिविधानविषयाणां परमात्मातिरिक्तानां प्रकृत्यादीनामुपलक्षणार्थं ज्ञातव्यम्। (*NS.* p. 431 b)
2. वियत्पद प्रकृत्यादीनामुपलक्षणार्थं ज्ञातव्यम्। न तावत् प्रकृत्यादयो जन्मरहिता एवाभ्युपगता इति युक्तम्। 'प्रतिज्ञाहानिरव्यतिरेकाच्छब्देभ्यः', यावाद्विकारं तु विभागो लोकवत्' इत्युक्तानां प्रतिज्ञाहान्यादीनामत्रापि साम्यात्॥ अन्यथा, तेषामनैकान्तिकत्वापातात्। नाप्यविगीतजन्मानः, श्रुतिविगानस्य दर्शितत्वात्। न चाधिकरणान्तरं तत्परमस्तीति। तस्मादत्रैव वियत्पदेन तेषामुपलक्षणं युक्तम्। मातरिश्वप्रभृतिषु पुनरधिकाशङ्कानिरासायाधिकरणान्तरारम्भ इति। (*NS.* p. 431 b)

According to M. the predicate *anutpattimat* (*is without genesis*) is to be supplied after the subject (na) *viyat.* The complete sūtra would thus read: *Na viyad anutpattimat* (*tathā*) *aśruteḥ:* Ākāśa (space or ether) is not without genesis; for there is no Śruti text predicating of it *such non-genesis as is opposed to the genesis which the Sūtrakāra has in mind for it.*[3] The predicate *anutpattimat* is *adapted* by *anuvṛtti* from the overall sense of *'utpattyasambhava'* referred to in ii.2.42. To suit the exigencies of the present context, this adapted term is given the necessary touches of grammar to put it in predicative relationship with *'Viyat'.*[4]

It deserves to be pointed out in this connection that in this context "Ākāśa" according to M. is to be understood in both the senses of that word—viz. *'Avyākṛtākāśa'* or Space and *'Bhūtākāśa'* or elemental ether. This in itself must be deemed to be a remarkable advancement in Vedāntic thought, if we consider Thibaut's comment in the footnote to his translation of S.'s bhāṣya on the Sūtras: that *"the Vedāntins do not clearly distinguish between empty space and an exceedingly fine matter filling all space which, however attenuated, is yet one of the material elements and as such belongs to the same category as air, fire, water and earth".*[5] *M. has shown himself well aware of this distinction and its scientific significance.*[6]

The 'abhimāni-devatās' of space (i.e. Cit-Prakṛti) and of ether (i.e. the deity Gaṇeśa) are also taken to be denoted by the term Ākāśa.[7]

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3. This has been well brought out by Vādirāja: यथा सूत्रकारस्योत्पत्तिरभिमता तद्विरोध्युत्पत्त्यनुत्पत्तेरश्रुतत्वात् । (*TPG.* p. 90)

4. Cf. अत्रोत्पत्त्यसंभवादित्यत्र मतुबर्थसंग्रहेण विभक्तिव्यत्ययेन च सम्बन्ध इत्यर्थः (Vādirāja *TPG.* p. 90). The *BD* gives an easier explanation: अत्रोत्पत्त्यसम्भवाद् इति सूत्रप्रकृतानुत्पत्तिबोधकानुत्पत्तिमत् इति पदमनुवर्त्य न वियदिति प्रतिज्ञाभागं व्याचष्टे (*BD.* ii 3.1) The *AC.* (p. 343) *is far from helpful in its comments on this point.*

5. Tr. of *S.BSB.* G Thibaut, *SBE* Series, Vol. XXXVIII (Vol. 2) p. 3. fn. 1.

6. Cf. अवकाशमात्रमाकाशः कथमुत्पद्यतेऽन्यथा ? (*AV.* ii.3.1)
Cf. Also: अत्र देशो नास्ति, इदानीं कालो नास्तीत्यस्य व्याहतत्वात्, देशकालयोः परिच्छेदनिरूपणानादि तयोरपरिच्छेदसिद्धिः । देशकालयोः स्वोपाधौ निषेधे विरोधेन, अविरोधाय निषेधोपाधितया देशकालान्तरयोरावश्यकत्वाच्च (*Vyāsatīrtha Nym.* i. 5).
भूताकाशव्यतिरिक्ताया देशकालापरिच्छिन्नाया. तात्त्विकाभिमतदिश एवास्याव्याकृताकाशत्वात् (*TC.* p. 932)

7. अत्र, श्रुतौ सूत्रे च वियच्छब्देन भूताकाशो तदभिमानिनो चेति चतुष्टयमुच्यते (*TDP.* ii.3.1)
Cf. also: the position taken earlier in the *Ānandamāyadhi*:
'तस्मादाकाशसृष्टिं च प्रोवाचात्र चतुर्विधाम् ।
भूतं भूताभिमानी च तद्देहोऽन्तर्नियामकः ।
हरिरत्राकाशशब्दोक्तः मुख्यतो हरिरेव च' (*AV.* 1.1.6 *adhi.*)

This distinction enables M. to fix the meaning of *utpatti* and *anutpatti* Śrutis,[8] bearing in mind the supreme truth of B.'s authorship of all finite reality as taught in the Śrutis themselves[9] and which cannot be whittled down in any circumstances. For this purpose, he clarifies the concept of creation by propounding, *for the first time in Indian philosophy,* the distinction between creation in the conventional sense of *abhūtvābhavanam* (creation *de novo*) and creation in the true philosophical sense of *'Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti'*.

J. expounds the concept of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti as follows:—

'आत्मन आकाश: संभूत:, स इदं सर्वमसृजत' इत्यादिश्रुति विभक्तत्वादियुक्ति चाश्रित्य यदिहाधिकरणे वियतो जनिमत्त्वमुदितं, तत्पराधीनातिशयलाभलक्षणं प्रतिपत्तव्यम्। अपूर्वविशेषोपजनने हि विशिष्टाकारोपजनोऽवश्यंभावी। विशिष्टाकारश्च वस्तुस्वरूपाभिन्न इति तस्यैवायमुपजनो भवति। देवदत्त: शरीरी जातो, विद्वान् जात इति, घट: संयुक्तो जातो विभक्तो जात इति च अवस्थितस्वरूप एव वस्तुनि विशेषावाप्तिमात्रेण जननव्यवहारो दृश्यत एव (*NS*. p. 431)[10]

According to this exposition Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti signifies, in the context of creation, the acquisition by the thing or being that is said to be created or born of a new characteristic or its entering into a fresh phase of becoming or a new kind of relationship as a result of such genesis. Such acquisition is *dependent* on the will or power of a superior power —in this case *of God.* This is the only kind of genesis that can be conceived for space, Time, Prakṛti, Jīvas, the Vedas and other (eternal) verities according to M.

The production of a pot from clay is of a different order. Tho' there is no room for production *de novo* in the sense of production of what did not at all exist before in any form in the theory of Pariṇāmavāda which is M.'s (and the Sūtrakāra's) theory of causation,—M. has

8. Śrutis which refer to Ākāśa as having been created by B.—such as *Ātmana ākāśas sambhūtaḥ* (*Taitt. Up.* ii, 1) and Śrutis which refer to Ākāśa as beginningless, all-pervasive and eternal like
अनादिर्वायमाकाश: ( )
आकाशवत् सर्वगतश्च नित्य: ( )
The first is an unidentified Śruti quoted by M. in his *BSB*. The second also unidentified has first been quoted by S. in his BSB. (ii, 3.4).

9. इदं सर्वमसृजत (*Taitt. Up.* ii.6) Also अहं सर्वस्य प्रभव: (*Gita* x.8)

10. The genesis of Ākāśa established in this *adhi.* on the basis of Śrutis like "From the Ātman Ākāśa is produced, He creates all this" is to be understood in the sense that a thing acqures dependently on another a new characteristic. When this new characteristic is acquired, the birth of the qualified entity is necessarily brought about. The configuration of the qualified thing is not different from the essence of the thing. Hence the birth of the qualified entity is the birth of the thing itself. We say for example "Devadatta has become embodied. He has become a learned man, the pot has become conjoined, separated and so on. In these instances, there is the usage referring to the person or thing as being "born" or becoming something, tho' there is only the acquisition of a new characteristic by the person or thing which otherwise keeps its essence intact."

brought out clearly in his *AV.* in his interpretation of the present *adhi.*, where exactly lies the point of departure between genesis in the sense of Paradhīnaviśeṣāpti and genesis in the other sense of Abhūtvābhavanam, within the framework of Pariṇāmavāda itself,[11] and where he differs from and disagrees with S. and others in his interpretation of the *adhi.* What distinguishes the latter from the former is:—

* * * * * जन्मनःस्थूलताभवः ।
पूर्वशब्दविलोपश्च * * * * (*AV*)

उपादानधर्मिणो धर्म्यन्तरात्मना परिवर्तःस्थूलताभवः । अत एव पूर्वशब्दविलोपश्च । पूर्वशब्दनिवृत्तौ शब्दान्तरप्रवृत्तिश्चेत्यर्थः : (*NS.* p. 434b)

To explain: When milk turns into curd, we have transformation of the given substance into another. The former name is dropped and a new one is given to it. The position is different when we speak of the genesis of Avyākṛta-Ākāśa or space at the time of world-creation when it has necessarily to come into contact with 'Mūrtadravyas'. But in doing so, space undergoes no extension or increase in dimension nor forfeits its name or acquires a new one. The same holds true of the 'birth' of Jīvas when they get embodied by God's will. A sound theory of creation has to take note of these facts. The Sūtrakāra's conception of B. as the author of the eight dispensations of finite reality emphasized in i.1.2 and again in iv.4.17 has got to be accepted as the sheet-anchor of his philosophy by every student of Vedānta philosophy. It would follow from this that in the philosophy of Bādarāyaṇa all finite reality has to be accepted as being subject to B.'s creation[12] (and other dispensations) in a sense consistent with Its Majesty. At the same time, the beginninglessness of Space, Time, Prakṛti, Jīvas and such other verities has also got to be accepted on *a priori grounds and on* the evidence of Śrutis. These two facts have to be reconciled. M. has amply shown in his AV. in his interpretation of the Viyadadhikaraṇa the logical impossibility of regarding Space as having been 'created' by B. *in any sense of 'creation' other than 'Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti', as set out before:*

अवकाशमात्रमाकाशः कथमुत्पद्यतेऽन्यथा ? (*AV.* ii.3.1)

His commentator J. explains this:—

Space is that which provides room for bodies to exist. It cannot be conceived as having been produced in time. The difficulties in the

11. ननु परिणामवादे घटादेर्ध्वंसेवोत्पत्तिर्यदवस्थितस्वरूपस्यैव मृदादेरन्यावस्थापत्तिः । परैरपि परिणामवाद एवाङ्गीकृतो नारम्भवादः । अतो विवादाभावात् व्यर्थोऽयमारम्भः । यथा न व्यर्थं तथाऽर्थ एव विवादविषयं स्पष्टयिष्यति । (*NS.* p. 431)
परिणामवादिभिः क्वाप्यभूत्वाभवनानभ्युपगमात् अतो विमतिविषयः क्वचित् स्थूलतामात्रमुच्यताम् (*NS.* p. 434 b)
At least in regard to the Jiva, most Vedāntins have to concede this point in substance.
See S. उपाधुत्पत्त्यास्योत्पत्तिः, तत्प्रलये च प्रलय इति (*BSB.* ii.3.17)
and R. जीवस्य सृष्टिवचनं भोक्तृत्वानुगुणज्ञानविकासाभिप्रायम् (*Vedāntadipa.* ii.3.18)
12. परमेश्वरादृते सर्वं जनिमत् (*NS.* p. 434 b)

way are obvious. We cannot conceive of the antecedent non-existence of space anywhere, prior to the production of space. The locus of such an antecedent negation of space will have to be 'space' itself: Space is presented to our understanding as existing in its own locus (*svāśraya*). The prior non-existence of space, if admitted, will also have to be referred to the same locus—which will be contradictory.

Production of Ākāśa will necessarily require a causal stuff out of which it can be produced. If Prakṛti were to be that stuff, the question will have to be repeated in respect of Prakṛti itself. If Prakṛti exists without being produced it will disrupt the grounds of *Pratijñāhāni, avyatireka* and others on which the Sūtrakāra claims (ii.3.6), that all finite reality is to be treated as having its genesis from B. If Prakṛti, *then, is to be treated as having a genesis in the sense of Parā*dhīnaviśeṣāpti, space too can be credited with the same kind of genesis. We cannot make B. the causal stuff of which Prakṛti is produced; for B. is not subject to change or modification of any kind and all transformation and change in the causal stuff are, in the last analysis, brought about by some superior force or agency external to the transforming substance and exercised over it. Such a thing is impossible in respect of B. *the One Independent principle. So no transformation of B. as* Ākāśa is possible.[13] Space then can neither be treated as having been created *de novo* nor as being absolutely uncreated. The former is logically impossible and the latter is repugnant to the supreme purport (*mahātātparya*) and teaching of the Śrutis. The right solution is to accept that Space, Time, Prakṛti, Jīvas and other verities are created *in the special (i.e. Pickwickian) sense of having Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti.*

The "creation" of Ākāśa would be equally impossible to explain if it is conceived as a mere abstraction—an absence of occupying bodies, as in Buddhist philosophy. Such a view would lead to the adverse *consequence that when such "Ākāśa" had* not yet come into being (i.e. produced) the entire cosmos was teeming with bodies. That would be a reversal of our received notions of what constitutes Sṛṣṭi

13. 'अन्यथा,' पराधीनविशेषाप्तिर्जन्मेत्यनगीकारे अवकाशमात्रमाकाश इति चागीकारे, कथमसावुत्पद्यते? तस्योत्पत्तिर्नोपपद्यत इति यावत्। सोपादाना हि सर्वा सृष्टिर्दृष्टा। न चाकाशस्योत्पत्तावुपादानमस्ति। न च ब्रह्मण उपादानत्वमुपपद्यत इति प्रकृत्यधिकरणे निर्दिष्टम्।
यस्य चोत्पत्तिः तस्य प्रागभावेन भाव्यम्। न चाकाशस्य प्रागभावः संभवति। अनुपपन्नप्रतीतिकत्वात्। अभावो हि प्रतीयमानोऽस्यात्रेति प्रतीयते, नतु निराश्रयः। न चाकाशाभावस्याश्रयप्रतीतिरुपपद्यते। यदेवेहेति निर्दिश्यते तस्यैवाकाशत्वात्। उपादानाश्रिताभाववादेऽपि तदभावान्नाभावप्रतीत्युपपत्तिः। अनवकाशरूप ब्रह्मैवाकाशस्य पूर्वावस्था, प्रागभावश्चोच्यत इत्यपि ब्रह्मणोऽनुपादानत्वेन प्रत्युक्तम्। प्रतियोग्याश्रय एवाभावस्याश्रयः न चाकाशस्याश्रयोऽस्तीति तदभावोऽपि निराश्रयोऽस्त्विति चेन्न। निराश्रयत्वे कार्यत्वानुपपत्तेः। किंच, प्रतीतावकाशः स्वाश्रय इत्यतः तदभावोऽप्याकाशाश्रयः प्रतीयेतेति विरुद्धमापद्यते। प्रकृतिराकाशस्य कारणमिति कश्चित्। तन्मते, प्रकृतेरजन्मत्वप्रसग। अथ तत्र पराधीनविशेषावाप्तिर्जन्मागीक्रियते, तदा असभावितोत्पत्तिके वियदादावप्येवमेवागीकरणीयमिति। (*NS.* p. 431-432 b)

and Pralaya respectively.[14] The theory is also open to other difficulties. The negation cannot be subsumed under any of the classifications of *abhāva*—antecedent, posterior, absolute or reciprocal.[15] It could not be brought under the first two heads as there will be no Ākāśa left in the world, after creation has been completed—when there cannot be any antecedent or posterior negation of occupying bodies once such bodies have come to stay after they have been created. Antecedent and subsequent negations subsist in their ground. If then Ākāśa *is to be equated* with the absence of moveable bodies, the ground of the antecedent or the subsequent negation will have to be viewed as Ākāśa". As long as there happens to be *some moveable body somewhere in the world,* Ākāśa cannot be equated with the absolute negation of moveable bodies lest so long as the world lasts there should be no room for Ākāśa therein. The possibility of equating Ākāśa with reciprocal negation of bodies is equally ruled out. Reciprocal negation between a cloth and a pot will partake of the essence of the cloth or the pot as the case may be in Dharmisvarūpabhedavāda; while it will be considered to be subsisting in either of them, as the case may be, in Dharmabhedavāda. In either case, the consequence of accepting such a view of Ākāśa would be that the perceiver of the pot or the cloth will be getting the impression of Ākāśa in perceiving the pot or the cloth. Unless the existence of Space (Ākāśa) *is admitted in its own right, one cannot even give an* intelligible answer to the question *where* one bird should be flying when another is also on flight. To say that one of them will be flying *where the other is not is to admit* Ākāśa *as the space* which is the abode which serves to mark off the presence or absence of one of the birds.[16] We are thus forced to admit space in its own right as the abode of both moveable bodies *and their absence* and, therefore, as something *other than* mere absence of occupying bodies. And in this capacity, it cannot, for reasons already given, admit *of creation in the sense of abhūt*vābhavanam and can do so only in the sense of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti.

Advaitic commentators like S. have taken it for granted that the creation of Ākāśa etc. taught in the Sūtras is only in the sense of Abhūt-

14. सर्वस्यापि मूर्ताभावस्य सृष्टावुत्पत्त्यङ्गीकारे प्रलयेऽप्यस्य तदभावोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः स्यात्, अत्यन्तासत्त्वे जन्मासम्भवात्. यदि च सृष्टेः पूर्वं प्रलये नाकाशता, सर्वस्य मूर्तद्रव्याभावस्याभावोऽङ्गीक्रियते, तर्हि किं तदा मूर्तनिबिडं जगदङ्गीक्रियते? यदुक्तलक्षणाकाशाभावः प्रलये भवेत्, तदा मूर्तसम्पूर्णता भवेदेव। अभावाभावस्य भावानतिरेकात्। सृष्ट्युत्तरकाले मूर्तभावत्वं न स्यात्। एवं च, सर्वप्रलयविपरिवर्तः स्यात्। अधिका च प्रलये मूर्तसम्पूर्णतापत्तिः (*NS.* 432 b)

15. अपि च, किं मूर्तद्रव्यस्य प्रागभाव आकाशः, किंवा प्रध्वंसो, यद्वात्यन्ताभावः, अथवान्योन्याभावः? न प्रथमद्वितीयौ; सृष्ट्युत्तरकाले निराकाशत्वप्रसङ्गात्। प्रागभावप्रध्वंसाभावयोः प्रतियोगिनिष्ठत्वेन तदाकाशबुद्धेरन्यत्र तदभावस्य चापत्तेः। न तृतीयः। क्वचित् कदाचित् मूर्तसद्भावे तदत्यन्ताभावानुपपत्तेः। न चतुर्थः। घटान्योन्याभावो हि घट-धर्मिष्ठो वेति, तत्राकाशबुद्धिप्रसङ्गात्। (*NS.* p. 432)

16. यो मूर्तद्रव्याणि तदभावांश्चाङ्गीकरोति तेनावश्यं तदतिरिक्तावकाशोऽङ्गीकर्तव्य एव। एकस्मिन् पतत्रिणि पतति द्वितीयेन पतत्रिणा कुत्र पतितव्यमिति वाच्यम्। यत्रासौ नास्ति तत्रेति चेत् तर्हि येनाधिकरणेन एकस्य पतत्रिणोः भावः परस्य च भावो विशेष्यते तदर्थान्तरमङ्गीकर्तव्यम्। स एव च प्रदेशरूप आकाश इति कथं तदनभ्युपगमः (*NS.* p. 432b–33)

vābhavanam. Theirs is obviously a superficial view which fails to take note of the many crucial points connected with this question.[17] The concept of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti, which M. has brought to bear on the evaluation of the Doctrine of Creation in the Theism of the Vedānta, is of *great scientific value*. It gives us a new insight into the whole problem of creation and solves many of its difficulties which have been left untouched by S., R. and others. *The possibility of the doctrines of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti and 'Eternal Creation' in Theism being the two sides of the same coin cannot be ruled out.*

The genesis of Abhimānidevatās of space is likewise a case of Parādhīnaviśeṣapti. The abhimānidevatā of space is Cit-Prakṛti or Ramā (Śrītattva)[18] She receives her impulsion from B. to evolve Mahat and other Tattvas from Prakṛti. *This is her genesis.*[19]

Bhūtākāśa or the element of ether is in a different category. As applied to Bhūtākāśa, the statement of the Śruti that Ākāśa is born from B. is to be taken in the other sense of *utpatti* viz. abh*ūtvābhavanam*.[20] M. holds that Bhūtākāśa possesses the property of dark color and is perceptible to supermundane vision.[21] There is also the evidence of the Smṛti that it is one of the component elements of our physical body and is as such susceptible to transformation.[22] It is a product of Tāmasa-ahaṁkāra.[23] We have also another text which speaks of Prāṇa and the five elements departing from the soul in part and merging in the adhidevas and in part following the soul in its onward journey after death. This is possible only in the case of Bhūtākāśa. Space or avyākṛtākāśa is unlimited and its parts cannot go from

17. इहाकाशस्योक्त जन्म घटादेरिवाभूत्वाभवनलक्षणमिति केचिदास्थिताः। तन्निराकरिष्यन् स्वमत तावदाह– 'पराधीने' ति (*NS.* p. 431 b)

18 अव्याकृताकाशम्य तदभिमानिचित्प्रकृतेश्च 'स इद सर्वमसृजत' इत्यादिश्रुत्युक्तोत्पत्ति. पराधीनविशेषाप्तिपरा। (*TC.* p. 931)

19 पुरुषाव्यक्तकालाना रमैकाभिमानिनी
सिमृक्षुत्वविशेष तत्साक्षात् भगवदिच्छया।
प्राप्तेव सृष्टेत्युदिता .... (*AV.*)

20. उत्पत्तिवचनाना असितवर्णभूततदभिमानिशरीरविषयत्वम् (*NV*) तत्र भूतं स्वरूपत एवोत्पत्तिमत्। रूपित्वात् (*TP.* ii.3.3)

21. भूतमप्यसित दिव्यदृष्टिगोचरमेव तु
उत्पद्यते . . . . . (*AV.* ii 3 1)
आकाशो नीलिमोदेति (*NV*) भावभवित्रोरभेदात् नीलिमेत्युक्तिः (*TPB*)

22. भूताकाश तु–'सर्वं पचभिराविष्टम्' 'पचभूतात्मके देहे' इत्यादि स्मृतेर्देहाकारेण विकारि (*TC.* p. 932)

23. भूत तु–आत्मन आकाशः सभूत, इत्यादिप्रकरणानुगृहीतश्रुतिभिः
तामसाच्च विकुर्वाणात् भगवद्वीर्यचोदितात्।
शब्दमात्रमभूत् तस्मान्नभः श्रोत्रं तु शब्दजम्॥ (*Bhāg.* iii.27.34)
इत्यदि स्मृतिभिश्च तामसाहकारकार्यम्। (*TC.* p. 933 b)

one place to another.[24] There are thus sufficient reasons to accept "Ākāśadvaitavāda"[25] and distinguish space or *avyākṛtākāśa* from ether or *bhūtākāśa.*[26]

That would resolve the conflict of *utpatti* and *anutpatti*—Śrutis in respect of "Ākāśa".[27] Accepting the concept of genesis in its more comprehensive and penetrating sense of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti, it can be appled to Avyākṛtākāśa and its abhimānidevatā as well as to Bhūtākāśa and its presiding deity Vināyaka, who acquires a physical body.[28]

In the light of these findings, the third Sūtra *Gauṇyasambhavāt* (ii.3.3) has been interpreted as follows: The texts which refer to Ākāśa as unoriginated (*anādi, anutpattimat*) contradict many others which speak of the origination of Ākāśa from B. Moreover, genesis in the sense of *abhūtvābhavanam* is perfectly true of Bhūtākāśa. The presiding deity of Bhūtākāsa viz. Vināyaka (who is also denoted by the term Ākāśa) can justifiably be referred to as having a genesis thro' his becoming embodied. As regards the other two: Avyākṛtākāśa and its presiding deity, which are also denoted by the term Ākāśa, both of them can be accepted as having a genesis from B. thro' Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti. Thus the "utpatti-Śrutis" score over the anutpatti-Śrutis in that they cover a wider ground and are applicable to *all the four* denoted by the term Ākāśa.

The Śruti which says that Ākāśa is without genesis and is beginningless is first of all absolutely inapplicable to Bhūtākāśa. If it is still to be called uncreated it can only be in a figurative sense of its going back to impenetrable immemorial antiquity. Without such diminution

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24. मृतिकाले जहत्येनं प्राणा भूतानि पंच च ।
भागतो भागतस्त्वेनमनुगच्छन्ति सर्वशः ।
इति ब्रह्माण्डे (*Q. M. BSB.* iii.1.4)
इत्यादि स्मृतिभिः भूताकाशं गत्यादियोग्यभागवत् । अवकाशस्तु न गत्यादियोग्यभागवान् । नहि प्रदेशविशेषः एतद्देशं त्यक्त्वा प्रदेशान्तरं गच्छति । (*TC.* p. 933 b)

25. The phrase "आकाशाद्वैतम्" *is first used by J. in his NS and by* Vyāsatīrtha in his *TC* न चाकाशाद्वित्वे मानाभावः (*p. 932*).

26. Read: नन्वव्याकृताकाशे प्रमाणमेव नास्ति, कस्यानुत्पत्तिरुच्यत इत्यत आह—साक्षीति
अव्याकृतं हि गगनं साक्षिगोचरम् ।
प्रदेश इति विज्ञेयं नित्यं नोत्पद्यते हि तत् ।
(तथापि मूर्तसम्बन्धपरतन्त्रविशेषयुक्)
(*AV.*)

27. नन्वेतदेव भूताकाशमिति चेन्न । रूपित्वारूपित्वव्याकृतत्वाव्याकृतत्वपरिच्छिन्नत्वापरिच्छिन्नत्वधर्माणां सत्त्वात् । किञ्च, उत्पत्त्यनुत्पत्तिश्रुत्योः विरोधोऽप्याकाशाद्वैतमवगमयति । व्यवस्थया अविरोधोपपत्तौ अनुत्पत्तिश्रुतेरौपचारिकत्वकल्पनायोगात् । न च प्रदेशस्योत्पत्तिरुपपद्यत इत्युक्तं प्राक् । ननु, सूत्रकृतैव गौण्यसम्भवादित्युक्तम् । सत्यम् । व्याख्यातं तत् भाष्यकृता, विवृतं चास्माभिः ।
(*NS.* p. 433 b)

28. अत आकाशशब्दोक्तः, तद्देवोऽत्र विनायकः । देहोत्पत्त्या समुत्पन्न इति श्रुत्याभिधीयते ॥ (*AV.*)

of meaning, it is applicable only to three other "Ākāśas"—Avyākṛtākāśa, its Abhimānidevatā and the abhimānidevatā of Bhūtākāśa, in the sense of Paradhīnaviśeṣāpti. Thus the *utpatti-Śruti* covers all the members contemplated while the *anutpatti-Śruti* covers *one less.* For this reason, the anutpatti-Śruti has to be treated as Gauṇī (partial)—*ekadeśanityatvam guṇayogaḥ (TD).*

The fifth Sūtra shows that the expression "having no origination" tho' primarily true of B., is applied to Ākāśa in a figurative sense, just as the term B. tho' primarily denoting the Supreme Being is also figuratively applied to the fourfaced Brahmā.[29]

The sixth Sūtra: *Pratijñāhānir avyatirekāt śabdebhyaḥ* draws attention to the adverse consequences which would follow if the texts saying that Ākāśa is *not originated* is *not* understood in a figurative sense, as insisted upon in Sūtra ii.3.3. The Śruti confronts us with a categorical statement that B. is the author and creator of everything in finite reality. "Ākāśa", in either or in all its accepted senses (as given before), *does* certainly fall within "the all" (*sarvam*) that is other than B. (*avyatirekāt*) and is created by It. As J. explains: B. and Ākāśa cannot both be regarded as "unoriginated" in the absolute sense of the term. Such a stand will compromise the position of the Śruti that B. has created "all this" finite reality. The expression *"anutpattimat"* (being unoriginated) must, therefore, be held to be applicable primarily only to B. and only secondarily to Ākāśa and others. There is no substance in the objection that there is no specific mention of Ākāśa in the Śruti text which says B. created *all this* and that by reason of such non-mention of Ākāśa here it may as well be deemed to be an uncreated substance, without prejudice to the Śruti in question. The fact remains that Ākāśa is included in the "all" and *there is no* justification to restrict the connotation of "all" so as to exclude Ākāśa from the purview of the promissory statement "He has created *all this*". If it is still contended that there is only a vague reference to "all this" as created and that it is not clearly seen that B. alone is without origin and that Ākāśa *has an* origin, we have only to refer the objector to the existence of many clear texts such as "B. alone existed in the beginning; nothing else existed in the beginning."[30] By using the expres-

29. एकस्यैवाकाशस्य गौणमुख्यत्वापेक्षयानुत्पत्तिमत्त्वमुत्पत्तिमत्त्वं चेत्युक्तव्यवस्था युक्तैव। अनुत्पत्तिमच्छब्दस्य ब्रह्मणि मुख्यार्थस्यापि आकाशे (ब्रह्मशब्दवत्) अमुख्यत्वोपपत्तेरिति। (*TP.* ii.3.5)

30. यदि ब्रह्माकाशयोरुभयोरनुत्पत्तिमच्छब्दो मुख्योऽङ्गीक्रियते, तर्हि ब्रह्मेदं सर्वमसृजत इति प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः स्यात्। अतो ब्रह्मण्येव मुख्योऽनुत्पत्तिमच्छब्दोऽन्यत्रामुख्यः। न च वाच्यमत्राकाशशब्दाश्रवणात् तस्य मुख्यानुत्पत्तावपि न प्रतिज्ञाहानिरिति। आकाशस्यापि सर्वमध्यपतितत्वात सङ्कोचे कारणाभावात्। तथाप्याकाशब्रह्मणोः सादित्वानादित्वे स्पष्टं न प्रतीयेते इति चेन्न। आत्मेत्यादिश्रुतीनां स्पष्टं तद्वाचकानां सद्भावात्। (*TP.* ii 3.6) आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्। असदेवेदमग्र आसीत्। इदं वा अग्रे नैव किंचनासीत्, इत्याद्युत्पत्तिश्रुतिभ्यः स्पष्टं सादित्वम्। (*TP.* ii 3.6)

sion *śabdebhyaḥ* (and because of the presence of "texts") in the Sūtra (ii.3.6) the Sūtrakāra himself wishes it to be understood that in view of the opposition to several texts, the stray *references to* Ākāśa as unoriginated deserves to be taken in a secondary sense.[31] The present Sūtra is only a clarification of the reason viz. the incompatibility of the anāditva *Śruti* (*asambhavāt*) adduced earlier in Sūtra 3 and should not, therefore, be deemed to be redundant.[32]

The concluding Sūtra: *Yāvadvikāram tu vibhāgo lokavat* shows that inference also helps us to determine that everything in finite reality is, in the last analysis, amenable to creation which will enable us to understand without any difficulty that the Śruti text which speaks of Ākāśa as being *unoriginated has necessarily to be understood in a* secondary sense as pointed out in Sūtra ii.3.3. The text of Sūtra 7, embodies the necessary Vyāpti in support of the inference. The predicate and the reason are implicit in the Vyāpti: *Yo vibhaktas sa vikriyamāṇaḥ.* The subject (Viyat) comes from the opening Sūtra and the *illustration is given thro' Lokavat* (as in the world[33]) *i.e. as in the case* of a pot or the like. The phrase *Yāvadvikāram* is an adverbial compound. '*Yāvat*' signifies delimitation by emphasis. 'Vikāra' signifies whatever is subject to modification (*Karmaṇi ghañ*). 'Vibhakta' denotes whatever is subject to limitation of capacity. The Vyāpti is that whatever *is subject to limitation of capacity* (*alpaśaktimat*)[34] is subject to modification and, therefore, to origination. It should be noted that according to M.'s interpretation '*Vibhaktatva*' here does *not mean being divisible.* This should be clear from J.'s comment in introducing the quotation in M.'s bhāṣya— द्रव्यत्वादविभाग इत्यसिद्धमित्यत आह–विभाग इति (*TP.* ii.3.7)

Applying this Vyāpti, M. concludes: विभक्तत्वाच्च विकारित्वं युक्तं (वियतः)[35] In-other words, in so far as Ākāśa is of limited power (*vibhaktatvāt*) it is a created product (vikāri) or in other words: created (*utpattimat*[36]). Conversely, B. in so far as it is of unlimited power (*avibhaktam*) is not

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31. बहुश्रुतिविरोधे चैकस्या अमुख्यत्वं नियतमिति भावः। (*TP.* ii.3.6)
32. अनेनासंभवादित्युक्तमेव विवृतं भवति (*TP.* ii.3.6) 'असंभवात्' इत्युक्तविवृतित्वात् अस्य न पौनरुक्त्यम् (*TDP.*)
Raghūttama makes another fine point:
असंभवप्रतियोगिनः श्रुतिबाहुल्यस्य शब्देभ्य इत्यनेनोक्तेः तद्विवरणरूपत्वात्। अत एव भाष्ये तत्र श्रुतीरनुदाहृत्यात्रोदाहृता इति भावः। (*TPB.* p. 250)
33. लोकवत् इति सप्तम्यन्तात् वतिः (*BD*)
34. विभागशब्देन कर्मार्थघञन्तेनाल्पशक्तिमानुच्यते। तस्य 'अयमिह भक्तो न' इति विभज्यमानत्वात् (Rash. *TDP*)
Also विभागो ह्यल्पशक्तिः स्यान्न तदस्ति जनार्दने। इति बृहत्संहितायाम् (M. *BSB.* ii.3.7)
35. वियत् इति विशेष्यनामेहानुवर्तते। (*BD*)
36. तथा च न केवलं शब्देभ्यः किन्तु वियतः विभक्तत्वात् अल्पशक्तित्वानुमानाच्च विकारित्वमुत्पत्तिमत्त्वमेव युक्तं, न्याय्यमित्यर्थः (*BD*)

subject to modification (*avikāri*) and therefore absolutely unoriginated (*anutpattimat*). J. puts the inference succinctly:—

अत्रेमौ प्रयोगौ भवतः–

वियदुत्पत्तिमत् विभक्तत्वात्, घटादिवत्।
ब्रह्म नोत्पत्तिमत् अविभक्तत्वात्, व्यतिरेकेण घटादिवत् इति। (*TP*)

The inference can readily be extended to other verities like Prakṛti, Puruṣa, Kāla, etc. which are all of them of limited power and, therefore, subject to modification in terms of Paradhīnaviśeṣāpti.

Saṁkara's Interpretation

According to S. the genesis of Ākāśa established in this *adhi.* is in terms of *abhūtvābhavanam*. The same is the view of R. and others. These commentators have not probed into the need for accepting creation in the sense of Paradhīnaviśeṣāpti, as defined in the foregoing section. But a probe seems to be really called for in the light of a more scientific examination of the question of the impossibility, not to say the inconceivability, of the creation of Space[37] and other relevant grounds as well as facts revealed by the traditions of Vedic and Upaniṣadic thought about the acceptance of eternal verities like Prakṛti, Puruṣa, Kāla etc. Even if Vedāntism is faced with *one other principle* like Avdiyā or the 'Prakāras' of B., it cannot resolve them into Brahmacaitanya, by any stretch of the imagination. The problem would remain very much alive and nothing can be gained by refusing to recognize facts and coming to grips with them, in a spirit of constructive thinking.

S. *starts* his *Pūrvapakṣa with the* second Sūtra[38] and interprets the first, third, fourth and fifth Sūtras as embodying the position of *quasi*-Siddhāntins and concludes by refuting the Ekadeśins' view by presenting the considered Siddhānta in Sūtras 6 and 7.

The Pūrvapakṣa is—In *Taitt. Up.* (ii. 1) we are told that Ākāśa is the first principle to be created while *Chān. Up.* (vi.2.3) refers to Tejas as the first to be created. There is thus mutual contradiction on this point between them.[39] The quasi-Siddhānta then puts forward a solution of the alleged contradiction in Sūtras 3, 4 and 5. The solution

37. "If space is created, it must have been previously non-existent. *The non-existence of space cannot, however, be imagined by any mental effort.* If the non-existence of space is absolutely un-conceivable, then necessarily its creation is absolutely inconceivable (Herbert Spencer, *First Principles*, p. 27).

38. तत्र पूर्वपक्षसूत्रं 'अस्ति तु' (*Bhāmatī* ii.3.2)
Dr. Radhakrishnan's comments on Sūtras 1 and 2 here, that the *prima facie* view is presented in Sūtra 1 and the answer to the objection in 2, do not reflect the correct position (*The Brahmasutra*, p. 397).

39. न श्रोभयोः प्रथमजत्वं समवति (S. *BSB.* ii.3.2)

is: no genesis need be admitted in reality for Ākāśa (Sūtra. 1). The *Taitt. Up.* passage ascribing genesis to Ākāśa can be explained away as a figurative statement (*gauṇī*)—even as in common parlance we speak of space being made or created *here or there* for X or Y (Sūtra 3).[40] As Ākāśa is all-pervasive and has no parts, its creation is impossible. Whatever originates springs from intimate, non-intimate and efficient causes. Such causes are inconceivable for Ākāśa.[41] There are also other texts which attribute omnipresence and eternity to Ākāśa, likening B. to it: *Ākāśavat sarvagataśa nityaḥ* ([42]). The reference to origination has, therefore, to be treated as figuratively intended in respect of Ākāśa and literally meant in respect of the other tattvas. This is not uncommon. In the Ānandamaya section of the *Taitt. Up.*, we find the expression Brahman used in a figurative sense with reference to food, vital air, mind and vijnāna and in its primary sense with regard to ānanda.[43] In this way, the alleged contradiction between the two Śrutis can be resolved. Thus concludes the Ekadeśin.[44]

The genuine Siddāanta is given in Sūtras 6 and 7. Sūtra 6 points out that if as suggested by the *quasi*-Siddhāntin Ākāśa is not to be regarded as an effect of B. the famous promissory statement (*pratijñā*) in the *Chān. Up.* (vi.1.1) and elsewhere that by knowing the One everything else is known will be violated.[45] The import of this promissory statement is that everything is non-different from B. as its effect. When the cause is known, the effect is known. The next Sūtra shows that Ākāśa is an effect in so far as it has a separateness about it. We see in the world that all created things are distinct and separate from each other. Whatever is thus divided and has difference from others is an effect. Whatever is *not* divided from another is *not* an effect. Ākāśa is seen to be different from other elements like the earth. Therefore, it must also be an effect like the earth, fire, etc.[46]

Criticism.

Tho' the conclusion that Ākāśa *is no less subject to creation* by B. is correct, in principle, the manner in which the apparent contradiction

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41. समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्तकारणेभ्यः किल सर्वमुत्पद्यमानं समुत्पद्यते। द्रव्यस्य चैकजातीयकमनेकं द्रव्यं समवायिकारणं भवति। न त्वाकाशस्य एकजातीयमनेकं च द्रव्यमारम्भकमस्ति यस्मिन् समवायिकारणे सत्यसमवायिकारणे च तत्संयोगे आकाश उत्पद्येत। तदभावात्तु तदनुग्रहप्रवृत्तं निमित्तकारणं दूरापेतम् (S. *BSB.* ii.3.3)
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hand and others which put it down as beginningless (*anādi*) and uncreated. *That is what M. has done.*[48]

S. has adopted the curious procedure of giving preference in the opening Sūtra to a pseudo-Siddhānta, intercepting it with the regular Pūrvapakṣa for the *adhi.* in the second Sūtra and going *back again to* the pseudo-Siddhānta and expatiating on it in three more Sūtras and finally establishing the genuine Siddhānta in the last two Sūtras. It is difficult to accept the suggestion that some quasi-Siddhānta is being set forth in four out of the seven Sūtras of this *adhi.* and refuted in the end.[49] There are no decisive marks or indications of any such intention in the wording of these Sūtras such as the use of the expression "*Eke*" pointing to a partial view of some others (*Ekadeśins*). In the wording of Sūtra 2 there is no indicatory "*Cet*" to warrant our putting it down as embodying *only* a Pūrvapakṣa. The requisite Pūrvapakṣa can always be accommodated outside the Sūtra in the absence of clear indicatory marks such as चेत् or इति चेत् pointing to the presence of a separate Pūrvapakṣa Sūtra entirely or in part.[50] We have seen how it is quite possible to treat all the Sūtras here (and elsewhere[51]) as presenting the Sūtrakāra's Siddhānta view that Ākāśa is subject to genesis.[52]

The way in which S. brings up the thesis of *Ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam* (by knowing the One all else is known) in order to show that Ākāśa must be regarded as an effect of B. is not sustainable. We have already seen in connection with the interpretation of the Prakṛtyadhi. and the Ārambhaṇādhi., that the thesis of *Ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam* is out of tune with S.'s Vivartavāda and that the wording of the original Upaniṣadic text *Ekena mṛtpiṇḍena vijñātena sarvam mṛnmayam vijñātam* (*Chān. Up.* vi.1.4.6) accords neither with Vivartavāda nor with Pariṇāmavāda of B.

Even conceding to Ākāśa a beginningless status such as is given to Bhāvarūpājñāna, the thesis of *Ekavijñānena Sarvavijñānam* can be maintained from the Advaitic point of view by looking upon Ākāśa as

48. किंच, 'अनादिर्वायुमाकाशं, आकाशवत् सर्वगतश्च नित्यः, स यथानन्तोऽयमाकाशः', आकाशः सम्भूतः इत्यनादित्व-सादित्वश्रुत्योः स्पष्टविरोधेन पूर्वपक्षसम्भवेनाप्यस्पष्टश्रुतिविरोधेन स न युक्तः (*TC.* p. 934 b).
It will be seen that R. has adopted a different ground of Pūrvapakṣa from S.'s.
49. किंच, आद्येन सिद्धान्त्येकदेशिमतं प्रक्रम्य, द्वितीयेन विरोधपूर्वपक्षमुक्त्वा, पुनः तृतीयादिभिरेकदेशिमतस्य विशिष्योक्तौ न हेतुरस्ति। (*TC.* p. 934 b-934)
50. किंच, चेदित्यादिपूर्वपक्षचिह्नस्य, नेत्यादिसिद्धान्तचिह्नस्य, 'एके' इत्याद्येकदेशिमतचिह्नस्याभावेऽपि न सूत्राणि छित्त्वा पूर्वपक्षत्वादिवर्णनं युक्तम् (*TC.* p. 934)
51. See Vol. I, p. 350.
52. आद्ये—पूर्वाधिकरणादनुवृत्तमुत्पत्त्यसम्भव न वियदनुत्पत्तिमत् इति वियति नञा निषिद्ध्य, अश्रुतेरित्यनेन तत्रानुत्पत्तिश्रुत्यभावहेतुमुक्त्वा तृतीये आद्योक्तहेतुसिद्ध्यर्थमनुत्पत्तिश्रुतेर्गौणत्वोक्तिरित्येवं सर्वेषां सिद्धान्तसूत्रत्वसम्भवे.. (*TC.* p. 934)

something superimposed on B. like Bhāvarūpājnāna so that it need not be shown that Ākāśa is an effect of B. (ब्रह्मकार्यं वियत्) To reduce *kāryatvam* (being an effect) to a superimposition will be going against the spirit of the Viṣayavākya: आत्मन आकाश: संभूत: and the Sūtras. Surely, the Śruti and Sūtra *are not conceiving* of the evolution of Ākāśa, Vāyu, Agni, etc. as mere superimpositions. If that be so, there being no proof of any creation or genesis of Ākāśa and others they would all be *mere superimpositions* like *Avidyā—whose* order and priorities would cease to be anybody's concern. By the same token, the denial of *utpatti* to B. in the Sūtra: *Asambhavastu sato anupapatteḥ* (ii.3, 9) would *not* be *denying any real genesis to B.*, *but only* superimposition which is not the purport thereof as we see from S.'s own C.: *No khalu Brahmaṇas sadātmakasya kutaścid anyatas sambhava utpattir āśamkitavyā. kasmād? anupapatteḥ* (S. *BSB.* ii.3.9). *In the same* way, the denial of origination to the Jīva in the Sūtra: *Nātmā aśruteḥ......* (ii.3.17) would make no sense unless it refers to denial of real genesis *in the accepted sense of production.* Otherwise, *as in S.'s philosophy* the "Jīva" is a *viśiṣṭa* or qualified being and in that sense superimposed, it would be denying his character as a superimposition.

Moreover, in S.'s interpretation the fact that everything in the universe is to be acccepted as 'created' has to be *deduced* by implication from the terms of *Ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam* being otherwise inappropriate (*anyathānupapatti*). This is not only a circuitous proceeding but the interpretation of the Pratijñā is itself open to question. On the other hand, the Śruti text (Sa) *idam sarvam asṛjata* (*Taitt. Up.* ii.6) goes directly to the root of the matter and establishes at one stroke without beating about the bush, that everything in finite reality (*yad idam kimca*) has its genesis from B. It is this viṣayavākya that should have been cited as Pratijñā *in ii.3.6 as it does not admit of any other* interpretation.[53]

S.'s argues *in* the last Sūtra that everything which has a separateness about it from another is a created thing. Whatever is divided is an effect. There is difference and separateness among all objects of the world. Ākāśa is different from the earth and others. Hence it must be an effect. The Ātman is immune from the purview of this argument as he is self-established while *Ākāśa is not.*

Be that as it may, the Sūtrakāra's B. is *Śāstrayoni.* There is real danger of S.'s *interpretation of Yāvadvikāram vibhāgaḥ* rendering the

53 (स) इद सर्वसृजत (*Taitt. Up.* ii.6) इति प्रतिज्ञया साक्षात् सर्वजन्मसिद्धौ एकविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञयार्थापत्ति-दुक्तिरयुक्ता। (*TC.* p. 935 b)

Supreme Brahman liable to genesis, as B. too is distinguished from the world of unrealities (*net neti*[54]).

Rāmānuja's Interpretation.

R. bases his Pūrvapakṣa on the opening Sūtra and rebuts it in the second. The three subsequent Sūtras are taken to raise a further contention that the text declaring Ākāśa to be a created product may be understood in a figurative sense. The last two Sūtras refute this further contention.[55] However, R. reads Sūtras 3 and 4 as a single one and splits no. 6 into two Sūtras, treating *Śabdebhyaḥ* as a fresh one. Apart from this, he extends the *adhi.* upto and inclusive of *Asambhavastu sato 'nupapatteḥ* (ii.3.9) unlike S. and M., who recognize separate *adhi.s* for Mātariśvan and Sat.

R. also relies on *Ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam* under the Sūtra *Pratijñāhanir* (ii.3.6) to establish the genesis of Ākāśa. But he grants that in his system Jīvas and Prakṛti are eternal verities without a beginning. If for reasons already shown, Ākāśa as space is also recognized as a beginningless reality besides them, the principle of *Ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam* is not likely to suffer in any way.

R. renders *vibhāgaḥ* in Sūtra 6 as "having a genesis" (*utpattiḥ*) and not in S.'s sense.[56] The *Śrutaprakāśa* has criticized S.'s interpretation of *vibhāga*. R. is inclined to treat *vibhāga* as the predicate in the *vyāpti*—Whatever is liable to modification (*vikāra*) has a genesis (*vibhāga*). He distinguishes two kinds of modification—one which is partial as in the case of the self and the other complete as in the case of Ākāśa:

ज्ञानसंकोचविकासलक्षणो जीवस्यान्यथाभावः। वियदादेस्तु स्वरूपान्यथाभावलक्षणः
(*Śrībhāṣya*, ii.3.18)

The first one is equivalent to genesis in terms of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti. When the rationable of the inconceivability of the creation of space comes to be realized, M.'s plea for making a fresh appraisal of the doctrine of creation in the light of the concept of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti in respect of eternal verities is sure to rouse wide philosophical interest.

54. सप्तमे–विभागशब्दोक्तो भिन्नत्वरूपो हेतुरप्ययुक्तः। आरोपितस्य धर्मिसत्तासमानसत्ताकस्य तस्याधिष्ठानेऽनृतत्व्यावृत्तेश्च ब्रह्मण्यपि सत्त्वात्। दृष्टोहि मुक्तौ स्वारोपिनाद्रूप्यात् धर्मिसत्तासमानसत्ताको भेदः। सत्यस्य च तस्याकाशेऽप्यभावात्। (*TC.* p. 935 b)

55 वियदुत्पद्यते न वेति संशय्यते। किं युक्तम्? न वियदुत्पद्यत इति। न खलु निरवयवस्य सर्वगतस्याकाशस्योत्पत्तिः निष्पादयितुं शक्यते। एवंप्राप्तेऽभिधीयते–अस्ति तु आकाशस्योत्पत्तिः * * * पुनश्चोदयति–गौण्यसंभवाच्छब्दाच्च * * परिहरन्ति–प्रतिज्ञाहानिरव्यतिरेकात् * * (*Śrībhāṣya*).

56. आकाशस्य ब्रह्मणो विभाग उत्पत्तिरप्युक्तैव (*R. Śrībhāṣya*)

CHAPTER XIV

THE GENESIS OF MUKHYA-PRĀṆA.

2. *Mātariśvādhikaraṇam* (ii.3.8)

This *adhi.* resolves the conflict of texts regarding the genesis of the deity Mukhya-Vāyu or Mukhya-Prāṇa—the chief *Abhimānidevatā* of the element of air. It cannot be taken to discuss the genesis of the element itself as, in the first place, there is no divergence of views about *its origination and secondly the previous adhi. has shown that* even a much higher *tattva* viz. Avyākṛtākāśa which is beginningless and eternal is also subject to creation in the special sense of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti. In the circumstances, there is no possibility whatsoever of any reasonable doubt arising about the genesis of the element of air which is much lower down in the grade. *We shall revert to this later.*

Mukhya-Prāṇa holds the supreme position among Jīvas.[1] The parables in several Upaniṣads about the incontestable suzerainty of Prāṇa over the other Indriyābhimāni-devatās are well-known.[2] As the origination of air can be easily established thro' upalakṣaṇa from the establishment of the origination of Bhūtākāśa (also) in the *Viyadadhi.*, M. feels that the present *adhi.* should be confined to the deity. As the inquiry into the adhibhūta principles includes the inquiry into their presiding deities also,[3] there is no bar to the present inquiry being conducted with reference to the deity.

1. भूतानि चेष्टा मन्त्राश्च मुख्यप्राणादिदं जगत् ।
मुख्यप्राण: परस्माच्च न पर कारणान्वित: ॥
2 Cf. *Chān. Up.* V.1.1-15; *AA.* ii. 1. 4; ii.1.6; *Bṛh.Up.* i.3, 23; *Praśna Up* ii 1; ii; iii. In Jaiminīya Br. iii. *1.1-2 Vāyu is said to be the "entire deity" that* there is and that the rest are all half-deities.
3. भूतविचारपरसूत्राण्येवाधिदैवविचारपराणीति भाव: । (*Ragh. TPB.* ii. 3. 1)

The doubt about Mukhya-Vāyu's origination arises from the conflict of texts in this way. We read:

(a) From Ākāśa Vāyu is produced (*Taitt. Up.* ii, 11) He (Vāyu) is their calf (child) (*Chan. Up.* iii. 15, 2).

(b) Vāyu is indeed eternal ( ) This is that deity—the beginningless one which is reputed to be the purifying one. ( ).

These *conflicting testimonies cannot, however, be resolved on the basis* of the solution of the conflict of texts given in respect of (Avyākṛta)-Ākāśa in the previous *adhi.* thus dispensing with the need for a fresh *adhi.* to discuss them,—as R. has done, making this Sūtra form part of the Viyadadhikaraṇa itself. R. would be right if it were merely a question of the genesis of *the element of air.* But as M. has shown, the present inquiry is concerned with the chief deity of Vāyu which stands on a different footing. There are *four adhikāśaṅkas* (supervening doubts) about this case which distinguish it from the position of Avyākṛta-Ākāśa. M. has cited some Śruti texts in this connection which leave no room for doubt that Mukhya-Prāṇa has a special status in the *world of Jīvas, in respect of eternality and intelligence calibre.* The Śrutis referred to are:—

(1) "There are the eternals and the non-eternals (among the finite reals). Tejas, waters and earth and Ākāśa, these are the non-eternals. Vāyu is indeed the eternal; for by Vāyu are all the other elements guided."[4a]

(2) "There are the unintelligent ones and the intelligent ones in the world. Tejas, waters and the earth and Ākāśa are the unintelligent ones. Vāyu indeed is the intelligent one. By Vāyu are all the five elements known."[4b] It is to be noted here that tho' the eternals and the non-eternals, the intelligents and the unintelligents have all been first referred to in the plural, *Vāyu has been mentioned selectively as the one outstanding eternal and outstanding Cetana among them.*[5]

(3) "Dear One, the gods who along with the Sun-god had formerly gained wisdom and had become purified by their devotion to Vāyu have

4a अथ ह नित्याश्चानित्याश्च । तेजोऽबन्नान्याकाश इति तान्यनित्यानि । वायुरेव नित्यो वायुना हि सर्वाणि भूतानि नेनीयन्ते ( )

4b अथ ह चेतनाश्चाचेतनाश्च—तेजोऽबन्नान्याकाश इति । तान्यचेतनानि । वायुरेव चेतनो वायुना हि सर्वाणि भूतानि विज्ञायन्ते ( )

5. Cf. यद्यपि नित्या इति प्रतिज्ञानुसारेणानित्या बहव. प्रदर्शनीयास्तथापि नित्यानां बहूनां मध्ये मुख्यवायोरतिनियतनित्यत्वमिति प्रदर्शनायैकवचननिर्देश. । एवं च नित्य इत्यस्य विशेषेण नित्य इत्यर्थः (BD)

now *somewhere in a secret place fixed their minds* on the same Vāyu —the wise one sought for shelter by those afflicted by the ills of life."[6] (*RV.* vii.91.1).

(4) "He who has no origin no middle (age) and end—who knows no rising no setting" ( ).[7]

These Śruti texts contain data that give rise to a supervening doubt (*adhikāśaṁkā*) over the conclusion established in the previous *adhi.* that the beginninglessness of Vāyu herein referred to: *Sā vā eṣa devatā anādir yo 'yam pavata iti* cannot be disposed of as a figurative description as in the case of Ākāśa—irrespective of its being taken in the sense of *bhūtākāśa* or of Avyākṛtākāśa. In the case of Bhūtākāśa, its presiding deity (Vināyaka) is also *nitya* in essence (*svarūpeṇa nitya*) like Vāyu and has likewise genesis thro' embodiment. That being so, the *exaltation of Vāyu over the deity of Bhūtākāśa cannot be satisfactorily* accounted for. This may very well lead to a supervening doubt that it must be due to the fact that his beginninglessness (*anāditva*) referred to in the Śrutis cited must be taken in the primary sense and not in a figurative sense as in the case of the Abhimānidevatā of ether. Such an *adhikāśaṁkā* would give rise to a fresh Pūrvapakṣa on behalf of Vāyu which will have to be tackled thro' a fresh *adhikaraṇa.*[8]

Turning to Avyākṛtākāśa, Vāyudevatā would be on a par with it so far as the aspect of its eternality of essence is concerned and both will be subject to genesis thro' Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti. Such Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti is common to the presiding deity of space also—notwithstanding the fact that there is no question of embodiment in their cases. Taking then only the aspect of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti into account, it will hold true for all the three—Avyākṛtākāśa, its abhimāni and Vāyu. The Śruti declaring *Vāyu* to be anādi would still offer a difficulty which would call for a further discussion and a distinctive solution. Hence the need for a fresh adhikaraṇa.[9]

6 कुविदङ्ग नमसा ये वृधासः पुरा देवास अनवद्यास आसन्।
ते वायवे मनवे बाधितायावासयन्नुषसं सूर्येण॥ (*RV.* VII. 91. 1)

7. यस्य नादिर्न मध्यं नान्तो नोदयो न निम्लोचः।
Tho' this particular Śruti cited by M. is *untraceable*, we have a *striking parallel to it in:*
म्लोचन्ति ह्यन्या देवताः न वायुः। सैषा अनस्तमिता देवता यत् वायुः (*Bṛh. Up.* i, 5, 22)

8 आकाशदेवताया विनायकस्येव वायुदेवतायाः स्वरूपेण नित्यत्वं देहोत्पत्त्यादिना जन्मादिमत्त्वमिति व्यवस्थानुपपत्तेः मुख्यैवानुत्पत्तिरित्यधिकाशंकया पूर्वपक्षिते व्यवस्थातिदेशेनैव सिद्धान्तितम्। (*NS.* p. 433)

9 अनुत्पत्तिस्तु तज्ज्ञापिका। पराधीनविशेषवत्त्वमात्र त्वव्याकृताकाशस्य तदभिमानिप्रकृतेश्च सममेव (*NV*) भूताकाशतदभिमानिनोरिव पूर्वाधिकरणेऽव्याकृताकाशतदभिमानिनोरपि वियच्छब्देन विवक्षितत्वात्, तयोश्च शरीरादितोऽप्युत्पत्त्यसंभवेन, पराधीनविशेषवत्त्वमात्रेण व्यवस्थाया वाच्यत्वेन, अस्याः पूर्वाधिकरणसिद्धव्यवस्थावैलक्षण्याभावात्। अत एवाधिकरणावैयर्थ्यायोक्तविधैव व्यवस्थाङ्गीकार्येति भावः (*Raghu. NV.* B. ii. 3. *adh.*)

Thirdly, the Ṛgvedic verse: "*Kuvid aṅga namasā ye vṛdhāsaḥ....*" endows Vāyu with the special merit of being worshipped by all the other gods. This clearly presupposes that he is unborn and uncreated.[10] This is confirmed by the other text which denies rising and setting *to him—which is tantamount to saying that he is unborn.*[11]

As M. rightly points out in his NV. in elucidating the *adhikāśaṁkā* here, if one should persist in recognizing a genesis in the primary sense even for such a being as Vāyu who has no rising and setting it would go against all experience[12] and logic:

ततोऽधिकमेतत्सर्वमनुभूत्यादिविरुद्धत्वं वायूत्पत्ताविति (*NV*)

This point has been well explained by Raghūttama in his *NVB.*[13]

Thus the genesis of Vāyu cannot be accepted as it is entirely opposed to experience, logic and the evidence of many Śrutis. Therefore, the Pūrvapakṣa concludes that such Śruti texts as ascribe a genesis to Mukhya Vāyu in the primary sense stand automatically invalidated. The Samanvaya of the entire body of Śrutis and Śāstras in B. as the author of all finite reality established by the Sūtrakāra has thus to fall to the ground.[14]

Siddhānta

M. refutes this Pūrvapakṣa with what is undoubtedly the most penetrating philosophical argument:

वायोरेवानुत्पत्त्यनुपपत्तेः। पराधीनविशेषवत्त्वमात्रं ह्युत्पत्तिः। तदभावे उभयोः स्वातंत्र्यं विरुद्धमेव (*NV*. ii.3. adh. 2)

The point is this: M. asks 'Does the Pūrvapakṣin hold that *only Mukhya-Vāyu* is without origination or that God or B. is *also unoriginated*? The first view is impossible to take for anyone who is a follower of the Śruti; for the Śrutis with one voice proclaim that God is eternal and uncreated.

न चास्य कश्चिज्जनिता न चाधिपः (*Śvet. Up.* vi.9)

The second would lead to the unenviable and impossible position of having to accept *two independent reals*. For the Pūrvapakṣa stands already committed to the position that Mukhy-Prāṇa is uncreated. As creation in the last analysis means Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti, the denial of

10. अनेन, वायोरुत्पत्तिमत्त्वे दोषित्वेन सर्वदेवोपास्यत्वानुपपत्तिरिति पूर्वपक्षे विशेषयुक्त्यन्तरमुपन्यस्तं भवति। (*BD.* ii.3.8)
11. वायोरुदयनिम्लोचयोरेवाभावात्, कुतो जन्म सम्भवतीत्याह—यतो नोदयो न निम्लोच इति। (*BD*)
12. एवंविधस्य चोत्पत्त्यंगीकारेऽनुभवव्याकोपः स्यात् (*TP.* ii.3.8)
13. पूर्वपक्ष—वायुर्नोत्पत्तिमान् परमनित्यत्वात्, परमचेतनत्वात् इत्यादिरूपः (*NVB*)
14. अतोऽत्यन्तमनुमितियुक्तिबहुवाक्यविरोधेन वायोस्तत्पक्षे योगादुत्पत्तिश्रुतिरप्रमाणमेवेति न जगत्कारणे ब्रह्मणि श्रुतिसमन्वयो युक्त इति (पूर्वपक्षः) (*TP.* ii.3.8)

creation or genesis of Mukhya-Vāyu would be the same as the affirmation that he is not dependent on any other being—in other words, that he *is an independent reality. As the* Pūrvapakṣin here *is not a Nirīśvaravādī* he must also accept God or B. as an independent Being. This would at once lead to an impasse created by the acceptance of two Independent Beings which is repugnant to logic, empirical and transcendental alike.[15]

As M. points out, with his inexorable logic, owing to the very nature of the situation two independent beings will both be reduced *to a position of mutual dependence if they are to submit to each other's* will. If they will not or do not submit to each other's behests, there will be no supremacy for either of them,—in which case, in so far as neither of them can *compel* the other to submit to his behests, the independence *of both of them* will *be void of meaning.*[16]

The conflict of Śrutis in respect of Mukhya-Prāṇa is then resolved by M. by showing in what *distinctive sense* the *anāditva* or beginningless existence predicated of Vāyu-devatā in the Śrutis is to be understood, in a secondary sense (*gauṇārtha*), in consistency and conformity with genesis in its primary sense of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti with special reference *to his becoming embodied. The special aspect of Viśeṣanityatva* and *atiśayacetanatva* affirmed of Vāyu in the *anāditvaśrutis* is to be understood, says M., in the sense that *in addition to his eternality of being (svarūpānāditva)* which he shares in common with other Nityapadārthas like Avyākṛtākāśa, the other Jīvas and the abhimānidevatā of Bhūtākāśa, Mukhya-Prāṇa has the unique distinction of retaining undiminished and intact, even in the state of Mahāpralaya, the special power of his genius called Prātibhajñāna[17] which *is* competent to visualize, *even* in the absence of a physical body (in Mahāpralaya), the past and the future like the present.[18] The principles of resolution of the conflict of *utpatti* and *anutpatti* Śrutis applied to Ākāśa are *extended* (by *atideśa*) *to Mātariśvan in this adhi.* by the *words: Etena vyā-*

15. तदभावे उभयोः स्वातत्र्य विरुद्धमेव (*NV*) यस्मात् वायोरुत्पत्तिः पराधीनविशेषलाभरूपा विवक्षिता अत तदभावे पराधीनविशेषलाभाभावे, उभयोर्वायुविष्ण्वोः स्वातंत्र्य स्यात्। न च तदस्त्विति वाच्यमित्याह्–विरुद्धमेवेति। उभयोः स्वातत्र्य विरुद्धमेव, न तु केनापि प्रकारेण घटनीयमित्यर्थः. (*NVB*)

16. तत्कथमित्यत आह्–उभयोरिति। वायुविष्ण्वोरन्योन्यानुरोधे उभयोरपि पराधीनत्वप्राप्ते, अननुरोधे तु, वायोरीश्वरनियामकत्वाभाववत् ईश्वरस्य च वायुनियामकत्वाभावात् न तयोः सर्वैश्वर्यमित्यर्थः (*NVB*)

17. Rāghavendra calls it योगर्धिलब्धातिशयवृत्तिरूपज्ञानम्। (*NSP.* p. 356). It is in the nature of a Vṛttijnāna endowed with the excellence accruing from Yogasiddhi.

18. *एवं प्रलयकालेऽपि प्रतिभातपरावरः।*
मुख्यवायुर्नित्यसम. शरीरोत्पत्तिकारणात्।
परतन्त्रविशेषेण जनिमानेव शब्दितः॥ (*AV.* ii.3.8)
शरीराभावेऽपि प्रातिभेनैव ज्ञानेन विषयीकृतातीतानागतो यतः तस्मात् नित्यसम इति शब्दितः। 'शरीरोत्पत्तिकारणात्' 'पराधीनविशेषेण' इति हेतुहेतुमद्भावः (*NS.* p. 433-34b)

khyātaḥ[19] with special reference to this distinctive merit and characteristic of Mukhya-Prāṇa.[20] Vyāsatirtha sums up the position in his characteristically trenchant manner: मुख्यवायोर्न भूताकाशाभिमानिविनायकदिवत् स्वरूपानादित्वेऽपि स्वरूपातिरिक्तज्ञानसादित्वरूपमनित्यत्वम्; प्रलयेऽपि प्रतिभातपरावरत्वात्। नापीश्वरवत् स्वातंत्र्यरूपं परात्परनित्यत्वम्; परतंत्रत्वात्। नापि चित्प्रकृतिवत् देहादिनित्यत्वरूपं परनित्यत्वम्; देहोत्पत्तेः सत्त्वात्। किंतु, स्वरूपातिरिक्तज्ञानस्यापि नित्यत्वमिति विशेषं वक्तुमिदमधिकरणमिति द्रष्टव्यम् (*TC*. p. 936)[21]

In the concluding part of his Bhāṣya here, M. clarifies the respective grades of Nityatva enjoyed by the different tattvas under the *aegis* of the Supreme Being, so that the place and position of Mukhya-Prāṇa may be clearly understood: "The world consists of four orders of existence, the indestructible, the highly indestructible, the destructible and the highly destructible. The last are the porducts of earth and other elements. The destructibles are the elements themselves. The indestructible is Vāyu. The absolutely indestructibles are Puruṣa, (Jīva-caitanya) Prakṛti and Kāla.[22] The Supreme Being is absolutely eternal, the highest of the high, supporting these four orders of existence in the world. *It reveals Itself in different ways and sustains the four* orders of existence. It redeems the souls from the cycle of births and arranges the reals in these groups, enters into them, dividing its own self *as Bimba among the souls which are its Pratibimbas and trans*cends them by Its own intrinsic Majesty.[23] Hence the Supreme is the

19. This means that all the reasons given in the previous *adhi.* are shown to be applicable to Mātariśvan in esatblishing the intended conclusion:
सोत्रेण 'एतेन' इत्यनेन पूर्वाधिकरणोक्तः सर्वोऽपि हेतु. विवक्षित इत्याह (*TC*. p. 936 b) एतेन अश्रुतेरित्यादि प्रागुक्तहेतुजातेन (*TDP*).
The manner of their application has been shown by Raghu. *TPB*. pp. 197-98.
20. ज्ञानाविस्मृत्या वायावपि व्यवस्थातिदेश. (*NV*) ज्ञानस्य वृत्तिरूपस्य स्वरूपातिरिक्तस्याविस्मृत्या अपरिलोपेन वायावपि शरीराद्युत्पत्तिस्वरूपानुत्पत्तिरूपानुत्पत्तिभ्या आकाशपदवाच्यदेवतासमानयोगक्षेमे प्रवाहतो वृत्तिज्ञाने स्वरूपातिरिक्तत्वमादाय व्यवस्था सम्भवतीति हेतो· 'एतेन' इत्यतिदेशो युक्त इत्यर्थ· (Raghu. *NVB*. ii.3.8)
21. With this idea of Vāyu's Prātibhajñāna one may usefully compare a similar distinction ascribed to Brahmā in the well-known Purānic passage:

ज्ञानमप्रतिघ यस्य वैराग्यं च जगत्पते:।
ऐश्वर्यं चैव धर्मंच सहसिद्धं चतुष्टयम्॥

as also: 'अय वै ब्रह्म, योऽयं पवते' इति बहृवृचब्राह्मणे (*BD*. ii.3.8)
22 Only Vādirāja and the *AC* explain tho' somewhat differently what the terms Prakṛti and Kāla are intended to signify here. Vādirāja's explanations are more elaborate and go into complex details. Both however agree in taking Prakṛti in the sense of Mahālakṣmī and Kāla in the sense of Her three forms of Śrī, Bhū and Durgā. For more details according to Vādirāja see has *TPG*, p. 39. The *BD* refers to an explanation of the *TD* but the corresponding passage is not to be found in the printed edn. of *TD* (ii, 3, 8).
23. नित्य: परमनित्यश्च तथानित्य: परस्तथा। चतुर्धैव जगत्सर्वं परानित्य तु पार्थिवम्।
अनित्यानि तु भूतानि नित्यो वायुरुदाहृत.।
परस्तु नित्य· पुरुष· प्रकृति. काल एव च। एतच्चतुष्टय विष्णु स्वय नित्य: परात्पर:।
प्रतिव्यूह्य व्यूहचाराणवर्तोत्स च जनार्दन·।
पारपत्यग्निम देवो नित्यानंदकलक्षण:॥ इति कौर्मे (M. *BSB*. ii.3.8)

highest of the high (*Parātparanitya*). It is of the essence of bliss infinite.

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

S. *considers that the adhi. resolves the conflict of texts regarding* the origination of air. In the context which treats of origination of tattvas air is not mentioned in the *Chān. Up.* (vi.2) while in the *Taitt.* Up. (ii. 1.) it is mentioned as having been produced from Ākāśa. In view of this contradiction, the Pūrvapakṣa argues that the *Taitt.* text should be understood figuratively, also because another text *Bṛh. Up.* i.5.22 refers to air as the deity which never sets. The Sūtra shows that air is as much a created product of B. as Ākāśa is, for identical reasons.[24] The reference to Vāyu as "not setting" is only for purposes of Apara Vidyā (lower knowledge) where lesser principles are glorified for purposes of meditation as B. The *nityatva* (eternality) of air referred to is, therefore, to be taken as purely relative (*āpekṣika*).

Criticism

There is *no necessary contradiction* between the mention of the genesis of air in *Taitt. Up.* (ii.1) and its non-mention in *Chān. Up.* (vi.2).[25] This point has already been made clear with reference to a similar contradiction in respect of the genesis of Ākāśa fancied by S.[26]

As both Ākāśa and Vāyu are purely elements (*bhūtas*) according to S., a separate *adhi.* is not called for by way of *atideśa* (extension of reasoning) to establish that, like Ākāśa, Vāyu also has to be accepted as a created product of B. for the same reasons as have been gone into. This can be left to be understood by the simple device of upalakṣaṇa.

Anticipating such an objection S. has tried to justify the need for a separate *adhi.* to discuss the case of Vāyu on the basis of an *adhikāśaṅkā* (further doubt) which cannot be covered by the previous ruling. But then as Vayū admittedly *abides* in Ākāśa, it cannot be put on a *par* with Ākāśa. That should suffice to rule out the possibility of any *adhikāśaṅkā*.[27] S. has no doubt pointed out that there is

24. एतेन वियद्व्याख्यानेन मातरिश्वापि वियदाश्रयो वायुर्व्याख्यातः। तत्राप्येते यथायोग पक्षा रचयितव्याः प्रतिज्ञानुरोधात् यावद्विकारं च विभागाभ्युपगमात् उत्पद्यते वायुरिति सिद्धान्तः (*S. BSB.* ii.3.8)
25. नहि भूतविषये श्रुतिविरोधोऽस्ति। तैत्तिरीयश्रुतावाकाशात् वायुरिति श्रूयते। छान्दोग्ये तु तेज.–पूर्वैव सृष्टिरिति चेन्नैवम्; उक्त्यनुक्त्योर्विरोधाभावात्। (*TP.* ii 3.8)
26. See P. 137 ante
27. भूतपरत्वेऽस्याधिकरणस्य आकाशाद्वायुरित्याकाशजे वायावाकाशसाम्यस्याप्यभावेन सुतरामधिकाशङ्काभावेनातिदेशायोगाच्च (*TC.* p. 939 b)

scope for *adhikāśankā* as there is a passage in the *Bṛh. Up.* which after mentioning in one place that both Vāyu and Ākāśa are "immortal" (*Vāyuśca antarikṣam caitad amṛtam Bṛh. Up.* ii.3.3) has thought it fit to make a special mention in another place of Vāyu as "not given to setting" *Saiṣā anastamitā devatā yad Vāyuḥ*" (*Bṛh. Up.* i.5.22). He has also stated that in the Samvarga-Vidyā (*Chān. Up.* iv.3.1-8) and in other places Vāyu has been glorified which may lead to a presumption in the minds of the dull-witted that Vāyu may be without genesis.[28]

Here S. has completely overlooked the fact that in this case it is the deity Vāyu, the *abhimānidevatā* of air that has been referred to in the Upaniṣadic passage and not the material element of air. This important fact should make a very real difference to the position. It ought not to have been forgotten in trying to make out an *adhikāśankā*. But if it is properly taken into account, the theme of the *adhi.* will have to be the genesis of Mukhya Vāyu the deity and *not* air as such.[29]

Without any inconsistency, the present *adhi.* can, therefore, be taken as *exclusively concerned* with Vāyu the deity and its genesis and the preceding *Viyadadhi* and the two succeeding ones about Tejas and Āpaḥ can be referred to both the material elements and their presiding deities. There are clear indications in the Śrutis discussed in the *Teja-adhi* and *Abadhi.*, that the deities are also referred to by the attribute of "seeing" (*īkṣaṇa*).[30]

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R. is also of opinion that the Sūtra *Etena Mātariśvā vyākhyātaḥ* deals only with the genesis of the element of air. But he sees no need to devote a fresh *adhi.* for the purpose as there is no supervening doubt justifying it. But he has not stated his reasons for thinking so. His commentator Sudarśana Sūri has, however, put in against the point made by S. that too much store cannot be set on the description of Vāyu as "not setting" as it carries much the same meaning as the other description of Vāyu and Ākāśa as "immortal" in another passage which S. has himself cited in support of the Ekadeśi view under ii.3.4.

28. ननु, वायोराकाशस्य च तुल्ययोरुत्पत्तिप्रकरणे श्रवणाश्रवणयोरेकमेवाधिकरणमुभयविषयमस्तु, किमतिदेशेनासति विशेष इति; उच्यते—सत्यमेवमेतत्। तथापि मन्दधियां शब्दमात्रकृताशङ्कानिवृत्त्यर्थोऽयमतिदेशः क्रियते। संवर्गविद्यादिषु ह्युपास्यतया वायोर्महाभागत्वश्रवणात्। अस्तमयप्रतिषेधादिभ्यश्च भवति नित्यत्वाशङ्का कस्यचिदिति (S. BSB. ii.3.8)

29. यद्यपि वायुश्चान्तरिक्षं चैतदमृतम् (*Brh. Up.* ii.3 3) इति द्वयोरप्यमृतत्वमुक्त्वा 'सैषा अनस्तमिता देवता यत् वायुः (*Brh. Up.* i.5.22) इति वायोर्विशिष्यानस्तमितत्वोक्तिरधिका, तथापि सा देवताविषया। स्वन्मते त्विदं भूतविषयम् (*TC.* p. 937 b)

30. न चास्याधिकरणस्य देवताविषयत्वे प्रकरणविरोधः। उक्तरीत्या वियदधिकरणे तत्तेजोऽसृजत तत्तेज ऐक्षत तदपोऽसृजत ता आप ऐक्षन्त 'इति वाक्यद्वयविषय उत्तराधिकरणद्वये च देवताया अपि प्रकृतत्वात्। परन्त्विदं देवतामात्रविषयं, पूर्वमुत्तरद्वयं चोभयविषयमिति भेदः (*TC.* p. 937 b)

But this reply does not seem to be adequate to dispose of the special point made by the *Bhāmatī* in further support of S.'s contention in his Pūrvapakṣa. Vācaspati has pointed out that after jointly referring to Vāyu and Ākāśa as "immortal" (*amṛtam*) in Bṛh. Up. ii.3.3 the Upaniṣad again *singles out* Vāyu in Bṛh. Up. i.5.22 and praises it as the deity which "does not set".[31] This, in Vācaspati's view, amounts to a repetition (*abhyāsa*) of the special distinction of Vāyu and is entitled to be treated as a mark of import (*tātparyalinga*). It cannot be brushed aside as a figurative statement meant to be understood in a relative sense of "long-enduring" (*cirakālāvasthāyitvābhiprāyam*).

The point raised by Vācaspati is certainly a crucial one tho' he himself quietly ignores it in deferring to the Siddhānta view. But we cannot help feeling that S. Vācaspati and R. have all ignored the most important point that in the passage of the *Bṛh. Up.* (i.5.22) the epithet "deity" (*Devatā*) has been used with special intent to show that it is the deity Vāyudevatā that is meant and not the element.

If due weight is given to this point, it will be seen where precisely the pivot of the *adhikāśankā* justifying the present adhikaraṇa lies. Credit goes to M. for having located it and brought out the *adhikāśankās* vividly before our eyes.

R.'s admission that there is no *adhikāśankā* here, would make the present Sūtra *Etena Mātariśvā vyākhyātaḥ* itself unnecessary as the origination of air can be left to be gathered by upalakṣaṇa from the origination of Ākāśa.[32]

The only purpose of retaining this Sūtra as part of the *Viyadadhi*, according to R. is to enable Sūtra 10—viz. *Tejo atas tathāhyāha* to refer back to Mātariśvan by the expression "ataḥ" used therein (no. 10).[33] This, if true, would be a poor compliment to the Sūtrakāra's resourcefulness.[34]

31. यद्यभ्यासे भूयस्त्वमर्थस्य भवति, नाल्पत्वं, दूरत एवोपचिरतत्वम्, हन्त भोः पवनस्य नित्यत्वप्रसंगः। 'वायुश्चान्तरिक्षमेतदमृतम्' इति द्वयोरमृतत्वमुक्त्वा, पुनः पवनस्य विशेषमाह–'सैषानस्तमिता देवता यद्वायुः' इति। तस्मादभ्यासाच्चापेक्षिकं वायोरमृतत्वम्, अपि त्वौत्पत्तिकमेवेति प्राप्तम् (*Bhāmatī* ii.3.8) पवनस्य विशेषेणेति–मुक्त्वान्तरिक्षमित्यर्थः (*Kalpataru*)

32. अधिकाशंकाभावे पूर्वन्यायेनैव सिद्धया * * अस्य सूत्रस्य व्यर्थत्वात् (*TC.* p. 937b-937)

33. वियन्मातरिश्वनोः पृथग्योगकरणं तेजोऽतः तथा ह्याह (ii.3.10) इति मातरिश्वपरामर्शार्थम् (*Śrībhāṣya* ii.3 8)

34. वियत्तुल्यन्यायतया मातरिश्वनोऽप्युपलक्षणतयोत्पत्तिसिद्धावप्युत्तरसूत्रपरामर्शमात्रार्थं पृथक् सूत्रकरणस्यानुचितत्वात् (*TCP.* ii.3.8)

CHAPTER XV

BRAHMAN IS ABSOLUTELY WITHOUT ORIGINATION

3. *Asambhavādhikaraṇam* (ii.3.9)

The two preceding *adhi.'s* having established the origination of eternal verities other than B. such as Space, Time, Prakṛti, Prāṇa, etc. howsoever impossible their origination may seem to be, a similar possibility is likely to suggest itself in the case of the Supreme B. also.[1] *Philosophy cannot refuse to discuss it.* The present *adhi.* therefore comes to grips with this question on the basis of similar conflict of testimony. The Śrutis which refer to the origination of Sat the Supreme: *Asatas Sad ajāyata* (*R.V.* x.72.2) *Tato vai Sad ajāyata* (*Taitt. Up.* ii.7) have thus the backing of the logic of precedents.[2] Since in the face of such texts it is not possible to take the extreme position that Sat or B. is *absolutely* unoriginated, the only course left open is to allow that it has a genesis within the meaning of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti like Space, Time and other verities.[3]

The Siddhānta denies not merely that Sat or B. has any origination of its essence (*Svarūpotpatti*) which is conceded by the Pūrvapakṣa also; but genesis in the sense of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti[4] as well.

1. एवमधिकरणद्वयेन अब्रह्मणोऽसंभवदुत्पत्तिकस्यापि नभः प्रभृतेः सर्वस्योत्पत्तौ श्रुत्योक्तायां, तर्हि, तद्वदेव ब्रह्मणोऽप्युत्पत्तिरस्त्विति पूर्वपक्षोदयात् सङ्गतिः (*TC.* p. 937b-937)
2. असंभवदुद्भवयोर्नभोनभस्वतोरुत्पत्तावनादिनया समस्य ब्रह्मणोऽनुत्पत्तिरयुक्तेति जन्मश्रुतेः सयुक्तिकत्वेन प्राबल्यात् (*TP.* ii.3 9)
3. स्वरूपोत्पत्त्यभावेऽपि पराधीनविशेषावाप्तिरूपोत्पत्तिसंभवात् गगनपवनवत् इति (*NS.* p. 434)
4. * * * * स्वतन्त्रत्वात् परात्मनः ।
नैवोत्पत्तिः कथमपि * * * * (*AV.* ii.3 9)
कथमपीति स्वरूपतो विशेषतश्चेत्यर्थः (*NS.* p. 434)

The genesis of Sat in the sense of Parădhīnaviśeṣāpti is in the nature of things impossible; for B. is by definition the One and only Independent Real. Such a Being cannot have any origination either of its essence or of its properties or acquire new ones. For acquisition implies want and want implies imperfection and its fulfilment dependence on another.

The existence of One *Independent Being without origination has got to be accepted on a priori grounds. Otherwise, there will be an endless regression, if we go in for a series of controlling principles one beyond the other without coming to rest on One Supreme Being who is* not subject to any extraneous control. In the absence of any such final controller of all, every one in the series will share the same disability of being subject to another in which case it will be impossible to see how they could control one another. If the Pūrvapakṣa is not denying that there is a Svatantra principle as such but only that it is not the God or B. of the Siddhāntin, the reply to it will be very simple that it is not a dispute over names and that it is not possible to think of a Being who is greater than God—meaning by that term the One Supreme Independent Reality. If there should be any such Being that One will readily be recognized as the One Independent Real by the Siddhāntin, to which he will apply the name of B.[5]

There is no overlapping between the theme of this *adhi.* and the *Asadadhi.* (ii, 1.8-13). In the latter, there is removal of opposition to B.'s causality of the universe from reasoning which lends support to the causality of the world's antecedent negation—which is taken to be conveyed by the Śruti *Asatas sad ajāyata.* But in the present *adhi.* the conflict resolved is between the Śrutis which teach B. to be the Author of the world and other Śrutis like *Asatas sad ajāyata* from which *it also* appears that B. itself is a product of Asat—which, if true, will come in the way of B.'s being recognized as the source and author of the Universe and make Asat the source and author of the world instead of B.—thereby invalidating the entire Samanvaya of Śāstra in B. as Jagatkāraṇam.[6]

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5 न स्वतन्त्र ततोऽपरम् (*AV.* ii 3.9)
Read: कुतः परमात्मनः स्वातन्त्र्यमिति चेन्मैवम्–किं स्वतन्त्रमेव वस्तु नाङ्गीक्रियते; किं वाऽतोऽन्यत् स्वतन्त्रमङ्गीकृत्य तस्य स्वातन्त्र्यं निराक्रियते? नाद्यः। अनवस्थितेरसम्भवाच्च। द्वितीयं प्रत्याह–नेति। प्रमाणाभावात्। भावे वा, तदेवास्माभिः परमात्मतयाङ्गीकरिष्यत इति भावः। (*NS.* p. 434)

6 'असदिति चेत्' इत्यत्र ब्रह्मकारणत्वश्रुतेः 'असतः सदजायत' इत्यादिप्रागभावकारणत्वश्रुतिसंवादियुक्तिविरोधो निरस्तः। अत्र तु, तस्या एव 'असतः सदजायत' इत्यादिकया ब्रह्मणोऽसत्कार्यत्वश्रुत्यैव विरोधो निरस्यत इति भेदः (*TC.* p. 938b)
अतो ब्रह्मणोऽप्युत्पत्तिमत्त्वात् न तत्र अशेषकारणतया श्रुतिसमन्वय इति (पूर्वः पक्षः) (*TP.* ii.3.9)

In his *BSB.* M. has explained the present Sūtra in a slightly different way:—The Supreme B. cannot be regarded as having any origination from non-being for origination of being from the non-being is untenable as it is outside the range of our observation.[7] For this reason the conflict of Śrutis regarding the genesis of Sat from Asat and the denial of any such origination to Sat in the different Śrutis cannot be resolved by resorting to the apportionment (*Vyasthā*) followed in other cases like Ākāśa and Vāyu in the preceding *adhi.'s* on the basis of non-origination of essence (*svarūpānutpatti*) and origination in the sense of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti.[8]

In this interpretation, the expression *tu* in the Sūtra carrying the sense of *eva* (only) refutes both origination in one aspect and Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti[9] for B. The meaning is that B. is out and out unoriginated *in essence as well as in respect of its Viśeṣas.* It is absolutely unoriginated in all respects. In this proposition the expression *Sataḥ* in the Sūtra is to be understood as suggestive of a reason which has only a negative concomitance that B. being 'Sat' i.e. absolutely independent is without origination, unlike Ākāśa, Mātariśvan and others.[10] This special meaning of Sat has been adopted by M. in interpreting this Sūtra in his *NV:*

न च सतः पराधीनविशेषवत्त्वम्; स्वातंत्र्यात् (*NV.* ii.3. *adhi.* 3)

This meaning of Sat is attested by a quotation from the *Mahābhārata:*

सत्त्वं स्वातंत्र्यमुद्दिष्टं तच्च कृष्णे न चापरे।
अस्वातंत्र्यात् तदन्येषामसत्त्वं विद्धि पाण्डव॥

This way of interpreting the expression Sat and connecting it with the predicate *asambhavaḥ* (no origination) serves to dispose of the contention of the Pūrvapakṣa that B. also may be presumed to have origination in the sense of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti, like Ākāśa and others, however difficult it may be to think of such origination in its case by drawing pointed attention to a fundamental difference that distinguishes B. from all else in the Universe viz. its *Sattvam* which means not only its reality but its independent character[11]—a reality which is complete in itself and is capable of being explained entirely by itself—which is not the case with the finite realities of the world.

7. न ह्यसतः सदुत्पद्यते, अदृष्टत्वादनुपपत्तेः (M. *BSB.* ii.3.9)
8. तुशब्देनोक्तव्यवस्थामपाकरोति (M. *BSB.* ii.3.9)
न व्यवस्थया ब्रह्मणोऽनुत्पत्तिः सूत्रे प्रतिज्ञायते, येन सिद्धार्था प्रतिज्ञा स्यात्। किंतु, सर्वात्मनानुत्पत्तिरेवेति भावः। अत एव तुशब्दमेवेति व्याचष्टे (*TP.* ii.3.9)
9 तुरिति विभागोत्पत्तिं पराधीनविशेषाप्तिं च निरस्य (*TP.* ii.3.9)
10. अस्यां प्रतिज्ञायां 'सत' इत्यनेनैव स्वातंत्र्याख्यो व्यतिरेकी हेतुः सूचितः (*TP.* ii.3.9)
अनेन न्यायविवरणोक्त स्वातंत्र्यरूपो हेतुः सूत्राल्लब्धो दर्शितः (*TC.* p. 938b)
11. सत इत्यनेनैव स्वातंत्र्याख्यो व्यतिरेकी हेतुः सूचितः। तेनैव पूर्वपक्षयुक्तेर्निरासोक्ता भवति—गगनपवनादीनाम-स्वातंत्र्यादेवोत्पत्तिरिति (*TP.* ii.3.9)

In the closing part of his Bhāṣya, M. explains the true meaning of the Śruti Asatas *Sad ajāyata* from the Siddhānta point of view—citing relevant authorities for his interpretation. B. is called Asat 'non-being' as no one can undo it. Another Śruti text says—'In the beginning of creation of the gods Sat sprang from Asat. The Paiṅgī Śruti explains this: B. is 'Asat' and Prāṇa is the 'Sat'—the enduring, the powerful and strong.[12] This is supported by a wellknown verse in *Bhāgavata* (iii, 6, 28): "O Shining One, unborn Lord, you put in your seed in Śakti (Śrītattva) the unborn, the source of all qualities and activities. From her we—the Sat (Prāṇa) and others have emerged. Tell us how we should fulfil the purpose for which you have made us".[13]

M. further explains in this context that the Supreme Lord tho' without genesis, reveals himself to human perception in his Avatārs. This is termed his "birth" in such Śruti texts as "Unborn, He is born in different ways."[14] His "birth" is not a modification. Others like the Jīva, Prakṛti, Kāla, Mahattattva etc. undergo changes of various kinds. In the case of the soul to be born is to be embodied which is to be in a particular state of dependence. This is equivalent to a change which the Jīva undergoes.[15]

The Supreme Lord tho' immutable in essence creates the world which is the effect of change. The question how the Supreme can remain unchanging if it is the creator of the world is answered. As the Almighty Lord, God effects changes keeping Himself above change. This He does by His powers. These powers too are immutable. The will, intelligence and effort needed for His creative activity are all part of God's nature.[16] There is no difference between the power and the possessor of the power. His powers are all identical with His nature and being. Yet they are spoken of as different from Him thro' the help of *Viśeṣas* to bring them within the scope of our understanding.[17]

12. 'तद्वा एतदसदाहुर्नासादयति कश्चनेति । ब्रह्म वा असत् सद्वाव प्राणो, प्राणो वाव महान् सह ओजो बलमित्याचक्षते' इति पैङ्गिश्रुतिः (M. BSB. ii.3.9)
13 त्वं देव शक्त्या गुणकर्मयोनौ रेतस्त्वजायां कविरादधेऽजः ।
ततो वयं सत्प्रमुखा यदर्थे बभूविमात्मन् करवाम किं ते ॥ (*Bhāgavata* iii.6, 28)
14. अजायमानो बहुधा विजायते (*T.A.* iii. 13)
15. प्रत्यक्षत्वं च हरेर्जन्म न विकारः कथचन
पुरुषः प्रकृतिः कालो महानित्यादिषु क्रमात् ।
विकार एव जननं पुरुषे तद्विशेषणम् ।
परतंत्रविशेषो हि विकार इति कीर्तितः ॥ इति पाद्मे (M. BSB. ii.3.9)
16. अविकार्योऽपि भगवान् सर्वशक्तित्वहेतुतः ।
विकारहेतुकं सर्वं कुरुते निर्विकारवान् ।
शक्तिशक्तिमतोश्चापि न विभेदः कथंचन ।
अविभिन्नापि सेच्छादिभेदैरपि विभाव्यते ॥ इति भागवततन्त्रे (M. BSB. ii.3.9)
See also अहिकुण्डलाधिकरणम् (BS. iii. 2. 28-31)
17. Cf. परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञानबलक्रिया च (*Svet. Up.* vi.8)

Śaṁkara's Interpretation.

S. agrees that this *adhi.* establishes that B. is unoriginated. Apart from the obvious contention that like Ākāśa and other tattvas, B. too may be presumed to be originated, he introduces another line of Pūrvapakṣa. Ether and other things which are themselves effects by modification have produced other effects, Even so, B. must also be an effect in itself—as it has originated ether.

Explaining the position of the Pūrvapakṣa further, the *Bhāmati* puts in that other Śrutis which represent B. as uncaused have to be understood only figuratively to avoid conflict with Śrutis which explain the origination of B. with the illustration of sparks emerging from fire.[18] In the light of these observations Amalānanda gives final form to the Pūrvapakṣa-śaṅkā as follows:

अत्र तु यथाग्नेरग्निरेव विस्फुलिंग उत्पद्यते एवं ब्रह्मान्तरात् ब्रह्म इति शंक्यते

(*Kalpataru.* ii.3.9)

(Here the doubt is raised that just as from fire sparks which are only fire are produced, B. is produced from another B.)

Put in syllogistic form the proposition would be:

ब्रह्म कार्यम्; कारणत्वात्

Brahman is an effect (or is originated). Because it is a cause.

This, the *Bhāmatī* says, will not lead to a fallacy of *regressus ad infinitum* as the causal chain in this case would be beginningless and therefore inevitable.

Criticism.

It is farfetched to argue that because B. is a cause it must also be an effect. The reason is not conclusive. When a clearly worded Śruti like *Asatas Sad ajāyata* is available to give weight to the contention of the Pūrvapakṣa that B. must be deemed to have had an origin and when such a Śruti would give rise to a conflict with others like *Sad eva somya idam agra āsīt* which make out that B. is without a beginning and when such a conflict of Śrutis would naturally call for a discussion in this Pāda, it is not proper to formulate a doubt on the basis of conflict with reason which is not relevant to this Pāda.[19]

S. interprets the argument of the Sūtra as follows: B. is mere being. It cannot spring from mere being. Without a certain measure

18. अकारणत्वश्रुतिरात्मनोऽग्निविस्फुलिंगदृष्टान्तश्रुतिविरोधात् प्रमाणान्तरविरोधाच्चानंशिकत्वेन व्याख्यातव्या (*Bhāmatī* ii.3.9)

19. 'असतः सदजायत' इत्यादिश्रुत्या ब्रह्मणः कार्यत्वशंकायाः पादसंगतायाः सम्भवेऽप्ययोग्यकेन कारणत्वेन तदसंगत-वस्तुकाशंकनम् (*TC.* p. 938)

of superiority in the cause over the effect, there can be no cause-and-effect relation between them. Nor can B. have sprung from a 'particular form of being'. A general form of being or being in general cannot spring from a particular form of it. Nor can B. have originated from non-being; for non-being is without a character (*svarūpa*).[20]

The claim that B. is being in general is not sustainable. This cannot be taken in the sense that B.'s generality of being is what is present in particular forms of being known as *vyāvahārika* and *prātibhāsika*. It cannot also be taken in the sense that B. possesses the general element of true being which is copresent in all those particular forms of *true* being; for there does not exist in the true being of B. the distinctive aspects of general and particular being.[21]

There is no impediment to causal relationship between two particular forms of being tho' both are equal in point of being. They can *enter into such a relationship by virtue of the intrinsic nature of the one being able to act upon the other and the other one being amenable* to be acted upon—as in the case of two particulars (*dravyas*) threads and cloth.[22]

The *Kalpataru* has tried to clarify what the Sūtra has in mind when it says there cannot be any origination of what is mere being. The point at issue is not whether B. is actually produced or not produced as an effect. It is the illusory appearance of something which constitutes an effect: *Vivartatā hi kāryatā*. The superimposition is impossible without conceding a real substratum. The existence of B. as such a substratum is, therefore, an essential requisite. By reason of such existence B. cannot be treated as ever becoming an appearance. This is the meaning of *Asambhavastu Sato 'anupapatteḥ*. It is in this sense that a genesis has been ruled out for B.[23]

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20. सन्मात्रं हि ब्रह्म, न तस्य सन्मात्रादेवोत्पत्तिः संभवति। असत्यतिशये, प्रकृतिविकारभावानुपपत्तेः। नापि सद्विशेषात्। दृष्टविपर्ययात्। सामान्याद्धि विशेषा उत्पद्यमाना दृश्यन्ते न तु विशेषेभ्यः सामान्यम्। नाप्यसतो, निरात्मकत्वात्। (S. *BSB*. ii.3 9)

21 यच्चोक्तम्–सन्मात्रं ब्रह्मेति; तन्न। परमार्थसतो ब्रह्मणो व्यावहारिकसदाद्यनुगत्ययोगात्। परमार्थसति च सामान्यविशेषभावाभावात्। (*TC*. p. 938)
सन्मात्रमित्यस्य किं व्यावहारिकप्रातिभासिकरूपसद्विशेषानुगतसन्मात्रमित्यर्थः? उत, पारमार्थिकसद्विशेषा यावन्तः तदनुगतपरमार्थसन्मात्र वेत्यर्थं इति विकल्पौ हृदि कृत्वा आद्य आह–'परमार्थसत' इति। द्वितीय आह–'परमार्थसति' इति। तथा च, सन्मात्रमित्यस्य परमार्थसन्मात्रमित्यर्थो न युक्त इति भावः (*TCP*)

22 सद्व्यक्तीनां च सत्त्वाविशेषेऽपि शक्तशक्यत्वादिविशेषेणैव द्रव्यादिव्यक्तीनामिव कार्यकारणभावोपपत्तेः (*TC*. p. 938)
यथा दण्डघटतन्तुपटादिद्रव्यव्यक्तीनां द्रव्यत्वाविशेषेऽपि दण्डादि घटजनने शक्तं, घटादिकं तु दण्डादिनिष्ठशक्तिविषयः इति शक्तशक्यत्वरूपविशेषेण पूर्वापरीभावलक्षणविशेषेण वा कार्यकारणभाववत् भवति, तथा सत्त्वाविशेषेऽपि शक्तशक्यत्वादिविशेषेणैव तथाभावोपपत्तेरिति भावः (*TCP*)

23. विवर्तता हि कार्यता। तत्र ब्रह्म कार्यमिति वदन् प्रष्टव्यः किं ब्रह्म स्वयं सत्यमसत्ये कुत्र चिदध्यस्तमुत सत्यान्तरे? किंवा निरधिष्ठानेन स्वयमारोपितम्? (*Kalpataru* ii.3.9)
See also: समारोपस्तु विकारस्य न समारोपिते उपादाने इत्युपपादितं माध्यमिकपरीक्षायां, तदत्र प्रस्मर्तव्यम् (*Bhāmatī* ii.3.9)

This way of interpreting the Sūtra would not be in tune with the general trend of the subject matter of the Pāda, as it has been dealt with so far by the Sūtrakāra. It cannot be said that in the preceding adhikaraṇas the genesis of Ākāśa and Vāyu from B. referred to in the Śrutis *Ātmana ākāśas sambhūtaḥ* etc. has been represented as in the nature of a superimposition of Ākāśa on B. or Vāyu on Ākāśa. As there is nothing of the kind in the earlier *adhi.s* it would be highly improper to maintain that it is superimposition and not actual origination of B. that has been considered and refuted.[24] Such an interpretation of the Sūtra would be repugnant to the use of the expression *a-sambhava* (no origination) instead of *an-āropa* (no superimposition) in the Sūtra.[24a]

If *sambhava* in the Sūtra should signify *samāropa* (superimposition), the denial of genesis (*utpatti*) to the *Jīvātman* in the *Ātmādhikaraṇam* (ii. 3. 17) would also be of the same nature and entail a redundancy with the present one—apart from rendering the Jīvātman liable to sublation (if he were only a superimposition).[25] That would clash with the plea for the eternal existence of the Jīva so fervently made by S. while criticizing the alleged Pañcarātra doctrine of Jīvotpatti, that it reduces the Jīva to impermanence.

Bhāskara's Interpretation.

Bhāskara seems to have been intrigued by this Sūtra and finds himself unable to see it in the light of resolving a conflict of Śrutis respecting the origination and non-origination of the Supreme B. His chief difficulty is that no reasonable doubt can be entertained about the non-origination of B. as the Śruti is emphatic that B. has no progenitor: *Na tasya kaścit janitā* (*Śvet. Up.* vi. 9).[26a] He has, therefore, thought it fit to give a different interpretation of the Sūtra to the effect that there is no possibility of existents like qualities of color etc. space and time being accepted as eternal and unoriginated because of the incompatibility of the Śruti which teaches that there is only one single reality—B.[26b]

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24. यत्तूक्तम्—अधिष्ठानापर्यवसितेन सत्त्वेन ब्रह्मण आरोपितत्वमिह निषिध्यते—आरोपितता हि कार्यतेति। तत्र प्रक्रमानानुगुण्यम्। नहि पूर्वाधिकरणयोरात्मन आकाशः संभूत इत्यादिश्रुत्या आकाशवाय्वोरात्माकाशयोरारोपितत्वमुक्तम्; येनेह ब्रह्मणि तदाशंक्य निषिध्येत (*TC.* p. 939b)

24a सौत्रासंभवशब्दास्वारस्यं च (*TC.* p. 939b)

25. नात्माश्रुतेरित्यनेन पौनरुक्त्यं च। विशिष्टरूपस्य जीवस्यारोपितत्वात्। आरोपितस्य च निवृत्तिनियमात् (*TC.* p. 939)

26. ये पुनः सतो ब्रह्मणः उत्पत्तिमाशंक्य निराकरणार्थं सूत्रं वर्णयन्ति तेषां निरर्थकं सूत्रम्। आशंकाहेत्वभावात्। 'स कारणं करणाधिपाधिपो न चास्य कश्चिज्जनिता न चाधिपः' इति मंत्रवर्णात्। नहि वचनमदृष्ट्वा पूर्वपक्षः क्वचित् क्रियतेऽनवस्थानात् (Bhāskara *BSB* ii.3.9)

26b. शब्दस्पर्शादीनां गुणानामुत्पत्तिश्रवणात् दिक्कालसंख्यापरिमाणादीनां चोत्पत्त्यश्रवणात् नित्यत्वमिति प्राप्ते उच्यते—'असंभवस्तु सतो विद्यमानस्य गुणस्यान्यस्य वा नित्यत्वासंभवः, कस्मात्? अद्वितीयश्रुत्यनुपपत्तेः (*Op. cit.* ii.3.9)

The *Bhāmatī* refers to Bhāskara's way of interpreting this Sūtra and criticizes it by pointing out that according to Bhāskara this adhikaraṇa sets aside the doubt of the non-origination of qualities space and time about whose origination nothing is said in the Śrutis. Now, this admitted absence of reference in the Śrutis to their origination will preclude the possibility of any conflict of testimony about their origination arising in the Śrutis. Without such a conflict being shown to exist, the matter cannot be brought within the scope of this Pāda and discussed. Apart from this, the expression Sat in the Sūtra has to be construed as denoting qualities, space and time—not without straining.[27] Finally, the predicate "because of violation of the Śruti which says there is only one reality" has to be *imported by adhyāhārā.*[28]

The *Kalpataru* also notes Keśava Kashmiri's attempted defence of Bhāskara. According to him, if the qualities, space and time stand excluded by the mention of only Ākāśa and Vāyu in the Śruti, then there will be breakdown of the ground of *Pratijñāhāni*, etc., in Sūtra 6. If they are included, there is no point in referring only to Vāyu and Ākāśa by name in the Sūtras. The *Kalpataru* refutes this contention by pointing out that the establishment of the genesis of Ākāśa and Vāyu—which by a faulty Pūrvapakṣa have been imagined to be without origination covers the genesis of all other tattvas in the world of effects, and that, therefore, no separate *adhi.* is required to discuss the case of *guṇas, dik* and *kāla.*[29]

Bhāskara's interpretation has also been cited and refuted by J. bringing to light some fresh points. J. points out that the genesis of guṇas, space and time will stand covered by the principle of extension of the same *nyāyas* as have been applied to *Viyad*[30]—unless a fresh *adhi.*

27. येतु गुणदिक्कालोत्पत्तिविषयमिदमधिकरण वर्णयान्तु तं सतोऽनुपपत्ते. इति क्लेशेन व्याख्येयम् । अविरोध-
समर्थनप्रस्तावे चास्य सगतिर्वक्तव्या । अबादिवत् दिक्कालादीनामुत्पत्तिप्रतिपादकवाक्यस्यानवगमात । तदास्ता
तावत् (*Bhāmatī* ii.3.9)
तैरश्रुतोत्पत्तिकानामनुत्पत्तिशकानिरासोऽधिकरणार्थं उच्यते । ततश्च श्रुतिविरोधापरिहारात् पादासगतिरित्याह
(*Kalpataru*)

28. क्लेशेनेति—सतो विद्यमानस्य गुणादेर्नित्यत्वासभव , कुत. ? अद्वितीयश्रुत्यनुपपत्तेरित्यध्याहारक्लेश:
(*Kalpataru*)

29 यत्तु केशवेन समादधे—पूर्वाधिकरणार्थं एवाक्षिप्यते श्रुताकाशादिभिरश्रुतदिगादीनां परिसख्याया प्रतिज्ञाव्यतिरेकयो·
बाधात्, अपरिसंख्याया त्वेकदेशस्योपादानवैयर्थ्यमिति, तन्न । अनादिपूर्वपक्षाभासोत्प्रेक्षितानुत्पत्तीनामाकाशा-
दीनामुत्पत्त्यभिधानस्य सर्वकार्योपलक्षणार्थत्वादिति (*Kalpataru*. ii.3.9)

30. केचिदिदं सूत्रमन्यथा व्याचक्षते—प्राग्गुणिना वियदादीनामुत्पत्तिरुक्ता इदानीं रूपादीना गुणानां दिक्कालादेश्चोत्पत्ति-
रुच्यते—सतो गुणादेरसभवो नोपपद्यते—प्रतिज्ञाहान्यादिनानुपपत्तेरिति । तदसत् – वियत्पदेनैव सर्वस्योपलक्षणात्
(*NS.* p. 435b)

is rendered necessary to deal with their claims by the presence of a further doubt (*adhikāśaṅkā*).[31] The point here is that Bhāskara *has* put himself in an awkward position by admitting that this Sūtra constitutes a fresh *adhi.*

It may be argued on Bhāskara's behalf that the term "*Viyad*" in the Sūtra is *not* competent to comprehennd the guṇas, space and time by *upalakṣaṇa*, as they fall into a different category from Bhūtas; and that therefore after finishing the topic of Bhūtas, the Guṇas and the others are taken up for consideration in a fresh *adhi.*[32] Against this plea J. *points out that this would only explain the contextual sequence* between the two *adhi-s* in this Pāda. It will not provide the *adhikāśaṅkā* required for opening a fresh *adhi.*[33] An *adhikāśankā* always operates by concealing or overpowering for the nonce the reasons by which a *conclusion was reached* in a previous or earlier *adhi.* Such is not the case here as the same reasons hold true for the genesis of guṇas, etc. Nor can the Pratijñā of *Ekavijñānena.....* be restricted in its scope to Bhūtas only, without reason.[34]

Thus, Bhāskara's attempt to dissociate this *adhi.* from the all-important topic of the impossibility of genesis of Sat or B. is baseless and short-sighted.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation.

Not less surprising is R.'s stand that this Sūtra is not a separate adhi. but is only a part of the Viyadadhi. and its concluding Sūtra. According to him, it does not enter into any actual discussion of the conflict of *utpatti* and *anutpatti* Srutis in relation to B.—in which case it will have to be constituted into a separate *adhi.* Its purpose is only to make it clear that the genesis of Ākāśa and air established in Sūtras ii.3.2; 5-8 is to be understood in the light of a general principle to be applied to all other *tattvas* like *Avyakta, mahat, ahankāra, tanmātras,* and *indriyas*, lest it should be thought, in the absence of this Sūtra, that only Ākāśa and Vāyu are subject to genesis and that the others are not.[35]

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31. अस्त्यधिकाशंकाभावाच्च (*NS.* p. 435b)

32. वियत्पदस्य सजातीयभूतमात्रोपलक्षकत्वं न्याय्यम्। विजातीयगुणादुत्पत्त्यसत्त्वमयुक्तमिति चेन्न। (*NS.* p. *ibid*)

33. संगतिरेषा, नाप्यधिकाशंका। रूपादीनामुत्पत्त्यश्रवणादिति चेन्न। प्रतिज्ञादिभ्यस्तदवगमात् (*NS.* p. 435b)

34. सङ्कोचस्तत्र कल्प्यत इति चेन्न। बाधकानुपलम्भादिति (*NS.* p. 435b)

35. वियन्मारुतयोरुत्पत्तिप्रतिपादनमुदाहरणार्थम्। उत्पत्त्यसंभवस्तु सत. परमकारणस्य परस्यैव ब्रह्मणः। तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य कृत्स्नस्याव्यक्तमहदहङ्कारतन्मात्रेन्द्रियविषयतत्त्वनादिकस्य प्रपंचस्य एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानप्रतिज्ञादिभिरवगतकार्यभावस्यानुत्पत्तिर्नोपपद्यत इति (R. *BSB.* ii 3.9)

This is not a satisfactory interpretation of the aim of this Sūtra. For it gives prominence to what is superfluous and fails to discuss what ought to have been fully discussed—viz. that Sat or B. has no origination whatever, in order to substantiate that the Śruti *Sad ajāyata* entails no contradiction.[36]

For, even without the presence of this Sūtra, the *nyāyas* given in Sūtras 5-7 will be sufficient and competent to accomplish R's desired objective. It is an accepted principle of scientific thinking to explain simialr facts by reference to a common principle wherever possible. If it were not so, there will be no obligation to make out an adhikāśaṅkā, where extension of application is desired by *atideśa*.[37a]

R.'s commentator has held that there is no need to establish the non-origination of Sat or B. in a separate *adhi.* here as B.'s eternality and non-origination have been established in the *Adṛśyatvādhi.* (i.2, 22-24).[37b] This is not a convincing answer. For, it is only in this Pāda of the *Avirodhādhyāya* that we have a *detailed discussion of the conflict of Śrutis pertaining to the origination and non-origination of different tattvas* and such a conflict is clearly to be seen in respect of the Sat or B. in such categorical statements as *Sad ajāyata* and *Sadeva idamagra āsīt*. *Such sharp conflict of testimony regarding the status of B. has not been presented or pressed to a decision earlier in the Adṛśyatvādhi. or elsewhere.* It falls entirely within the scope of *this* Adhyāya and Pāda and we have every *right to expect* the Sūtrakāra to meet this challenge to B.'s unoriginated existence for all time and not run away from it or miss the opportunity afforded by the natural and appropriate context of removal of conflict of Śrutis respecting origination and deal with it *in the manner it deserves to be*.[38]

A separate *adhi.* for this purpose is, therefore, an absolute and inexorable necessity in the Sūtras and not a luxury or a superfluity.

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36 केचित्—असभवोऽनुत्पत्तिः सत एव ब्रह्मण एव। अन्यत्तु महदादिकमुत्पद्यत इत्येव महदादेरुत्पत्त्यर्थमिद सूत्रमित्याहुः। तन्न। अवक्तव्योक्तेरवश्यवक्तव्यानुक्तेः (*TC.* p. 939)

37*a*. पूर्वेणैवास्यार्थस्य लब्धत्वात्। वियन्मातरिश्वनोरुत्पत्तिप्रतिपादनमुपलक्षणार्थमिति ज्ञापयितुमेतदिति चेन्न। प्रतिज्ञाहान्याद्युपन्यासेनैव तज्ज्ञापनसिद्धेः। समानन्यायोपलक्षणस्य मीमांसाया सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धत्वात्। अन्यथा, अतिदेशेऽधिकाशङ्काभ्यूहनवैयर्थ्यादित्युक्त एव सूत्रार्थः। (*NS.* p. 435b)

37*b*. कार्यत्वशङ्कानिरासः किं युक्त्येति श्रुत्या? नाद्यः, युक्तेरसभवात् * * * यदि श्रुत्या, तर्हि कृतकरत्वप्रसङ्गः, 'अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोक्तेः' इत्यादिषु नित्यं विभु सर्वगत सुसूक्ष्मम्' 'स बाह्याभ्यान्तरो ह्यजः' इति नित्यत्वाजत्वादिधर्मकस्यैव ब्रह्मणो भूतयोनिशब्देन परमकारणतया निर्दिष्टस्य परमात्मत्वनिर्णयात् तद्विरुद्धाशङ्कोत्थानं हि नोपपद्यते (*Śrutaprakāśa* ii.3.9)

38. अवश्यवक्तव्या च सतोऽनुत्पत्तिः 'सदजायत' इत्यादिश्रुत्यविरोधाय (*TC.* p. 939)

As the world's greatest Theistic philosopner, Bādarāyaṇa has shown sound judgment in devoting a separate *adhi.* for establishing that *the First Cause of all causes is and must necessarily be uncaused:*

'मूले मूलाभावादमूलं मूलम्'।
स कारणं कारणकारणाधिप: (*Śvet. Up.* vi. 9)

It is in M.'s interpretation of this Sūtra, showing the depth of suggestiveness contained in the Sūtrakāra's use of the term *Sataḥ* therein, that we get the insight into Bādarāyaṇa's *philosophical reason* why the Supreme Being must *ex hypothesi* be without genesis.

CHAPTER XVI

FIRE AND WATER SPRING FROM BRAHMAN

4. *Tejo'dhikaraṇam* (ii.3.10)

Having established in the first two *adhi.'s* that everything in finite reality has its genesis from B. and having shown in *adhi.* 3, that as the primary and independent source of all B. itself has no origination, the Sūtrakāra now turns to the removal of apparent conflicts of testimony regarding the identity of the specific causes[1] of particular forms of existence of effects like fire, water, etc. The conclusion is established that in each case it is B. that is and acts as *the* (primary) *source* of all genesis thro' the vehicle of 'the mediate causes'.[2] This is not acceptance of 'plurality of causes'.[3] M. explains this by pointing out that this *adhi.* helps to correct the impression that the primary and the mediate causes referred to in the *Kāraṇatvādhikaraṇam* (i.4.15) are independent causes as both have been recognized as causes there, bearing the names of Ākāśa, Vāyu, Tejas, etc. as causes;[4] tho' in different degrees

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1. एव ब्रह्मान्यस्य सर्वस्योत्पत्तौ, ब्रह्मणश्चानुत्पत्तौ सिद्धायामिदानीं कार्यविशेषे कारणविशेषविप्रतिपत्तिर्निरस्यते। (*TC.* p. 940b)
कार्यविशेषेऽग्न्यादिरूपे वायुब्रह्मरूपकारणविशेषे इत्यर्थः : (*TCP*)
2. न च वायोरग्निरित्यादिश्रुतिविरोधः। तत्र वायुद्वारा तेजसो ब्रह्मजातत्वोक्तेः : (*TP*)
3. न च द्वारवैयर्थ्याद्उभयकारणत्वं वाच्यम्; वाय्वादेरकारणत्वेऽपि वाय्वादिद्वारमनुसृत्य ब्रह्मणः स्वेच्छयैव लीलया तेज प्रभृतिकारणत्वस्य श्रुतिसिद्धत्वात् (*TP.* ii.3.10)
4. It should be noted that in the *Tadananyatvādhi.* (ii.1.15-21) the independent existence and power of the accessories in creation, as deduced from reasoning, have been repudiated. The present *adhi.* repudiates them as they purport to be supported by Sruti texts. There is therefore no redundancy here (Ragh. *TPB.* ii.3.10).

of the primary sense of the terms applied.[5] Plurality of causes is not to be determined on the basis of number but of status. The Supreme B. alone is the one and only independent cause in the full sense of the term everywhere. Ākāśa, Vāyu, Tejas and other causes—each with its own place and function in the evolutionary chain, are *not at all independent causes.* When the Śruti says Vāyu is the cause of Tejas's coming into being, it does not mean to say that Vāyu the element produces Tejas *independently of B. by its own creative power.* The potential capacity of Vāyu to evolve Tejas from out of itself thro' a process of change is implanted in it by the Supreme B.

उपादानशक्तेश्च परमात्माधीनत्वात् (*TP.* ii.3.10)

It is the power of B. that does everything and in this sense B. is the true cause of the evolution of Vāyu, Tejas, Waters, etc. The latter act merely as vehicles (*dvāra*) or intermediary causes. This does not mean that B. makes *use of these vehicles because it is otherwise* powerless to create Tejas or Waters without making use of Vāyu, Tejas or the like. It does not limit B.'s capacity to do otherwise. It is the Will of B. to do as it does,[5a]—its sport (*See* Vol. I, p. 370).

The present *adhi.* takes up the conflict of testimony observed in the case of the genesis of Tejas—the deity and the element of that name.[6] We read:

From Vāyu Agni was produced (*Taitt. Up.* ii. 1).

It (B) produced Tejas (*Chān. Up.* vi.2.3).

There is no need for a similar inquiry in the case of Ākāśa as there is no counter-testimony of its genesis from any other source than B. Tho' in respect of Vāyu there is some such conflict in the Śrutis tracing it to Ākāśa (*Taitt. Up.* ii.1.) and to B. (*Kham, Vāyur*—*Mund. Up.* ii.1.3) still the Sūtrakāra has passed on to consider the case of Tejas. The reason is that in the light of what he is going to establish about the genesis of Tejas which is lower down in the evolutionary scale than Vāyu, it will be easy enough to see that

5. 'कारणत्वेन' इत्युक्तेऽपि अमुख्यतयान्येषामपि मन्दांशत्वात् पुनरुक्तिरुभयकारणत्वनिवृत्त्यर्थम् (M. BSB. ii.3.10)
न च तद् तेन निरस्तं भवति। तत्र वाय्वादीनामप्यमुख्यतया वाय्वादिजन्यत्वस्याङ्गीकृतत्वेन उभयकारणत्वाविरोधादिति भावः (TP. ii.3.10)
'उभयकारणनिवृत्त्यर्थत्वात्' इति ब्रह्मवत् वायुरपि स्वतंत्रकारणमिति शंकानिवृत्त्यर्थत्वादित्यर्थः (TC. p. 940)

5a. The words *Tathā hy āha* in the Sūtra convey this meaning that the Śrutis state that B. creates Tejas thro' the medium of Vāyu and that it is its pleasure to do so.

6. यथोक्तं ब्रह्मण एव सर्वस्रष्टृत्वं वायुदेवतातः तेजोजन्मश्रुतिविरुद्धं न वेति चिन्ता (TC. p. 940b)
वायुदेवतात इत्युक्तलक्षणम्। वायुजन्यात् तेजःपरिणामरूपतेजोजन्मश्रुतिविरुद्धं न वेत्यपि ध्येयम्। कि वायो'' रिति वायुदेवताया वायुभूतस्य चेत्यर्थः (TCP. ii. 3. 10)

for similar reasons Vāyu also must be having its genesis from B. thro' the medium of Ākāśa.[7] Doubtless, the same result of establishing the genesis of Tejas and others primarily from B. and refuting their direct origination independently of B. could have been obtained by wording the Sūtra as: *Vāyuratas tathā hyāha* instead of *Tejo atas tathā hyāha* as we now have it. But the Sūtrakāra has chosen to word it *as it is* for good reasons. He has already conducted the inquiry into Vāyu from the standpoint of the chief deity thereof. There are also plenty of other instances to start the inquiry with. The inquiry into Tejas will, however, have to intersect Vāyu at some point as its mediate source. So when it is commenced with Tejas which is lower down in the evolutionary series and concluded with the finding that Tejas has its genesis primarily from B. thro' Vāyu, it will establish without any further expenditure of effort in that direction that Vāyu, which is nearer to B. in the series, must, also, for the same reasons, have had its genesis primarily from the same B. The Sūtrakāra has thus brought down two mangoes with one stone:

एका क्रिया द्व्यर्थकरी बभूव[8]

It may be felt that as the Śruti: *Tat tejo'srjata* (*Chān. Up.* vi.2.3) obviously refers to B.'s role as efficient cause and *Vāyor agniḥ* to the role of the element of air as the material cause in the production of Tejas, there is no conflict between them as each deals with a different matter; and that, therefore, viewed in this light, there is no need for this *adhi*. J. says it is a misconception to think that the Sūtrakāra's inquiry is confined only to the evolution of the material element of air, fire, water, etc. The fact, however, is that it also embraces the genesis of the respective deities of the elements.[9] These are Cetanas and cannot be brought under material cause and effect relation (*upādānopādeyabhāva*) to one another or with B.[10] It also appears from the Śrutis *Vāyor agniḥ, Agner āpaḥ* that as efficient causes in the development of the respective effects, the deities Vāyu, Agni and others have complete independence. This would naturally conflict with the Śrutis which make it clear that it is B. which is the independent efficient cause in the evolution of these elements from one an-

7 यद्यपि, आकाशाद्वायुरित्यस्ति वायावन्यजातत्वबोधिका विवादहेतुभूतश्रुति, तथापि अतिव्यवहितस्य तेजसो ब्रह्मजातत्वसाधकैतन्न्यायेनैवाव्यवहितवायोस्तत्सिद्धेः पृथग्विवादाभाव इति भावः। (Ragh. *TPB.* ii.3.10)

8. अत्र 'वायुरतस्तथा ह्याह' इत्युक्तावपि एतन्न्यायेनैवान्यजातत्वेन श्रुताना तेज प्रभृतीनामीश्वरादेव जन्म नान्यस्मात्, स्वतन्त्रादिति सिद्ध्यति, तथापि वायौ मुख्यदेवतामादायैव विचारस्य कृतत्वात्, उदाहरणदारिद्र्याभावाद्वायुमपि विषयीकुर्वतो विचारान्तरस्यापि व्यवहिते तेजसि कृते वायौ कैमुत्यसिद्धिलाभाच्च 'तेजोऽतः' इत्येवोक्तिरिति तात्पर्यं ध्येयम् (Ragh. *TPB.* ii.3.10)

9. एतच्छ्रुतीनामुपादाननिमित्तविषयतया स्वत एव व्यवस्थितत्वात् किमनेनायासेनेति; मैवम् वायुप्रभृतीनां देवतात्वात् (*TP.* ii.3.10)

10. देवतानां चोपादानोपादेयत्वाभावादिति भावः (*TC.* p. 940)

other. In this way, a conflict of testimony is sure to be there. The attempt to solve it cannot, therefore, be regarded as uncalled for.[11]

What is perhaps of greater philosophical significance in this context is that even the development of the material element of Tejas from air or of water from tejas is not to be glibly assumed to take place without energization from the Supreme. The potency of Matter in any form to evolve other forms of matter is *not* independent of B. It is derived from B. and is implanted there by B. It is not as if the Upādānakāraṇas have any metaphysical *carte blanche*.[12] The *nimitta* as well as the *Upādānakāraṇas* are equally activised by B.—which thus remains the One and only Independent Cause of whatever happens in the realm of finite reality—*in any form or shape or to any extent, at any time.* This is the philosophical truth that this *adhikarṇa* and the following highlight according to M.'s thoughtful interpretation of *what looks like a casual and a routine line of inquiry in the Sūtras* He has in the next *adhi.* quoted some very important texts which bring out most vividly the unfathomable majesty of B. as the All-Cause.[13]

Other commentators on Bādarāyaṇa have doubtless *talked* of B. as the source of *ap, tejas, vāyu,* etc. But none of them has given us such a deep insight into the full force and meaning of Bādarāyaṇa's mighty conception of B. as *Cetanācetanajagatkāraṇam.* And therein lies M.'s chief merit as the interpreter of Bādarāyaṇa.

5. *Abadhikaraṇam* (ii.3.11)

This *adhi.* rests on the conflict of texts like:—

'From Agni waters were produced' (*Taitt. Up.* ii, 1).

'From that B. all this is born—Ākāśā,

Vāyu, Tejas, Waters and the Earth' (*Muṇḍ. Up.* ii, 1, 3)

11. तथाच, वायुदेवताया अपि ईशवत् स्वातंत्र्येण तेजः प्रति निमित्तकारणत्वं प्राप्तमिति श्रुत्योर्विरोधः प्राप्त इति तत्परिहारायासः सफल इति भावः (Ragh. *TPB.* ii.3.10)

12. उपादानकत्वेऽपि परमात्माधीनत्वात् (*TP.* ii.3.10) 'तत्तेजोऽसृजत' इति श्रुतेर्ब्रह्मणो भूतवाय्वनुप्रवेशेन तदुपादानत्वमपि प्रेरकत्वेनापि कारणत्वप्रतिपादकत्वमभिप्रेतम् (Raghu. *TPB.* ii. 3. 10)

13. सत्ता सर्वस्य वै विष्णुरेक एव न संशयः।
इतरेषां तु सत्ताद्या यत एव तदाज्ञया।
तत्र तत्र स्थितो विष्णुस्तत्तच्छक्तीः प्रबोधयन्।
एक एव महाशक्तिः कुरुते सर्वमंजसा (M. BSB. ii.3.11)

The explanation of the second verse here given by *BD.* is very illuminating:

यद्यपि विष्णुरेक अन्यानपेक्ष एवाकाशादिजनने महाशक्तिः पूर्णसामर्थ्योऽपि; तथापि मौनिवैव तत्र तत्राग्न्यादिषु स्थितः सन् स्थित्वा, तत्तच्छक्तीः अग्न्यादिसामर्थ्यानि प्रबोधयन् तद्द्वारा सर्वमाकाशादिकमंजसा सम्यक् कुरुते जनयतीत्यर्थः (ii. 3. 11)

'B. alone existed in the beginning of this.

It created the waters' (   ).

It is finally resolved in the same way as the *genesis of Tejas—that* the waters are primarily generated by B. thro' the vehicle of Tejas.

The necessity for a separate *adhi*. for Āpaḥ has been explained by M. on the basis of an *adhikāśaṅkā:*

धर्मात् स्वेदादिदृष्टे : पुन: प्रतिषेध : (M. *BSB.* ii.3.11)

It is an observed fact that high bodily temperature is followed by sweat. The mediate *role of Tejas in the* generation of water does not, therefore, hold good. It will have to be given up and the fact recognized that Tejas directly and independently produces water. This receives support from the Śruti.

Thus the plea for not looking upon Tejas merely as a vehicle (*dvāra*) in the genesis of waters and recognizing it as the primary and independent cause of the origination of waters has the support of an observed concomitance *backed by the* Śruti.[14] Thus entrenched, the Pūrvapakṣa contends that not B. but Tejas is the direct and independent source of waters.

The Siddhānta refutes this by pointing out that dispensing with *the mediacy-role* of Tejas in the genesis of waters and making it instead the independent source of the genesis of waters depreciates the full sense of the authoritative pronouncement of the Śruti that B. alone is *the independent source* of all finite reality. This will not brook the slightest restriction, relaxation or reservation of meaning in any instance.[15]

In the Sūtra: *Āpah* the words *tathāhyāha* follow by *anuvṛtti* from the previous one. These words refer to the statement of the Śruti: *Sa idam sarvam asṛjata* in the full and *unexpurgated sense* explained above.[16] This is sufficient to establish that no exception is to be *made in* regard to B.'s being the primary and independent source of everything, acting thro' appropriate vehicles as set forth in the Śrutis. M. indicates the application of the same nyāyas in establishing the

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14. प्रत्यक्षप्राप्तयुक्तिमूलकत्वेन युक्तेः प्राबल्यमुक्त्वा श्रुतिसंवादित्वेनापि तदाह (Raghu. *TPB.* ii.3.11)

15. Vādirāja makes a fine point here:
ततेजोऽसृजतेति श्रुतेरिति वदता असृजतेति कर्तृप्रयोगात् ब्रह्मणः स्वतन्त्रकारणत्व लभ्यत इति सूचितम् । (*TPG.* p. 94)
वायुब्रह्मणोरुभयोरपि साम्ये, तद्ब्रह्म वायोरसृजत इत्यवक्ष्यत्

16. अत एव यथा स्वातंत्र्यं स्यात् तथा आहेति सूत्रमिति भावः (Vādirāja. *TPG*)

other. In this way, a conflict of testimony is sure to be there. The attempt to solve it cannot, therefore, be regarded as uncalled for.[11]

What is perhaps of greater philosophical significance in this context is that even the development of the material element of Tejas from air or of water from tejas is not to be glibly assumed to take place without energization from the Supreme. The potency of Matter in any form to evolve other forms of matter is *not* independent of B. It is derived from B. and is implanted there by B. It is not as if the Upādānakāraṇas have any metaphysical *carte blanche*.[12] The *nimitta* as well as the *Upādānakāraṇas* are equally activised by B.—which thus remains the One and only Independent Cause of whatever happens in the realm of finite reality—*in any form or shape or to any extent, at any time.* This is the philosophical truth that this *adhikarṇa* and the following highlight according to M.'s thoughtful interpretation of *what looks like a casual and a routine line of inquiry in the Sūtras* He has in the next *adhi.* quoted some very important texts which bring out most vividly the unfathomable majesty of B. as the All-Cause.[13]

Other commentators on Bādarāyaṇa have doubtless *talked* of B. as the source of *ap, tejas, vāyu,* etc. But none of them has given us such a deep insight into the full force and meaning of Bādarāyaṇa's mighty conception of B. as *Cetanācetanajagatkāraṇam.* And therein lies M.'s chief merit as the interpreter of Bādarāyaṇa.

5. *Abadhikaraṇam* (ii.3.11)

This *adhi.* rests on the conflict of texts like:—

'From Agni waters were produced' (*Taitt. Up.* ii, 1).

'From that B. all this is born—Ākāśā,

Vāyu, Tejas, Waters and the Earth' (*Muṇḍ. Up.* ii, 1, 3)

11. तथाच, वाय्वादेवताया अपि ईशवत् स्वातंत्र्येण तेजः प्रति निमित्तकारणत्वं प्राप्तमिति श्रुत्योर्विरोधः प्राप्त इति तन्निरासायायं सूत्र इति भावः (Ragh. TPB. ii.3.10)

12. उपादानकर्तृत्वस्य परमात्माधीनत्वात् (TP. ii.3 10) 'तत्तेजोऽसृजत' इति श्रुतेर्ब्रह्मणो भूतवाय्वनुप्रवेशेन महदुपादानानन्तकल्याणगुणैकत्वेनापि कारणत्वमुपपादकत्वमभिप्रेतम् (Raghu. TPB. ii. 3. 10)

13. कर्ता सर्वस्य वै विष्णुरेक एव न संशयः ।
इतरेषां तु सत्ता या तत एव तदाश्रया ।
तत्र तत्र स्थितो विष्णुस्तत्तच्छक्तीः प्रबोधयन् ।
एक एव महाशक्तिः कुरुते सर्वमञ्जसा (M. BSB. ii.3.11)

The explanation of the second verse here given by *BD.* is very illuminating:
सर्वत्र विष्णुरेक अन्तर्यामी एवाकाशादिवचने महाशक्तिः पूर्णशक्तिमत्त्वात् तथापि नीलवर्ण तत्र तत्राकाशादिषु स्थितः सन् स्थिरता, तत्तच्छक्तीः अन्यादिस्थानस्थानि प्रबोधयन् तद्द्वारा सर्वमाकाशादिकमञ्जसा सम्यक् कुरुते जगन्नाथवत् :
(ii. 3. 11)

'B. alone existed in the beginning of this.

It created the waters' (   ).

It is finally resolved in the same way as the genesis of Tejas—that the waters are primarily generated by B. thro' the vehicle of Tejas.

The necessity for a separate *adhi.* for Āpaḥ has been explained by M. on the basis of an *adhikāśaṅkā:*

धर्मात् स्वेदादिदृष्टे : पुनः प्रतिषेध :   (M. *BSB.* ii.3.11)

It is an observed fact that high bodily temperature is followed by sweat. The mediate role of Tejas in the generation of water does not, therefore, hold good. It will have to be given up and the fact recognized that Tejas directly and independently produces water. *This receives support from the Śruti.*

Thus the plea for not looking upon Tejas merely as a vehicle (*dvāra*) in the genesis of waters and recognizing it as the primary and *independent cause of the origination of waters has the support of an* observed concomitance backed by the Śruti.[14] Thus entrenched, the Pūrvapakṣa contends that not B. but Tejas is the direct and independent source of waters.

The Siddhānta refutes this by pointing out that dispensing with the mediacy-role of Tejas in the genesis of waters and making *it* instead the independent source of the genesis of waters depreciates the full sense of the authoritative pronouncement of the Śruti that B. alone is *the* independent source of all finite reality. This will not brook *the slightest* restriction, relaxation or reservation of meaning in any *instance.*[15]

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15. Vādirāja makes a fine point here:
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वायुब्रह्मणोरुभयोरपि साम्ये, तद्ब्रह्म वायोरसृजत इत्यवक्ष्यत्   (*TPG.* p. 94)

16. अत एव यथा स्वातंत्र्यं स्यात् तथा आहेति सूत्रमिति भावः (Vādirāja. *TPG*)

genesis of *air, Pṛthvi, oṣadhi, anna* etc. by the expression *ādi* in his opening statement *Brahmaṇa eva abādisṛṣṭiḥ.*[17] The term *Āpah* in the Sūtra applies to them by *upalakṣaṇa.*[18]

Śaṁkara's Interpretation.

According to S. the Pūrvapakṣa of the two *adhi.s* is: The Śrutis say that from B. Vāyu came into being after Ākāśa, Agni after Vāyu and Waters after Agni. They also say that Prāṇa, Vāyu Akāśa, Tejas, Waters, etc. have all sprung from B. This shows that as everything has sprung from B. it must be held that Tejas and Waters also are directly produced from B.

The Siddhānta is that due weight must be given to the '*Kārakavibhakti*' attached to '*Vāyu*' 'Tejas' etc. It would thus be proper to hold that Tejas originates *directly* from Vāyu and waters *directly* from Tejas and not from B. This will not be an '*Apasiddhānta*' (negation of the true Vedānta view). For what is meant is that these subsequent effects are the effects of *B. which has assumed the form of Ākāśa, Vāyu, Tejas, etc.* and not of the Śuddha-Brahman—i.e. B. which has not transformed itself into Vāyu, Agni and other forms.[19]

Criticism.

The effect of this Siddhānta will be to reduce the primacy of B.'s role in causation—except at the first stage of the production of Ākāśa. This will contrast unfavorably with the position of complete and absolute primacy of B.'s role in causation at all stages of evolution upheld by M. (See also *Gītā* VII.6. S *BSB*. ii.2.3).

However that may be, in conformity with the Siddhānta as embellished by S. we should expect his Pūrvapakṣa to be raised by challenging the position taken in B.S. i.1.2 that B. is *the cause* of all and his point of order of *Pratijñāhāni* in Sūtra ii.3.6 on the ground that fire and water are products only of Vāyu and Tejas and *not of B.*[20]

It is only by adopting such a line of Pūrvapakṣa and refuting it with the Siddhānta that in all such cases it is the same B. which has assumed the form of Vāyu, Tejas, etc. that is the uniform cause of the

17. अत्र व्यापकभूतवायुपृथिव्योषध्यादीनां ब्रह्मणस्तत्सृष्टत्वप्रदर्शनार्थमादिपदं भाष्ये (*TP.* ii.3.11)

18. सूत्रे अप्पदमन्योपलक्षणम् (*TP.* ii.3.11)

19. इह तु यद्यप्याकाशादिविकारस्यापि ब्रह्मणो वस्तुतोऽनन्यत्वात् वाय्वादानत्वेऽपि साक्षादेव ब्रह्मोपादानत्वोपपत्तेः कारकविभक्ते र्वर्णान्तरस्यानुरोधेनाभिवाय्वाद्युपादानता श्रुतयः कार्यक्रमाभिप्रायेण नियम्यन्त इति युक्तमिति सिद्धान्तः (*Bhāmati*)

20. ननु एवं, मुख्यवाक्यादिकार्यत्वेन जन्मादिसूत्र विषयाधिकरणोक्ता प्रतिज्ञाहानि स्यादिति पूर्वपक्षस्य, तेजोवायुभावापन्नब्रह्मकार्यत्वमिति समाधानेन सिद्धान्तस्य च संभवे, वस्त्वन्तरोक्तिना पूर्वपक्षादसंगतम् (*TC.* p. 341b)

origination of Tejas, water, etc. that the expression *ataḥ* used in Sūtra ii.3.10 which follows by *anuvṛtti* in ii.3.11 can be shown to refer to *one and the same antecedent*—viz. Sat or B. "given" in ii.3.9, which immediately precedes *Tejo' ataḥ*.[21] But in the way in which S. has posed the Pūrvapakṣa and met it, the term *ataḥ* where it actually occurs in ii.3.10 has *to refer to* Mātariśvan as its antecedent while under Sūtra ii.3.11 where *'ataḥ'* follows by *anuvṛtti* it has to refer to Tejaḥ.[22] The B. which has assumed the *form* of Vāyu and Tejas being qualified and, therefore, *different* in each case, *ataḥ* cannot be made to refer to the pure B. underlying the essence of both, except *thro'* the roundabout process of Bhāgatyāgalakṣaṇā. But then such a pure B. is *not the cause* of anything.

Further, the position that Tejaḥ and Āpaḥ are the products of B. which has assumed the form of Vāyu or Tejas would make them the effects of different qualified Brahmans. This would preclude the possibility of *Ekavijñānena sarvavijnānam*.[23] By bringing the *adhi.* within the confines of *Vivartavāda*,[24] the *Bhāmatī* and *Kalpataru* have brought S.'s interpretation to the verge of liquidating the existence of Tejas, Āpaḥ, etc. as effects by knowing their cause: Vāyu or Tejas.[25]

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

According to R. the *Tejo 'dhikaraṇam* consists of eight Sūtras ii.3.10-17. *The Pūrvapakṣa is that Tejas Āpaḥ and Pṛthvī spring solely* from Vāyu, Tejas and Āpaḥ. The Siddhānta is given in Sūtra 15 *that they spring from* B. which has for its 'body' the substances which are the immediate antecedent causes of Tejas, Āpaḥ and Pṛthvī. Sūtras 16 and 17 uphold the Siddhānta by taking note of incidental objections.

R. *could more* easily have shown that B. is *the source* of all by constituting Tejas, and Āpaḥ into sepaarte *adhi.'s* with *ataḥ* "given" after Tejaḥ and following by *anuvṛtti* after Āpaḥ and Pṛthivī, referring uniformly to Sat or B. *as its natural antecedent—instead of* permitting himself of the awkwardness of giving *ataḥ* different antecedents in different places. He need not have delayed his siddhānta till *Tadabhidhyānād eva tu* (Sūtra 15) because of the particle *tu* therein. *The tu in Asambhavastu* (ii.3.9) does not make *Etena Mātariśvā....* (ii.3.8) a Pūrvapakṣa, *even for* R.

21. किं चैवं हि, 'तेजोऽत.' इति सौत्रात: शब्द: स्वस्थाने 'आप' इत्यनुवृत्तिस्थले चाव्यवहितप्रकृतसदाख्यब्रह्मरूपैकार्थपरो भवति (*TC. p.* 941b)
22. अन्यथा हि, स्वस्थाने व्यवहितप्रकृतमातरिश्वपरोऽनुवृत्तिस्थले च तेज:पर.स्यात् (*TC. p.* 941b)
23. किंच, तेज आदेर्वाय्वादिभावापन्नविशिष्टभिन्नब्रह्मकार्यत्वे एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं न स्यात्
24. अध्यस्तस्याधिष्ठानत्वायोगात् न ब्रह्मण: कुतश्चित् सम्भव इत्युक्तं तर्हि वायोरप्यध्यस्तत्वात् न तेजसस्ततो जन्म किंतु ब्रह्मण एवेति प्रत्यवस्थानात् संगति: (*Kalpataru* ii 3.18)
25. विवर्तमते शुक्तितत्त्वज्ञानेन रूप्यस्येव वाय्वादितत्त्वज्ञानेन तेज आदेर्निवृत्तिश्च स्यात् (*TC.* p. 941)

CHAPTER XVII

NO CONTRADICTION AMONG LINK-TEXTS

6. *Pṛthivyadhikaraṇam* (ii.3.12)

After establishing that everything in finite reality originates from B. directly and indirectly (thro' links), the Sūtrakāra now turns to remove conflict of testimony among the 'Dvāra-Śrutis'—or texts which refer to the role of intermediary links thro' which causation proceeds from one stage to another.

We read in one such link-text: "They (the waters) created 'food'" (*Chān. Up.* vi.2). Another says: "From Water the earth was created" (*Taitt.* Up. ii.1). Here the doubt arises whether the waters are the link-cause in the production of food or of the earth. The Pūrvapakṣa is: Owing to the conflict in the testimony, it would appear that waters are not the link-cause either of the production of food or of the earth. As both the texts are of equal strength neither can be accommodated in any other sense. If the Śruti referring to the creation of *annam* (food) from water is taken in its expressed sense, there will be consistency with many others such as "Therefore whenever it rains anywhere then there is abundant food" (*Chān. Up.* vi.2.4). At the same time, we cannot take it that the term Pṛthivī denotes *annam*. If we presume that food was created directly from water, it will go against the testimony of texts like—'From water Prthivī, from Prthivī vegetation and from vegetation, food (*Taitt. Up.* ii.1). Nor can it be held that both Pṛthvī and *annam* are produced from water because of the opposition from the abovementioned text. Nor can we hold for a moment that the same *annam* is produced from water, as it is from vegetation. That will involve many unproved assumptions. Nor can it be supposed

that food is produced from water thro' intermediary stages; for we cannot depart from the primary sense of the passage: 'They (the Waters) created food'. Thus as both the Śrutis turn out to be self-contradictory neither can be preferred to the other. Both are, therefore, to be rejected as invalid. This will affect the Samanvaya of Śāstra in B. built on such foundations.

The Siddhānta resolves the conflict by showing that what has been referred to in the Śruti as 'annam', is *not* to be taken in the sense of 'food' in its commonly accepted sense, but in the sense of 'earth' which produces the food. The reasons for this preference are:

(ii.3.12)

अधिकाररूपशब्दान्तरादिभ्य :

(i) The context (*adhikāra*) in which the disputed passage (*Tā annam asṛjanta*) is found is one of the emergent evolution of the *elements*. This is clear from the texts: It created tejas, it created the waters and the subsequent reference to the process of tripartition (*trivṛtkaraṇam*) to which the three subtle elements (*tejo'abanna*) are subjected (*Chān. Up.* vi.3.2-3) which is *inapplicable to food as such*.

(ii) In addition to the evidence of the context, we have also the mark (*liṅgam*) furnished by the reference to the natural color of the earth which is black,—attributed to *'annam'*: The red color of a flame is the color of fire, the white one of water and the black one that of food (*Chān. Up.* vi.1.1).

(iii) Thirdly, there is evidence that *'anna'* has the power to denote 'the earth' in the texts: *Pṛthivī vā annam* (*Taitt. Up.* iii.9) *Āpaśca pṛthivī cānnam* (*A.Ā.* ii.3.1) *Tā āpo annamasṛjanta pṛthivī vā annam* ( ).

(iv) The expression *ādi* in the Sūtra (ii.3.12) is intended to convey that it is not proper to reject the validity of both the texts on this point as proposed by the Pūrvapakṣa as the Śrutis are *apauruṣeya* and *free* from all flaws. Therefore, a proper attempt must be made on the above lines to resolve the apparent contradictions in respect of the *Dvāra-Śrutis*.

CHAPTER XVIII

NO CONTRADICTION RESPECTING AUTHORSHIP OF LAYA

7. *Tadabhidhyānādhikaraṇam* (ii.3.13)

After having resolved the contradiction in respect of the origination of adhibhūta and adhidaiva tattvas, the next *adhi.* removes similar contradiction in respect of the identity of the author of Laya. The conflict turns on the following texts: The *Taitt. Up.* (iii.1) refers to B. as the author of Laya: *Yat prayanti.* The *Mah. N. Up.* (xvi.2) calls upon Rudra the supporter of the vital airs and the destroyer of all not to visit the suppliant with destruction. The Pûrvapakṣa argues that as we seldom find a father destroying his own offspring, the source of Laya must be other than the author of the world viz. B.

The Siddhānta holds: *Tadabhidhyānād eva tu talliṅgāt saḥ* (ii.3.13): B. is the author of cosmic Laya or destruction and not Rudra or any other deity. A Being like B. which is moved by true knowledge, acquired by correct meditation and other sâdhanas practised by earnest souls and which redeems them, when their Prārabdhakarmas have been worked out, from their *beginningless bondage of Samsāra* by Its gracious desire to do so, can *a fortiori* be assumed to be capable of bringing about the Laya or destruction of the *created world-order with its beginning in time.*[1]

It is not parenthood as such that accounts for a creator's *not choosing to destroy his own offspring* but his being influenced by feelings of

1. तस्याभिध्यानाद्योजनात्तत्त्वभावाद्भूयश्चान्ते विश्वमायानिवृत्तिः (*Svet. Up.* 1.10)
इति बन्धलयस्य तदभिध्याननिमित्तत्वलिङ्गात् तत्कर्तृत्वं प्रतीयते; किमु सादेर्जगतः इत्यतस्तस्मादेव सर्वसंहारकर्ता विष्णुरिति प्रतीयते (M. *BSB.* ii.3.13)

I and mine towards the offspring. The Supreme B. is above such attachments and weaknesses. There is, therefore, no bar to its being the cause of dissolution during Pralaya of everything it has brought into being at the time of creation.[2]

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

S. introduces the Pūrvapakṣa as holding that the elements themselves bring forth their effects independently. The objection that non-intelligent tattvas lke the elements cannot initiate independent activity is overcome by the explanation that these elements are spoken of in the Śrutis themselves as being endowed with intelligence. (*Chān. Up.* vi.2.3-4).

The Siddhānta is that it is the Supreme B. abiding in the form of these elements that reflects and produces the effects.[3] In other words, the Pūrvapakṣa is put up from two different points of view (i) that in texts like *Ākāśād Vāyuḥ Vāyor Agniḥ* the intelligent principles are the agents while (ii) the elements as such are to be regarded as the material causes. The Siddhānta will be that B. in the form of these intelligent principles will be the superintending principle (*adhiṣṭātṛ*) in the transformation, and their material cause (*upādānam*) in the form of the elements.[4]

Revised Interpretation.

But then, the investing of the elements themselves with the power to bring about their own modifications without their being *"indwelt"* by B. has been set aside earlier in the *Īkṣatyadhi.* (i.1.5-11) and elsewhere (i.1.14; i.4.1). It cannot, therefore, be brought up again for decision.

The other position that B. as expressing itself in the form of different elements is the material cause of their further transformation has also been well-established in the *Tejo 'dhikaraṇam* (ii.3.10). There is thus no need for this *adhi.* from any of these points of view.

The *Bhāmatī* and *Kalpataru* frankly admit this[5] and have, therefore, tried to give a better foothold to S.'s interpretation by improving

2. ममत्वादिदोषराहित्येन लोकपितृत्ववैलक्षण्यात्, लोकविरोधस्यादोषत्वात्। (*TP.* ii.3.13)
3. स एव परमेश्वरः तेन तेनात्मनावतिष्ठमानोऽभिध्यायस्त तं विकारं सृजतीति (*S. BSB.* ii.3.13)
4. स ईश्वर एव तेन तेनाकाशादिभावेनावतिष्ठमानः स्वयमधिष्ठाय निमित्तकारणभूतस्त त विकार वाय्वादिक सृजति (*Bhāmatī* ii.313)
5. न तावदिह भूताना ब्रह्मानधिष्ठिताना स्रष्टृत्वाभावश्चिन्त्यते, ईक्षत्याद्यधिकरणगतत्वात्। नापि ब्रह्मण एव तत्तद्भूतात्मनावस्थितस्योत्तरोत्तरकार्योपादानत्वम्। 'तेजोऽत' इत्यत्र तन्निर्णयात्। अतोऽधिकरणानारंभ इत्याशंकामपनयन् संगतिमाह। (*Kalpataru* ii.3.13)

on the Pūrvapakṣa. According to them, the Pūrvapakṣa is raised with reference to the Abhimānidevatās of the elements. In texts like *Ākāśād Vāyuh; Vāyor Agniḥ*, the abhimānidevatās themselves (without being indwelt by B.) are said to produce different effects. Being themselves sentient beings they do not require to look up to another sentient being like B. to bring about such changes[6]

This Pūrvapakṣa is set aside by the Sūtra' *Tadabhidhyānād eva tu tallingāt saḥ*. The Sūtra says that only the Supreme B. causes all these transformations of the elements because the Śruti has it that B. assumes the forms of the different substances by its own desire and reflection to do so, because there is the mark of its indwelling in all.

Criticism

This revised interpretation of the *Bhāmatī* and the *Kalpataru* is not in conformity with the position taken by S. at the outset of the Viyadadhikaraṇa that the terms Ākaśa, Vāyu, etc mentioned in the Śruti texts cited there are all of them to be undertsood in the sense of *the purely material elements of those names* and that the ablative cases affixed to those words are to be interpreted only in the sense of their being viewed as material causes. This precludes Ākāśa and others being understood in the sense of the corresponding Abhimānidevatās and the ablatives as signifying the idea of their being *efficient causes.*[7]

One cannot be allowed to shift the ground by switching on to the *abhimānidevatās* here and putting forward a Siddhānta by way of Abhyupagamavāda or granting for the sake of argument—without committing oneself to it in all sincerity and seriousness.[8] This unenviable predicament in which S. and his commentators find themselves in negotiating this *adhi.* is enough to bear out the correctness of M.'s approach to the whole question of the genesis of Adhibūtas, which from the very beginning of his C. on this Pāda he has kept closely and intimately linked with their *adhidaivavicāra* as the two go hand in hand —being organically interconnected issues.[9] *One may talk irresponsively of "M.'s inability to keep out theology from his metaphysics"*— not realising how unavoidably theology has to be invited to save a difficult situation, as here, even for others.

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6. इदानीमाकाशादिभूताधिष्ठात्र्यो देवताः किं स्वतंत्रा एवोत्तरोत्तरभूतसर्गे प्रवर्तन्ते उत परमेश्वराधिष्ठिता. परतंत्रा इति । तत्राकाशाद्वायुर्वायोरग्निः इति स्ववाक्ये निरपेक्षाणां श्रुतेः, स्वयं चेतनानां च चेतनान्तरापेक्षाया प्रमाणाभावात् स्वतन्त्राणामेवाकाशादीनां वाय्वादिकारणत्वमिति जगतो ब्रह्मयोनित्वव्याघात इति प्राप्तम् ।
(*Bhāmatī* ii.3.13)

7 त्वया आकाशादिशब्दानां भूतार्थत्वस्य पंचम्याश्चोपादानत्वस्योक्तत्वेन, अभिमान्यर्थत्वस्य निमित्तार्थत्वस्य चाभावात् । (TC. p. 944b)

8. अभ्युपगमवादेन सिद्धान्तोऽयं च क्लिष्टत्वात् । (TC. p. 944b)

9 Cf. भौतिकसर्गतारतम्याधिभूताधिदैवेषु श्रुतीनां परस्परविरोधपरिहारोऽस्मिन् पादेन । (M. *BSB.* ii.3.1)

In S.'s interpretation, the phrase *Tadabhidhyānāt* is altogether superfluous. For, the mark of B. being the indwelling author and regulator of the modifications of Ākāśa, Vāyu, Tejas, etc., from one another, which is required to establish the conclusion that all the modifications take place only because of B. and not by the initiative of the Devatās which are dependent beings, has been fully expressed by the words *Tallingāt* which immediately calls up the authority of the Śruti: *Yah Pṛthivyām tiṣṭhan,yo vāyau tiṣṭhan.* In the circumstances, there will be no further need to refer to the fact of *tadabhidhyāna* (meaning reflection or desire on the part of B. to assume the forms of the different elements)—as the fact of B.'s indwelling in the elements is sufficient to explain their transformation without asking further as to *how this indwelling of B, has come about.* Conforming to this, the Sūtra could, therefore, be cut short to *Tallingāt Saḥ.*[10]

There is, however, necessity for both the reasons—the one helping to establish the other (*hetusādhakahetu*), in M.'s interpretation: B. is the author of the dissolution of the cosmic order that has had a *beginning in time,* because It dissolves by its grace (*abhidhyāna*) the *beginningless bondage* of individuals in Samsāra.[11]

By way of internal evidence in support of this meaning of *abhidhyāna* here, the *TD* of Trivikrama Paṇḍita draws attention to the Sūtra: *Parābhidhyānāt tu tirohitam tato hyasya bandhaviparyayau* (iii.2.5) where the termination of the beginningless bondage of souls has been ascribed to the *abhidhyāna* (gracious will) of the Lord.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation.

According to R. this adhi. covers eight Sūtras from *Tejo'tas tathā hyāha* to *Carācara......* (ii.3.17). It establishes that among the remote effects of B., it is B. in the form of that substance which is the immediately antecedent cause that produces that substance and *not* the bare antecedent substance as such.

We have already seen the awkwardness which results from treating Sūtras 10, 11 and 12 as Pūrvapakṣa Sūtras as R. has been obliged to do. Apart from that, his interpretation of *Tadabhidhyāna* in ii.3, 14, is unable to call to mind a Śruti in which that expression *abhidhyāna* is embodied. There is such a Śruti—*Tasyābhidhyānāt......viśva-*

10. किंच, 'यःपृथिव्यां तिष्ठन् पृथिवीमन्तरो यमयति' इति त्वदुक्तस्य नियन्तृत्वलिंगस्य 'तल्लिङ्गात्' इत्यनेनैवोक्तत्वात् 'सोऽकामयत' इत्यभिध्यानस्य च देवतानामीश्वराधिष्ठितत्वे लिंगत्वायोगात् सूत्रे तदभिध्यानात् इति व्यर्थम् । (*TC.* p. 94b)

'तल्लिंगात् सः' इत्येतावतैव पूर्तेरिति भावः (*TCP*)

11. अनादिबन्धसंहर्तृत्वात् सादिजगत्संहर्तानुमीयत इति पञ्चम्योर्वैयधिकरण्यमुपेत्य परंपरया हेतुत्वोक्तिः (*TDP*)

māyānivṛttiḥ (*Śvet. Up.* i.10). But R. has no use for it. But that is not the criterion. If the Sūtrakāra had really intended to refer to the Śruti '*Tad aikṣata bahu syām*' (*Chān. Up.* vi.2.3) as R. would have it, in this context, the former would have used the appropriate expression *Tadīkṣaṇāt* as the more compact and precise one. Otherwise, it may be difficult to rule out the other Śruti: *Tasyabhidhyānāt......* (*Śvet. Up.*) from being thought of in this connection. Taking his clue from *Tadabhidhyānāt*, M. has cited *Śvet. Up.* i.10 as the intended Śruti. The overall interpretation of the Sūtra too *has to change with the change in the Śruti.*

CHAPTER XIX

RETRACTION OF TATTVAS IN REVERSE ORDER

8. *Viparyayādhikaraṇam* (ii.3.14)

This *adhi.* resolves the conflict of testimony in regard to the *order of retraction of tattvas and their abhimānidevatās* in Laya. This topic naturally comes up after it has been established in the previous *adhi.* that the Supreme B. is the author of their Laya.

The *Bhāllaveya Śruti* quoted by M. refers to the tattvas being produced in order and *merging in order*:

Kramād utpadyate kramād vilīyate.

The *Caturveda-śikhā* quoted speaks of the merger as taking place in the *reverse order of creation: Vyutkramād vilayaścaiva.* Merger in the order of origination can claim the support of our own experience. We find as a general rule that seniors in age predecease their juniors.

The conflict is resolved by the Siddhānta Sūtra: *Viparyayeṇa tu kramo'ta upapatteḥ,* pointing out that the order referred to in the Bhāllaveya Śruti is the reverse of the order of evolution because in another verse of the same Bhāllaveya Śruti it is clarified that involution is in the reverse order of evolution:

Kartā Prāṇādikasyāsya hantā bhūmyādikasya ca /
Yaḥ kramād vyutkramāccaiva sa Hariḥ para ucyate //

Tho' we find in our experience that seniors in age generally predecease the juniors, this may not be applicable to the Tattvas[1] and

1. लोकें प्रथमोत्पन्नाना प्रथम नाशे, किं प्रथमोत्पत्तिः प्रयोजिका, किंवा सामर्थ्यविशेषाभाव इति (चिन्ता) (TC. p. 945b)

The existence of a Mūla-Śruti answering to what has been taught in the Smṛti can easily have been assumed on the basis of the Mīmāmsā dictum *Asati hyanumānam* and the discussion carried out.[12] The fact that the Sūtrakāra has thought it fit to raise a discussion over this question, in this Pāda, cannot be properly explained without evidence of actual conflict of testimony on the point, from the Śrutis. It is not necessary that the materials available to the Sūtrakāra should, all of them, be extant to this day.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation.

According to R. this Sūtra has *nothing to do with the question of the order of retraction of the elements.* It is a continuation of the topic of the order of *origination* itself from the previous Sūtras. It establishes that the order of succession of Prāṇa, Indriyas, Ākāśa, Vāyu, Tejas, Waters and Pṛthivī mentioned in *Muṇḍ. Up.* (ii.1.3) in reverse of (i.e. in conflict with) the true order of their origination as Ākāśa, Vāyu, Agni, etc. as set out in *Taitt. Up.* (ii, 1) is justifiable only on the acceptance of the position that each of these effects is really from B. itself in the form of a special causal substance producing the next. For, the acceptance of mediate causality for B. would annul its immediate causality taught in the Śrutis.[13]

Criticism.

We have, however, to point out that after the consideration given to the question of the creation of the elements upto Sūtra 13, it would be more natural to expect attention to be given to the topic of their retraction also. *There is no reason for R. to fight shy of the topic.* S. is right in discussing it tho' not in the way in which he has done it.

12. 'ज्योतिष्यापः प्रलीयन्ते ज्योतिर्वायौ प्रलीयते' इति त्वदुक्तस्मृत्यनुमितश्रुतौ च लये क्रमस्य श्रुतत्वेन तदश्रवणस्वीकारेण पूर्वोत्तरपक्षयोरयोगाच्च (TC. p. 945b)

13. अव्यक्तमहदहङ्काराकाशादिक्रमात् विपर्ययेण यः सर्वेषां कार्याणां ब्रह्मानन्तर्यरूपः क्रमः 'एतस्माज्जायते प्राण' इत्यादिषु प्रतीयते, स च क्रमः तत्तद्रूपात् ब्रह्मणः तत्तत्कार्योत्पत्तेरेवोपपद्यते। परम्परया कारणत्वे हि आनन्तर्यश्रवणमुपरुध्येत। अत 'एतस्माज्जायते' * * * इत्यादिकर्मा सर्वस्य ब्रह्मणः साक्षात् संभवस्योक्तम्
(*Śrībhāṣya* ii.3, 15)

CHAPTER XX

NO EXCEPTION TO THE LAW OF RETRACTION IN THE REVERSE ORDER.

9. *Antarādhikaraṇam* (ii, 3, 15-16)

This *adhi.* removes the doubt of exception to the rule of retraction of all created elements and their presiding deities in the reverse order, as established in the previous *adhi.* The doubt arises with reference to the retraction of *manastattva* and *vijñānatattva.*

The Pūrvapakṣa takes its stand on certain texts like: "From Prāṇa Manas is produced and from Manas Vijñāna is produced" (   ). "Let the enlightened one contemplate that speech merges into mind and mind into vijñāna" (*Kaṭha. Up.* i.3.13).

The Pūrvapakṣa contends that it is clear from the first text that *Vijñāna is produced from the mind.* The Laya-Śruti, cited above, has it that it is the cause viz., the mind that is retracted into the effect viz., *Vijñāna* and not the effect vijnāna into the cause viz. the mind, as we should expect from the principle of retraction in the reverse order. This means that the law laid down in the previous *adhi.* is broken in this case and is applicable only to cases other than that of vijnāna and manas. The opening words of the Sūtra thus sum up the Pūrvapakṣa neatly:

विज्ञानमनसी अन्तरा (विना) क्रमः
(i.e. पूर्वोक्त॰युत्क्रमलयक्रमः)[1]

The second part of the first Sūtra *replies to this objection* and answers that there is no special proof that there is any such excep-

1. विज्ञानमनसी अन्तरा विपरीतक्रम इति चेत् (*M. BSB.* ii.3.15)

tion in the case of Vijnāna and Manas: *Aviśeṣāt* (i.e. *viśeṣapramāṇā-bhāvāt*).

The second sūtra clears up matter by pointing out where the misconception of the Pūrvapakṣa lies. The Śruti: *Manasaśca vijñānam* (   ) quoted for the Pūrvapakṣa does not refer to the origination of *vijnāntaattva* from *manastattva* as misunderstood by the Pūrvapakṣa. Its real meaning is that the mind as a sense organ (*antaḥ-karaṇa*) produces the *vṛtti* of cognition (*vijnānam*) thro' reflective thinking (*ālocana*)[2] The words *manas* and *vijnānam* in the Śruti quoted for the Pūrvapakṣa as representing the genesis of *vijñānatattva* from *manastattva* convey the partial senses of the terms[3] vijñāna and *manas* in terms of cognition in the form of a *vṛtti* thro' the action of the mind. (*Tadvyapadeśo bhāktaḥ*). The other senses of the terms Vijnāna and Manas are of course *vijñānatattva* and *manastattva*. Those senses are *not* intended here in the text: *Manasaśca vijñānam*.[4a] In respect of the Laya Śruti: *Tad yacched jñāna ātmani*, however, it is the merger of the *manastattva* in *vijñānatattva* that is intended. Such a merger is in conformity with the reverse order of their origination.[4b] The order of origination is: From the Supreme B emerges Avyakta, from Avyakta mahattattva, from Mahat emerges Vijñānatattva; from Vijñānatattva emerges manastattva and from manastattva Ākāśa, etc. The phrase '*Carācarvyapāśrayaḥ tadbhāvabhāvitvāt* in the Sūtra has been explained as conveying that awareness in the form of a *manovṛtti* in respect of the moving and non-moving world of objects is produced by the mind as a cognitive sense organ:

नच, 'मनसश्च विज्ञानम्' इति श्रुतिविरोधः। तस्याः चराचरविषयकवृत्तिरूपज्ञानस्य मनोरूपेन्द्रियजन्यत्वप्रतिपादकत्वेन सावकाशत्वादित्यर्थः:[6] (Raghu *NVṭ*)

2. 'मनसश्च विज्ञानम्' इति व्यपदेश चराचरेषु आलोचनाद्विज्ञान भवतीति (M. *BSB*. ii.3.16)

3. भागांशया ` ` स्यात् (M. *BSB*. ii 3 16). The term *bhākta* in the Sūtra is rendered as 'a part' of the meaning of the terms in question. The derivation of tho word in this sense is given by the *TC*. 'भजनो भागसेवयोः' इति वचनात् भागार्थस्य भजेर्भावे क्तप्रत्ययान्तात् भक्तशब्दात् वा, क्तिन् प्रत्ययान्तात् भक्तिशब्दात् वा, तस्येदमिति सवन्धसामान्ये विहिताण्प्रत्ययान्तस्य भक्तशब्दस्य भागविषयवाचकत्वं युक्तम् (Op. *cit*.) Ragh. *TCP*. (p 947b) identifies the Kośa cited as *Kavikalpadruma*. (Ver. 123b)

4a. मनः शब्दो हि, तत्त्वेऽन्तःकरणे च वर्तते। तथा विज्ञानशब्दोऽपि तत्त्वेऽवबोधने च। अय च व्यपदेशः साधारणमनोविज्ञानयोर्मनोरिन्द्रियावबोधाख्यभागविषय एव, ननु मनोविज्ञानतत्त्वविषय। न चेन्द्रियादिविषयत्वे कात्र-नानुपपत्तिः (*TP*. ii 3.16)

4b. यद्यपि यस्मात् वाङ्मनसि, इत्येव तत्त्वनयक्रम, तथापि नायमुत्पत्तिक्रम (*NVt*. ii.3 adhi. 9)

5. परादव्यक्तमुत्पन्नमव्यक्तात् महांस्तथा।
विज्ञानतत्त्वं महतः समुत्पन्नं चतुर्मुखात्॥
विज्ञानतत्त्वात् मनो मनस्तत्त्वात् खादिकम्॥ इति स्कान्दे (M. *BSB*. ii.3 16)

6. चराचरविषये मनसः आलोचनेनावबोधस्योत्पद्यमानत्वात् (*TP*. ii.3.16)
"In so far as knowledge (awareness) is being produced (*bhāvitvāt*) by the distinctive attribute (*tadbhāva*) of reflection (*ālocana*) belonging to the mind (*manaḥ*) in respect of (*viṣaye*) the moving and non-moving objects of the world.

The term *carācara* has also been explained as alluding to the two senses which the terms *manas* and *vijñāna* carry—one of them being what is 'constant' (*acara*>*acala*) and the other 'transient' (*cara*>*cala*). The vijñāna and manastattvas are constant principles. Used in the sense of 'the sense organ (mind or antahkaraṇa) producing thro' the process of reflective thinking (*ālocana*) knowledge of some distinctive kind, it is the cara—aspect of the meaning of the word that is to be taken into account. It is to show that it is the transient aspect of the dual sense of the words that has been kept in view here in interpreting the text *Manasastu vijñānam* that the Sūtrakāra has read the term *carācaravya-pāśraya* by itself tho' syntactically it is an integral part of the compound: *Carācaravyapāśrayatadbhāvabhāvitvāt* standing in adjectival relation to *"tadbhāva"*. Vādirāja in his TPG has, however, explained the term *carācaravyapāśrayatadbhāvabhāvitvāt* as referring to the production of knowledge (*vṛttirūpam*) by the sense organ (mind) in the two classes beings—the trees, plants and such other *acala*—Jīvas and in other classes of beings who are *cala* (moving) such as men and animals:—

अल्पाक्षरत्वात् जीवव्यपाश्रय इति वक्तव्ये,[7] यच्चराचरग्रहणं, तन्मनसः तज्जन्यबोधस्य च जीवेष्वभावे चरे संचरणाद्यसंभवात् । अचरेऽपि स्वतः संचरणाभावेऽपि परदत्तजलपानादिना-भिवृद्धयसंभवात् इति च हेतुसूचनार्थम् । (*TPG*. p. 96-97)

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

According to S. the Sūtra: *Antarā vijñānamanasī***** (ii.3.15) constitutes an *adhi*. by itself. It deals with an objection against the order of origination referred to in the *Taitt. Up.* (ii.1) that from B. Ākāśa originates and from Ākāśa Vāyu, from Vāyu Tejas and so on. This seems to be contradicted by *Muṇḍ. Up.* (ii.1.3) which places the genesis of the sense organs, and the mind *between* B. *and the elements* headed by Ākāśa.[8]

The Siddhānta refutes this objection. It says that the order of genesis referred to in the *Taitt. Up.* holds true everywhere (*aviśeṣāt*). The apparent intrusion of manas and the *indriyas* in between B. and Ākāśa in the *Muṇḍ. Up.* text has got to be explained without clashing with the order established in the *Taitt. Up.* The mind and the sense organs are instruments of knowledge and they are composed of the essence of the elements (*bhautika*) and therefore they must necessarily

7. समासान्तर्गतं तद्भावं प्रति विशेषणस्यापि चराचरव्यपाश्रयत्वस्य पृथगुपादानं तु, मनोविज्ञानशब्दरूपो व्यपदेश· इन्द्रियावबोधयोस्तु चंचलत्वेन चरत्वात् इह भागविषय· इति योजनान्तरप्रदर्शनार्थमिति द्रष्टव्यम् (*TC*. p. 948b)

8 आत्मादिरुत्पत्तिः प्रलयश्चात्मान्त इत्युक्तम् । सेन्द्रियस्य च मनसो बुद्धेश्च सद्भावः प्रसिद्धः श्रुतिस्मृत्योः । तयोरपि कस्मिंश्चिदन्तराले क्रमेण उत्पत्तिप्रलयावुपसंग्राह्यौ । आथर्वणे उत्पत्तिप्रकरणे भूतानामात्मनश्च अन्तराले करणान्यनुक्रम्यन्ते । तस्मात् पूर्वोक्तोत्पत्तिप्रलयक्रमभङ्गप्रसंगो भूतानामिति - चेत् - (S. *BSB*. ii.3.15)

have been created *after* the elements. The mention of created things in the *Muṇḍ. Up.* is only *a specification of all that had been created and not an enumeration in the precise order of their creation.* But the logical order (required by the law of cause and effect) shows that the sense organs and the mind could not have been created before the elements which are part of their causal complement. Thus understood, there is no real violation of the order of genesis.[9]

Criticism

This way of interpreting the Sūtra involves a *break in the continuity of theme.* The subject of creation of elements had been concluded with Sūtra 13 and the topic of their retraction had been taken up, according to S. himself, in Sūtra 14. Sūtra 15 would most naturally be expected to go into alleged cases of exception to the *order of retraction, if any.* This is how M. has explained Sūtra 15. If any case of alleged exception to or contradiction of the order of genesis is to be specially discussed, its proper place would be *before opening the topic of Laya.*[10]

S. has tried to justify the opening of this topic at this stage with the explanation that in the foregoing Sūtras it had been shown that the creation and the retraction of the elements take place (from and into B), in the direct and in the reverse order. However, apart from the elements referred to in the earlier Sūtras, the Śrutis and the Smṛtis speak of the existence of the mind, the senses and the intellect. It stands to reason that these things also originate in B. and are refunded into It in some order. They must accordingly have a place of their own among the things created and refunded. It is in this context that the *Muṇḍ.* Up. text which mentions the organs and the mind *between B. and Ākāśa* creates a break in the order of creation and retraction so far made known to us. Hence, it becomes necessary to thrash out this question.

This explanation tho' plausible is not very satisfactory. In the first place, the Muṇḍ. Up. text cited deals *only with the origination of manas and indriyas,* along with other things. It does not *say anything about their retraction.* The actual contradiction is thus only with reference to their place in the scheme of *origination.* The settlement of their place and order of origination will automatically decide the ques-

9. न । अविशेषात् । यदि तावत् भौतिकानि करणानि ततो भूतोत्पत्तिप्रलयाभ्यामेवैषामुत्पत्तिप्रलयौ भवत इति नैतयोः क्रमान्तरं मृग्यम् । भवति च भौतिकत्वे लिङ्गं करणानाम्—'अन्नमयं हि सोम्य मनः' इत्येवंजातीयकम् । आथर्वणे तु, सामान्यक्रममात्रं करणानां भूतानां च, न तयोरुत्पत्तिक्रम उच्यते (S. *BSB.* ii.3.15)

10. Cf. क्रमान्वितस्य पूर्वसूत्रद्वयप्रलयक्रमपरत्वयोगेन, सृष्टिक्रमपरत्वं तथास्याधिकरणस्य सृष्टिक्रमप्रकरणादुत्कर्षः (इति नोपपद्यते) (*TC.* p. 934)

tion of the order of their retraction; for S. has not raised cases of any exception to the accepted order of retraction (in the reverse order) as M. has done. Hence, there will be (greater) coherence in raising this question of the indriyas and senses *before* beginning the topic of Laya as such *and not after it.* Unless there is contradiction in *both the directions* in the case of manas and the senses or contradiction in respect of their retraction only, it would not be proper to raise their question *after* the topic of Laya has been *concluded.* But no such contradiction has been reported by S. The difficulty is only with regard to where their origination is to be placed and in what order. The order of their Laya would be governed by the reverse order of their creation without any difference of opinion. Thus, even accepting S.'s special reasons for going into this question of the *indriyas* and *manas,* we fail to see why the topic should have been brought up *after Laya* and could not have been discussed *before Laya.*

There are other misfits in S. 's interpretation of the wording of the Sūtra to sustain his interpretation, which raise grave doubts about the correctness of his diagnosis of what is precisely at issue in this adhi.

To begin with the *Muṇḍ. Up.* text cited by him refers to *Prāṇa, manas* and *indriyas* in between B. and Ākāśa. S. has *not* offered any explanation as to why the Sūtrakāra has ignored the case of *Prāṇa* and shown so much solicitude only for determining the place of manas and the senses, in the evolution scheme.[11] As a matter of fact, accepting the semantic derivation of the term '*vijñāna*' proposed by Vācaspati, as pointing to the cognitive organs of *mind, indriyas* and *buddhi,* the mind also as an internal sense organ can be brought under the connotation of vijñāna, thus eliminating the use of *manas* in the Sūtra. (and giving place to Prāṇa which has been left out).[12] It cannot be that the term *manas* has been specially retained in order to give a clue to the origination of the indriyas as *bhautikas,* from the *bhūtas.* The Śruti quoted by S. for this purpose: *Annamayam hi somya manaḥ* (*Chān. Up.* vi.5.4) merely refers to the quotidian build-up of the mind by the finest essence of the food eaten. It has nothing to do with the question of the origination of the mind from the elements in primordial creation. This should be clear from the opening statement there "Food when eaten becomes threefold; its middle part flesh and its subtlest portion the mind" (*Chān. Up.* vi.5.1)[13]

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11. आथर्वणे आत्मनो भूताना चान्तराले प्राणस्यापि श्रुतत्वात् सूत्रे तत्त्यागेन विज्ञानमनसोरेवोपादानम् (अनुपपन्नम्) (*TC*)
12. तथा, यौगिकेन विज्ञानशब्देनैव मनसोऽप्युक्तिसंभवेन सूत्रे पृथङ्मन शब्द (अनुपपन्नः) (*TC.* p. 948)
13. अन्नमयत्वादिश्रुतिस्तु 'अन्नमशितं त्रेधा विधीयते' इति वाक्यशेषात् पार्थिवेनान्नेन मनस उपचयमाह। न तु पृथिवीभूतान्मनसस्तत्त्वोत्पत्तिम् (*TC.* p. 948b)

S. mentions the existence of the Buddhi and other Śrauta tattvas. By the same token, we have to take into account Mahat, Avyakta and the Tanmātras referred to in the *Subālopaniṣad*. The *Taitt. Up.* makes no mention of Avyakta and Mahat which are mentioned in the *Kaṭha. Up.* Surely, S. would not be justified in treating these as productions of the *bhūtas*. It is in this connection that the Śruti cited by M:

आकाशादूर्ध्वं तन्मात्राणि भूतादौ[14] लीयन्ते। भूतादिर्महति, महानव्यक्ते लीयते

and the Smṛti:

परादव्यक्तमुत्पन्नमव्यक्तात्तु महांस्तथा।
विज्ञानतत्त्वं महतः समुत्पन्नं चतुर्मुखात्॥
विज्ञानतत्त्वात्तु मनो मनस्तत्त्वाच्च खादिकम्॥

deserve attention.

Strikingly enough, it is this order of the genesis of *ākāśa* etc. only after Prāṇa, Manas and indriyas that is reflected in the *Muṇḍ. Up.* text

एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च।
खं वायुर्ज्योतिरापः पृथिवी (ii, 1, 3).

The famous text of the *Subālopaniṣad* quoted by R. under B.S. i.4.27:—

पृथिव्यप्सु लीयते, आपस्तेजसि, तेजो वायौ, वायुराकाशे, आकाशमिन्द्रियेषु, इन्द्रियाणि तन्मात्रेषु, तन्मात्राणि भूतादौ भूतादिर्महति, महानव्यक्ते, ऽव्यक्तमक्षरे, अक्षरं तमसि, तमः परे देव एकीभवति।

also affords evidence of the order of evolution of the elements from and after the indriyas.[15]

There is nothing wrong in adjusting this information by way of *anuktopasaṁhāra* in the scheme of the *Taitt. Up.* so that the difficulty vanishes without resorting to desperate remedies like ignoring Prāṇa and making separate mention of Manas and Indriyas when both can be combined under one term 'Vijñāna'. If this is done, there will be no need for this *adhi.* at all.

The way in which S. construes the words *'antarā'* and *'vijñāna-manasī'* in the Sautra pūrvapakṣa necessitates importation (*adhyāhāra*) of additional words in brackets:—

(आत्मानं भूतानि च) अन्तरा विज्ञानमनसी (समाम्नायेते)

Between [Atman and the elements] the senses and the mind [have been mentioned].[16]

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14. भूतादिः means अहङ्कारतत्त्वम्
15. Cf. 'मनस्तत्त्वाच्च खादिकम्' इति भाष्यावतस्मृत्या, तथा, 'आकाशादूर्ध्वं तन्मात्राणि भूतादौ लीयन्ते भूतादिर्महति, महानव्यक्ते' इति (श्रौत) लिङ्गे तथापरत्वे एव 'ख वायुरित्याद्युत्तरवाक्य एव, एतस्माज्जायते प्राण इत्यादावपि पाठक्रमेण च मनआदनन्तरमेव आकाशोत्पत्तेः सिद्धेः (TC. p. 948b)
16. अन्तरेत्यध्याहृताभ्यां "आत्मानं भूतानि च" इत्याभ्यां द्वितीयान्ताभ्यां विज्ञानमनसी इत्यस्य प्रथमान्तस्याध्याहृतेन 'आम्नायेते' इत्यनेनान्वय (न सूत्र) (TC. p. 948)

(ii) Similarly, in trying to establish a suitable connection for the word '*kramena*' in the Sūtra S. has to import a full sentence:

(तयोरपि) अन्तराले क्रमेण (उत्पत्तिप्रलयावुपसंग्राह्यौ)

"In between (genesis and retraction of them must be provided for) in due order.***"

Such devious importations are avoided in M.'s one straight and simple construction of the Pūrvapakṣa:

विज्ञानमनसी अन्तरा = meaning विना (व्युत्) क्रमेण लयः (अन्येषा)[17]

The meaning of '*krama*' (order) can be conveyed by the expression *antarā* equivalent to *antarāla* (in between the two ends), as S. understands the position. This renders the term *kramena* in the Sūtra superfluous.[18]

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

We have already noticed that according to R. the two Sūtras: *Antarā vijñānamanasī* and Carācara****are part of the *Tejo'dhikaraṇam*. Accordingly, R. treats the Sūtra: *Antarā vijñānamanasī**** as connected with the topic of genesis of the tattvas (and *not* with their Laya). We have seen that even the Sūtra *Viparyayeṇa tu krama**** has *not* been interpreted by him in terms of Laya. His interpretation of *Antarā vijñānamanasī*****is not, therefore, open to the criticism of break of continuity of the topic of Laya and reverting to the topic of origination, as is S.'s interpretation.

R. holds that the Sūtra *Antarā vijñāna*** takes note of the objection that the sense organs and the mind are accepted as being created in between the elements and the Tanmātras because there is a parallel agreement between the order of the *Taitt. Up.* and the order of creation given in the *Muṇḍ. Up.* including the senses and the mind and that for this reason the entire text is evidence only of the orderly genesis of the various Tattvas *directly from one another and not directly from B.* as contended by the Siddhāntin in Sūtra 15 (*viparyayeṇa tu****).[19] This objection is refuted by the argument (*aviśeṣāt*) that the

17. मद्रीत्या 'विज्ञानमनसी' इत्यस्य द्वितीयान्तस्य विज्ञानमनसी अन्तरा–विना, इत्यनध्याहारेणैव अन्वयसम्भवे (*TC.* p. 948)

In M.'s interpretation on the other hand, 'Kramena' referring to the previously established '*krama*' viz. the *reverse order* (*vyutkramena*) is *quite* justified and is not rendered superfluous by *the term antarā, which means 'except in the case of* (विना)

18 क्रमस्यान्तरालार्थेनान्तराशब्देनैवोक्त्या पुनः मूले क्रमशब्द. (अयुक्त.) (*TC.* p. 948)

19. अत्रापि सर्वेषां क्रमप्रतीतेः । खादिषु तावत् श्रुत्यन्तरप्रसिद्धः क्रमोऽत्रापि प्रतीयते । तै सहपाठलिंगात् भूतप्राणयोरन्तराले विज्ञानमनसी अपि क्रमेणोत्पद्येते इति प्रतीयते । अतः सर्वस्य साक्षात् ब्रह्मण एव सम्भवस्योत्सभकमिद वाक्य न भवतीति (*Śrībhāṣya* ii.3.16)

inclusion of Prāṇa, the senses and the mind in between does not in any way alter the fundamental position of the Siddhānta that every one of them is created by B. directly in so far as the fact remains that each of the Tattvas producing the next in the series constitutes the body of B. For this reason, they are all produced directly by and from B.

Needless to say, such an interpretation also involves a good deal of importation (*adhyāhāra*) to establish the desired point of view.[21] An interpretation of the Sūtra which is able to explain without adhyāhāras or with the minimum of adhyāhāras is certainly to be preferred.

20. तत्र। अविशेषात्। विज्ञानमनसोः खादीनां च साक्षात् सम्भवरूपसम्बन्धस्याभिधेयस्य सर्वेषां प्राणादिपृथिव्यन्तानामविशिष्टत्वात्, स एव विधेयः; न क्रमः। अतोऽव्यक्तादिशरीरकात् परस्मात् ब्रह्मण एव सर्वकार्याणामुत्पत्तिः। तेजः प्रभृतयश्च शब्दाः तदात्मभूतं ब्रह्मैवाभिदधति। (*Śrībhāṣya* ii.3.16)

21. अनेकाध्याहारादिदोषात् (Ragh. *TCP.* p. 948)

CHAPTER XXI

BRAHMAN IS NOT SUBJECT TO LAYA

10. *Ātmādhikaraṇam*[1] (ii.3, 17)

Having established that everything other than B. is subject to retraction, the Sūtrakāra now turns to dispose of a doubt that may arise whether B. also may similarly be subject to Laya. The doubt itself is not an idle one. It arises on account of a conflict of testimony. One text proclaims that B. is 'the eternal of the eternals' (*Kaṭha. Up.* ii, 2.13). Another reads: "Having involved all this in darkness (*tamas*) *He remains hidden in that darkness*". "Having dissolved the darkness, He issues forth. Unaided, He creates all this world, withdraws it, ordains it in various ways, impels it to activity, envelops it in ignorance and brings the light of self-experience to the souls and redeems them from bondage" ( )[2].

The Pūrvapakṣa thinks that the statement that at the time of Cosmic Laya, B. lies hidden in darkness is only a euphemism for saying that it gets bodily disintegrated. The text which alludes to B.'s merger (*antas tamasi nilīnaḥ*) can also be supported by the reasoning that as a sentient being, like the Jīvas, B. also must be subject to merger, in the great dissolution.[3] The Pūrvapakṣa overrules the ob-

1. नात्मा अश्रुतेर्नित्यत्वाच्च ताभ्यः (ii.3.17). This word Ātman is to be understood here in the sense of the Supreme B. It is the primary sense of the word, as has been established by the Sūtrakāra in i, 3.1 and as followed by him in iv.1.3.

2 'स वा इदं सर्वं विलाप्यान्तस्तमसि निलीनः तद्विलाप्य व्युत्तिष्ठते । स इदं सर्वं विसृजति, विलापयति, विस्थापयति प्रस्थापयति, आच्छादयति, प्रकाशयति विमोचयत्येक एव'

3. (न च) चेतनत्वेन साम्यात् विष्णोरपि देहलयः (*NV*. ii.3. adhi. 10)

inclusion of Prāṇa, the senses and the mind in between does not in any way alter the fundamental position of the Siddhānta that every one of them is created by B. directly in so far as the fact remains that each of the Tattvas producing the next in the series constitutes the body of B. For this reason, they are all produced directly by and from B.

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BRAHMAN IS NOT SUBJECT TO LAYA

10. *Ātmādhikaraṇam*[1] (ii.3, 17)

Having established that everything other than B. is subject to retraction, the Sūtrakāra now turns to dispose of a doubt that may arise whether B. also may similarly be subject to Laya. The doubt itself is not an idle one. It arises on account of a conflict of testimony. One text proclaims that B. is 'the eternal of the eternals' (*Kaṭha. Up.* ii, 2.13). Another reads: "Having involved all this in darkness (*tamas*) *He remains hidden in that darkness*". "Having dissolved the darkness, He issues forth. Unaided, He creates all this world, withdraws it, ordains it in various ways, impels it to activity, envelops it in ignorance and brings the light of self-experience to the souls and redeems them from bondage" (   )[2].

The Pūrvapakṣa thinks that the statement that at the time of Cosmic Laya, B. lies hidden in darkness is only a euphemism for saying that it gets bodily disintegrated. The text which alludes to B.'s merger (*antas tamasi nilīnaḥ*) can also be supported by the reasoning that as a sentient being, like the Jīvas, B. also must be subject to merger, in the great dissolution.[3] The Pūrvapakṣa overrules the ob-

1 नात्मा अश्रुतेर्नित्यत्वाच्च ताभ्यः (ii.3.17). This word Ātman is to be understood here in the sense of the Supreme B. It is the primary sense of the word, as has been established by the Sūtrakāra in i, 3.1 and as followed by him in iv.1.3.

2. 'स वा इदं सर्वं विलाप्यान्तस्तमसि निलीनः तद्विलाप्य व्युत्तिष्ठते । स इदं सर्वं विसृजति, विलापयति, विस्थापयति प्रस्थापयति, आच्छादयति, प्रकाशयति विमोचयत्येक एव'

3. (न च) चेतनत्वेन साम्यात् विष्णोरपि देहलयः (*NV.* ii.3. adhi. 10)

jection that as an Independent Being not even subject to *Parādhīna-viśeṣāpti*, it will not be possible to conceive of B.'s merger.[4] It is within the competence of B. to assume a body sportively (for purposes of creation?) and there is every likelihood of its losing such a body in universal Laya.[5]

The Siddānta therefore rules out the possibility of B.'s Laya thro' loss of Its body, in cosmic dissolution.[6] Earlier, in the *Asambhavādhikaraṇam* (ii.3.9) B.'s freedom from origination was established. Here its immunity from loss of being thro' loss of its body[7] is established. There is thus no overlapping between the two *adhikaraṇas*.

The Sūtrakāra proceeds to refute the Pūrvapakṣa by pointing out that there is really no evidence in the Śruti (*aśruteh*) of the alleged merger of B. The commentator explains this by pointing out that the text referring to B.'s being "hidden in darkness" does not mean to say that B. is lost or that its body is dissolved in cosmic dissolution but only that B. remains concealed and enwrapped in primeval darkness which is an aspect of Prakṛti and is invisible to others. This is corroborated by the famous Ṛgvedic verse from the *Nāsadīya Sūkta*:

तुच्छयेनाभ्वपिहितं यदासीत् (X.129.3c)

'The all-pervading One (*ābhu*) lay concealed by the dependent and inferior (*tucchya*) principle of Prakṛti'. In this Śruti we see that after referring to the fact that while the entire world of effects was merged in Prakṛti, in Mahāpralaya, the Supreme One (*tad ekam*) lying all the while concealed in this Prakṛti came out of its concealment at the end of this period, by its own will and power of thought:

तपसस्तन्महिनाजायतैकम् (*RV.* x.129.3d)

M. quotes the *Paiṅgī Śruti* also in this connection: 'Hidden from view, in this primeval darkness, He distinctly sees Prakṛti, Puruṣa and Kāla. None other sees Him'. The *Kaṭha Up.* (ii.2.13) says: "He is the

4. न च वक्तव्य स्वातन्त्र्यहेतुना परमात्मनोऽनुपपत्तेरुक्तत्वात् कथ लय इति (*TP.* ii.3.17). See Ragh. *TPB.* on this.

5. स्वतन्त्रस्यापि लीलया विग्रहग्रहणपरित्यागोपपत्तेः (*TP.* ii 3.17).

The *AC* of Satyanātha is the only C. which throws welcome light on this point:
अपरिहार्यमेव लयादिकं दोषत्वात् जगज्जन्मादिकारणत्वविरोधि, न तु लीलया प्राप्तम्। नहि लीलया बालकैस्ताड्यमानो राजा न राजा भवति, येनेश्वरो जगज्जन्मादिकारण न स्यादिति चेत्; न ब्रूमो वय लीलया विनाशो भवतीति, येनोक्तदोषः स्यात्। किनाम यथा लीलया कुड्यात् कुड्यमुत्पतत अवर्जनीय पात, एव लीलया विग्रह गृहीतिवतोऽपि अवर्जनीयो विनाश इति। सति च विनाशे, दोषित्वात् न सर्वजगत्कारणत्वमिति युक्त एव पूर्वः पक्षः (*AC.* ii.3.17)

6. अनेन मोक्ष प्रतिज्ञाश नात्मा देहतो लीयते इति व्याहतो भवति। (Raghu. *NVt.* ii.3.17)

7. No physical body of any material essence is intended by this expression. Nor is any "body" alluded to as being "sportively assumed" (लीलया गृहीतो विग्रहः) in the Pūrvapakṣa intended here. The "body" of B. is a synonyom for its unique personality. For further comments see M.'s *BSB.* ii.2.41. p. 95 *ante.*

eternal of the eternals". This very distinction conferred on B. as the "eternal of the eternals"—implying 'degress' (?) of eternality should make it clear, says M., that while the Jīvas are eternal only in their essence of being (*svarūpeṇa nitya*) while their bodies are not, the Supreme has a superior order of eternality in that even its body of transcendental essence is for ever immune from loss or disruption or diminution of any kind.[8]

Śaṁkara's Interpretation.

S. treates Sūtras 16 and 17 as two different *adhikaraṇas*—both, however, dealing with the topic of Jīvātman, which according to him begins with Sūtra 16 and extends to the end of the Pāda.

S.'s Carācarādhikaraṇam (ii.3.16)

Sūtra 16 raises the Pūrvapakṣa as follows: In common parlance, we speak of Devadatta as 'born'. The name Devadatta must, therefore, appertain to the Jīvātman and not to his body. The rites of Jātakarma at birth and of Vaiśvānareṣṭi on account of such birth of a child, the offering of Śrāddhas to the dead cannot be on account of the body answering to the name Devadatta. It must, therefore, be conceded that the usages: Devadatta is born, Devadatta is dead are with reference to the birth and the death of the Jīvātman himself who is born with the body and dies with the death of the body.[9]

The Siddhānta is that the fruits of heavenly rewards held out in the Śāstras will be incompatible with the assumption that the Jīvātman is born with each body that he acquires and dies at the death of that body.[10] The usage of birth and death in regard to the Jīvātman should, therefore, be understood primarily with reference to the moving or the non-moving bodies which the Jīvātman may come to occupy and leave after a time. Such a usage should be deemed to be a figurative one (*bhākta*) based on considerations of contact and cessation of contact with the bodies and depending on the emergence and disappearance of such bodies.[11] It is not to be taken in a literal sense but only as a courtesy-reference (*upacaryate*).[12]

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8 'सर्वे वा एते चिदात्मानो ब्रह्मॅल्लयमनुप्राप्य विष्णोरुदरे संविशन्ति' इति तस्योदरे सर्वसंग्रहणादिश्रुतिभ्यो नित्यत्वावगमात् तद्देहस्य (*NV*. iii.3.17)

9. देवदत्तादिनामधेय तावज्जीवात्मनो, न शरीरस्य। तन्नाम्ने शरीरस्य श्राद्धादिकरणानुपपत्तेः। तस्मान्मृतो देवदत्तो, जातो देवदत्त इति व्यपदेशस्य मुख्यत्व मन्वानस्य पूर्व. पक्षः (*Bhāmatī* ii.3.16)

10. न जीवस्योत्पत्तिप्रलयौ स्तः। शास्त्रफलसबन्धोपपत्तेः। शरीरानुविनाशिनि हि जीवे, शरीरान्तरगतप्टानिष्टप्राप्तिपरिहारार्थौ विधिप्रतिषेधावनर्थकौ स्याताम् । (*S. BSB.* ii.3.17)

11. भाक्तस्त्वेष जीवस्य जन्ममरणव्यपदेशः। किमाश्रयः पुनरस्य मुख्यो यदपेक्षया भाक्त इति, उच्यते। चराचरव्यपाश्रय. स्थावरजगमशरीरविषयौ जन्ममरणशब्दौ (*S. BSB.* ii.3.16)

12 शरीरप्रादुर्भावतिरोभावयोर्हि सतोर्जन्ममरणशब्दौ भवतो नान्यतः (*ibid*)

Ś's Ātmādhikaraṇaam (ii.3.17).

In this *adhi.* the Pūrvapakṣa is that as there is the Śruti (*Bṛh. Up.* ii.2.20) which after stating that "like sparks from fire all the Prāṇas emerge from B." makes separate mention of the emergence of the Jīvātmans also: "All these Ātmans emerge from It",[13] it must be admitted that like Ākāśa and other elements which have had their genesis from B., the Jīvātman also has his genesis in essence (*svarūpeṇaiva*) from B. at the time of the primordial creation.[14] For this reason, then, he will continue to survive, like the elements themselves, till the next period of universal dissolution. This will amply provide for the reaping of the fruits of Karma in subsequent births and the enjoyment of heavenly rewards attaching to the sacrifices performed, without hitch.[15]

The Siddhānta is that Jīvātman is not subject to genesis at all; for in the context of the origination of elements like Ākāśa, there is no mention of the genesis of the Jīvātman.[16] It is also clear from Śrutis like 'Indestructible indeed is this self' (*Bṛh. Up.* iv.5, 14) that the Jīvātman is eternal and uncreated. He is also known from the Śrutis to be beginningless, immutable and identical in essence with B.[17]

This identity of Jīvātman with B. is clear from the *Taitt. Up.* (ii.6) which says: "after creating all this, B. entered into them". This entry we learn from the *Chān. Up.* vi.3.2 was "in the form of the Jīvātman to bring about development of name and form". This shows that the Jīvātman is of the essence of B. itself which has entered into what It had created. Thus the Jīvātman becomes identical with the eternal B. and he cannot, therefore, be differentiated in essence from B. Without being essentially different from B. he cannot be subject to creation like the elements.[18] Therefore, the Jīvātman must be accepted as being without genesis and destruction.

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13. 'यथाग्नेः क्षुद्रा विस्फुलिंगा व्युच्चरन्त्येवमेवास्मादात्मनः सर्वे प्राणा' इति प्राणादेर्भोग्यजातस्य सृष्टिं शिष्ट्वा 'सर्वं एते आत्मानो व्युच्चरन्ति' इति भोक्तॄणामात्मना पृथक्सृष्टिं शास्ति (S. *BSB.* ii.3.17)

14. जीवस्य परस्मादात्मन उपत्तिर्वियदादीनामिवास्ति नास्ति वेत्येतदुत्तरेण सूत्रेण वक्ष्यति (S. *BSB.* ii.3.16)

15. स्वर्गादिभोगाय देहनाशेऽप्यात्मा न नश्यतीत्युक्तम्। तर्हि कल्पमात्रावस्थानेऽपि स्वर्गादिभोगसम्भवात् जीवः कल्पान्तयोरुत्पत्तिविनाशवानिति सगतिमाह (*Kalpataru.* ii.3.17)
मा भूतामस्य शरीरोदयव्ययाभ्यां स्थूलावुत्पत्तिविनाशौ। आकाशादेरिव तु महासर्गादौ तदन्ते चोत्पत्तिविनाशौ जीवस्य भविष्यत इति शकान्तरमपनेतुमिदमारभ्यते (*Bhāmati.* ii.3.17)

16. नात्मा जीव उत्पद्यते; कस्मात्, अश्रुतेः। न ह्यस्योत्पत्तिप्रकरणे श्रवणमस्ति भूयस्सु प्रदेशेषु (S. *BSB.* ii.3.17)

17 उत्पत्तिरेव त्वस्य न सम्भवतीति। नित्यत्वाच्च ताभ्यः। च शब्दादजत्वादिभ्यश्च। नित्यत्वं ह्यस्य श्रुतिभ्योऽवगम्यते। तथाजत्वमविकारित्वमविकृतस्यैव ब्रह्मणो जीवात्मनावस्थानं ब्रह्मात्मना चेति (S. *BSB.* ii.3.17)

18. तस्मादाकाशवत् जीवात्मान उत्पद्यन्ते इति प्राप्ते उच्यते–भवेदेव यदि जीवा ब्रह्मणो भिद्येरन् नत्वेतदस्ति। 'तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत् (*Taitt. Up.* ii.6) अनेन जीवेन (*Chān. Up.* vi.3.2) इत्याद्यविभागश्रुतेः (*Bhāmati.* ii.3.17)

Criticism

It is surprising that S. and his commentators should have failed to see that the conclusion established by them in the *Ātmādhikaraṇam* renders nugatory their own Pūrvapakṣa in the immediately preceding Carācarādhikaraṇa also dealing with the Jīvātman.[19] For, when it is *to be proved in the very next adhi. that there is no genesis in essence of the Jīvātman as a separate entity, from B. as the two are not different beings, it is hardly possible to have a doubt that the Jīvātman may be born in essence at the time the body is born.*[20] *When it is to be* ruled out in the *Ātmādhi.* that the Jīvātman is without *genesis in essence*, even at the time of the Mahāsarga (universal creation), *a fortiori* it would follow that he cannot be having any genesis in essence at frequent intervals between one Mahāsarga and one Mahāpralaya.[21]

The expression *'Tadvyapadeśa'* in Sūtra 16 refers in all probability to the order betwixt vijñāna and manas raised in the preceding Sūtra. There is no justification whatsoever for S.'s arbitrarily referring it to the subject of genesis of the Jīvātman—a subject which has not figured in the preceding adhikaraṇas of *this* Pāda, *so far*.[22]

S. is eager to establish in the *Carācarādhi.* that usages like 'Devadatta is born or is dead' are to be taken as made from the point of view the birth or the death of the body alone, and not of the soul and are accordingly to be viewed as figurative (*bhākta* or *gauṇa*)[23] But that can be done only when it is established that the Jīvātman is absolutely different from the body. Conversely, when it is established that the Jiva and his body are different entities, no doubt can possibly be entertained that the birth or the death of the body refer primarily to the birth or the death of the Jīvātman.[24] *Now,* S. *takes a special adhi. to establish the thesis of Dehātmabheda (difference between body and soul) in Adhy.* III.3, 53-54. That *adhi.* would knock down the Pūrvapakṣa

19. द्वितीयसिद्धान्तेन दण्डापूपनयहतस्याद्यपूर्वपक्षस्यानुदयात् (*TC.* p. 949)

20 नित्यब्रह्मभेदायोगादित्यादिना यदा स्वरूपोत्पत्तिरेव वार्यते, तदा देहोत्पत्त्याश्रयोत्पत्तिशङ्काया- स्नावकाश इत्यर्थः. (*TCP.* p. 950b)

21. सर्गादावुत्पत्त्यभावोक्तौ मध्ये मध्ये जन्माभाव कैमुत्यसिद्ध इत्यर्थं (*TCP*)

22 तद्व्यपदेश इति सूत्रस्थस्य विज्ञानमनसी इति पूर्वप्रकृतविज्ञानमन क्रमपरामर्शितच्छन्दस्याप्रकृतजीवजन्मविषयत्वा- योगाच्च (*TC.* p. 950b)

23. The true Śamkarite position is that usages like *'Devadatta is born' or is dead.*— 'I am blind, I am fair or stout' are all cases of pure *adhyāsa* (superimposition) and not *gauna*. It would be a terminological inexactitude for the Sūtrakāra to have called them *bhākta* in disregard of S.'s position: The *Bhāmatī* notices the slip and hastens to the rescue with an excuse.

24. देहात्मभेदासिद्धौ देहोत्पत्त्याश्रयो जन्मव्यपदेशो जीवे भाक्त इत्युक्त्यनुपपत्तेः । तद्भेदसिद्धौ च गृहोत्पत्ति- विनाशयो र्देवदत्त इव, शरीरजन्ममरणयो र्जीवे मुख्यत्वशङ्कानुदयात् (*TCP.* p. 950b)

raised in ii.3.16. There will thus be no necessity for this *adhi.*[25] or else for *that one,* in the Sūtras.

In the *Ātmādhikaraṇa,* S. will have to clarify if the word Jīva-ātman presupposed in the Śruti *Tat sṛṣṭvā tad evānuprāviśat,* refers to the being which stands qualified by the fact of having entered into what has been created (*sṛṣṭānupraveśaviśiṣṭa*) or to 'pure consciousness' (*cinmātram*). The *viśiṣṭa* or the qualified being will naturally have to have a beginning and cannot for that reason be eternal.[26] The beginningless existence of 'pure consciousness' or pure being (*sanmātram*) has already been established in the *Asambhavādhikaraṇam* (ii.3.9). This *adhi.* will not serve the purpose or else will be superfluous.[27] The question of the *anāditva* of the Jīivātman has also been argumentatively established in the Sūtra ii, 1.35 which also renders S.'s *Ātmādhikaraṇa* superfluous.[28] It would be much more satisfactory, therefore, to devote the present Sūtra (ii.3.17) to the question of the possibility of Laya of the Supreme B.—a topic which has immediate contextual nexus. In the light of the finding given in the *Dyubhvādyadhikaraṇam* (i.3.1) about the primary connotation of the word "Ātman" being the Supreme B. and not the Jīvātman, there should be no objection to preferring such an interpretation of the Ātmādhikaraṇam to the one sponsored for it by S. which bristles with so many difficulties as have been pointed out.

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

According to R. the Sūtra: Carācara **** is introduced to answer the objection in the course of the *Tejo'dhikaraṇam,* that if all the words such as Ākāśa, Vāyu in the Kāraṇavākyas—(Ākāśād Vāyuḥ, etc.) are to be understood in the sense of B. itself having those elements as its body, it would invalidate the recognised use of such words in their widely accepted denotations of *ākāśa, vāyu,* etc. in worldly usage.[29]

The Sūtrakāra answers this objection with the explanation that the ordinary denotations of these words are *limited to a part of the* denoted, because the higher denotation of these words in terms of B. has not yet dawned on men's minds.[30]

25. स्वद्रीत्या देहात्मभेदसाधकेन 'एक आत्मनः शरीरे भावात्' (iii, 3, 53) इत्यधिकरणेनास्य गतार्थत्वाच्च (*TC.* p. 950b)
26. द्वितीये–तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत्' इति श्रुत्या सृष्टानुप्रवेशविशिष्टस्य जीवत्वेन, तस्य नित्यत्वोक्त्ययोगात् (*TC.* p. 950)
27. चिन्मात्रानादित्वं तु, 'असंभवस्तु' (ii.3.9) इत्यनेनैव सिद्धम् (*TC.* p. 950)
28. न कर्म (ii, 1.35) इत्यत्र समारानादित्वस्योक्तत्वेन द्वितीयस्य तेन गतार्थत्वाच्च (*TC.* p. 950)
29. नन्वेवं सर्वशब्दानां ब्रह्मवाचित्वे तैस्तैः शब्दैस्तत्तद्वस्तुव्यपदेशो व्युत्पत्तिसिद्ध उपरुद्धयेत। तत्राह–'चराचरेति' (*Śrībhāṣya* ii.3.17)
30. स्थावरजंगमवस्तुव्यपाश्रयः तद्व्यपदेशः तद्वाचिशब्दः ब्रह्मण्यभाक्तः (*Vedāntadīpa,* ii.3.17) निखिलजंगमस्थावरव्यपाश्रयः तत्तच्छब्दव्यपदेशो भाक्तः वाच्यैकदेशे भज्यत इत्यर्थः। समस्तवस्तुप्रकारिणो ब्रह्मणः प्रकारभूतवस्तुग्राहिप्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणाविषयत्वात् वेदान्तश्रवणात् प्राक् प्रकार्यप्रतीतेः। प्रकारिप्रतीति-भावभावित्वाच्च तत्पर्यवसानस्य (*Śrībhāṣya* ii.3.17)

The chief difficulty in this interpretation of this Sūtra is that the antecedent of *'tad'* in *Tadvyapadeśa* has to be sought in particular "words" like Ākāśa, Vāyu etc., which is unsustainable.[31] It also suffers from the necessity to import the additional words "in Brahman" to correlate them with the antecedent *'śabdaḥ.'*[32]

The establishment of the *anāditva* of Samsāra (in B.S. ii.1.35) of which the *anāditva* of Jīvātmans is a necessary corrollary would also render R.'s interpretation of the *Ātmādhikaraṇam redundant,*[33] *like S.'s.*

31 तत्र तद्व्यपदेश इति तच्छब्दस्याप्रकृतशब्दपरत्वायोग इत्युक्तप्रायम्। (*TCP*. p. 950)

32. ब्रह्मणीत्यध्याहारः (*ibid*)

33 'न कर्माविभागादिति चेत्' इत्यत्र संसारानादित्वस्य श्रीभाष्यादावुक्तस्य गतार्थत्वेनेत्यर्थः (*TCP*)

CHAPTER XXII

JĪVĀTMAN ALSO HAS GENESIS FROM BRAHMAN

11. *Jñādhikaraṇam* (ii.3.18-19)

Having completed the inquiry into the genesis and Laya of adhibhūta and adhidaiva realities, the Sūtrakāra now commences another into various problems connected with the Jīvātman and his relationship to B. and carries it thro' the remaining *adhi.s* of this Pāda.[1]

The first topic is naturally the Jīva's genesis itself. There are Śrutis in which the Jīva is said to be without a beginning or origination. It has to be clarified, therefore, if this will or will not in any way conflict with the governing idea of B.'s being the author and source of one and all of the eightfold dispensations of finite reality which has been demonstrated thro' Samanvaya of the entire Śāstra in B.[2] If anything in finite reality should fall outside the scope of B.'s dispensation of which origination of finite reality is a generic feature, the definition of B. given in i.1.2 will be negatived in part. Hence the inquiry is necessary.

The doubt itself arises in view of conflict of testimony on this point. In the Śruti, the Jīva has been recognized as eternal (along with B. which is described as the eternal of the eternals):

नित्यो नित्यानाम् (Kaṭha. Up. ii.2.13)

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1. [illegible] (TC. p. 951)

2. [illegible] (TC. p. 951)

In another we read: All these conscious selves emerge (are produced) from It.

सर्वं एते चिदात्मानो व्युच्चरन्ति

The Pūrvapakṣa is that Jīva is without origination because he is beginningless like B.:—

न जीव उत्पत्तिमान्, अनादित्वात्, ईश्वरवत्

By *anāditva* here, it is meant that the Jīva is without prior non-existence (*prāgabhāvaśūnya*). This distinguishes it from the predicate so that there is no fear of the defect of identity of the reason and the predicate (*sādhyāviśiṣṭatā*).[4] It *must* be admitted, says the Pūrvapakṣa, that the Jīva is without prior non-existence. Otherwise, it would mean that there was prior non-existence of the Jīva in Pralaya (during the period of universal dissolution). In that case, *adṛṣṭa* or unseen merit and demerit (*dharma* and *adharma*) Karma, Vāsanās, etc. which are the operative factors (*nimittakāraṇa*) in the origination of new life or being will be without a suitable abode (*āśraya*) for them, which would make the creation of such new life for the Jīvas impossible.[5]

Abhyadhikāśaṅkā

It has no doubt been established in the *Viyadadhi.* that everything in finite reality has genesis within the meaning of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti. And Svarūpotpatti or genesis of essential nature of being is not acceptable to the Siddhāntin in the case of eternal verities like Avyākṛtākāśa, and Cetanas. In the circumstances, it may be felt that there is no need at all for the present *adhi.* for the purpose of establishing the genesis of the Jīvātman in terms of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti.[6] The *TC*, therefore, takes up this point and shows that there is room for a supervening objection (*adhikāśaṅkā*) here, which justifies the opening of this *adhi.*

The point is this. If "genesis" is to be understood in the sense of Parādhīnavisșeāpti in respect of Viyad and others—as has been shown, its opposite: *anutpatti* or no-genesis must necessarily be understood uniformly as absence of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti everywhere—be it in respect of B. or others. It is not proper to take *anutpatti* Śruti in respect of

3 This Śruti has been cited by S. also under ii.3.17.

4 न च साध्याविशिष्टता हेतोः। प्रागभावशून्यतायाः विवक्षितत्वात्। कारणशून्यता वानादित्वं ब्रूमः। न च तत्रापि विवादः। कारणानुपलब्धेरेव। * * * * (*TP.* ii.3 18)

5. जीवस्य प्रागभावशून्यत्वनास्तित्वं नाम प्रागभाववत्त्वमेव। तथाच, यदा प्रलये जीवस्य प्रागभावः तदा धर्माधर्माश्रयाभावेन धर्माधर्माख्यादृष्टमपि न स्यात्। तथाच सर्वोत्पत्तिनिमित्तकारणाभावादुत्पत्तेरेवाभावप्रसंगात् यस्याः कस्याश्चिदुत्पत्तेरप्यभावप्रसंगादित्यर्थः। तदुक्तमनुव्याख्याने 'धर्माधर्माश्रयत्वेन स्वीकार्योऽपि नरो लये' इति (Vādirāja *TPG.* p. 97)

6. ननु, जीवस्य पराधीनविशेषाप्तिरूपोत्पत्तिर्वियदधिकरणन्यायसिद्धा। स्वरूपेणोत्पत्तिस्तु नेष्टा इति व्यर्थमिदमिति चेत् (*TC.* p. 951)

B. alone in terms of absence of Parādhinaviśeṣāpti and take it when it comes to the Jīvas, Viyad, etc. in the sense of Svarūpānutpatti compounded *with Parādhīnaviṣeśāpti. Thus, the Pūrvapakṣa of this adhi.* is raised by way of a supervening objection, challenging the rationale of the attitude to anutpattiśruti based on the adoption of different criteria in regard to B. and the others.[7]

Adhikāśaṅkā overruled

This objection is met by pointing out that there is *sufficient reason* to accept different criteria in explaining anutpattiśruti in respect of B. and the others. The reason is that there is *no evidence* in the Śruti of B.'s being subject to Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti, while there is ample evidence of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti in respect of the Jīvas and others. This point is established in the second Sūtra[8] of this *adhi.: Yukteśca.* This expression *Yukteḥ* as used in the Sūtra is not intended to refer to any reasoning in this behalf. It simply means that in respect of Jīvas *anutpattiśruti* should be interpreted in terms of Svarūpānutpatti or Svarūpanityatva coupled with Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti in respect of body, etc., because *it is compatible with the nature of the Jīva and the facts known about* him and it is also the intended sense of the Śrutis.[9]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is given in the Sūtra: *Jño ata eva* which means *Jīvopi ata eva Parameśvarād utpadyate śabdād evo* (M. *BSB.* ii.3.18). "The Jīvātman[10] too has genesis from B. only (*ata eva*)—because (*ata eva*)[11]—(there is Śruti to that effect—*śabdāt*)."[12] M. quotes the following:

Te vā ete cidātmāno avinaṣṭāḥ param jyotir niviśanti

avinaṣṭā evotpadyante na vinaśyanti kadācana (   )

"All these intelligent beings as indestructible selves enter into the Supreme Light of B. and as indestructible beings are born from It. They

7. उत्पत्तिश्रुतिः पराधीनविशेषावाप्तिरूपोत्पत्तिपरा चेत्, अनुत्पत्तिश्रुतिरपि ब्रह्मणीव जीववियदादावपि तदभावपरा; अनेकार्थत्वस्यान्याय्यत्वात् इत्यतीतसर्वाक्षेपेण पूर्वपक्षिते * * * (*TC.* p. 591)
8. ब्रह्मणि पराधीनविशेषावाप्तिरूपोत्पत्तिश्रुतिर्नास्ति; जीवादौ त्वस्ति इति तदविरोधायानेकार्थत्वं न्याय्यमितीह 'युक्तेश्च' इति सूत्र एवोक्ते: (*TC.* p. 951)
9. "युज्यते" इति। अनेन नायं युक्तिशब्दो लिंगार्थः किन्तु योगार्थको विवक्षार्थकश्चेति सूचितम् (*BD.* ii.3.19)
10. The term *'Jñah'* in the Sūtra denotes the Jīvātman or the knowledge self as an active principle of consciousness: जानातीति ज्ञः जीवः। इगुपधज्ञाप्रीकिरः कः (*Pan.* iii.1.135) (Ragh. TDP.) इति कर्तरि कप्रत्ययान्तत्वेनानुशिष्टत्वात् (*TCP.* p. 952b).
11. अत एव इति तन्त्रावृत्त्योरन्यतरः (*TDP*)
12. अत एवेत्यनुवादेन परमेश्वरादिति व्याख्यानम्। परमेश्वरादेवेत्येवकारान्वयः। सर्वसूत्रेषु तस्यैव प्रकृतत्वादिति भावः। उत्पद्यत इत्यावर्तते। अनेन जीवोऽपि उत्पद्यत एव, उत्पद्यमानश्च परमेश्वरादेवोत्पद्यत इति प्रतिज्ञाद्वय सूचितं भवति। (*BD*)

never have dissolution". This is not contradictory. For we can explain origination of Jīvas without coming into conflict with the earlier half of the Śruti which asserts their beginningless existence. The explanation is given in the next Sūtra[13] (*Yukteśca*)[14] that these two statements can be harmonized with the explanation that origination is thro' Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti or acquisition of new adjuncts of body etc.[15] Such origination is *not a mere mode of speech, a way of speaking.* (*upacarita*). The acquisition of body etc. is a real and an actual birth or genesis in terms of Parādhīnaviṣeśāpti. which consists in the Jīvas' having to go thro' a new phase of becoming, in subjection to God's will and power and undergo its consequences.[16]

Utpadyante cidātmano nityā nityāt Parāamanaḥ/
Upādhyapekṣayā teṣām utpattir api gīyate//

iti *Vyomasamhitāyām* (M. BSB. ii.3.19)

"From the eternal B. the eternal beings of intelligence are born. It is with reference to the condition of their bodily existence that birth or genesis is predicated of them".

Gatārthatāśaṅkā Rebutted

This *adhi.* is *not* rendered superfluous by the *Mātariśvādhikaraṇam.* For, this *adhi.* establishes the *general principle that all Jīvas are subject to genesis in terms of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti.* Interest in the *Mātariśvādhi.* on the other hand, is *exclusively* bestowed on Mukhya-Prāṇa as a privileged Jīva and his genesis in terms of Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti has been shown to be *deserving of special treatment in view of an adhikāśankā* with reference to him. There is, therefore, no overlapping between these two adhikaraṇas.[17]

As this adhi. marks the commencement of a separate *section* dealing with the Jīvātmans, the present inquiry into the conflict of *testimony* pertaining to their "genesis" is begun after concluding the inquiry *in respect of* Laya Śrutis. It is not therefore open to the objection raised against S.' interpretation of the *Antarādhi.* that *as discussing the*

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13 नन्वनादिनित्यस्य जीवस्योत्पत्तिः श्रुतावपि कथं युज्यते ? इत्याशङ्कां परिहरत्सूत्रमुपन्यस्य व्याचष्टे—युक्तेश्चेति (*TP*)

14. This Śutra is *not read* by S. and R.

15. नित्यस्यापि जीवस्य उपाध्यपेक्षयोत्पत्तिर्युज्यते । (M. *BSB.* ii.3.19)

16. युक्ता चानादेरपि जीवस्योत्पत्तिः, तदुपपत्स्यते । न चैवं जीवोत्पत्तिरित्युपचारमात्रं स्यात् । पराधीनविशेषलाभस्योत्पत्तेरत्र विवक्षितत्वात् इति भावः । (Raghu. *TPB.* ii 3.19) (*TP.* ii.3.19)

17. इह जीवमात्रे उक्ता देहयोगरूपोत्पत्तिः 'एतेन' त्वत्र मुख्यप्राणस्यैव विशेषयुक्त्याक्षिप्य समाहितेति न तेनास्य गतार्थतेति (TC. p. 951)

question of genesis of Vijñāna and Manas its proper place should have been *before* the topic of Laya.[18]

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

According to S. this *adhi.* is intended to consider whether the individual self is to be regarded as intrinsically non-intelligent (jaḍa), having intelligence as a purely adventitious property thro' the exercise of the sense organs, as the Vaiśeṣikas have it; or whether we should hold with the Sāṅkhyas that the soul is characterized by eternal intelligence which constitutes its very essence.[19]

The Pūrvapakṣa maintains that the self's intelligence is purely adventitious to is as it is brought into being by the conjunction of the self with the mind and the sense organs, just as the redness of a pot is due to baking in fire.[20] Moreover, in deep sleep and some other states there is no consciousness or intelligence but only in the waking state when there is the operation of the sense organs.[21] Otherwise, the latter can be dispensed with. The Śrutis which attribute eternal intelligence to the Jīva are to be explained in the sense that the Jīvas have in them the potential capacity of possessing knowledge, unlike Ākāśa or other substances which notwithstanding such sensory contact are not able to have it.[22]

The Siddhānta is that Ātman is of the nature of eternal intelligence.[23] Anything whose nature is non-intelligent, and knowledge of which is adventitious remains sometimes indirectly perceived, and sometimes misconceived. But the self is the opposite of this. Tho' engaged in the act of inferring, it remains intuited; tho' remembering others, it is of the nature of experience; tho' falling into error about external things, it remains self-revealed to itself and must, therefore, be of the essence of intelligence and cannot be otherwise.[24] *For that very reason,* it must be essentially identical with the unmodified highest B.

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18. जीवार्थं प्रकरणान्तरस्य कृतत्वात् उत्पत्तिश्रुत्यविरोधोऽप्ययं लयश्रुत्यविरोधानन्तरमुक्तः। (*TC.* p. 951)

19. स किं काणभुजानामिवागन्तुकचैतन्यः, स्वतोऽचेतनः आहोस्वित् सांख्यानामिव नित्यचैतन्यस्वरूप एवेति संशयः (*S. BSB.* ii.3.18)

20. आगन्तुकमात्मनश्चैतन्यं आत्ममनःसंयोगजमग्निसंयोगजरोहितादिगुणवदिति प्राप्तम्। (*ibid*)

21. नित्यचैतन्यत्वे हि सुप्तमूर्च्छितग्रहाविष्टानामपि चैतन्यं स्यात्। (*ibid*)

22. नित्यचैतन्यश्रुतयश्च शक्त्यभिप्रायेण व्याख्येयाः। अस्ति हि ज्ञानोत्पादनशक्तिर्निजा जीवानाम्। न तु, व्योम्न इव इन्द्रियादिसंनिकर्षेऽपि ज्ञानं न भवतीति। (*Bhāmatī* ii.3.18)

23. ज्ञो नित्यचैतन्योऽयमात्मा अत एव

24. यदागन्तुकज्ञानं जडस्वभावं तत्कदाचित्परोक्षं, कदाचित् संदिग्धं, कदाचिद्विपर्यस्तं, यथा घटादि। न चैवमात्मा। तथा ह्यनुमिमानोऽप्यपरोक्षः, स्मरन्नप्यानुभविकः, संदिहानोऽप्यसंदिग्धः विपर्यस्यन्नप्यविपरीतः सर्वस्यात्मा। तथा च तत्स्वभावः। न च तत्स्वभावस्य चैतन्यस्याभावः। तस्य नित्यत्वात्। (*Bhāmatī* ii.3.18)

which owing to contact with limiting adjuncts appears as the individual self. Intelligence constitutes its essence, being *unoriginated* on account of its identity with the Supreme B. whose nature is self-luminous.[25] The contact with sense organs in the case of the individual self is, however, limited to the purpose of producing concurrent psychosis.[26]

Criticism

The consideration of different conceptions of the self's relation to its intelligence, analogous to those held in different schools, from the point of view of their logical consistency or acceptability *does not fall within the scope of this Pāda.* This is a Pāda devoted exclusively to *reconciling conflicts of testimony (Śrutis) within 'Vedānta', in respect* of given topics. No case has been made out by S. or Vācaspati on behalf of the self's conscious nature *on the basis of conflict of texts on the point.*[27]

Sensing this difficulty, the *Kalpataru* has tried to situate the conflict of testimony between the texts *'Ātmaivāsya jyotiḥ'* (*Bṛh. Up.* iv.3 6) and *Paśyan cakṣus śṛṇvan śrotram manvāno manaḥ*[28] (*Bṛh Up.* i.4.7). But the latter Śruti occurs in the context of primordial evolution of name and form which is a prerogative of B.—*as conceded by S. himself* under ii.4.20 and it cannot, therefore, be aligned with the individual self. In order to be able to sustain a *conflict of testimony* on the point at issue here, we should have a clearer text in its place.[29]

Ranade has put in that S.'s interpretation of Jñaḥ as of the nature of intelligence is "correct tho' unphilological".[30] The correct position should be that the self is both of the nature of *caitanya* and knower at all levels—and not merely knower at the phenomenal level and intelligence at the noumenal level as Ranade has been trying to make out, in defence of S. There is no inconsistency in the self being both together. Belvalkar (*Basu Mallik Lectures on Vedanta.* p. 163) has argued in this connection that since the Sūtrakāra has rejected the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of Samavāya, "he could not be a party to any theory in which the *dharma* and *dharmi*—the subject and its qualities, are regarded as

25. यस्मादेव नोत्पद्यते परमेव ब्रह्माविकृतमुपाधिसम्पर्काज्जीवभावेनावतिष्ठते । परस्य हि ब्रह्मणः चैतन्यरूपत्वमाम्नातम् (S. *BSB.* ii.3.18)

26. गन्धादिविषयवृत्त्युपजनने चेन्द्रियाणामर्थवत्तेति सर्वमवदातम् (*Bhāmatī*)

27. युक्तिविरोधकीर्तनस्य पादासंगतेः (*TC.* p. 951)

28. 'आत्मैव ज्योतिः' इत्यादिश्रुतीनां 'पश्यन् चक्षुः शृण्वन् श्रोत्रमित्यादिश्रुतिभिर्जीवस्यागन्तुकज्ञानत्ववादिनीभिर्विरोध परिह्रियते । (*Kalpataru* ii.3, 18)

29. 'पश्यन्' इत्यादिश्रुतेरागन्तुकज्ञानत्वाप्रतीतेरिति भावः । (*TCP.* p. 952b)

30. *Vedanta the Culmination of Indian Thought*, 1971, p. 124.

two entities to be brought into relation permanently or temporarily by a third something. The only way out would be to regard the knower and knowledge as ultimately identical and it seems the Sūtrakāra must be held to be subscribing to some such view, when he characterizes the soul as *Jñaḥ* and not as Jñātā as he could very well have done on the analogy of *Kartā* in Sūtra ii.3.33" (*Op. cit.* p. 163-164).

Belvalkar is right that the rejection of Samavāya by the Sūtrakāra is enough to establish that he could not be a party to any position which makes the self (and by the same token B.) absolutely different from its intrinsic characteristics of consciousness etc. We have seen how the two could be integrated thro' Viśeṣas and Saviśeṣābheda.[31] But that does not give us the right to construe the word *Jñaḥ* actually used by the Sūtrakāra, in the sense of *Jñāna* also. The Vyutpatti or derivation of the word is fixed by the rules of grammar,[32] *and it cannot be altered.* We have, therefore, to come to the conclusion that the question before the Sūtrakāra in ii.3.18 was *not that of the nature of the relationship between the self and its consciousness or intelligence* but something else—and that something else could only have been the question whether the Jīvātman too has his genesis from B. like the others or not. It is quite within the realm of possibilities that the question of the genesis of the Jīvātman should be raised at the commencement of a series of questions connected with him. This possibility is confirmed into a certainty when we find that the expression *ata eva* in the Sūtra is indubitably reminiscent of the identical expression that has been used by the Sūtrakāra to underline the genesis of *Tejaḥ* and *Āpaḥ* ultimately from B.—even according to S.'s own showing. There is a naturalness about accepting this even tenor of the use of the words *ata eva* in this context. The post-position of the two words *ata eva after* Jñaḥ as in Tejo'*ataḥ* further corroborates the naturalness of such a construction being intended in *Jño ata eva* also. If *ata eva* is to be construed with S. as embodying the *reason* why the self has got to be accepted as both knower and of the essence of knowledge (as Belvalkar and Ranade would like it) or as establishing that the self is "of the nature of eternal intelligence *because of the fact* that it is not a product but nothing other than the unmodified highest B." (as S. has explained), one may take the liberty of pointing out that (in that case) the Sūtrakāra would very naturally have placed the words *ata eva before* Jñaḥ, as he has done in: *Ata eva copamā sūryakādivat* (iii, 2.18) *Ata eva na devatā bhūtam ca* (i, 2.27) *Ata eva cānanyādhipatiḥ* (iv, 4.9) to show the trend of his thinking. That he has *not done so* but has stuck to the same order as in *Tejo ataḥ; Āpah,* is an unmistakable indication that

31. See Vol. I. pp. 181, 220.
32. See p. 196. fn. 10.

S.'s interpretation is off the track. In the light of this material evidence, the rhetorical query of Belvalkar repeated by Ranade:[33] "Otherwise, why did the Sūtrakāra *not* use the word Jñātā[34] like Kartā as in the Sūtra *Kartā śāstrārthavatvāt* (ii.3.33)" *loses its point.* Apart from being the shorter form and having unquestionable grammatical sanction and authority, "Jñaḥ" is also met with in the Upaniṣad (*Jñājñau: Śvet. Up.* i.9) and the Sūtra (*jñaśaktiviyogāt* ii, 2.9) and in *NyS.* iii.2.35.

To revert to S., his interpretation of the Sūtra *Jño ata eva* is open to question on some other grounds also. It will be noticed that according to S. *the reason why the self must be accepted to be of the essential* nature of *Jñāna* is that *it is not born because it is identical with B.*[35] But the dent in this reasoning is that what is designated as "knower" (*jñaḥ*) in S.'s metaphysics is consciousness limited by antaḥkaraṇa and this one is *ipso facto "originated"*.[36] Thus, the ground of inference viz. *of not being originated* will be absent in the 'knowing subject'—the *Jñaḥ* or *Jñātṛ*. It will not be possible then to conclude that what has been designated as Jñaḥ is of the essence of knowledge because it is unoriginated.[37] The mere fact of being unoriginated will not also be competent to establish that it is of the nature of intelligence.[38] The *identity of Jīvātman with B.*, which is of the nature of intelligence, *has not* been "given" as a *datum* in the earlier Sūtras of this Pāda. Hence the words *ata eva* cannot justifiably be so construed.[39]

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

According to R. *Jño ata eva* is only the first of fourteen Sūtras of one *adhi.* It establishes that it is the intrinsic nature of Jīvātman to be a "knower".[40] Knowership is not, as in the Vaiśeṣika school, an adventitious property of the self; nor is the self of the *nature of intelligence itself as in Buddhism* or the Sāṃkhya.[41] The other Sūtras (of this *adhi.*) establish the *atomicity of the self so as to subserve the* interests of the Jīva's intrinsic nature of being a knower.

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33. *Op. cit.* p 124. His reference to *'krah' in this connection is mystifying as no such word in the sense of 'thought'* is traceable in Vedic or Post-Vedic literature.
34. *Basu Mallik Lectures on Vedanta*, 1929, p. 164.
35 ज्ञो नित्यचैतन्योऽयमात्मा अत एव यस्मादेव नोत्पद्यते परमेव ब्रह्माविकृतमुपाधिसम्पर्काज्जीवभावेनावतिष्ठते। (S. *BSB.* ii 3.18)

36. अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्नस्य ज्ञातृत्वेऽपि तस्य जन्यत्वेन (*TC.* p. 952b)
37. अनुत्पत्तिज्ञत्वयोरैकाधिकरण्यासिद्धेः (*TC.* p. 952b)
38. अनुत्पत्तिमात्रेण ज्ञत्वासिद्धेश्च (*TC.* p. 952b)
39. ज्ञानरूपब्रह्माभेदस्य चाप्रकृतत्वेन सौत्रात शब्देनानुक्तेश्च (*TC.* p. 952b)
40 आत्मा ज्ञातृस्वरूप एव, न ज्ञानमात्रम् (*Śrībhāṣya* ii.3.19)
41 किन्तु सुगतकपिलाभिमतचिन्मात्रमेवात्मनः स्वरूपमुत कणभुगभिमतपाषाणकल्पस्वरूपमचित्स्वभावमेवागन्तुकचैतन्यगुणकमुत ज्ञातृत्वमेवास्य स्वरूपमिति। (*ibid*)
R. does *not include* the Advaita Vedānta *here expressly. Contra:* Radhakrishnan: *Brahmasutra*, p. 405.

Criticism

The way in which the topic of Jīva's knowership is sought to be discussed against the background of divergence of philosophical views of the Vaiśeṣikas, Buddhists and Sāmkhyas on the subject deprives it of proper nexus with the present Pāda, without a reference to conflict of testimony of Śrutis.

R. seems to be unaccountably *chary* of admitting intelligence as constituting the very essence of Jīvahood, tho' the Śrutis are clearly of that view without prejudice to the Jīva's retaining his knowership also as his intrinsic property. This comes out clearly in his comments on the subsequent Sūtra *Tadguṇasāratvāttu tadvyapadeśaḥ* (ii.3.29) where he observes that the self is designated as knowledge or intelligence itself *only* because it is its essential "quality", just as bliss is the essential "quality" of B.[42] Thus, throughout, intelligence and bliss remain for R. *only dharmas* coexistent with their *dharmis.* He is not prepared to envisage the possibility of intelligence and bliss being *also the essence* in addition to being the intrinsic properties of Jīva and B. That is something his 'system' does not permit.

42. ज्ञातैवात्मा। ज्ञानमात्रव्यपदेशस्तु ज्ञानस्य प्रधानगुणत्वात् स्वरूपानुबन्धित्वेन स्वरूपनिरूपकगुणत्वात् आत्मस्वरूपस्य (ज्ञानवत्) स्वप्रकाशत्वाद्वा उपपद्यते। (*Vedāntadīpa* ii.3.19)
विज्ञानमेवास्य सारभूतो गुणः यथा प्राज्ञस्यानन्दः सारभूतो गुणः (*Śrībhāṣya* ii.3.29)

being broken between the teeth and feel its taste on his tongue—all at the same time. These are possible only if the self is aware of the touch, throughout the body, at the same moment and be in contact with the different sense organs at the same time.[4] This means the self must be pervasive and not confined to one point of the body. But at the same time, we cannot accept the other hypothesis that the self is of the same dimension as the body it tenants, as this has already been shown to be untenable. (See B.S. ii.2.34-36).

Moreover, if the soul is limited to the size of the body, it will be necessary to recognize that as a living organism, it is constituted of many parts (*aṁśas*) like the physical body itself[5] (with the additional distinction that each of these parts is also sentient). For, anything whose size is other than atomic or what is technically known as madhyamaparimāṇa must be composed of numerous constituent parts (*aṁśas*) which are different from one another but are partly dfferent and partly identical with the whole—while the whole is equivalent to all the constituent parts put together. Thus, in admitting the self to be of the size of the body and made of numerous intelligent parts, in order to account for the distribution of awareness of different sensations arising in different parts of the body by the respective parts of the self lodged in those parts of the body, there will be the most awkward predicament.[6] When the numerous parts of the body start registering conflicting sensations at the same time, the self would be driven to act in conflicting ways in response to them. It will find itself pulled simultaneously in numerous directions, not knowing what to do. As the parts of the self in the different zones will be mutually different, it will be futile to expect any unanimity of decision among them[7]

The difficulty cannot be avoided by looking upon the Self as a unity evolved out of its numerous *aṁśas* (parts). That would deprive the self of its eternality[8] We are thus forced to accept the position that the self must be pervasive and neither atomic nor of the size of the body.[9]

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4 न तावदणुरात्मा; सर्वदेहगतस्पर्शज्ञानात् रूपादीनां च तत्तदिन्द्रियैर्ज्ञानात्। न चेद् ज्ञानमणावात्मनि संभवति (*TP.* ii.3.20)

5 शरीरपरिमाणत्वे चात्मनः शरीरवत् सांशत्वं स्यात्; मध्यमपरिमाणस्य तन्नियमात् (*ibid*)

6. तेषां चांशानां प्रत्येकं चेतनत्वेन विरुद्धदिक्क्रियं शरीरमुन्मथ्येताक्रियं चापद्येत (*TP.* *ibid*)

7. भोगे वैचित्र्याभावप्रसङ्गोऽकारे, पादस्थितांशेन कण्टकवेधाद् दुःखानुभवे करस्थितांशेन मोदकग्रहणात् सुखमनुभूयत इत्युक्तं स्यात्। तथा च वैषम्यमपरिहार्यम्। एवमन्यांशानामपि विषमाणां नैकप्रकारा क्रिया। अतस्त्रिभिराश्वाश्ववत् विरुद्धदिक्षु नियमाभावस्य तच्छरीरमुन्मथ्येत इत्यर्थः। शरीरान्तरेव क्रियायां सर्वदा क्रियाभावे चेतनत्व. चननाशसर्वेनाश्चिमेव स्यादित्यर्थं (Vādirāja *TPG.* p. 98)

8 न चांशारब्धोऽवयवी स्वीकर्तुं शक्यते; अनित्यत्वप्रसंगात् (*TP.* *ibid*)

9 अतः परिशेषात् आत्मनो व्याप्तत्वमेव सिद्ध्यति (*TP.* *ibid*)

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the self is of atomic size and not all-pervasive; because it is subject to the vicissitudes of passing out of the body (*utkrānti*) peregrinations (*gati*) thro' other worlds and regions to enjoy or suffer the rewards and retribution of its deeds and returning to the body for rebirth in the course of its transmigrations. It is not possible to think of an all-pervasive substance like Ākāśa[10] to be subject to motion of any sort..[11] As the hypothesis of the self's being of *madhyamaparimāṇa* has been shown to be defective and as the self cannot also be invested with *mahatparimāṇa* or all-pervasiveness in the sense of being spatially unlimited like Ākāśa, in view of the difficulty of Utkrānti etc., the only alternative left is to accept its atomicity of size.

The next Sūtra *Svātmanā cottarayoḥ* raises an incidental issue whether this exit and other movements of the self are self-directed ones, as it appears *prima facie* from the wording of certain texts or if all such movements are at the direction of the Supreme Being. This Sūtra is thus to be treated as an *antarbhedādhikaraṇa* within the body of the main adhi.[12] The doubt here arises from the texts: "The Jīvātman passing out from his body goes to yonder worlds and thence comes back to this one, gets into the womb of the mother, is born and he works". Another text says "All by himself, the creature is born. By himself he enjoys the good and the bad." This doubt is set at rest by the Sūtra which says the passing out etc. of the Jīva is *along with*, at the behest of and with the help of the Supreme 'Ātman' (Ruler) who enjoys his innate bliss and *not* on his own initiative. This is borne out by the succeeding statements (*uttarayoḥ*). These statements are:

(i) The Soul enters the womb *with Him* who is the Supreme Lord seated in himself (i.e. Jīva) as his guide. He is born with Him, is guided by Him and does all his actions with His help. He is taken to other

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10 जीवोऽणुरेव; न व्याप्तः । उत्क्रान्तिगत्यागतिमत्त्वात्, पतत्रिशरीरवत् । नहि व्याप्तद्रव्यस्य व्योमादेरुत्क्रान्त्यादिरस्ति (*TP. ibid*)

11. The reader's attention is invited in this connection to Rāghavendra Tīrtha's illuminating explanation of how in spite of its all-pervasiveness, the Supreme B. has been admitted in the Siddhānta to be capable of movements of various kinds such as *utkrānti* and moving thro' the different states of the Jīva's going thro' *jāgrat, svapna, suṣupti* and other experiences:
उच्यते–व्याप्तस्येत्यस्य केवलमपरिच्छिन्नस्येत्यर्थः । अणुत्वासमानाधिकरणदेशापरिच्छेदयुक्तस्येति यावत् । अत एव व्याप्तस्येत्येवानुक्त्वा, व्योमवदित्युक्तम् । हरे रूपं तु, * * * सर्वव्याप्तमपि अस्मन्मते अन्यथाभावव्याप्तेरित्यत्रोक्तदिशाणुपरिमाणं च भवतीति न दोष इति (Ragh. *TPB*, ii.3.20) .
In this connection see also Vol. I, pp. 231-32.

12 एवमुत्क्रान्त्यादिहेतुभ्यो जीवस्याणुत्वे सिद्धे किंचित् प्रसङ्गाच्चिन्त्यते–किमिदमुत्क्रान्त्यादिरमात्मनः परमेश्वरेण, स्वयमेव वेति । (*TP.* ii.3.21)
See *Abhinavacandrikā*, ii.3.21. (p. 362).

worlds and lifted up to Mokṣa by Him. Him they call the Lord of the self".

(ii) He—the Supreme Being, imbibes the blissful essence of the good works of the selves. He makes the souls live, go up and come down.

It will be seen that these two passages make it clear that the word "Ātman" used in the first passage (referred to by the Pūrvapakṣa) should be understood in the sense of the Supreme B. The *Smṛti* cited by the Pūrvapakṣa refers to the travails of birth and transmigration of the self by way of reaping the consequences of his past deeds.[13]

The topic of the Jīva's size is resumed from Sūtra 22. Sūtra 22 raises (and answers) the objection that the Jīva cannot be atomic as the Śruti quoted earlier is found to describe the Ātmans as pervasive.[14] The second part of the Sūtra *itarādhikārāt* shows that the reference to pervasiveness is to that of the B. as may be seen from the further description of the creative and other activities of B. in the continuing part of the text. This shows the plural form must be taken to refer to various forms of B. entering into Its creations[15] to sustain them.

The fact that the One Supreme B. may be referred to by different numbers dual or plural is shown by the commentator[16] with the help of a typical illustration from the *A.Ā.*[17] (ii.3, 8) where the human body is referred to as the chariot of the gods (*devarathaḥ*) presided over by 'Prāṇa' i.e. Brahman. In the *mantra* cited in praise of this chariot, the Supreme B. is hailed and invoked in the dual under the name of Aśvinā.

The next Sūtra (23) adduces two more reasons why this should be so.—viz. the presence of the term "Ātman"—the word for B.'s own self

13. नैतच्छ्रुतिगतमाधारस्थोक्त्या जीवस्य स्वयमेवोत्क्रान्त्यादीति मन्तव्यम्। किन्तु, परमात्मनैव। उत्तरवाक्ये तयोक्तत्वात्। तदनुसारेण साधारणपूर्ववाक्यस्यापि तदर्थत्वोपपत्तेरिति भावः। स्मृतिस्तु भ्रमवादिदुःखानुभवविपर्येति द्रष्टव्यम्। (*TP.* ii.3.21)

14. न जीवोऽणुः 'व्याप्ता ह्यात्मानः' इत्यनणुत्वाभिधायकश्रुतेः। उत्क्रान्त्यादिकं तु मनोगतमात्मन्युपचर्यत इति (*TP.* ii.3.22)

15. तस्याः श्रुतेः परमात्मविषयत्वात् 'स आत्मेदं सृजति' इत्यत्र परमात्मनः प्रतिपन्नत्वेनास्याः तत्प्रकरणत्वात्। (*TP*)

16. एकशब्दैर्द्विशब्दैश्च बहुशब्दैश्च वैभवः।
एक एवोच्यते वेदे स्वायता नास्य भिन्नता। (*M. BSB.* ii.3.22)

17. तस्य प्राणोऽधितिष्ठति। तदुक्तमृषिणा —
'आ तेन यातं मनसो जवीयसा'। (*RV.* x.39.12)
इत्यादि च (*M. BSB.* ii.3.22)
अत्र परमात्मन एकस्यैव शरीराधिष्ठातृत्वमुक्त्वा, तत्र द्विवचनमुक्तमश्वौ प्रमाणयति श्रुतिः (*TP*).

(*svaśabda*[18]) and the presence of the mark (*liṅga*) of transcending all measure[19] (*unmāna*):

एष ह्यात्मा अभ्युद्गतो मानशक्ते :

The next Sūtra *Avirodhaś candanavat* (ii.3.24) answers the objection raised in Sūtra 20 by the Pūrvapakṣa that if the self were atomic in size, it will not be possible for it to be in touch with all the parts of its body, as by position it will be confined to some particular spot therein.

The objection is met by an illustration. A drop of sandal paste of the highest quality placed in a particular spot of the body gives a refreshing sensation all over the body. The soul may similarly be occupying one particular spot in the body and yet be able to experience the pleasure or pain extending over the whole body thro' its *aṁśas* (parts). For, it is admitted that the Jīvas are *Sāṁśa*—with aspects, with which they extend all over the body.[20] These *aṁśas* are colorfully identical (*saviśeṣābhinna*) with one another and with the *aṁśin* i.e. the self. This would not clash with impartibility of the self's nature (*niravayavatva*[21]). This point has been clarified in the Itaravyapadeśādhikaraṇa (ii, 1.22-27). See Vol I, pp. 382-85.

The *TD*[22] and BD clarify another point. The acceptance of *aṁśas* does not render the Jīvas liable to impermanence. It is not the fact of having *aṁśas* or integral parts that by itself makes for impermanence. It is the fact of an organism being formed by the successive agglutination of parts which are different from the whole that makes for impermanence of the resulting organism. But such is not the case with the Jīvas.[23]

Trivikrama Paṇḍita makes it clear in this connection that ontologically every substance will have to be conceived as being endowed with *aṁśas* or integral parts, even if they are *ex hypothesi* indivisible

18. See under BS. i.3.1. Also Vol. I, pp. 204; 300.
19. *Cf.* न ते विष्णो जायमानो न जातो
देव महिम्न: परमन्तमाप (*RV.* vii. 9 92)
20. नाणुत्वेऽपि जीवस्य तत्र तत्र परिज्ञानायोग । अंशै. शरीरे व्याप्तत्वात् । एकदेशपतितचन्दनबिन्दोरंशै. शरीरव्याप्तिवदेवेति भाव: । (*TP.* ii.3.24)
21 परस्परमात्मना च सविशेषाभिन्नैरित्यर्थ'। अतो न 'निरवयवत्वशब्दकोपो वा' इत्युक्तविरोध:
(Ragh. *TPB.* ii.3.25)
22. न च सांशत्वेऽनित्यत्वमिति वाच्यम् । भिन्नांशारब्धस्य हि पटादे: सांशत्वमनित्यत्वव्याप्तम्; न च सांशत्वमात्रादनित्यत्वम् ।
23 चन्दनबिन्दुवज्जीवस्यापि सांशत्वाभ्युपगमात् । न चानित्यत्वप्रसंग:, यतो न सांशत्वमात्रमनित्यत्वे प्रयोजकम्; किंत्वारम्भकांशवत्त्वम् । तच्च न जीवेऽस्ति। अन्यथा, प्रकृत्यादेरपि देशादिसंबन्धेन सांशत्वादनित्यत्वप्रसंगादिति भाव: । (*BD.* ii.3.25)

or impartible substances. The atoms of the Logician, for example, as having spatial existence, will have to be in contact with space on all sides. When two atoms combine to form a dyad, if there is no side of the atom except the one where the combination takes place, there will be no increase in magnitude from the *paramāṇu* to the *dvyaṇuka*. If imaginary sides are to be assumed for the purpose, the product of such imaginary combinations will be equally imaginary. Similarly, if Ātman is without *aṁśas*, it will not be possible to conceive of differences as being caused by upādhis, in the system of the Monist.[24]

The next Sūtra meets a further objection that analogies do not solve the problem as counter examples can always be thought of. Moreover, the drop of *haricandana* is present as a whole at one spot while it is not present in its intensive form in other places. But no such definite place of abode can be ascribed to the Jīva, in the body.

The Sūtra replies to this objection by pinpointing the place where the Jīva is taken to be present in the body—viz. the heart: *Hṛdi hyeṣa ātmā (Praśna Up.* iii, 6).[25]

The next Sūtra: *Guṇād vā ālokavat* (ii.3.26) gives another illustration as to how the Jīvas tho' *not* spatially pervasive, may yet be pervasive thro' their intrinsic property of intelligence (*cidguṇa*)—which will adequately explain the fact of simultaneous awareness of sensations all over the body.[26] The example cited is that of a flame. A flame *qua* flame is limited to a particular spot but by means of its property of light[27] it pervades the area beyond:

24. परमाणूना च निरंशत्वे सर्वदिक्संबन्धासिद्धिः । मिथः संयोगे च संयुक्तप्रदेशात् प्रदेशान्तरासिद्धेः प्रथिमानुपपत्तिः । काल्पनिकप्रदेशाश्रयणे तत्संयोगजानां कार्याणां काल्पनिकत्वप्रसंगः । आत्माकाशयोश्च निरंशत्वे पराभिमतस्यौपाधिकभेदस्य, बहुवस्तुसंयोगस्य चासंभवः । संयुक्तप्रदेशातिरिक्तप्रदेशाभावादेव । (*TD.* ii.3.25).
Cf. also न चेदुपाधिसंबन्ध एकदेशेऽप्य सर्वगः ।
एकदेशेऽन्यथा स्यात्सर्वगस्यैव भेदकः ॥ (*M. BSB.* ii.3.25)

25. गन्धगम्यमवस्थानविशेषाद्युक्तं चन्दनस्येति चेन्न । 'हृदि ह्येष आत्मा' इति जीवस्यापि तथाभ्युपगमात् । (*M. BSB.* ii. 3 26)

26. J. explains it as another way of explaining the point:
एव स्वपक्षदृष्टान्ताभ्यामात्मनः शरीरव्याप्त्यव्याप्त्योः सदृष्टान्तमुक्त्वा, प्रकारान्तरेणापि तदुपपादकं सूत्रं पठित्वा व्याचष्टे (*TP.* ii.3.26). The *TDP* adds that the analogy of sandal is particularly applicable to the Devas. The illustration of the flame is applicable to all classes of Jīvas including the Devas:—
सुराणामस्मदादिवैलक्षण्येऽपि अन्येषां तदभावात् प्रकारान्तरेण देहव्याप्तिमाह–गुणाद्वेति । (*TDP*). Raghu.
TPB has the same explanation:
चष्टे मानुषादिसर्वजीवसाधारण्या चिद्गुणव्याप्त्या आगुक्तयुक्तेरन्यथासिद्धिरिति सूत्रकम ।
This point is recognized in the quotation given by M. from the *Skānda*:
अणुमात्रः सम्यगपि च स्वरूपेणैव गुणः ।
व्याप्नुयादखिलं देहं चिद्गुणेनैव नान्यथा ॥ (M. BSB. ii.3 2.6)
Which is introduced by J. with a significant observation:
अणुत्वेन च व्याप्तिनिर्देशस्य विरुद्धमिव भाति–तत्राह चेति (TP)

Yathā ālokasya prakāśaguṇena[27] *vyāptir jyotirūpeṇa avyāptir evam cidguṇena vyāptir Jīvarūpeṇa avyāptir iti vā*

,(M. *BSB*. ii. 3. 26)[28]

It will be seen that M.'s conception of Viśeṣas enables him without the least difficulty to draw a pragmatic distinction of reference (instead of essence) between Jīva-(svarūpa) and its *cidguṇa*, for purposes of elucidating such subtle problems.

27. J. has shown after an interesting discussion in his *TP* (ii.2.26) that light is indeed a property (*guṇa*) and not a substance (*dravya*) in its own right. *Contr. S.* (ii, 3, 26; 29).

28. "Or just as a flame pervades by its property of light but is limited to a particular spot, as a flame, the Soul pervades thro' its property of intelligence and remains non-pervasive in its capacity as Jīva".

CHAPTER XXVI

YOGIJĪVAS HAVE POWER TO EXTEND THEMSELVES THRO' THEIR AṀŚAS

13. *Vyatirekādhikaraṇam* (ii.3, 27)

This *adhi.* removes conflict of testimony in respect of Jīvas who in some Śrutis are stated to be capable of '*becoming many*'—fivefold, sevenfold, tenfold, hundredfold and so on[1], while in others the Jīva is said to be without parts—an indivisible whole.[2] However, in the Śrutis and Purāṇas we hear about the transcendental powers of great Yogins like Saubhari, Agastya and Kardama which include the assumption of many forms at will, at the same time. The evidence shows that they keep intact a full sense of personal identity of their alter-egoes in the numerous forms, as one single experiencing self.[3] The question, therefore, arises as to how this outgoing of the self without diminution of personal identity is possible, if the selves are indivisible and partless and, therefore, void of *aṁśas*. This question is different from the other one dealt with in the previous *adhi.* where it was established that tho' present intensively in one particular spot of the body, the Jīva is capable of being in touch with all parts of the body thro' his numerous *aṁśas* (within the body) which are all *saviśeṣābhinna* form his own self.

1. 'स पञ्चधा स सप्तधा स दशधा भवति स शतधा च सहस्रधा । स गच्छति स मुच्यते' इति पाराशर्यायणश्रुतौ बहुरूपत्वं प्रतीयते। (M. *BSB.* ii.3.27)
2. 'स नित्यो निरवयवः पुण्यपापयुक् च स इमं लोकममुं चावर्तते, स विमुच्यते स एकधा, न सप्तधा, न दशधा न शतधा' इति गौपवनश्रुतावेकस्याबहुत्वं प्रतीयते। (M. *BSB.* ii.3.27)
3. 'सौभरिश्च महायोगी पञ्चाशज्जन्मसंस्मृतिः ।
दिव्यज्ञानेन विज्ञाय भाविजन्मफलं पुनः ॥
एकदैव फलं भुक्त्वा पंचाशज्जन्मसंभवम् ।
स्वेच्छयैव ततः शुद्धो राहुमुक्त इवोडुराट् ॥ (*Āgneya Purāṇa*)

But the problem raised by the phenomenon of certain Yogijīvas' projecting their *aṁśas* beyond one body and living in several bodies at the same time maintaining the unity of being and identity of conscious experience in all of them as correlated to the same ego is something different—as it presupposes the going out of one's own self without diminution of being.[4] This would seem to involve self-partition of a mysterious nature without diminution of essence or identity of being. *It is* this problem that this *adhi.* tackles, according to M.

In the Sūtra: *Vyatireko gandhavat tathā ca darśayati* (ii.2.27) the words '*Aṇu* and '*Jñaḥ*' are taken over by *anuvṛtti* and connected in the genitive case with the opening word '*Vyatireka*'. The idea of Svarūpāṁśas implicit in the previous discourse is also appropriately connected with the differentiation or splitting of the self without disruption of oneness of *being:*

> *Aṇor (api) Jñasya (Svarūpāṁśair) Vyatireko (=vibhāgaḥ) gandhavad (asti) Tathā darśayati ca (Śrutis Smṛtiśca)*

The full meaning of the Sūtra is thus:

The Śrutis (and Smṛtis) show that it is possible for the Yogijīvas to divide themselves (*vyatireka*) into many alteregos tho' remaining undivided in essence of identity and to exhibit or enjoy their Yogic powers in that way just as the fragrance of a flower while remaining in the flower manages to go out of its abode in minute forms.[5]

The illustration of odor has been chosen to highlight the possibility of self-extension of Svarūpāṁśas of Yogi-Jīvas. *When even a quality like odor is capable of such extension from its locus, it is all the more possible for Svarūpāṁśas of an individual to be endowed with such powers.*[6] The latter part of the Sūtra (*tathā ca darśayati*) is intended to show that the reconciliation of the conflict of Śrutis about the oneness and multiforms of the same self is to be found on the basis of Svarūpaikya (identity of being) based on '*anusandhāna*'[7a] without prejudice to the assumption of many forms thro' Yogic powers The objection that the ascription of such mysterious powers to some selves would be tantamount to elevating them to a position of equality with the Supreme B. to whom alone the Śāstras ascribe such power of accom-

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5. ज्ञस्येत्यस्ति। अंशैरस्तीति शेषः। तथाशब्दोऽणोरपीत्यर्थक। अणोरपि तदंशै व्यतिरेको भेदोऽस्ति। यद्वा, व्यतिरेको विभागः, बहुरूपत्वमस्तीत्यर्थः। यथा पुष्पगन्धस्य स्वांशैर्विभागस्तथेति। (*TDP*)

6 यद्यपि गन्धो गुणः, नाश, तथापि गुणोऽपि यदा व्यतिरिच्यते, किमु तदा अंशस्यांशिव्यतिरेको वक्तव्यमिति भावेन गुणो दृष्टान्तत्वेनोपात्त इति। (*AC.* ii.3.27)

7a. अनुसन्धानं नामानेन सुखेनाहं सुखीत्याद्यनुभव. (*J. VTNt.* i)

CHAPTER XXVI

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3. 'सौभरिश्च महायोगी पञ्चाशज्जन्मसंस्मृतिः ।
   दिव्यज्ञानेन विज्ञाय भाविजन्मफलं पुनः ॥
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5. ज्ञस्येत्यस्ति। अणोरस्तीति शेष। तथाशब्दोऽणोरपीत्यर्थक। अणोरपि तदर्श. व्यतिरेको भेदोऽस्ति। यद्वा, व्यतिरेको विभाग:, बहुरूपत्वमस्तीत्यर्थ:। यथा पुष्पगन्धस्य स्वांशविभागस्तथेति। (*TDP*)

6 यद्यपि गन्धो गुण, नाश, तथापि गुणोऽपि यदा व्यतिरिच्यते, किमु तदा अशस्यांशिव्यतिरेको वक्तव्यमिति भावेन गुणो दृष्टान्तत्वेनोपात्त इति। (*AC.* ii.3.27)

7a. अनुसन्धान नामानेन सुखेनाह सुखीत्याद्यनुभव. (*J. VTNt.* i)

plishing the unaccomplishable is met by the explanation that even this power of the Yogi-Jīvas is *derived* by them from the Supreme B. thro' the practice of intensive Sādhanas, as has been made clear in the Śrutis and Purāṇas.[7b]

It will thus be seen that the resolution of the conflict of Śrutis regarding the assumpton of many forms by the Yogi Jīvas in this *adhi.* helps in a significant manner to illumine the supreme and unfathomable majesty of B. as the source of all such powers of *aghaṭitaghaṭanā* enjoyed by some highly evolved souls. This point implicit in the words *darśayati ca* of the Sūtra is brought out by M. in the closing words of his Bhāṣya on ii.3.27:

अचिन्त्येशशक्त्यैव ह्येकोऽवयववर्जितः ।
आत्मानं बहुधा कृत्वा क्रीडते योगसंपदा ॥

इति पाद्मे (M. *BSB.* ii.3.27)

In his *AV* he has explained how this *adhi.* stands connected with one aspect of Divine majesty of all-embracing *Svatāntrya* implicit in the use of the word *Sat* to denote B. in the *Asambhavādhikaraṇa* (ii. 3.9) by expounding how the Supreme Being confers on highly specialized souls like the Yogi Jīvas the power of expressing themselves thro' many alteregos by extension of Svarūpāṁśas:—

अच्छेद्यस्यापि जीवस्य विभागं बहुधा हरिः ।
कृत्वा भोगान् प्रदायैव चैक्यमापादयेत् पुनः ॥
अत ईशवशं सर्वं चेतनाचेतनं जगत् ।
किमशक्यं परेशस्य तदेति ह्यभिधीयते ॥ (*AV.* ii.3.27)[8]

7b. See *BD.* ii.3.27:— भिन्नांशशून्यत्वेऽपि ज्ञस्य योगाराधितेश्वरप्रसादायत्तयोगसंपदांशविभागसंभवेन बहुरूपतोपपत्तेः (*TDP*)

8. Read: अत्र योगिना स्वरूपेणैवानेकत्वमुपपाद्यते । तस्य च 'अविरोधश्चन्दनवत्' इत्युक्तार्थोपपादकतया संगतौ स्थितायां, 'असम्भवस्तु सतोऽनुपपत्तेः' इति यदीश्वरस्य सर्वस्वातंत्र्यमुक्तं तदुपपादकत्वेनापि संगतिं ज्ञापयंस्तया सूत्रं व्याचष्टे–'अच्छेद्यस्यापि' इति । ऐक्यमेवेत्येवशब्दान्वयः । ऐक्यमेकस्वरूपत्वम् । स्वरूपैक्यस्य विभागेऽपि त्यागात् । सर्वमीशवशं तथा च स एव स्वतन्त्र इति वाक्यशेषः । यथा लोके किंचिदद्भुतं कार्यं कृतवतस्तथाभूतेऽन्यत्रापि कार्यशक्तिः संभाव्यते, तथात्यन्ताघटितमिदं घटयतो जगन्नाथस्य सर्वत्रापि शक्तिसंभावना युक्तेति भावः ।

नन्वत्र सूत्रे जीवस्यानेकत्वापत्तिमात्रमुच्यते । ननु तस्याः परमेश्वरायत्तत्वम् । तत्कथमनेन तस्य सर्वैश्वर्यावगतिरित्यत आह–इति हीति । 'तं यथेश्वरः कुरुते तथा तथा भवति, सोऽचिन्त्यः परमो गरीयान् । अचिन्त्येशशक्त्यैव' इति सूत्रोपात्ताभ्यां श्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यां यस्मादेवमभिधीयते तस्मात् सूत्रेणाप्येवमेवाभिधीयते । प्रतिज्ञाप्रमाणयोरेकार्थताया आवश्यकत्वादिति । (*NS.* p. 435)

CHAPTER XXVII

JĪVA IS DIFFERENT FROM BRAHMAN

14. *Pṛthagadhikaraṇam* (ii.3, 28-29)

This adhi. resolves the conflict of testimony regardng the Jīva's relation to B. Some texts like *Tat tvam asi* (*Chān. Up.* vi.8.7): 'That thou art' and *Aham Brahma asmi* (*Bṛh. Up.* i.4.10) 'I am Brahman' identity the Jīva with B. while others: *Nityo nityānām* (*Kaṭha Up.* ii.2.12): 'It is the eternal of the eternals' *Dvā suparṇā* (*Muṇḍ. Up.* iii.1.1): 'The two birds living together, friends" distinguish them. There are also a number of other texts of both the descriptions in the Śrutis and Purāṇas. As this question has been agitating the minds of philosophers of all climes and ages, it is to be expected that Bādarāyaṇa should press it to a decision in his *Nirṇāyaka Śāstra*. This adhikaraṇa, therefore, and the Sūtras figuring therein should naturally have the greatest philosophical interest to commentators on the Brahma-Sūtras. Unfortunately, no commentator other than M. has been able to see the two Sūtras *Pṛthagupadeśāt* and *Tadguṇasāratvāttu* * * * * in this true philosophical perspective and realize their possibilities in formulating a final solution of the vexed question of how to harmonize the Bheda and the Abheda Śrutis in Vedānta. The others have been content to keep them grappling with the question of the Soul's size or its relation to its own intelligence. It would be very surprising if the Sūtrakāra should have *not* made any special attempt *in this part* of the *Avirodha Adhyāya* to solve the conflict of Bheda and Abheda Śrutis and show how they are to be reconciled. The problem discussed in the *Aṁśādhikaraṇam* (ii.3.43-50) is not the same as the harmonization of Bheda and Abheda Śrutis. A discerning student of the Sūtras will concede the point that a separate discussion of this topic is important enough to call for a sepa-

CHAPTER XXVII

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rate *adhi*. It is here that M.'s judgment commands respect and compels agreement.

M. accordingly develops the Pūrvapakṣa of this *adhi.* on the basis of an objection (*ākṣepasaṅgati*) against the conclusion established in the preceding *adhi.* that the powers of the Yogi Jīvas to disport themselves thro' many alteregos are all derived from the Supreme B. The objection to this is taken on the ground that the Jīvas are not different from B. but are identical with its being.[1]

Pūrvapakṣa.

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that the Jīva is one with B. because of the presence of a large number of identity texts. The presence of dualistic texts need not deter us from accepting the truth of identity. For the latter is reinforced by the six marks of purport (*tātparyaliṅgas*) such as commencement, conclusion, repetition, novelty, fruit, commendation or censure and reasoning. The text 'One only without a second' gives the commencement of the identity-thesis, where it is asserted that all things existed in the begining *as* B. In 'That thou art' we have the conclusion of identity affirmed. This is repeated nine times in the course of the discourse. The criterion of novelty is fulfilled by the fact that the identity of Jīva and B. is not known thro' any other source of knowledge except the Śruti. The fruitfulness of this knowledge of identity is commended in "For the knower, there is only that much delay" in attaining complete identity. There is praise of the identity-teaching in the statement: By knowing which the unknown becomes known. The illustrations of the clod of clay etc. support the thesis.

All this shows that the doctrine of identity of Jīva and B. is the purport of the Śrutis. The texts which speak of them as different are, therefore, to be treated as *not* teaching the true doctrine (*atattvāvedaka*). There can thus be no meaningful Samanvaya of Śruti in B. on the basis of B.'s essential difference from the world of matter and souls, as has been contended by the Siddhāntin.[2]

Siddhānta.

The above Pūrvapakṣa is refuted by the Sūtra: *Pṛthagupadeśāt.* The words *Jñaḥ* and *Svātmanā* are taken over by *anuvṛtti* from Sūtras

1 न जीवजगतोरीश्वरायत्तत्वम्, तयोरभेदादिति पूर्वाक्षेपेण पूर्वपक्षोत्थानात् सङ्गतिः (*TC.* p. 954)

2 परमात्माभिन्न एव जीवः । तत्त्वमसीत्यादिश्रुतेः । न च विपर्ययेऽप्यस्ति श्रुतिरिति वाच्यम् । अद्वैतश्रुतेः षड्विधतात्पर्यलिङ्गयुक्तायाः प्रबलत्वात् । एकमेवाद्वितीयमित्युपक्रमात्, तत्त्वमसीत्युपसंहारात्, तत्त्वमसि तत्त्वमसीति नवकृत्वोऽभ्यासात् । अद्वैतस्य प्रमाणान्तराप्राप्तत्वेनापूर्वत्वात्, 'तस्य तावदेव चिरम्' इति फलश्रवणात् । येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवतीति अर्थवादात्, मृत्पिण्डादिदृष्टान्तेनोपपादनात् । एवं श्रुतेरद्वैत एव तात्पर्यावगमात् तद्विरुद्धभेदश्रुतेरतत्त्वावेदकत्वमेवेति न परमात्मनि परमार्थत श्रुतिसमन्वयो युक्त इति प्राप्ते * * *

(TP. ii.3.28)

18 and 21. The Sautra proposition would thus read: *Jñaḥ svātmanā pṛthak (eva;*[3]*) upadeśāt.* 'The Jīvatman is indeed different from the Independent Ruling Self because of the scriptural teaching (*upadeśa*) establishing their difference on incontestable grounds.[4]

The expression *upadeśa* in the Sūtra is explained by M. with a citation from the Kauśika Śruti which mentions the incontestable grounds on which rests the difference between Jīva and B. This Śruti says: The Supreme is different from the whole class of Jīvas and is infinite in time, space and qualities. The Jīvas are limited by time and space and in qualities. The Supreme is ever free while the Jīva has to work for and attain his deliverance from bondage thro' B. and by its grace.

From this Śruti and from other evidences like Sākṣi-Pratyakṣa and sound reasoning we find that the Jīvas and B. have intrinsically different and opposite attributes. (*viruddhadharmādhikaraṇa*)—the one ever-free and the other bound and depending for his release on the other: which is infinite[5] The Bheda Śrutis which are thus corroborated by other Pramāṇas are stronger than the texts which speak of the identity of Jīvas and B. But the question will remain—what are we to do with the Abheda Śrutis? How are they to be reconciled with the acceptance of Bheda as the correct position[6]?

The next Sūtra: *Tadguṇasāratvāt tu tadvyapadeśaḥ Prājñavat* (ii.2.29) answers the objection that if the Bheda-Śrutis are to be accepted as the last word on the question, the other group of identity-texts will be void of content worth accepting and that will affect their inherent status of validity as *Śruti.* The Sūtra gives the ruling that there is no fear of the identity texts losing their status as Śruti in the event of the difference between Jīva and B. being accepted as the correct teaching and the true purport of all the texts including the so-called identity-texts. For, the fact is that the identity-texts refer to the Jīva as identical with B. *not* in the literal sense of oneness of essence with B. (*svarūpaikya*) but *only* (*tu*)[7] in the sense of likeness of some essential properties, because the Jīva has for his essence of be-

3. ज्ञ इति स्वात्मनेति च वर्तते । ज्ञो जीवः स्वात्मना परमात्मना भिन्नः, न त्वभिन्नः (*TDP*)

4. सोपपत्तिककौशिकश्रुतेर्भिन्न एव जीवः (*M. BSB.* ii.3.28)

5 न चास्ति विपर्ययेऽपि श्रुतिरिति वाच्यम्; विरुद्धधर्माधिकरणत्वयुक्तियुक्तत्वेन भेदश्रुतेः प्राबल्यादिति भावः (*TP.* ii.3.28)

6. नन्वेव सत्यद्वैतश्रुतेर्निर्विषयतयाप्रमाण्य प्राप्तमित्याशङ्का परिहरन् सूत्रमुपन्यस्य व्याचष्टे–तदिति। (*TP.* ii.3.29)

7. *Tu* (only) excludes *identity of essence* (*svarūpaikya*) and not the other senses of identity thro' *lakṣaṇā*, *lakṣitalakṣaṇā* etc. in terms of prādhānya; svātantrya etc. See fn. 13 (in this Chapter).

ing such properties as intelligence and bliss which *resemble* those of B.[8]

ज्ञानानन्दादिब्रह्मगुणाः एवास्य यतः सारः स्वरूपं, अतोऽभेदव्यपदेशः
(M. *BSB.* ii.3.29)

The expression "*Brahmaguṇāḥ*" in the above has been explained by M. himself, in his *AV* as "properties such as intelligence and bliss, *resembling those of B.*":—

तथापि तु चिदानन्दपूर्वास्तत्सदृशा गुणाः ।
सारः स्वरूपमस्यापि (*AV*)

Accordingly, Vādirāja points out in his *TPG* that "*Tadguṇa*" in the Sūtra and its equivalent "Brahmaguṇa" in M.'s *bhāṣya* are to be understood as compounds suggestive of comparison (*upamāgarbha-samāsa*) as in "*Puruṣavyāghraḥ*"[9] ('man-tiger').

The Sūtrakāra clarifies his interpretational ruling '*Tadguṇasāratvāttu tadvyapadeśaḥ*' of how to reconcile the Abheda Śrutis with the Bheda Śrutis, with an illustration: *Prājñavat.* The 'Tadvyapadeśa' or the reference to Jīva as B. is to be understood in the same way as "the reference to the omniscient one (Prājña)" M. recognizes in this an allusion to the famous text of the Chān. Up. (iii, 14).

Sarvam Khalvidam Brahma.

"All this is verily B."—where the Supreme B. is identified with the world of matter.[10]

This must raise a ticklish question; for the nature of B. is pure intelligence, while that of the world of matter is absence of intelligence. How then can the world be identified with B. in the face of this glaring disparity of nature? The answer is implicit in the ruling *Tadguṇasāratvāt tadvyapadeśaḥ*—to be applied *mutatis mutandis.* The properties of the material world such as its reality, causal efficiency (*arthakriyākāritvam*) are similar to the like ones in B. In view of the similarity of some of its properties to those of the world of matter B. is identified with the (*Jaḍa*)—world, in *Sarvam khalvidam Brahma,* notwithstanding the yawning difference between them in other respects. In the *Mahābhārata* ( ) we have such a reference:

8. नाभेदश्रुत्यैकात्म्यपरत्वमपि । परमात्मगुणसदृशज्ञानानन्दादिगुणस्वरूपत्वेन जीवस्य गौण्या वृत्त्याभेदव्यपदेशोपपत्तेः
(*TP.* ii.3.29)

9. पुरुषः शार्दूल इव पुरुषशार्दूल इतिवत् तस्य परमात्मनो गुणा इव गुणास्तद्गुणाः । ब्रह्मणो गुणा इव गुणा ब्रह्मगुणा इति सूत्रभाष्ययोः उपमागर्भसमासं पुरुषव्याघ्रवत्–परमात्मगुणसदृशेति । (TPG. ii.3.29)

10. Cf. भूतानि विष्णुर्भुवनानि विष्णुः (*Viṣṇu Purāṇa* ii, 12.38) वनानि विष्णुर्गिरयो दिशश्च

सर्वभूतगुणैर्युक्तं देवं त्वं ज्ञातुमर्हसि ।

The earth's characteristic of supporting the creatures has its counterpart in B.'s supporting all.[11] *Bhartā san bhriyamāṇo bibharti* (T.A. ii. 14). The oddity of the comparison between the all-intelligent B. and the unintelligent world is intended to focus attention on the fact that no Svarūpaikya or identity of essence is contemplated between Prājña and Jaḍa, but only identity in the sense of similarity in some respects.[12] This resolves itself into what may be called *Gauṇaikya* or Sādṛśyābheda —as M. calls it. J. renders "Sādṛśyābheda" as *Sādṛśyam eva abhedaḥ* (NS. p. 451)—identity in the sense of similarity in certain vital respects.

'Tat tvam asi' and all such texts in which Jīvātman is identified with B.—as in *Nānyo atosti draṣṭā* (*Bṛh. Up.* iii.7.23). *Yatra tvasya sarvam ātmaiva abhūt* (*Bṛh. Up.* iv.5.15). *Pare 'vyaye sarva ekībhavanti* (*Muṇḍ. Up.* iii.2.7) are to be understood only in the sense of *Gauṇaikya* and not *Svarūpaikya*, as the latter is barred by Pramāṇas.[13] M. has indicated a number of complementary standpoints from which such Gauṇaikya may be recognized in scriptural statements concerning the relation in which the *Jīva stands to the Supreme*[14]:—

अतोऽभेदवदेवैताः श्रुतयः प्रवदन्ति हि ।
पौराणानि च वाक्यानि सादृश्याभेदसंश्रयात् ।
सादृश्याच्च प्रधानत्वात् स्वातंत्र्यादपि वाभिदाम् ।
आहुरीशेन जीवस्य न स्वरूपाभिदा क्वचित् ।
स्थानैक्यमैकमत्यं च मुक्तस्य तु विशिष्यते
सादृश्यं तु विशेषेण जडानां द्वयमेव तु
भवेत्सादृश्यमत्यल्पं तृतीयं परमात्मना ।। (*AV.* ii.3.28-29)

J. explains in his *NS* the precise nature of Gauṇaikyas and their determinants as applied to different kinds of identity texts met with in the Śrutis. For example:

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11. Cf. गामाविश्य च भूतानि धारयाम्यहमोजसा (*Gītā* xv. 13) where the attribute of supporting the creatures similar to the one possessed by the earth is ascribed to B. 'गामाविश्य' इति भूम्यादिगतधारकत्वादिगुणसदृशगुणात्मकत्वोक्ते जगद्गुणसारत्वं प्राज्ञस्य बोध्यम् । (*TDP*)

12 प्राज्ञवदिति दृष्टान्तीकृते सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्मेति वाक्ये सर्वपदेन जडप्रपञ्चः कथ्यते । तस्य ब्रह्मैक्यं परमतेऽपि नास्ति अतो न दृष्टान्ते विप्रतिपत्तिः । अत एव विरुद्धधर्माक्रान्ततया तयोर्भेदं सूचयितुं 'प्राज्ञवत्' इत्युक्तं सूत्रकृता । प्राज्ञजडयोरैक्यासंभवस्तु सर्वजनसम्मतः । अतो दृष्टान्तकथनव्याजेन तस्यापि वाक्यस्यार्थं निर्णेतुमिदमेवोदाहरणमुदितं सूत्रकारेण । (Vādirāja *TPG*)

13. *Trivikrama Paṇḍita refers to six different senses,* (including *svarūpaikya,* which *is however out of the question here*) in which identity or tadatmya can be understood:—
तदधीनत्वं, तत्प्राधान्यं, तन्मत्यैक्यं, तत्सामीप्यं, तत्सारूप्यं, तत्स्वारूप्यमित्यनेकविधं हि तादात्म्यम् ।
(*TD.* ii.1.14)

14 *Cf.* उपलक्षणं चैतत् सौत्रमभेदागमव्याख्यानमित्याशयवान् उक्तानुवादेनार्थान्तरमप्याह–सादृश्याच्चेति ।
(*NS.* p. 451b)

(i) In *Tat tvam asi* (*Chān. Up.* vi.8.7) we have *gauṇaikya* based on the principle of similarity of attributes, as explained in the Sūtra ii.3.29.

(ii) In *Nānyo atosti draṣṭā* * * * * (Bṛh. Up. iii.7.23) we have identity thro' *Lakṣaṇā* in terms of *prādhānya* and *Svātantrya* of B.[15]

(iii) In *Pare 'vyaye sarva ekībhavanti* (*Muṇḍ.* iii.2.7) we have *sthānaikya* (identity of location) based on *Lakṣaṇā*.[16]

(iv) In *Yatra tvasya sarvam ātmaivabhūt* (*Bṛh. Up.* iv.5.15) we have *matyaikya* (agreement of will) thro' '*Lakṣitalakṣaṇā*' (double lakṣaṇā).[17]

(v) In respect of Jaḍas, the determinants of identity usage are having B. as their supreme principle and being dependent on it and similarity in respect of existence.[18]

In this connection J. has also discussed at some length the logic behind the Sūtrakāra's (and M.'s) insistence that the identity texts must be interpreted in a figurative sense (gauṇārtha)—as in *Tadguṇasāratvāt tadvyapadeśaḥ*.

To the objection that the adoption of Gauṇīvṛtti in interpreting the identity text would be a departure from the primary sense of the words, J. replies that this cannot be helped. We have to accept the non-primary sense for the very good reason that the primary sense would be inapplicable as in *Siṁho Devadattaḥ* (Devadatta is a lion). For there cannot be any identity in the real sense of the term for a creature like the Jīvātman who is of limited understanding and bliss with the Supreme B. which is endowed with omniscience and other august attributes. It is not possible to dismiss the omniscience and other characteristics of B. as not absolutely true; for they are characteristics predicated of B. by the Śrutis themselves. To set aside what has been solemnly recognized in the Śrutis is to join hands with the Buddhists and others who do not recognize the Śruti. With such scant regard for the Śruti one may ask what reason the Monist will have for swearing by the identity texts alone, except a bias in their favor.[19]

15. 'नान्योऽतोऽस्ति द्रष्टा' इत्यादिनिर्देशस्तु प्राधान्यस्वातन्त्र्याभ्यां लाक्षणिकः। द्रष्टृपदेन तत्रारोपित वैशिष्ट्य स्वातंत्र्यं चोपलक्ष्यते। तथा च, द्रष्टा विशिष्ट· स्वतन्त्रश्चान्यो नास्तीत्यर्थः सम्पद्यते। (*NS.* p. 451b)
16. स्थानैक्यपरदेशो लाक्षणिकः। स्थानमस्यैकस्य स्थानिषु प्रयोगात् (*NS.* p. 451)
17. ऐकमत्यनिमित्तेन प्रयोगे लक्षितलक्षणा। विपर्ययेऽपान्मत्यैक्यं तत्रापि मतिमत्त्वमिति। (ibid)
18. जडानामपि–तदधीनत्वं तत्तत्स्वातन्त्र्यमेव। सादृश्यस्यापि तृतीयस्य विद्यमानत्वात्कथमियमेवेत्यत आह–सत्त्वमपि सादृश्यं किन्तु तत् सत्तादिनैव। ननु जीवब्रह्मणोः ज्ञानानन्दादिना। अतो द्वयस्यैव सत्त्वात् उपपन्ना अप्रचुरोक्तिः (*ibid*)
19. सोऽसौ वृत्तिरमुख्यापि चेत्, गम्यताम्। मुख्यार्थासम्भवादाश्रीयते। नहि सार्वज्ञ्यादिगुणवता ब्रह्मणाल्पज्ञानादिमतो जीवस्याभेदो मुख्यः। न सार्वज्ञ्यादि पारमार्थिकमिति चेन्न। 'यः सर्वज्ञ' इत्यादिश्रुतिसिद्धत्वात्। श्रुतिसिद्धसार्वज्ञ्यादेरपि मिथ्यात्वे, बौद्धाद्यनुसारिता। कथमद्वैतश्रुतिसिद्धार्थे विश्वासहेतुरन्यत्राभिनिवेशात्? (*TP.* ii.3.29)

As a matter of fact, the identity texts are opposed to *Upajīvapramāṇa* or their own standing ground in evidence. For, all means of proof by which Jīva and B. are first established—either on *a priori* grounds or thro' inference, for purposes of moving the propositions of their identity —presuppose the clear distinction between them as postulates in the said proposition. A proposition of identity moved in the face of this basic fact—in whatever *direction* the identity may be moved will have to founder on the very foundations of its Upajīvyapramāṇa. The Upaīvyapramāṇa by which Jīva and B. are given as the subject of the identity proposition moved either way (as—Jīva is B. or B. is Jīva) is the Dharmigrāhakapramāṇa. It establishes them in their true nature as possessed of mutually incompatible attributes. *It is for fear of offending the* Upajīvyapramāṇa *that even the Monist has taken* recourse to Lakṣaṇā in interpreting identity texts like *Tat tvam asi* in terms of *Jahadajahallakṣaṇā*. It is for the very same reason that the Realist also pleads for the adoption of *Gauṇīvṛtti* in interpreting such texts.[20]

Since both the Monist and the Realist have to resort to Lakṣaṇā, *the only pertinent point to consider will be which of the two modes of* Lakṣaṇā *proposed by them would be less arbitrary and involving less violence to or depreciation of the primary sense of the terms.*

In the interpretaton proposed by him, the Monist *deprives* both the terms *'Tat'* and *'Tvam'* *(of the identity-proposition) of their primary senses as established by their* Dharmigrāhakapramāṇa *and retains only the primary meaning of the copulative asi in terms of their apposition (sāmānādhikaraṇyam). This is a repudiation of the very context of* the given data *tat* and *tvam and cannot be permitted in the name of* interpretation. An *interpretation which is able to fully accommodate* given data *without diminution of their content of meaning and assign* a figurative sense only to the copulative *asi in terms of any one of the* many *compatible ideas of Tadadhīnatva, Tatpradhānatva, Tatsāhacarya,* *Tatsāmīpya* or *Tatsādṛśya is certainly entitled to preference as it would* involve less interference *with the terms of the proposition as they* stand.[21]

Some ingenious apologist of the Monist has ventured to put in here *that it is not because* of any conflict with Pramānas that he is going in *for the non-primary* meaning of the terms (*tat* and *tvam*) here—in

20. उपजीव्यप्रमाणविरुद्धं चाद्वैतबोधनम्। जीवपरमात्मविषयप्रमाणैर्भेदस्यैव ग्रहणात्। परेणापि हि प्रमाणविरोधभीरुणा लाक्षणिकार्थोऽङ्गीकृतोऽद्वैतश्रुतेः। तथाच, सुतरां युक्तं गौणार्थग्रहणम्। (*TP.* ii.3.29)
Cf. एवम् तयो र्लक्षितयो र्न वाच्ययो (Śamkara· *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, Ver. 244)

21. लक्षणावृत्तौ हि तत्त्वपदवाच्यार्थपरित्यागेनासिपदमात्रे सामानाधिकरण्यरूपमुख्यार्थता अशेषप्रमाणविरुद्धाङ्गीकरणीया। वरं हि, ततः तत्त्वंपदमुख्यार्थमङ्गीकृत्यासिपदमात्रस्य गौणार्थवर्णनम् (*TP.* ii.3 29)

(i) In *Tat tvam asi* (*Chān. Up*. vi.8.7) we have *gauṇaikya* based on the principle of similarity of attributes, as explained in the Sūtra ii.3.29.

(ii) In *Nānyo atosti draṣṭā* * * * * (Bṛh. Up. iii.7.23) we have identity thro' *Lakṣaṇā* in terms of *prādhānya* and *Svātantrya* of B.[15]

(iii) In *Pare 'vyaye sarva ekībhavanti* (*Muṇḍ*. iii.2.7) we have *sthānaikya* (identity of location) based on *Lakṣaṇā*.[16]

(iv) In *Yatra tvasya sarvam ātmaivabhūt* (Bṛh. *Up*. iv.5.15) we have *matyaikya* (agreement of will) thro' '*Lakṣitalakṣaṇā*' (double lakṣaṇā).[17]

(v) In respect of Jaḍas, the determinants of identity usage are having B. as their supreme principle and being dependent on it and similarity in respect of existence.[18]

In this connection J. has also discussed at some length the logic behind the Sūtrakāra's (and M.'s) insistence that the identity texts must be interpreted in a figurative sense (gauṇārtha)—as in *Tadguṇasāratvāt tadvyapadeśaḥ*.

To the objection that the adoption of Gauṇīvṛtti in interpreting the identity text would be a departure from the primary sense of the words, J. replies that this cannot be helped. We have to accept the non-primary sense for the very good reason that the primary sense would be inapplicable as in *Siṁho Devadattaḥ* (Devadatta is a lion). For there cannot be any identity in the real sense of the term for a creature like the Jīvātman who is of limited understanding and bliss with the Supreme B. which is endowed with omniscience and other august attributes. It is not possible to dismiss the omniscience and other characteristics of B. as not absolutely true; for they are characteristics predicated of B. by the Śrutis themselves. To set aside what has been solemnly recognized in the Śrutis is to join hands with the Buddhists and others who do not recognize the Śruti. With such scant regard for the Śruti one may ask what reason the Monist will have for swearing by the identity texts alone, except a bias in their favor.[19]

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15. 'नान्योऽतोऽस्ति द्रष्टा' इत्यादिनिर्देशस्तु प्राधान्यस्वातंत्र्याभ्यां लाक्षणिकः। द्रष्टृपदेन तत्रारोपितं वैशिष्ट्यं स्वातंत्र्यं चोपलक्ष्यते। तथा च, द्रष्टा विशिष्टः स्वतन्त्रश्चान्यो नास्तीत्यर्थः संपद्यते। (*NS.* p. 451b)
16. स्थानैक्यव्यपदेशो लाक्षणिकः। स्थानगस्यैकस्य स्थानिषु प्रयोगात् (*NS.* p. 451)
17 ऐकमत्यनिमित्तेन प्रयोगे लक्षितलक्षणा। विषयैक्यान्मत्यैक्यं ततश्च मतिमतामिति। (*ibid*)
18 जडानामिति—तत्प्रधानकं तत्तत्स्वातंत्र्यमेव। सादृश्यस्यापि तृतीयस्य विद्यमानत्वात्कथं द्वयमेवेत्यत आह—सत्यमस्ति सादृश्यं किन्तु तत् सत्तादिनैव। नतु जीववदानन्दादिना। अतो द्वयस्यैव सत्वात् उपपन्ना अप्रचुरोक्तिः (*ibid*)
19 गौणी वृत्तिरमुख्येति चेत्, सत्यम्। मुख्यार्थासंभवादाश्रीयते। नहि सार्वज्ञ्यादिगुणवता ब्रह्मणाल्पज्ञानादिमतो जीवस्याभेदो युक्तः। न सार्वज्ञ्यादि पारमार्थिकमिति चेन्न। 'यः सर्वज्ञ' इत्यादिश्रुतिसिद्धत्वात्। श्रुतिसिद्धसार्वज्ञ्यादेरपि मिथ्यात्वे, बौद्धाद्यापत्तिः। कथंचैवंवादिनोऽद्वैतश्रुतिसिद्धार्थे विश्वासहेतुरन्यत्राभिनिवेशात् ?
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As a matter of fact, the identity texts are opposed to *Upajīvapramāṇa* or their own standing ground in evidence. For, all means of proof by which Jīva and B. are first established—either on *a priori* grounds or thro' inference, for purposes of moving the propositions of their identity —presuppose the clear distinction between them as postulates in the said proposition. A proposition of identity moved in the face of this basic fact—in whatever *direction* the identity may be moved will have to founder on the very foundations of its Upajīvyapramāṇa. The Upaīvyapramāṇa by which Jīva and B. are given as the subject of the identity proposition moved either way (as—Jīva is B. or B. is Jīva) is the Dharmigrāhakapramāṇa. It establishes them in their true nature as possessed of mutually incompatible attributes. It is for fear of offending the Upajīvyapramāṇa that even the Monist has taken recourse to Lakṣaṇā in interpreting identity texts like *Tat tvam asi* in terms of *Jahadajahallakṣaṇā*. It is for the very same reason that the Realist also pleads for the adoption of *Gauṇīvṛtti* in interpreting such texts.[20]

Since both the Monist and the Realist *have to* resort to Lakṣaṇā, the only pertinent point to consider will be which of the two modes of Lakṣaṇā proposed by them would be less arbitrary and involving less violence to or depreciation of the primary sense of the terms.

In the interpretaton proposed by him, the Monist deprives both the terms '*Tat*' and '*Tvam*' (of the identity-proposition) of their primary senses as established by their Dharmigrāhakapramāṇa and retains only the primary meaning of the copulative *asi* in terms of their apposition (*sāmānādhikaraṇyam*). This is a repudiation of the very context of the given data *tat* and *tvam* and cannot be permitted in the name of interpretation. An interpretation which is able to fully accommodate given data without diminution of their content of meaning and assign a figurative sense only to the copulative *asi* in terms of any one of the many compatible ideas of *Tadadhīnatva, Tatpradhānatva, Tatsāhacarya, Tatsāmīpya* or *Tatsādṛśya* is certainly entitled to preference as it would involve less interference with the terms of the proposition as they stand.[21]

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20. उपजीव्यप्रमाणविरुद्धं चाद्वैतबोधनम्। जीवपरमात्मविषयप्रमाणैर्भेदस्यैव ग्रहणात्। परेणापि हि प्रमाणविरोधभीरुणा लाक्षणिकार्थोऽङ्गीकृतोऽद्वैतश्रुतेः। तथाच, सुतरां युक्तं गौणार्थग्रहणम्। (*TP.* ii.3.29)
Cf. ऐक्यं तयो र्लक्षितयो र्न वाच्ययो (Śamkara: *Vivekacūdāmaṇi*, Ver. 244)

21. लक्षणावृत्तौ हि तत्त्वंपदवाच्यार्थपरित्यागेनासिपदमात्रे सामानाधिकरण्यरूपमुख्यार्थता अशेषप्रमाणविरुद्धाङ्गीकरणीया। वरं हि, ततः तत्त्वंपदमुख्यार्थमङ्गीकृत्यासिपदमात्रस्य गौणार्थवर्णनम् (*TP.* ii.3 29)

which case alone he could be asked to state why he should set aside the Gauṇārtha suggested by the Realist and opt for the roundabout procedure of *Padadvayalakṣaṇā*—but only because *Svarūpaikya* of Jīva and B. happens to be *the sense intended by the Śruti* in question. But we are entitled to ask him how he has discovered *this intention of the Śruti*. If his answer is that he has discovered it with the help of the marks of import (*tātparyaliṅgas*) like *upakrama, upasaṁhāra*, etc., we have to tell him that marks of purport establish the purport of a given passage or proposition in the primary sense of the terms, provided there is no opposition to it from other means of proof. But in the present case, there *is* such an opposition to admitting the purport of the terms in their primary senses, from other Pramāṇas. That is why the Monist himself seeks the aid of Lakṣaṇā and Padadvayalakṣaṇā at that.[22]

Thus, when the doors of Mukhyārtha are closed once for all and one is forced by the very exigencies of the situation to look for some other suitable sense to be given to the proposition, that other sense may be a Gauṇārtha or a Lākṣaṇikārtha. It is not surely within the competence of the Tātparyaliṅgas to lay down that a *Gauṇārtha ought not to be adopted and only a Lākṣaṇikārtha should be.* And even in adopting the Lākṣaṇikārtha, the Realist is in a position of vantage; for he manages with *a single Lakṣaṇā* at a time either on Tat or Tvam unlike the Monist who has no other way than to go in for Lakṣaṇā on *both the terms Tat* and *Tvam at the same time.*

The further contention of the Monist that the marks establish the purport of the proposition to be one of absolute identity of essence between Jīva and B. and that for this reason Gauṇārtha is not to be favored as it would only help to preserve and keep intact the distinction of Jīva and B. as separate entities and, therefore, a resort to Padadvaya-Lakṣaṇā is inevitable, is mere wishful thinking. The Realst has shown elsewhere that all the six Tātparyaliṅgas are fully, uniformly and unequivocally in favor of the thesis of difference between Jīva and B. in respect of the *Tat tvam asi* and other texts.[23] Vide my *Lectures on Vedanta*, Karnatak University, Dharwar, 1973, pp. 41-90.

22. नात्र प्रमाणविरोधेन श्रुतेरमुख्यार्थताभ्युपगम्यते येन गौणार्थोऽङ्गीकार्यं स्यात् किन्तु श्रुतेरेव तथाभिप्रेतत्वादिति कश्चित्। स प्रष्टव्यः। कथमयं श्रुतेरभिप्रायो लोकोत्तरप्रज्ञेन विज्ञात इति। तात्पर्यलिङ्गैरिति वदन् देवानांप्रियो-ऽनुपेक्षितव्यः। नहि लिङ्गानि तात्पर्यावबोधकानि लाक्षणिकार्थग्रहणे कारणानीति युक्तम्। (*TP*. ii.3.29)
23 लिङ्गबलाद्भेद एव तात्पर्ये सिद्धे, प्रमाणविरोधात् गौणार्थमनङ्गीकृत्य लक्षणाश्रीयत इति चेन्न। उपक्रमादीनामन्यार्थत्वात्। यथा चैतत् तथोक्तमन्यत्रेति। (*TP*. ii.3 29)
See Madhva *VTN* Par, i.
Vyāsatīrtha *Nym*. ii, 28.
and my *History of Dvaita School of Vedanta and its Literature*, Vol. ii. pp. 124-39.

CHAPTER XXVIII

JIVA'S SVARŪPOPĀDHI IS EVERLASTING

15. *Yāvadadhikaraṇam* (ii.3.30)

In the previous section, genesis of the Jīva was established with reference to his upādhis and non-genesis with reference to his essence of being. But the doubt arises as to how the Jīva can be without genesis when his upādhis originate.[1] Also, if the Jīvas have such genesis thro' upādhis, the Śrutis which speak of their being bound by beginningless Karma and attainng everlasting freedom with the help of *B. become unintelligible.*[2]

These difficulties are solved here by pointing out: *Yāvadātmabhāvitvācca na doṣas taddarśanāt* that the 'upādhis' of the Jīva are of two different kinds — one by which he remains constituted as a Pratibimba (reflection) of B. *for ever and another by which he goes thro'* embodiment, works out his karma and attains release.[3] The former is his *Svarūpopādhi* what configures him as he is in himself. It is intrinsic to him, internal and indistinguishable from his essence. The other is purely extrinsic and is dissolved at the time of his attaining

1 ज्ञोऽत इत्यत्र जीवोत्पत्त्यनुत्पत्तिश्रुत्योर्विरोधे शङ्किते, उत्पत्तिश्रुतिरुपाधिविषया, अनुत्पत्तिश्रुति स्वरूपविषयेत्युक्तम् । इह तूपाध्युत्पत्तिस्वरूपानुत्पत्तिश्रुत्योरपि विरोधः । उपाध्युत्पत्तौ प्रतिबिंबभूतजीवानुत्पत्त्ययोगादिति शंकिते । * * * * (*TC.* p. 956 b)

2. 'बन्धान्मोक्ष तत एवाभिवाञ्छेत्' इति पूर्वोक्तानादिबन्धानन्तमोक्षाक्षेपेण पूर्वपक्षोदयात् सगति · (*TC.* p. 955)

3. 'जीवोपाधिर्द्विधा प्रोक्तः स्वरूप बाह्य एव च ।
बाह्योपाधिर्लयं याति मुक्तावन्यस्य तु स्थिति · ॥' इति (*TP.* ii.3.30)

Mokṣa. In other words, the Upādhis which determine the Jīva's essential character as Pratibimba of B. are without origin and dissolution; while the Upādhis which bring about his transmigration have a genesis and an end.[4]

The present Sūtra is concerned with the Svarūpopādhi. Its function and purpose are to enable the Jīva as a Pratibimba of Paramātman to fully realize his essential nature of being a Pratibimba of B.[5] which consists in having an intrinsic affinity with B. (as explained in ii.3.29) by virtue of having a resemblance with It in respect of his own essential properties of intelligence, bliss, etc. and being dependent on B. for them and for his reality, activity and power of consciousness.[6]

This figure of Pratibimba as applied to illustrate this intimate relation of Jīva to B. should be carefully dissociated from certain ideas commonly associated with ordinary reflections as of the face in the mirror — such as their inanimate character and dependence on an external medium. The Jīva's relation to B. is intrinsic to him in all respects. It is an indissoluble bond — one to be cherished. In the ordinary Bimbapratibimbabhāva between the face and its reflection in the mirror, the reflection is terminable with the movement of the face outside the range of the medium or the destruction of the medium itself. In the case of the Jīva his Svarūpopādhi lasts as long as Paramātman (Bimba) lasts—which is for ever. There is no question also of Paramātman moving out of the range of the Jīva's Svarūpopādhi — as He is omnipresent. Hence the Jīva's character and status as the Pratibimba of B. in the philosophical sense of the term — is assured for ever.[7]

There is also another aspect of this symbolism which is of special significance. In the ordinary instance of reflection, the Bimba remains external to the medium and the reflected image. The Supreme B. as Bimba is, however, present *inside* the *Jīvātman* and his Svarūpopādhi and is *not altogether external to them.* Another interesting point to be noted is that *we* see *our refleced image* in he mirror. The medium is

4 नहि येनोपाधिना जीव प्रतिबिम्ब तस्यैवोत्पत्तिविनाशौ स्तः ; अपि तु, घटत्वादिवदोदितबाह्योपाधेरेव । येन स्वरूपोपाधिना जीव प्रतिबिम्ब न तस्योत्पत्ति यावदात्मभावित्वात् । यस्य तु बाह्योपाधेरुत्पत्तिः, न तेन जीव प्रतिबिम्ब इत्युच्यते । (*TC.* p. 956 b)

5 यत्र, स्वरूपप्रतिभाससुखोपलम्भनाय (उपाधि) (*NS.* p. 506)

6 स्वरूपेणात्र प्रतर्क ; चित्त्वात् (*M. GB.* ii.18)

7 बिम्ब एव जीव । प्रतिबिम्बस्य बिम्बोपाधिसन्निधिनाशं विना नाशानुपपत्तेः । बिम्बस्य परमात्मनोऽनाद्यनन्तत्वात् उपाधेश्च यावदात्मभावित्वात् । सर्वतो बिम्बस्योपाधिसन्निधेश्च नित्यत्वात् । (*TP.* ii.3.30)

meant for that. But in the present case, it is the image — the Pratibimba i.e. the Jīva who has to perceive his original viz. B. thro' the Svarūpopādhi by cleansing it of all dross and visualizing B. in all its splendor and realizing at the same time his own close agreeable and intimate relationship with It, for all time. This necessitates the nityatva of the Jīva's Svarūpopādhi[8] and *its survival in Mokṣa* too, for obvious reasons.

8. The reader knows by this time that the Jiva and his Svarūpopādhi tho' not distinct or different entities *are distinguished thro' the help of Viśeṣas:* उपाध्युपाधिमद्भावो विशेषबलेनेत्यर्थं (J. *GBt.* ii, 18)

CHAPTER XXIX

OBSCURATION OF JĪVA'S BLISSFUL NATURE IN SAMSĀRA AND ITS MANIFESTATION IN MOKṢA THRO' DIVINE GRACE

16. *Puṁstvādhikaraṇam* (ii.3.31-32)

Resolving conflict of testimony on the question,[1] the present *adhi.* establishes how the essential characteristics of the Jīva such as his intelligence (*svarūpajñāna*) and bliss (*svarūpasukha*) lie obscured in Samsāra by positive ignorance from time immemorial and are made manifest by God's grace.

Some texts describe the Jīva as Vijñānātman or one whose essence is intelligence. (*Praśna Up.* iv. 11). "He is bliss, he is taken up to that world by B. and is released."[2] The *Paiṁgi Śruti* on the other hand observes: "He becomes *blissful* when freed from misery. He *becomes intelligent* when rid of ignorance[3]*****"

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that these expressions *ānandī*, *Jñānī*, *Balī*, etc. tend to show that bliss and intelligence are not the intrinsic nature of the souls but that they are only adventitious attributes which make their appearance in the released state.[4] This supposition is fully confirmed by reasoning. If intelligence and bliss are the essential nature

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1 अत्र जीवस्यानन्दादिरूपत्वश्रुतिः किमनुपलब्धिमुक्त्यवस्थायामुत अनानन्दादिरूपत्वयुक्त्या बाधितार्था नेति चिन्ता। (*TC.* p. 956)

2 'स आनन्दः स परेणात्मना नीयते स विमुच्यते'। (M. *BSB.* ii 3.31)

3 स दुःखाद्विमुक्त आनन्दी भवति, अज्ञानाद्विमुक्तो ज्ञानी भवति। • • • • (ibid)

4 Cf. आनन्दी ज्ञानी बलीति मतुबन्तया स्वाभाविकत्वाभावस्यैवावगतेरिति। (Raghu. *TPB.*)

of the soul, they should be clearly experienced by us here and now. But they *are not*. *It is no use to explain that they are not experienced now because of counteracting influences.* When the self continues to be experienced as "I am", there is no reason why its other characteristic of bliss, which is as much the essence of selfhood as self-*consciousness, should alone remain unapprehended* or obscured by counteracting influences.[5] Further, if bliss *were the very essence* of selfhood, no soul need exert itself to attain release from Samsāra; for what is ingrained in the essence of the self is sure to come up to the surface sooner or later, of its own accord.[6] The usual defence against such an objection that it lies obscured in the state of bondage will have to identify the nature of this obscuring element or cause. Is it mere absence of awareness that keeps it back or the presence of the physical body? It can be neither. It has already been said that when *the awareness of the self is there unimpeded, there is no valid reason* why the bliss of selfhood alone should remain unapprehended as both are integral aspects of selfhood. To say that the physical body prevents the experience of innate bliss is ridiculous; for the body is specially adapted to the enjoyment of bliss and not to retard it. It is thus untenable to hold that bliss is of the nature of the self and that it comes to be manifested in Mokṣa.[7]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that bliss and intelligence are all the essence of selfhood. Nevertheless, they remain latent in the state of Samsāra and become *fully* manifested only in the state of Mokṣa. The Sūtrakāra here gives an apt illustration of this. Virility in man and power of *bearing children in a woman* tho' existing potentially in childhood become manifest at the time of puberty. They do not originate from previous *non-existence* because in that case they may originate in the impotent also. In the same way, tho' *constituting the very essence of self*hood, the characteristics of intelligence and bliss of Jivas come to be fully manifested only by the grace of B. in Mokṣa. It is in this sense that the Śruti describes the Jīvātman as *"becoming* blissful" (*ānandī bhavati*), *becoming* intelligent (*jñānī bhavati*) and so on. They are not fully experienced in the state of bondage. Spiritual efforts (*sādhanas*) are calculated to help such manifestation thro' earning the grace

5. अनानंदादिरूपत्वश्रुते: सयुक्तिकत्वात्। न ह्यानदादिरूपत्वमात्मनोऽनुभूयते। न च प्रतिबन्धकात् विद्यमाना प्यानंदादिरूपता नानुभूयत इति वाच्यम्। जीवस्याहमिति नित्याभिव्यक्तत्वेन तत्स्वरूपभूताना व्यवधानस्यैवानुपपत्ते:। (*TP.* ii.3.31)

6. आनंदादिरूपत्वे च जीवस्य न केनचिन्मोक्षाय प्रयतितव्यम्। (*TP.* ii.3.31)

7. अज्ञावरणादननुभवो, मोक्षे त्वभिव्यक्तेरनुभव इति वदन् प्रष्टव्य:– किमावरणमानन्दादीनामज्ञानं शरीरादि वा नाद्य:, तस्यैवानुपपत्तेरुक्तत्वात्। न द्वितीय:, वैपरीत्यात्। अत एव मोक्षेऽभिव्यक्तिरित्ययुक्तम्। (*TP.* ii.3.31)

of B.[8] The objection that as this bliss is the essence of selfhood it cannot remain unapprehended when self-awareness is already there is not a formidable one. What is asserted by the Siddhāntin is *not* that there is merely a non-awareness of innate bliss in the state of Samsāra but that such bliss lies obscured by a positive force, other than mere absence of awareness,[9] which goes by the name of *Bhāvarūpa-ajñāna* in Vedānta.[10]

The next Sūtra: *Nityopalabdhyanupalabdhiprasaṅgo 'nyatarāniyamo vā anyathā* (ii.3.32) shows the rationale of (i) accepting obscuration of Svarūpānanda of souls in the state of bondage by Bhāvarūpājñāna and (ii) the manifestation of this innate bliss etc. later by the removal of this obscuration by pointing to the adverse consequences (*prasaṅga*) of *not recognizing* the fact of manifestation of Svarūpānanda in Mokṣa. For this reason, this Sūtra and the other one: *Parābhidhyānāttu* * * * * * * (iii.2, 5) have a special bearing on the Sūtrakāra's theory of bondage and release. It will also be seen that M. finds tacit acceptance of a triple classification of souls in this Sūtra, as elsewhere, See his C. on BS. iii.1, 19-23; 4, 34-40. For a detailed examination of M.'s doctrine of "Jīvatraividhya" see my *Philosophy of Madhvācārya* Chapters XXXIV and XXXV.

The words *Jña* and *asya* are taken over by *anuvṛtti* from Sūtras 18 and 31. The former is suitably connected in the genitive plural (*Jñānām*) with the words of Sūtra 32. *Asya* (by *anuvṛtti*) denotes the respective intrinsic natures of *ānanda* etc. of the three different classes of souls[11] implicit in the terms *nityopalabdhi* (*nitya*)-*anupalabdhi* and (*nitya*)-*anyataropalabdhi* of the Sūtra.

The overall meaning of the Sūtra is thus, as follows:—

"If the fact of (manifestation of Svarūpānanda, etc. by the removal of their) immemorial obscuration of Bhāvarūpājñāna is *not admitted* (*anyathā*),[12] there will be the adverse contingency (*prasaṅga*) of

8. [illegible]
[illegible] (*TP.* ii.3.31)

9. [illegible] (*TP.* ii.3.31)

10. Cf. [illegible] (*TC.* p. 956)
[illegible] (Raghu. *TPB.*)

11. [illegible] (*TDP*)

12. [illegible] (Vādirāja *TPG.* p. 102)
[illegible] (*TDP*)

(i) perpetual experience (*nityopalabdhi*) of their Svarūpānanda, Svarūpajñāna, etc. in the case of Muktiyogas;[13] (ii) perpetual experience (*nityopalabdhi*) of misery (without scope for enjoyment of bliss even from worldly sources) in the case of Āsura-Jīvas;[14] and (iii) perpetual experience of both their Svarūpānanda and misery—which are their deserts and are in keeping with their intrinsic nature, in the case of human souls of the middle category (*madhyamamanuṣya*[15]), with no prospect whatever of enjoying the bliss or misery derived from wordly sources.[16] For, in the absence of obscuration of Svarūpānanda, etc. there is nothing to prevent the full, complete and perpetual experience of whatever is the constitutive essence of each distinct class of Souls by those belonging to it, for all time (including the state of bondage).[17]

Śaṁkara's Interpretation.

Utkrāntyadhikaraṇam. (ii.3, 19-32)

According to S. the *Utkrāntyadhikaraṇa* covers all the *fourteen* Sūtras from 19 to 32, of which the first ten are reserved for the Pūrvapakṣa and the remaining four beginning with *Tadguṇasāratvāt* * * * embody the Siddhānta. The topic dealt with is the size of the soul—whether it is atomic, medium-sized or infinite (*vibhu*). The Pūrvapakṣa is expounded in the first *ten* Sūtras in favor of the self's atomicity.

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13 मनुष्योत्तमाना परिग्रहाय देवादीनामित्येतत् व्याचष्टे मोक्षयोग्यानामिति। (Ragh. *TPB.* ii.3 32)

14. यदि जीवस्वरूपस्यानदादिरूपत्वमगीकृत्यावरणाभावात् व्यक्तिरावणनिवृत्तिर्मोक्षे नाभीक्रियते, तर्हि देवादीना मोक्षयोग्याना नित्यमानन्दाद्यनुभव· स्यात्। असुरादीना न कदाप्यानन्दानुभव· स्यात्। दु खाद्यनुभव एव भवेत्। (*TP.* ii.3.32)

भाष्ये * * * असुराणामानदाद्यनुपलाब्धिर्नापाद्यते किंतु, तत्प्रयोजिका सुखाद्युपलब्धिविरुद्धा स्वरूपदु खाद्युपलब्धिरापाद्यत इत्याह–दु.खाद्यनुभव एव भवेदिति। (*TC.* p. 957 b)

15. मध्यममनुष्याणा च नित्यमानदादीनामुपलब्धि· केवलतदुपलब्ध्यभावो दु खाद्युपलब्धिश्च समैव स्यात्। (*TP.* ii.3.32)

16 मध्यममनुष्याणा मिश्ररूपत्वात् स्वरूपभूतस्य सुखस्य दु खस्य चोपलब्धि समैव स्यात्। नतु कदाचित् विषय-सुख दु खोपलब्धि (*BD.* ii.3.32)

17. व्यक्त्यनगीकारे–देवाना नित्योपलब्धिरानन्दादीनामसुराणा नित्यानुपलब्धि, मनुष्याणा च नित्योपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी प्रसज्येते।

'नित्यानदो नित्यज्ञानो नित्यबल परात्मा, नैवमसुरा एवमनेव च मनुष्या' इत्याग्निवेश्यश्रुतिः। भविष्यत्पुराणे च

नित्यानदज्ञानबला देवा नैवं तु दानवा।
दु खोपलब्धिमात्रास्ते मानुषास्तूभयात्मका।
* * * *
सम्यज्ज्ञानं तु देवाना मनुष्याणां विमिश्रितम्।
विपरीत तु दैत्याना ज्ञानस्यैवं व्यवस्थिति॥

इति (*M. BSB.* ii.3.32)

of B.[8] The objection that as this bliss is the essence of selfhood it cannot remain unapprehended when self-awareness is already there is not a formidable one. What is asserted by the Siddhāntin is *not* that there is merely a non-awareness of innate bliss in the state of Samsāra but that such bliss lies obscured by a positive force, other than mere absence of awareness,[9] which goes by the name of *Bhāvarūpa-ajñāna* in Vedānta.[10]

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8. भवत्येवानन्दादिरूपो जीवः। न चोक्तश्रुतियुक्तिविरोधः। यथा पुरुषस्योपिदादीना अपत्योत्पत्तिशक्तिस्वरूपत्वेऽपि कालतः तदनभिव्यक्तेर्नायं पूर्वं पुमानिदानीं तु पुमान् इत्यादि युज्यते, एवं जीवस्वरूपत्वेन मुक्तेः पूर्वमपि सतो ज्ञानानन्दादेरीश्वरप्रसादेनाभिव्यक्तिनिमित्तेन, आनन्दीभवति इत्यादिव्यपदेशोपपत्तेः। प्रागनभिव्यक्तत्वेनानुभवाभावप्रसंगात्। तदभिव्यक्त्यर्थं च मुमुक्षुणा प्रयत्नोपपत्तेरिति भावः। (*TP.* ii.3.31)

9. न चावरणानुपपत्तिः। ज्ञानाभावातिरिक्ततन्निमित्ताविद्याभ्युपगमात्। (*TP.* ii.3.31)

10. Cf. तदर्थमावरणं किं ज्ञानाभाव एव, किंवा ज्ञानाभावादिनिमित्तं भावान्तरमिति चिन्ता (*TC.* p. 956) तदर्थं, मदावरणत्वं किं ज्ञानाभावस्यैव, उत तन्निमित्तभावरूपाज्ञानस्य? (Raghu. *TPB.*)

11. अस्येत्यस्ति त्रिविधजीवराशिपरोऽयमंशश्च। (*TDP*)

12. मुक्तौ स्वानन्दादिपरस्याभिव्यक्त्यनङ्गीकारे इति भाष्य एवोक्तम्. (Vādirāja *TPG.* p. 102)
'अन्यथा'—आवरणानङ्गीकारे। (*TDP*)

(i) perpetual experience (*nityopalabdhi*) of their Svarūpānanda, Svarūpajñāna, etc. in the case of Muktiyogas;[13] (ii) perpetual experience (*nityopalabdhi*) of misery (without scope for enjoyment of bliss even from worldly sources) in the case of Āsura-Jīvas;[14] and (iii) perpetual experience of both their Svarūpānanda and misery—which are their deserts and are in keeping with their intrinsic nature, in the case of human souls of the middle category (*madhyamamanuṣya*[15]), with no prospect whatever of enjoying the bliss or misery derived from wordly sources.[16] For, in the absence of obscuration of Svarūpānanda, etc. there is nothing to prevent the full, complete and perpetual experience of whatever is the constitutive essence of each distinct class of Souls by those belonging to it, for all time (including the state of bondage).[17]

Saṁkara's Interpretation.

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According to S. the *Utkrāntyadhikaraṇa* covers all the *fourteen* Sūtras from 19 to 32, of which the first ten are reserved for the Pūrvapakṣa and the remaining four beginning with *Tadguṇasāratvāt* * * * embody the Siddhānta. The topic dealt with is the size of the soul—whether it is atomic, medium-sized or infinite (*vibhu*). The Pūrvapakṣa is expounded in the first *ten* Sūtras in favor of the self's atomicity.

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13. मनुष्योत्तमानां परिग्रहाय देवादीनामित्येतत् व्याचष्टे मोक्षयोग्यानामिति। (Ragh. *TPB.* ii.3.32)

14 यदि जीवस्वरूपस्यानदादिरूपत्वमगीकृत्यावरणाभावात् व्यक्तिरावणनिवृत्तिर्मोक्षे नागीक्रियते, तर्हि देवादीना मोक्षयोग्याना नित्यमानन्दाद्यनुभव' स्यात्। असुरादीना न कदाप्यानन्दानुभव' स्यात्। दु खाद्यनुभव एव भवेत्। (*TP.* ii.3.32)

भाष्ये * * * असुराणामानदाद्यनुपलाब्धिर्नापाद्यते किंतु, तत्प्रयोजिका सुखाद्युपलब्धिविरुद्धा स्वरूपदु खाद्युपलब्धिरापाद्यत इत्याह–दुःखाद्यनुभव एव भवेदिति। (*TC.* p. 957 b)

15 मध्यममनुष्याणा च नित्यमानदादीनामुपलब्धि केवलतदुपलब्ध्यभावो दु खाद्युपलब्धिश्च समैव स्यात्। (*TP.* ii.3.32)

16 मध्यममनुष्याणा मिश्ररूपत्वात् स्वरूपभूतस्य सुखस्य दु खस्य चोपलब्धिः समैव स्यात्। नतु कदाचित् विषय-सुख दु खोपलब्धि· (*BD.* ii.3.32)

17. व्यक्त्यनगीकारे–देवाना नित्योपलब्धिरानन्दादीनामसुराणा नित्यानुपलब्धिः, मनुष्याणा च नित्योपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी प्रसज्येते।

'नित्यानदो नित्यज्ञानो नित्यबल. परात्मा, नैवमसुरा एवमनेव च मनुष्या' इत्याग्निवेश्यश्रुतिः। भविष्यत्पुराणे च

नित्यानदज्ञानबला देवा नैव तु दानवा.।
दु खोपलब्धिमात्रास्ते मानुपास्तूभयात्मना।

* * * *

सम्यज्ज्ञानं तु देवाना मनुष्याणां विमिश्रितम्।
विपरीत तु दैत्यानां ज्ञानस्यैवं व्यवस्थितिः॥

इति (M. *BSB.* ii.3.32)

Pūrvapakṣa

The Śrutis say—"This self is atomic." This must indeed be so on account of the reference in Śrutis to the Soul's passing out of the body. going to heaven, etc., and returning from there. This is compatible only with *aṇutva*. For, a being of infinite size cannot be going or coming. The second Sūtra argues that granting that "going out" can somehow be explained with reference to a pervasive being, in the sense of its ceasing to be the owner of the body it has left behind, the other two movements of going to other worlds and returning from there cannot be adequately explained without assuming the soul to be atomic in size. The third Sūtra disarms the objection that in the Śruti, the self is referred to as "the great unborn one who consists of knowledge and is surrounded by the Prāṇas (*Bṛh. Up.* iv.4.22); "Like ether he is omnipresent and eternal" (   ); "Truth, knowledge and infinite is B." (*Taitt. Up.* ii, 1) by pointing out that the subject matter there is B. and *not* the individual self.[18] The fourth Sūtra mentions the different statements in the Śruti "this Ātman is atomic" (*Muṇḍ.* Up. iii.1.9) and the reference to his dimension as part of the hundredth part of the tip of a hair subdivided into a hundred parts (*Śvet. Up.* v. 9) and the conclusion that "he makes for infinitude" (*ānantya*). From this the measure of Jīva can be understood to be atomic by a process of fractional abstraction.[19] The same Śruti also tells us "the lower one (Jīva) is seen to be small like the point of a goad" (*Śvet.* v. 9). Sūtra 23 shows that there is no difficulty in an atomic self being able to experience sensations all over the body thro' the skin (sense of touch) which is in connection with the whole body, like a drop of sandal ointment which causes the perception of a pleasant sensation all over the body tho' itself abiding in one particular place in the body. The next Sūtra disarms the objection that there is no parallelism between the two cases of sandal ointment and the self which has no special abode in the body. The Sūtra cites the authority of the Śruti (*Praśna Up.* iii.6; *Chān. Up.* viii.3.3) which fix the soul's abode in the heart. Sūtra 25 gives another argument to show how an atomic self can have experience throughout the body like a light placed in one place in a room lighting up the whole place. The soul can also similarly pervade the body with its quality of intelligence. Sūtra 26 refutes the contention that a quality cannot stretch itself beyond the substance, by citing the example of odor. Sūtra 28

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19. उद्धृत्य मानमुन्मानम् । बालाग्रादुद्धृतः शततमो भागः तस्मादपि शततमादुद्धृतः मानमात्रमिति । (*Bhāmatī*) "A measure which is distinct from all gross measures" (Radhakrishnan *Brahmasutra*, p. 407) does *not* bring out the exact sense intended.

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The Siddhānta is introduced by the Sūtra: *Tadguṇasāratvāttu tadvyapadeśaḥ* * * * (ii.3.29) that the declaration that the soul's size is atomic is on account of the soul's having for its essence the quality of *that* (i.e. Buddhi)[21] as in the case of the Prājña (Intelligent Lord)" —i.e. to say just as the Highest self is spoken of as possessing relative minuteness and so on because of the limiting adjuncts of its essence—as in the description: "Smaller than a grain of rice or barley" (*Chān. Up.* iii.14.2).[22] To the objection that if this be so, *then as the* conjunction of the Soul and Buddhi, which are different entities, must *come to an end sometime,* the Soul *then disjoined from* Buddhi *will* either cease to be or at least cease to be a transmigrating self answer *is given in* Sūtra 30, *that there is no fear of such a contingency arising,* as the Buddhi exists as long as the Soul exists in Samsāra.[23]

To another objection that it cannot be maintained that the connection of Ātman with Buddhi lasts as long as the self because in the state of Suṣupti and Pralaya no connection can be acknowledged between Buddhi and the self answer is given[24] in Sūtra 31, that just as virile power which exists in a potential state in childhood becomes manifest in adolescence, the connection with Buddhi exists in Suṣupti and Pralaya in its potential form and it becomes manifest when the *waking state or the period of creation begins.*[25]

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21 तस्या बुद्धेर्गुणास्तद्गुणा:, इच्छा द्वेष, सुख दु:ख इत्येवमादय: तद्गुणा सार· प्रधान यस्यात्मन संसारित्वे संभवति, स तद्गुणसार: तस्यभावस्तद्गुणसारत्वम्। नहि बुद्धेर्गुणैर्विना केवलस्यात्मन· ससारित्वमस्ति। (S. *BSB.* ii.3.29)

22 एवमुपाधिगुणसारत्वात् जीवस्याणुत्वादिव्यपदेश प्राज्ञवत्। यथा प्राज्ञस्य परमात्मन· सगुणेषूपासनेषु उपाधिगुणसारत्वात् अणीयस्त्वादिव्यपदेश. 'अणीयान् व्रीहेर्यवात् वा' 'मनोमय प्राणशरीर' इत्येवमकार, तद्वत्। (*ibid*)

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24 ननु, सुप्तिप्रलययोर्न शक्यते बुद्धिसबन्ध आत्मनोऽभ्युपगन्तुम्। तत्कथ यावदात्मभावित्वं बुद्धिसबन्धस्येति ? अत्रोच्यते। (S. *BSB.* ii.3.31)

25 यथा लोके पुस्त्वादीनि बीजात्मना विद्यमानान्येव बाल्यादिष्वनुपलभ्यमानानि यौवनादिष्वाविर्भवन्ति एवमयमपि बुद्धिसबन्ध: शक्त्यात्मना विद्यमान एव सुप्तिप्रलययो. पुन: प्रबोधप्रसवयोराविर्भवति। (S. *BSB.* ii.3.32)

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The last Sūtra points out that if the contact with the Buddhi or the mind of such a description is not admitted, there will result (either) the perpetual perception because there is the conjunction of the Soul and the senses and the objects of sense — the three together constituting the instruments of perception. If on the conjunction of these requisites, perception does not follow, there will be perpetual non-perception;[26] or else one will have to assume that there is something that is limiting or restraining the power of either the senses or of the self—for neither of which there is any warranty.[27]

Criticism

The way in which S. has so generously allotted *ten Sūtras* to the *Pūrvapakṣa* takes one's breath away.[28] The *utkrānti, gati* and *āgati* of the Jīvātman are built-in features of the Sūtrakāra's own doctrine of transmigration and eschatology. They are part of his Siddhānta positions and cannot, therefore, be treated as relevant only for purposes of the Pūrvapakṣa. This can be seen from (i) the adhikaraṇas in Adhy. III Pāda i, where the Sūtrakāra speaks of the Jīva's migration from this body to others in order to reap the fruits of past Karmas (*Tadantarapratipattau ramhati* *** iii.1.1) of (ii) his descent into the mortal world after the exhaustion of his good works and the enjoyment of their rewards in the celestial world, with the residual karma, along the path he had gone by or by a different one (*Yathetam anevam* ca iii.1.8); (iii) how he goes to the abode of Yama to suffer the consequences of his bad deeds (iii.1.13) and (iv) how he proceeds by the path of light to Brahmoloka (iv.3.1).

It is to the Jīvātman that these adhi.s must refer as the transmigrating self, as it cannot be maintained that transmigration and release are for Buddhi. The ten Sūtras which have been quietly turned into Pūrvapakṣa-sūtras, by S. to suit his own purpose, have no distinguishing marks of Pūrvapakṣa-sūtras upon them. Nor has any attempt been made to refute the points raised in any of them in any of the Siddhānta

26. तदवश्यमन्तःकरणमस्तीत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम्। अन्यथा, नित्योपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिप्रसंगः स्यात्। आत्मेन्द्रियविषयाणामुपलब्धिसाधनानां सन्निधाने सति, नित्यमेवोपलब्धिः प्रसज्येत अथ, सत्यपि हेतुसमवधाने फलाभावस्ततो नित्यमेवानुपलब्धिः प्रसज्येत। न चैवं दृश्यते। (S. BSB. ii.3 32)

27. अथवा, अन्यतरस्यात्मन इन्द्रियस्य वा शक्तिप्रतिबन्धोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः। (S. BSB. ii.3.32)

28 Thibaut (Op. cit. Introdn. p. lv) is struck "at the outset by the *unusual length to which the mere defence of a Pūrvapakṣa is carried*" in S's interpretation. But the other circumstance of this *unusually lengthy Pūrvapakṣa remaining unanswered in the body of the Sutras* does not seem to have struck him at all. Read: न चाभिस्पष्टेन पूर्वपक्षोक्तस्यानिबन्धनेन निरसितं गम्यते। न चोक्तं सिद्धान्तनिराकरणमिति वाच्यम्: अनुक्तिस्यासिद्धान्तत्वात्। पूर्वेषु निरस्तपक्षान्तराम, उन्मूत्र पोन्नेशमीव स्तत्र तत्र सिद्धान्तदुर्घटत्वं इति न समञ्जसमाभाति (Trivikrama *TD.* ii.3 29).

Sūtras as S. would have them.[29] *This should strike any detached observer as very strange.*[30] What S has done is to refute them *suo moto*. Sūtra 21 which, however, carries the clear mark of a Pūrvapakṣa on itself, in the earlier part, immediately silences the Pūrvapakṣa with a suitable reply and confirms that the Jīvātman should be deemed to be atomic in size.

Belvalkar has entered a feeble plea that "as the Sūtrakāra has refuted the doctrine of Atomism as put forth by the Vaiśeṣikas, the *aṇutva* cannot connote *nityatva* or what is the same thing, the individual soul's atomic size need not be associated with him for all time but that it can be destroyed or replaced by vibhutva" (*Basu Mallik Lectures on Vedanta*, 1925, p. 159).

This is frivolous. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas are not interested in the *aṇutva* of Jīvas. Their Ātman is *Vibhu*. The Sūtrakāra's objection is to the Vaiśeṣika's theory of atomic genesis (*Paramāṇvārambhaāvda*) *of the world*, which he has refuted in *II.2.11-12*. But it would not necessarily follow as a corollary from that refutation that he is equally against recognising the size of the Jīva to be atomic. *The one has nothing to do with the other.* The question of the atomicity of the self is being discussed by the Sūtrakāra *entirely on the basis of Scriptural evidence, by resolving conflict of testimony.* The problem is not the acceptance of atomic genesis or its application to the Soul, which is not a product (*Kāryadravya*). *This should suffice to dispose of Belvalkar's ingenious but irrelevant plea.*

It is customary for S. and his commentators to shift the ground from Vyavahāra to Parmārtha, as often as it is convenient for them to do so. Belvalkar has come out with the same plea that "from the point of view of ordinary Vyahavāra, there is nothing wrong in declaring the soul to be of atomic size but we cannot follow R. and others in *thinking that even in the* liberated condition, the soul should retain that size" (*Basu Mallik Lectures on Vedānta*, pp. 159-60).

We may remind ourselves *that the discussion is being carried* on here by the Sūtrakāra to determine *the intrinsic size of the Jīva in* its Paramārtha aspect, against the conflict of the Śrutis, such as it is. If we go strictly by the evidence of the Sūtras, we find no proof in them

29. उत्क्रान्त्यादिसूत्राणां शकालिंगरहितानामुत्तरसूत्रेष्वनुक्तपरिहाराणां च कथं शंकासूत्रत्वम्? कथं च 'नाणुरतच्छ्रुतेरिति चेत्' इति शकालिंगसहितसूत्रोक्तस्य उक्तश्रुत्यादिविरुद्धस्य च महत्त्वस्य सिद्धान्तत्वम्? न ह्युत्तरसूत्रेषु परिहार उक्तः। किन्तु, स्वयमेव सूत्रव्याख्यानव्याजेन सूत्राणि दूषितानि (*TC*. p. 958).

30. It is the normal practice in Sūtra works to do so. Cf. *PMS*. i, 2, 2, 4, 12-16, i.2.31-38; i.2. 43-49.
NyS. ii. 1. 47, 58-60,
Paṇini 1. 2. 51; 53.

for holding the view that while the soul may be conceded to be atomic in the Vyavahāra state which will accommodate the Pūrvapakṣa view, its intrinsic size is established to be *vibhu,* in the Siddhānta Sūtras, which represent the Paramārtha position.

There are many hurdles in the way of accepting the interpretation which S. has put on Sūtra 29 itself (the opening of the Siddhānta, according to him). The acceptance of the conclusion that the Jīva has a different size from *aṇutva,* in reality, depends entirely on the acceptability of his interpretation of Sūtra 29 as a Siddhānta Sūtra of the Utkrāntyadhikaraṇa, quite apart from the other point whether the expression 'Tat' in *Tadguṇasāratvāt* in Sūtra 29 can be taken to denote Buddhi, which has *not* been referred to earlier. Bhāskara has, no doubt, put in that it is passible to see a reference to Buddhi or antaḥkaraṇa in the word 'Tat' — as Buddhi and the mind have been mentioned in Sūtra ii, 3, 15, under the names Vijñānamanasī[31] However, the difficulty created by the Sūtrakāra's expression "Yāvadātmabhāvitvāt" in the next Sūtra would be insurmountable for both S. and Bhāskara, tho' the latter may somehow concede that the Jīvātman is really of the essence of Buddhi in Samsāra. But it is more than doubtful as Belvalkar himself points out "whether in S.'s own system, the qualities of Buddhi can, with any propriety be said to constitute the *essence* of the soul, *even in the Samsāra* state. The essence of the soul, in whatever state, according to S.'s system is knowledge or intelligence and whatever is due to its association with Buddhi is non-essential, or more strictly, unreal, false". (Op. cit. p. lvi).

The commentators like S. and Bhāskara who have held that the Sūtra: Tadguṇasāratvāttu..." represents the Siddhānta that the Jīvātman is not atomic in essence but is only adventitiously so will find it almost impossible to give a convincing and satisfactory answer to the points raised by Vyāsatīrtha as to why (i) the ten Sūtras supposed by them to constitute the Pūrvapakṣa do *not* carry any distinctive marks of Pūrvapakṣa on them; (ii) why no attempt has been made to refute their points in any of the Siddhānta Sūtras here and (iii) why there is no categorical assertion in Sūtra ii, 3, 29 to the effect that the Jīva is *vibhu;* instead of its being left to be gathered by implication from the analogy in *"Prājñavat" which is open to other interpretations also.*

S. faces another discomfiture in the expression "Sāra" in "Tadguṇasāra" applied to the Jīva, in Sūtra 29. This word is primarily used and

31. तदिति बुद्धिरन्तः करणम्–'अन्तरा विज्ञानमनसी' (ii. 3.15) इति वृत्तं परामृश्यते। तस्य गुणाः रागादयो ऽहं प्रत्ययाधमाः, सारः प्रधानं संसरणे यस्य जीवस्य स तद्गुणसारो वियदादिभिः सूक्ष्मावस्थैः इन्द्रियैश्च तदाश्रितैः पंचवृत्तिना च वायुना परिवेष्टितः तत्स्वभावानुविधायी संसरतीत्यर्थः।

(Bhāskara *BSB.* ii. 3. 29).

understood in the sense of *intrinsic essence,*—something belonging to the core of things and not an external attribute or adventitious limiting adjunct *(aupādhikadharma)*, such as the suffusion of the self by Buddhi. To S. then, the limitation by or association with Buddhi and its qualities or phases *must, in fact,* remain the non-essence *(a-sāra)* of *Ātman* and *not* his *Sāra* or essence! This disconcerting expression of the Sūtrakāra puts him in a very awkward position from which he tries to come out by suggesting that the qualities of Buddhi are spoken of as the essence or principal characteristics of Ātman, *within the Saṃsāra stage.*

But the term *'saṃsāritve'* (during the transmigration state) is S.'s *own addition* to the Sūtra and is *not found there.* To make matters worse, the Sūtrakāra all unmindful of S.'s difficulties, goes on in the next Sūtra too, to affirm that this *'Tadguṇasāratva'* (whatever it may be) is "coterminous with the Ātman"—and as such bound *to last as long as the Ātman himself will last: Yāvadātmabhāvitvāt* (ii.3.30).

Here, again, S. is ready with his prevarication and emendation— "as long as the Ātman remains in transmigration *(Yāvad ātmā saṃsārī bhavati)* — " suggesting that once transmigration is over, the Jīva will regain his *vibhutva.* But the point is all this is reading his own ideas into the Sūtra and not giving a natural and faithful interpretation of its wording without straining it to suit a preconceived idea.

The difficulty is that the interpretation put on what S. regards as the Siddhānta Sūtra viz. *Tadguṇasāratvāttu***** is neither convincing nor sustainable. It takes too much for granted and leaves much unexplained. The conclusion that the size of the Jīva is *not* atomic but all-pervasive in reality is *not* articulated *in the wording of Sūtra 29* अत व्याप्त्यसाधनात् (TD, ii.3.29) as one would expect, after the impressive array of Pūrvapakṣas presented and cogently argued over *as many as ten Sūtras!* Even according to S.'s own showing, there is no categorical pronouncement on the question in Sūtra 29 — which merely *explains how* and why the Jīvātman is said to be atomic in size. It does not say in so many words that its real size is different. It is left to be gathered by implication and from the analogy indicated by the words *Prājñavat* whose import may be different from what S. thinks it to be.

It will not do to play hide and seek with the conditioned and unconditioned states of Jīvātman or B. in coming to grips with the interpretation of these Sūtras. *The universe of discourse* must be clearly defined to permit a definite conclusion to emerge. We have to ask S.

what precisely is the term Jīva intended to convey in this context of the *utkrānti* and others which follow. Is it the unconditioned B. that is suggested by Lakṣaṇāvṛtti by the term 'Jīva', in this context; or does the term Jīva, about whose size the inquiry is being pursued, stand for the *unconditioned* B. delimited by antaḥkaraṇa or by Avidyā; or the reflection of that B. thro' Upādhis—i.e. to say, the qualified one (*viśiṣṭa*)?

It is out of the question to make the unconditioned B. the subject of the adhi. because it has been affirmed by the *Kalpataru* that in this Pāda, the inquiry regarding the Śuddha-Brahman is *concluded before* the *Carācarādhikaraṇa* (ii.3.16) and that from Carācarādhi, till the end of this Pāda, the inquiry is about the Jīva.[32] This precludes any person from ushering in B. into the present field of inquiry about the size of the Jīva by way of shifting the point of view from the Jīva-level to Brahman-level. Moreover, the adhi. evidently seeks to resolve the conflict of testimony regarding the size of the Jīva.[33] This conflict regarding *aṇutva* is only with reference to the Jīvātman and *not* with reference to the unconditioned B.—as there is no Śruti text attributing *utkrānti, gati* and *āgati* to B. Any difficulty caused by the reference to B as confined to a minute space has already been set at rest in Sūtra i.2.7. There is thus no possibility of any Pūrvapakṣa arising with reference to or implicating B. in this context.[34]

Thus, as B. does not and cannot come into the present picture of this adhi. as the subject of inquiry (*jijñāsādharmi*) and only the Jīvātman could be the proper subject of the adhi, the conclusion established by S. that the *utkrānti* etc. are to be viewed only from the point of view of the adjunct of Buddhi etc. and the illustration of B. in terms of imagining the all-pervasive B. to be atomic for the sake of meditation are all irrelevant to the theme.

On the other hand—if, by the term Jīva, here, is meant pure consciousness conditioned by Avidyā or the reflection (pratibimba) of B. thro' upādhis, such a being would *a priori* be limited by Avidyā and, therefore, non-pervasive and cannot be invested with pervasiveness (*mahatparimāṇa*) in reality, as required by S.'s Siddhānta.[35]

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32. एवं तावत् तत्पदवाच्यकारणत्वनिर्णयाय भूतोत्पत्तिश्रुतिविरोधो निरस्त.। इदानीमापादसमाप्ते: त्वपदार्थशुद्धं जीवविषयश्रुतिकलहो वारयिष्यते। (*Op. Cit.* ii.3 16)

33. 'आत्मैवास्य ज्योतिरित्यादिश्रुतीनां 'पश्यश्चक्षु' शृण्वन् श्रोत्र' मित्यादिश्रुतिभि: जीवस्यागन्तुकज्ञानत्ववादिनीभिविरोध: परिह्रियते। (*Op. Cit.* ii.3.18)

34. शुद्धे उत्क्रान्त्यादिश्रुतेरभावेन, अणुत्वश्रुतेश्च व्योमवदित्यादौ गतेरुक्तत्वेन पूर्वपक्षस्यानुदयाच्च। (*TC.* p. 960 b)

35. विशिष्टे परिच्छिन्नाविद्यादिनावच्छिन्ने महत्त्वायोगात्। (*TC.* p. 960 b)

His explanation that the texts referring to the Soul's passing out of the body, its going and coming are all to be viewed as being imputed to it because of its being imagined to be connected with Buddhi and its qualities is not sustainable. For, we see from such texts as *Tam utkrāmantam Prāṇo anūtkrāmati* (*Brh. Up.* iv, 4.2), as interpreted by S. himself, that Śārīra-Ātmā makes his exit from the body even *before Prāṇa*, *Buddhi* and other principles make *their* exit.[36] For this reason, it will not be correct to maintain that Jīva is conditioned by Buddhi at the time of exit. It should be clarified further if the passing out of the body, moving to other worlds, etc. of Buddhi entails any corresponding passing out or going into other worlds in Ātman or simply whether such passing out etc. pertaining to Buddhi is *superimposed* on Jīva, or just attributed to him as a mere mode of speech (*upacāra*).[37]

The first alternative cannot be accepted. We do not find, for example, any movement in Ākāśa delimited by a pot when the pot itself is moved to another place. Otherwise, one should find a vacuum in the place wherefrom the pot or Buddhi has moved and an augmentation of the presence of Ākāśa or Ātman at the place it has gone to[38] Nor can it be said that the movement of Buddhi is superimposed on Ātman. For in Adhy. III.1. the Sūtrakāra recognizes the fact of Jīvātman's descent into this world from the smoke to the clouds, from the clouds to Ākāśa, thence to the moon's world and from the light to the day, from day to the bright half of the month etc.,—either by the same way he went up or by a different way, in order to enjoy the fruits of his residual Karma.

This disposes of the superimposition theory or treating such movements of the Jīvātman as "a mere mode of speech".[39] We cannot satisfy our conscience with the usual explanation that there is some sort of a Vyāvahārika-passing out of the body and peregrinations in the other worlds, even tho' in actual fact, the movement of Buddhi is superimposed on Atman. The Ātman being *amūrta* (formless) there is no Vyā-

36. 'तमुत्क्रामन्तं प्राणोऽनूत्क्रामति' इति श्रुतौ त्वद्रीत्या प्राणाख्यबुद्धिगतित· प्रागेव जीवगत्युक्त्या तस्या बुद्ध्युपाधिकत्वायोगात्। (*TC.* p. 961)

37. किं च, बुद्धिगतेन गत्यादिना तदवच्छिन्नात्मनि गत्यादिर्जायते, किंवा बुद्धिगतमेवारोप्यते, उपचर्यते वा? (*TC.* p. 961)

38. घटगत्या तदवच्छिन्ननभसि गत्यन्तरादृष्टेः अन्यथा, यतो घटस्य बुद्धेर्वा गतिः तत्राकाशस्यात्मनो वा सच्छिद्रत्वं, यत्र गतिस्तत्र द्विगुणीकृत्य वृत्तिश्च स्यात्। (*TC.* p. 961)

39 वैराग्यपादे 'यथेतमनेव च' इत्यादिसूत्रै त्वद्रीत्यापि कर्मफलभोगाय धूमादिमार्गेण गत्यादिप्रतिपादकत्वेन निर्णीतानां धूमादभ्रमभ्रादाकाशमित्यादिश्रुतीनां, 'धूमो रात्रि' इत्यादिस्मृतीनां चाबाधेऽप्यत्यन्ताप्रामाण्योपचरितार्थत्वयोरयोगात्। (*TC.* p. 962 *b*)
Cf. Ranade: "Bādarāyana views self as non-spatial and regards transmigration as a mere mode of speech" *Op. cit.* (p. 121).

vahārika movement seen when an Amūrtadravya comes to be delimited by a mūrta-dravya.[40] Even the Advaitin will not be prepared to concede, for example, that the limitation of Ākāśa brought about by conditioning by a pot can be described as a Vyāvahārika—limitation, on a par with the Vyāvahārikatva signified by its possession of *mahatparimāṇa*.[41] Nor can it be said that the Śrutis referring to the Soul's passing out of the body is really true of Buddhi and that, therefore, there is no question of its being a mere mode of speech.[42]

The evidence of Śrutis, Smṛtis and Sūtra bear out the fact that all such movements are movements directly of the Soul itself.[43]

We find enough evidence in the Śruti, Smṛti and Sūtras that the upward movement of the purified Jīva continues *even after the liquidation of Avidyā* and the bonds of the Vyāvahārika world. Śrutis like:—

Tena pradyotenaiṣa ātmā niṣkrāmati cakṣuṣo vā mūrdhno vā anyebhyo vā śarīradeśebhyaḥ (*Bṛh. Up.* iv, 4.2): "By that light the self departs either thro' the eye or thro' the head or thro' other apertures of the body"; *Tayordhvam āyan amṛtatvam eti* (*Kaṭha, Up.* ii, 3.16): Going upward thro' that artery one becomes immortal" *Muktopasṛpyavyapadeśāt* (B.S. i.3.2) "In view of the statement in Śruti that It is to be approached by the released souls"

ब्रह्मणा सह ते सर्वे संप्राप्ते प्रतिसंचरे ।
परस्यान्ते कृतात्मानः प्रविशन्ति परं पदम् ।

"At the end of the age of a hundred years of Brahmā, when dissolution of all effects take place, they all go to the highest B. together with Brahmā".

S.'s supposition that there is no passing out or movement of Ātman other than the movements of the mind or Buddhi is *not* true to facts recorded in the Śrutis. In:

Mana udakrāman mīlita ivāśnan piban āstaiva (*A.Ā.* ii.1.4) "The mind went out of the body but he remained inattentive eating and

40. न च व्यावहारिकस्य गत्यादे मत्यत्वान्नात्यन्ताप्रामाण्यम् । अमूर्ते मूर्तावच्छिन्नेऽपि व्यावहारिकगत्यदृष्टेः । (*TC.* p. 962 b)

41. नहि घटोपाधिकं नभस· परिछिन्नत्वं महत्त्वमिव व्यावहारिकम् ! (*Op. cit.*)

42. न च गत्यादिश्रुतिः बुद्धिमात्रविषयत्वान्नोपचरितार्थेति युक्तम् ।

43. 'नाकस्य पृष्ठे सुकृतेऽनुभूत्वेमं लोकं हीनतरं वाविशन्ति' (*Muṇḍ.* 1.2.10) 'ते शुभमनुभूयावर्तन्ते पुनः कर्म कुर्वन्ति, पुनर्गच्छन्ति' इत्यादिश्रुतौ क्षयमने त्वनुभूयेतरेषा आरोहावरोहौ तद्गतिदर्शनात् (*BS.* iii. 1. 14) इति सूत्रे च गतेःसुखदुःखानुभवस्यसमारसामानाधिकरण्योक्तेः । योनिमन्ये प्रपद्यन्ते शरीरत्वाय देहिनः । स्थाणुमन्येऽनुसयन्ति (*Katha up.* ii. 2. 7) इत्यादिश्रुतौ साक्षाज्जीवगतत्वोक्तेश्च । (*TC.* p. 962 b)

drinking as before" we see there is movement of the Ātman when the mind has left the body. In "He who knows this, on departing from this world, reaching the Annamaya, reaching Prāṇamaya, reaching Manomaya goes up and down these worlds, according to his wishes, assuming desired forms, remains singing the Sāman" (*Taitt. Up.* iii. 10.5) we find there is movement of the *Ātman on its own initiative long after the passing of mind, Prāṇa, etc.*" The *Chān. Up.* (viii.3.4) clearly recognizes the movement of the released soul and its sport. *Muṇḍ. Up.* (iii.1.3) recognizes the movement of the soul even "after becoming free from name and form". *Bṛh. Up.* iv.3.35 compares the *utkrānti of the Śārīra Ātman to the natural movement of a cart.* Another passage there (iv.4.3) refers to the Ātman moving forward from one foothold to another *after having thrown away his body and dispelled Avidyā.*[44] It is meaningless to contend in the face of such clear evidences from the Upaniṣads, as does Dr. K. Narain, that "it is impossible to establish the presence of movement, action etc., in the Jīvātman which is transcendental and is one with the absolute reality because according to S movement etc. really pertain to the intellect and M.'s argument therefore suffers from the fallacy of the unreal probans" (*A Critique of Madhva Refutation of the Samkara School of Vedanta*, Udayana Pub. Allahabad, 1964, p. 308).

In the light of the Śruti:

यथाणुनः चक्षसःप्रकाशो व्याततः एवमेवास्य पुरुषस्य प्रकाशो व्याततोऽणुर्ह्यप पुरुषो भवति (   ) the correct interpretation of the *Śvet. Up.* (v.8) would be that the Jīvātman is pervasive in terms of the quality of Buddhi viz. intelligence but of the measure of the tip of a goad i.e. *aṇu* by the characteristic of selfhood (*ātmaguṇena*). This is because the sense-order overrides the text-order where there is incongruity. In the present case, *the reading Buddher guṇena ātmaguṇena caiva hyrāgramātraḥ* appears to say that both by 'property of self' and by property of Buddhi the self is minute like the point of a goad. This cannot be so because the attribute of Jnāna is *to be pervasive.* There is here no doubt an *adhyāhāra* of the word *Vyāptaḥ* after *Buddher guṇena* as against the *adhyāhāra* of "*Vibhuh*" after *ātmaguṇena.* But the point is that the Ātman being "*nirguṇa*" to S. it will not be possible for him to have the meaning *ātmaguṇena vibhuḥ,* in any case.[45]

S. has held that as *Śvet. Up.* v.9 refers to the Jīvātman "making for infinitude" (*aānantyāya kalpate*) the reference to his atomicity in the earlier part of the same verse must be deemed to be due to Upādhis.

44. *TC.* p. 962.

45. बुद्धेर्ज्ञानस्य गुणेन व्याप्तः अपरः आत्मगुणेन च आराग्रमात्र इत्यन्वयात्। पाठक्रमादर्थक्रमस्य बलीयस्त्वात्। त्वन्मते आत्मनो निर्गुणत्वाच्च। (*TC.* p. 963 b)

But this reference to *ānantya* as being something "*to be* achieved" (cf. '*kalpate*') by the Ātman would be inappropriate from S.'s point of view as it is *ever present* (*siddha*) in the self. Consistency is restored between the *upakrama* and the *upasamhāra* if we take *ānantya* in the simple sense of freedom from (birth and) death.[46]

We cannot agree with S. that: *Kasmin nvaham utkrānte utkrānto bhaviṣyāmi* (*Praśna* vi.3) endorses the position that the passing out is conditioned by upādhis. For this text pertains to the *Sṛṣṭiprakaraṇa* (See *ibid.* vi.4) and the "Aham" there is correlated to B. It is quite in order to construe that B. in one of its forms in the body passaes out with Prāṇa—even as the mother cow may be seen running when she finds her calf running. We have clear reference to the Supreme Brahman in his "Prājña-Form" passing out riding over the Śārīra-Ātman (Bṛh. Up. iv.3.35).[47]

Śaṁkara's Sūtrārtha Examined

S.'s interpretation of individual Sūtras of this *adhi.* both of the Pūrvapakṣa and the Siddhānta is weak and unsatisfactory in many respects. The opening Sūtra is perhaps the only exception. Under the second Sūtra: *Svātmanā cottarayoḥ* (ii.3.20), he writes "tho' *utkrānti* or passing out of the body may be explained in the sense of the Soul's ceasing to be the ruler of the body without actually moving out of the body, the other two activities (*uttare*) of going to and coming back from the other worlds cannot be otherwise explained and must be held to be connected with the self as the agent., in his own person.[48] This overlooks the fact that going out and coming back are all activities and it seems pointless to concede any exception in respect of the first alone. Having made the exception, the need for the use of the genitive dual where the nominative dual (*uttare*) would have sufficed is not made clear. The reflexive *Sva* in *Svātmanā* would also seem to be superfluous as *Ātmanā cottare* would have been quite sufficient to establish the contention of the Pūrvapakṣa.[49]

Under Sūtra 21, S. makes his Pūrvapakṣin quote the Śrutis: *Satyam jñānam anantam* (*Taitt. Up.* ii.1.1) and *Sa vā eṣa mahān aja*

46. आनन्त्यशब्दस्य मरणादिरूपनाशाभावात्मकमोक्षपरत्वात्। अन्यथा, अनन्तत्वस्य साध्यत्वोक्त्ययोगात्। (*TC.* p. 963 b)

47. यच्चोक्तम्–'कस्मिन्नु अहमुत्क्रान्ते उत्क्रान्तो भविष्यामि' इति श्रुतेर्जीवस्योत्क्रान्त्यादि प्राणोत्क्रान्त्युपाधिकमिति तन्न। अस्य सृष्टिवाक्यस्य ब्रह्मविषयत्वात्। 'वत्से धावति गौर्धावति' इत्यादाविव अत्रापि ब्रह्मणि प्राणोत्क्रमणादन्यस्यैवोत्क्रमणस्य श्रुतेश्च। परमात्मनोऽपि रूपविशेषेणोत्क्रमणस्य 'प्राज्ञेनात्मना' इत्यादिश्रुतिसिद्धत्वाच्च। (*TC.* p. 963 b)

48. उत्क्रान्तिः क्वचिदचलतोऽपि ग्रामस्वाम्यनिवृत्तिवत् देहस्वाम्यनिवृत्त्या कर्मक्षयेणावकल्पेत। उत्तरे तु गत्यागती नाचलतः सम्भवतः। स्वात्मना हि तयोः सम्बन्धः सम्भवति। (S. BSB. ii.3.20)

49. उत्क्रान्तेरपि गत्यादिवत् क्रियात्वेनाविशेषात्। सूत्रे आत्मना चोत्तरे इति निर्देशापत्तेश्च। (*TC.* p. 960)

ātmā (*Bṛh. Up.* iv.4.22) as supporting the contrary view about the Jīvātman's size and refute it by the words: *itarādhikārāt*. We have to say that the Pūrvapakṣa should have made a better choice of the text even to refute a tottering case! For *Satyam jñānam anantam* is so obviously the text associated with B. It offers not the slightest basis for any doubt to be raised in favor of its being appropriated to the Jīvātman.[50] As for *Eṣa mahān aja ātmā* (*Bṛh. Up.* iv.4.22) S. himself has accepted that it is the Jīvātman that is the actual subject of the discourse,[51] at the commencement, whose identity with B. is, however, asserted at the Upasaṃhāra: *Anūdya saṃsārisvarūpaṃ pareṇa brahmaṇā asyaikatām vivakṣati* (S. *BSB.* i.3.42).

Sūtra 22, according to S. reinforces the Pūrvapakṣa position by appealing to the evidence of *Svaśabda* (word for one's self—or Jīvātman) and the ground of *unmāna* (*Śvet. Up.* v.8). If the purpose of this Sūtra is to establish the atomicity of the Jīva (for the Pūrvapakṣa), it should have been placed immediately *after* Sūtra 19 as furnishing another clinching material evidence in favor of Jīva's *aṇutva*, so as to have an orderly presentation.

Sūtra 26, according to S., supplies only another illustration that a property can extend beyond the substance.[52] In that case, we should expect the presence of a "*vā*" after the words *Gandhavat* here, as after *Guṇād* in Sūtra 25. The absence of vā shows that the purpose of the Sūtra as envisaged by the Sūtrakāra is different from what S. thinks it to be (See M. in this connection).

S.'s harnessing of Sūtras 28-29 for purposes of going into the question of the true relation between the Jīvātman and his intelligence, *deprives the Sūtrakāra of the only opportunity of discussing one of the most important topics of perennial interest to all Vedāntins—the conflict of Bheda and Abheda Śrutis as such—which, by any criterion, ought to have a place and a prominent place too, in this Pāda.* The inadequacy of S.'s interpretation of *Tadguṇasāratvāt*** (ii.3.29) has already been gone into.

According to S. Sūtras 30 and 31 establish that Buddhi remains with the self as its adjunct (*Upādhi*) as long as it goes on transmigrating and that Buddhi is in a potential form in Suṣupti and Pralaya and that it is awakened to activity during waking state or when Crea-

50. सत्यादिवाक्ये जीवविषयत्वशङ्काबीजाभावात्। (TC)

51. 'स वा एष महानज' इत्यत्र तु, त्वन्मते जीवस्यैवाधिकृतत्वात्। (TC: p. 960)

52 एतदपि शब्दद्वारेण दूषयित्वा दृष्टान्तान्तरमाह। (*Bhāmatī* ii.3.26)

tion is started again—like virility dormant in the child manifesting itself in adolescence.[53]

This overlooks the fact that in S.'s own metaphysics, the liquidation of Buddhi in the state of Pralaya has been accepted as a dogma, in order to make Avidyā the sole conditioning factor or determinant of Jīvahood and to establish the non-survival of the ego-principle (*ahamartha*) or the empirical "I" in the state of Suṣupti.[54]

The interpretation of Sūtra 32 establishes the continued existence of the mind (*Buddhi*) in order to account for the fact of perception and show the adverse consequences which are sure to follow if such a necessary factor is not admitted. This too is not satisfactory. The mind is an organ whose existence is pre-eminently established by the evidence of Sākṣipratyakṣa. It does not, therefore, lend itself easily to any doubt as to its existence. It would have been more proper, therefore, to have raised the doubt about the existence of other senses which are supersensuous but are at the same time necessary to account for perception or knowledge. In any case, in terms of S.'s interpretation of Sūtra 32, the expression *"nitya"* in the Sūtra which carries the sense of "eternal" or what is without a future temporal limit, would be overshooting the mark. Even conceding the necessity to recognize the existence of the mind to account for perception, it is difficult to see how S. could avoid the contingency of *nityopalabdhi* thereby. For, the mind itself is *not* atomic to S. as it is to the Naiyāyika. It can therefore be pervasive and be in connection with several sense organs at the same time and it would be equally difficult to preclude constant perception of different kinds on that account. If some special property of concentration or some such trait is to be assumed to preclude such a contingency, a similar characteristic can also be assumed in the Jīva himself *qua aṇu* or in the external senses, which would meet the situation equally well. There is thus nothing to specially commend the acceptance of the interpretation which S. has put upon this Sūtra.[55]

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53. एवमयमपि बुद्धिसंबन्धः शक्त्यात्मना विद्यमान एव सुषुप्तिप्रलययोः पुनः प्रबोधप्रसवयोराविर्भवति।
(S. *BSB.* ii.3.31)

54. तन्न। स्वमतेऽविद्याया एव जीवोपाधित्वार्थं सुषुप्तावहमर्थाभावार्थं च तदा बुद्ध्यभावस्य साधितत्वात्।
(*TC.* p. 963)

55. उक्तरीत्या मनःसिद्धावपि, त्वन्मते तार्किकमत इवाणुत्वाभावेन, युगपदनेकेन्द्रियसंबन्धसंभवेन तद्दशायां नित्योपलब्धिप्रसङ्गाच्च। यदि चानेकेन्द्रियसंबन्धे सत्यपि मनस्येवावधानाख्यः कश्चित् विशेषः कल्प्यते, तर्हि, क्लृप्ते आत्मनि बाह्येन्द्रिये वा स कल्प्यः स्यात्। (*TC.* p. 963)

Rāmānuja's Interpretation
(*Jñādhikaraṇam* ii.3.19-32)

R.'s interpretation of the opening Sūtra of this adhi.: *Jño ata eva* has already been noticed. The other Sūtras of this *adhi.* have been interpreted by him as directly contributing to the establishment of *Jñātṛtva* or knowership being his essential nature, by establishing his atomicity of size.[56] It is absolutely necessary that as a knower the Jīva should be assumed to be of atomic size. Otherwise, being all-pervasive, there will be the adverse contingency of his having consciousness of objects always and everywhere.

Criticism

Despite R.'s contention, the self's atomicity does not seem to have any vital bearing on his being essentially a knower. For tho' itself atomic, the soul is in contact with other pervasive substances like Ākāśa and B. all the time, without being aware of them always. In the same way, there could be some other way of circumventing perpetual perception even tho' the self may also be pervasive.[57] The Self's atomicity does not therefore seem to have any necessary bearing on its having to be recognized as a knower, in essence.

R.'s interpretation of Sūtra 21 is the same as S.'s and is open to the same objection. *If the purpose of Sūtra 23 is to establish the Jīva's* atomicity with an additional reason, its proper place should have been immediately after Sūtra 20 (*utkrānti* ***). Sūtra 27 (*Vyatireko* **) deserves to be used for a better purpose than to adduce just *another illustration*, of the difference between substance and attribute. Even then, there is no special propriety in the preference given to odor when any other example, say color (after light) would have served equally well. This is an indication in itself that the purpose of the illustration of odor may really be quite a different one, as in *M.* Sūtra *29* according to R. establishes that the self is referred to in some Śruti texts as being of the nature of intelligence for this reason that intelligence happens to be its essential property.

विज्ञानगुणसारत्वात् आत्मनो 'विज्ञान'मिति व्यपदेशः : (*Śrībhāṣya.* ii.3.29)

But this principle is not applicable to the odor of musk tho' it is its essential property and lasts as long as the substance endures,—while "intelligence" tho' an essential property of the Self is used synonymously with Ātman. This dissonance between the two cases weakens the force of R.'s interpretation.[58]

56. This special point in R.'s interpretation of the *'Utkrāntyadhikarana'* also as part of Jnādhikaraṇa has *not been brought out by Thibaut* (Tr. S. *BSB.* Intro. p. liv).
57. ज्ञातृस्वभावस्यात्मनोऽणुत्वपक्षे तत्सम्बन्धस्य विभोराकाशेश्वरादेर्नित्यमप्रकाशवत् विभुत्वपक्षेऽपि तत्सम्बन्धस्या प्रकाशोपपत्त्या अणुत्वस्य ज्ञातृस्वभावत्वेऽनुपयोगाच्च । (*TC.* p. 964)
58 गन्धादेः कस्तूर्यादिसारत्वेऽपि यावद्द्रव्यभावित्वेऽपि तत्र गन्धादिशब्दस्य मुख्यत्वाभावाच्च ।(*TC.* p. 965 b)

Under Sūtra 31, R. takes the position that in Suṣupti the essential quality of the self viz. intelligence remains unmanifested and comes to be manifested on regaining the waking state. This overlooks the fact that even in Suṣupti there is not only awareness of the ego as R himself concedes,[59] but awareness of time and bliss. The absence of awareness of external objects for want of sensory contact during the state of Suṣupti does *not* mean or justify R.'s view that intelligence of the self *as such* remains unmanifested in Suṣupti.[60]

The unsatisfactory alignment of the fourteen Sūtras from *Jño ata eva* or *utkrānti* * * comes out from the remarks expressed half-heartedly by many modern scholars like Thibaut and Ghate. They have commented on the unusualness of as many as ten Sūtras being devoted to the Pūrvapakṣa as S. would have it, consoling themselves at the same time that such a course is not impossible or improbable especially as the word *tu* in Sūtra 29 leads us at first sight to believe that a new point of the Siddhānta as opposed of the *prima facie* view begins in 29.

But then the *tu* has other meanings and functions too in the Sūtras, besides being indicative of repelling a Pūrvapakṣa. Whether it should be interpreted as introducing a Siddhānta view as opposed to a Pūrvapakṣa would depend entirely on the Pūrvapakṣa arguments set forth earlier being found to be expressly refuted, point by point, in Sūtra 29 and others following it. *But no modern scholar has paused to consider this crucial point which alone can decide whether the Sūtra Tadguṇasāratvāt should be taken to pronounce a Siddhānta on the question of the Jiva's atomicity or not.* There is clearly no point by point refutation of the elaborate arguments for *aṇutva* set forth in the ten preceding Sūtras, in *Tadguṇasāratvāt* or the other Sūtras following it. Why then should we connect its interpretation with the theme of *refutation of aṇutva*? Where are the refutations of the ten arguments for aṇutva *in the body of the Sūtras*?

The position is not improved by R.'s interpretation of *Tadguṇasāratvāt* where, instead of being straightway connected with the refutation of *aṇutva* (which R. cannot afford to have)—it is made to take a leap right back to *Jño ata eva* and support the position that the Self is essentially a 'Knower'. The establishment of Jiva's *aṇutva* in 20-28 *as part of the Siddhānta* has thus, in R. only a subsidiary value as reinforcing

59. Cf. अनेन स्वप्नदर्शने सुषुप्तावप्यहमर्थस्यात्मनः सुखित्वं ज्ञातृत्वं च भासते। (*Śrībhāṣya*, i, 1.1)

60 'एतावन्तं कालं सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' इति परामर्शनेन सुषुप्तौ कालस्य स्वात्मादिज्ञानस्यानिश्चितत्वेन, इन्द्रियाणां घटादिविषयसंबन्धस्य च तदा स्वरूपसंबन्धमात्रेणानभिव्यक्त्युपपत्तेः। (TC. p. 965 b)

the main position that the Jīva is a knowing subject. There is thus break of continuity of theme in R.'s interpretation which justifies our looking for a fresh alignment of the Sūtras at a point nearest to *Tadguṇasāratvāt* viz. *Pṛthagupadeśāt* (Sūtra 28) and constitute 28-29 into an independent *adhi.* having nothing to do with *aṇutva* at all. The Utkrāntyadhi. can stand by itself without being tagged on to *Jño ata eva* as in R. and it can very well close with *Guṇād vā ālokavat* (Sūtra 26)—all the seven Sūtras (20-26) being Siddhānta Sūtras with the Pūrvapakṣas standing outside except in 22 where it has been incorporated.

This seems to be the most sensible way of restoring the alignment of the Sūtras in question, because of the abruptness of R.'s backward leap and because S.'s interpretation of *Tadguṇasāratvāt* suffers from other serious objections mentioned before,—leaving aside the possibility of finding an antecedent for *Tad* in 'Buddhi, in Sūtra ii, 3.15, after a desperate search. V. S. Ghate (*Op. cit.*, p. 88) is therefore very much mistaken in supposing that it is the only material objection against accepting S.'s way of interpreting the *adhi.*

With the artificial alignment of the Sūtra *Tadguṇasāratvāt* with the topic of *aṇutva* of the Jīva being thus struck down by the insufficiency of the internal evidence, the way is at once cleared of all cobwebs of mal-alignment, for a reconstitution of Sūtras 28 and 29 into a distinct *adhi.* to discuss one of the long-deferred and burning questions of the Śrutis,—the reconciliation of the Bheda and Abeda Śrutis. "*Tad*'—in *Tadguṇa*" without any difficulty can find its antecedent in "Brahman" referred to earlier in Sūtra 21 by the term "*Svātman*" as already pointed out. (See page 205).

In adjudging the alignment of the Sūtras into different adhikaraṇas, the only criteria should be the merits of the case. We fail to see the propriety of Ghate's comment that tho' "M.'s interpretation of this particular Sūtra (29) is quite good, his splitting up of what forms a single *adhi. according to others,* into so many different *adhi.s* is anything but satisfactory" (*Op. cit.*, p. 90). He has made a similar comment on M.'s interpretation of the Jñādhi. (ii.3.18) that "tho' plausible in itself it has to be rejected as it is necessarily dependent on a reference to Paramātman in the preceding Sūtra" (*Op. cit.* p. 85). If it is anything, the evidence of preceding Sūtra is a safe guide to follow and its help should be gratefully acknowledged. (See P. 200). The TC has presented M.'s case for a realignment of the Sūtras 18-32 into six distinct adhikaraṇas and has thrown it open for discussion by all those genuinely interested in the correct interpretation and understanding of the Sūtras. The ball is now in the others' court.

CHAPTER XXX

JĪVĀTMAN IS A REAL AGENT

17. *Kartṛtvādhikaraṇam* (ii.3, 33-42)

This *adhi.* resolves the conflict of testimony regarding the self's agency. The conflict is seen between texts like *Bṛh. Up.* iv.4.5. which refers to the self reaping the fruits of its actions and others which make the Supreme B. the sole agent that there is in the world: *Nānyaḥ Kartā* (   ).

It starts with the objection that unlike intelligence and bliss which may be recognized as intrinsic properties of the self (lying dormant in Samsāra and becoming fully manifested in Mokṣa) as established in the previous *adhi.*, agency (*kartṛtva*) cannot at all be recognized as an intrinsic property of the self,[1] as it has already been established in the *Itaravyapadeśādhi.* (ii.1.22-27) that God is the only independent agent in the world. It would be pointless and cumbersome to recognize the agency of both God and the Soul. Nor can it be reserved for the self and denied to God, as God's agency has the support of Śrutis.[2] Apart from that, the hypothesis of the Self's agency bristles with difficulties. We will have to clarify if such agency vests in the Jīva independently or as bestowed upon him by another (God). It cannot be taken to vest in him, independently, as that would be against the position of the Śrutis. The objections based on 'hitākaraṇa' etc. (not being able always to do what is beneficial to oneself and refraining from doing what is not

1. अस्त्वानन्दादीनां मनामेवाभिव्यक्तिः । कर्तृत्वस्य तु न, तस्य कदाप्यभावादिति पूर्वपक्षोत्थानात् सङ्गतिः । (*TC.* p. 965)

2. अकर्तृत्वश्रुतेः सयुक्तिकत्वेन प्राबल्यात् । समर्थितं हीश्वरस्यैवानन्ययोगेन कर्तृत्वमितरव्यपदेशादित्यादौ । अत एव द्वयोः कर्तृत्वमित्यपि अयुक्तम् । ईश्वरस्यैव कर्तृत्वाङ्गीकारे कल्पनालाघवं च स्यात् । न खलु लाघवाय श्रुत्यादिसिद्धमीश्वरस्य कर्तृत्वं हातुं युक्तम् । (*TP.* ii.3.33)

beneficial to oneself) will also be relentlessly dogging the steps of the Self's independent agency. On the other hand, if the Jīva's agency is taken to be vested in him by God, we will have to clarify further if this means that the Jīva's agency is something like that of a wage-earning carpenter who makes chairs and tables to his master's order but whose skill in workmanship, energy etc. are his own and are not derived from the master; or whether the very capacity of the Jīva to do anything is derived from God just as all the acts of a puppet are controlled by the showman who pulls the strings.[3] The first view would militate against the statement of the Śrutis that God controls everything pertaining to the Jīvas from within them. The second would at once place the self outside the jurisdiction of religious, moral and ethical injunctions and prohibitions of the Śāstras.[4]

The Siddhānta Sūtra: *Kartā Śāstrārthavattvāt* (ii.3, 33) gives the ruling that the Jīva is indeed an agent in his own right within certain limits and must be deemed to be so in the interests of the meaningfulness of the injunctions and prohibitions of the Śāstras. For these can have no meaning except as applicable to *such* agents in the person of the Jīvas. They cannot apply to God who will otherwise become liable to merit and demerit and thereby lose His higher status or to the insentients which cannot respond. Thus agency of the Jīva has to be accepted in order to preserve and guarantee the meaningfulness of the injunctions and prohibitions of the Śāstras.[5]

The next Sūtra: *Vihāropadeśāt* (ii.3.34) establishes that this agency of the Jīva cannot be treated as *not* being intrinsic to him but something mistakenly assumed by him thro' transference of the agency of Buddhi to himself. This is done by showing how the Śrutis refer to the sportive activities of the Jīvas such as amusing themselves with their fellow Jīvas in various ways, *in the released state where all errors of judgment, superimpositions and misconceptions have been transcended once for all. This is the significance of referring to the activities of souls in the released state*[6] by the Sūtrakāra. (*Chan. Up.* viii, 2, 3).

3 अथ भावः—जीवस्य कर्तृत्वं किं स्वतन्त्रमुत परतन्त्रम् ? नाद्यः, श्रुत्यादिविरोधात्, हिताकरणादिप्रसक्तेश्च। द्वितीयेऽपि पारतंत्र्यं कर्तृत्वशक्तेः स्वायत्तत्वेऽपि तक्षण प्रासादादिकारयितृपुमधीनत्ववत् ईश्वराधीनत्वमात्रं, किंवा दारुयोषावदीश्वराधीनचेष्टाकत्वम् ? (*TC.* p. 965)

4 नाद्यः—'य आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति' इत्यादिश्रुतिविरोधात्। अन्त्ये, दारुयोषावदेव न जीवो विधिनिषेधविषय स्यादिति। (*TC.* p. 965)

5. अस्त्येव जीवस्य कर्तृत्वम्। तदभावे विधिनिषेधशास्त्रवैयर्थ्यप्रसंगात्। नहि कर्तारमन्तरेणारण्यरोदनायमानशास्त्रस्य सार्थक्यम्। न च जडं प्रति तौ भवतः नापीश्वरं प्रति। तथा सति पुण्यपापलेपप्रसंगेनानीश्वरत्वापत्तेः। अतो जीवस्य कर्तृत्वांगीकारे शास्त्रस्यार्थवत्त्वसिद्धेः सोऽपि कर्तांगीकार्य इति भावः। (*TP.* ii.3.33)

6 जीवस्य स्वतः कर्तृत्वाभावेऽपि परगतकर्तृत्वे विवेकाग्रहोऽस्त्येवात तादृशं कर्तृत्वं प्रति शास्त्रं प्रवर्ततामित्याशंका परिहरत्सूत्रमुपन्यस्य व्याचष्टे—विहारेति। न जीवस्य काल्पनिकं कर्तृत्वं, किंतु पारमार्थिकमेव विगलिताखिलकल्पनेऽपि कैवल्ये विहारादिकर्तृत्वोपदेशात् इति। (*TP.* ii.3.34.)
Note the Pāramārthika implication of the Sautra expression '*Upadeśa*' in *Vihāropadeśāt*.

The third Sūtra answers another objection that even conceding real and intrintic agency to the Jīva later, in the released state, the case may be different here and now in Samsāra, where the meaningfulness of Śāstric injunctions and prohibitions can somehow be maintained with an agency *assumed* by the self thro' transference by misapprehension from Buddhi.[7] The Sūtra rejects this plea by showing how the Jīvas practise various acts of progressive spiritual Sādhanas or disciplines for the attainment of Mokṣa and how these bear fruit in due course. If the Jīvas' agency in the practice of such disciplines is not their own but something erroneously transferred to themselves from Buddhi, results cannot accrue to them, in reality, as they do. For one does not get results for one's own self by merely assuming agency for the acts really done by others! This is the point in referring to the practice of Sādhanas, in this Sūtra.[8]

Having established agency as an intrinsic property of Jīvātman on the basis of experience and the logic of facts, the Sūtrakāra next establishes it on the evidence of Śruti. The Jīva is referred to as an agent in texts such as: He shall meditate on the Supreme B. as the resplendent one—the abode of all (*Bṛh. Up.* 1.4.15). This text referring to an act of meditation, presupposes an agent for the act, without which no act can be conceived. This must be the Jīva. Were B. intended to be the agent, it would not have been mentioned as the object of meditation.[9]

The next Sūtra *Upalabdhivad aniyamaḥ* (ii.3.37) explains how the conflict with the other Śruti, *which makes B. the sole agent that there* is in the world, is to be resolved without prejudice to what has already been established — viz. that the agency of Jīvātman is intrinsic.[10] It is pointed out that the reconciliation is to be found on the analogy of the variability of knowledge. There is variability in carrying agency to fulfilment as there is in our attainment of knowledge to the extent or of

7. अस्तु मोक्षे जीवस्य स्वाभाविक कर्तृत्व, प्रामाणिकत्वात्। ससारे तु काल्पनिकमेव कि न स्यात्? तावतापि च शास्त्रसार्थक्यात् इत्याशका परिहरत्सूत्र पठित्वा व्याचष्टे–'उपादानात्' इति। (*TP.* ii.3.35)

8. न जीवस्य संसारे कर्तृत्वं काल्पनिकम्; मोक्षार्थं साधनाद्युपादानप्रतीतेः, ततश्च फलदर्शनात्। नहि परानुष्ठितसाधनेष्वात्मीयताकल्पनामात्रेण फलाभिसंबन्धो भवति; अतिप्रसगादिति। (*TP.* ii.3.35)

9. एवमुपपत्त्या प्रत्यक्षेण च साधितं जीवकर्तृत्वं श्रुत्यापि समर्थयन् सूत्रमुपन्यस्य व्याचष्टे-व्यपदेशादिति। 'आत्मानमेव लोकमुपासीत' इत्यादावुपासनक्रियाया कर्तृत्वेनात्मनो व्यपदेशात् तस्यापि कर्तृत्वमस्त्येव। अत्र जीव उपासीत इत्युल्लेखाभावात् कथमयं जीवस्य कर्तृत्वव्यपदेश इति? मैवम्–नहि तावत् क्रिया कर्तृशून्या युक्ता। न तावज्जडं कर्तृ। जीवस्यात्र कर्तृत्वेन श्रुत्यनभिमतत्वे, परमात्माभिप्रेत. स्यात्—तथाच तस्य कर्तृत्वेन व्यपदेशः स्यात्, न तु कर्मत्वेन। अतो जीवस्यैवात्र कर्तृत्वमुच्यते। तथा च, प्रामाणिकत्वान्न गौरवमिति। (*TP.* ii.3.36)

10. नन्वेव जीवस्यापि कर्तृत्वे कथमीश्वरस्यैव कर्तृत्व पूर्वं समर्थितम्? कथ च श्रुतिरुपपद्येत, अतस्तद्विरोधोऽस्त्येवेत्याशङ्क्य तत्परिहाराय सूत्रम्। (*TP.* ii.3.37)

the kind desired in all cases.[11] To explain the point a little more clearly, even when we wish to see only the beautiful, smell only the fragrant or hear only the pleasant sounds and not the ugly, the foul-smelling or the unpleasant ones, our expectations are not always fulfilled. So too in the case of agency.[12] Tho' intrinsically possessing the power of agency, the Jīva is not invariably in a position to successfully accomplish what he seeks to do and is at times thwarted. The case is other with God with whom His Will is effort, effort is action and action accomplishment—without fatigue. There is no point in the objection that the analogy of knowledge is incompetent as its point is as much in need of proof as Jīva's agency not being invariably competent to successfully accomplish what has been undertaken. For, we do see in the world that any one who seeks to know something directs his efforts toward the means of such knowledge and not to the act of knowledge straightway. These means of knowledge are open to perception and we know from experience their limitations.[13] The Jīva and Īśvara are not, therefore, on the same footing so far as the unfettered nature of their intrinsic agency is concerned. This makes all the difference between them. As the next Sūtra *Śaktiviparyayāt* (ii.3.38) puts it, — the difference lies in the wide divergence in their competency. The invariable competency of God as an agent flows from His perfection of personality as *He has realized all His wishes, lacks nothng and yearns for nothing.*[14] The Jīvātman is not so constituted. He has, therefore, to be content with playing a restricted role in the matter of exercising his intrinsic agency.

The next Sūtra *Yathā ca Takṣā ubhayathā* (ii.3.30) illustrates this point. A skilled carpenter working for an employer is, of course, an agent within the means at his disposal. At the same time, he is bound to act as directed by the employer in respect of any alteration or modification of what he has been asked to do. In the same way, the Jīva is (i) an agent in one sense but (ii) *a dependent one, in another.*

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11. इद वस्त्वह जानामीत्येव निरूपितेऽपि यथा जीवस्य न ज्ञाने नियमोऽस्ति। स्वेच्छानुसारेण न ज्ञानलाभः। तथा करिष्यामीति निरूपितेऽपि कर्मणि नियमाभावादीश्वरस्य तु तत्सद्भावात् स एव कर्ता न जीव इत्युक्त प्राक्। न तु सर्वथा कर्तृत्वाभावादिति भाव। (*TP.* ii.3.37)

12 यथा ज्ञाने इद सुरूप सुगन्ध सुस्वर वा ज्ञास्यामि विपरीत न पश्यामि, न जिघ्राणि, न शृणवानि, इत्येव स्पृहयतोऽपि तदुपलब्धावनियमो दृश्यते, एव चिकीर्षाविशेषवतोऽपि कर्मण्यनियमोऽस्वातन्त्र्य दृश्यते। अत कर्तृत्व-निराकरणमिति। (*TP.* ii.3.37)

13 न चाय दृष्टान्त. साध्यविकल.। न हि जिज्ञासु लोके ज्ञानक्रियायामेव साक्षात् व्याप्रियते, किंतु, तत्साधन एवेति। (*TP.* ii.3.37)

14. समाधिरलवुद्धिः ईश्वरस्येति तस्य स्वातन्त्र्यम्। जीवस्य तु तदभावादस्वातन्त्र्य प्रतीयते। स्वतन्त्रस्य पूर्णत्वात्। (*TP.* ii.3.39)

Yathā takṣṇaḥ kārayitṛniyatatvam, kartṛtvam ca vidyate
evam Jīvasyāpi (M. BSB. ii.3.40).

His role is circumscribed.

The next Sūtra answers the question raised in the Pūrvapakṣa whether the Jīva's 'power to do anything' is absoluely his own—having its origin in and flowing entirely from himself—wherein God has no hand just as the carpenter owes nothing of his skill and efficiency to his employer; or whether God has a hand in it too. The answer is given in *Parāttu tacchruteḥ* (ii.3.41) in the words of the Śruti that God has implanted this power to act, in the Jīvātman and it is in *that* sense that such power is intrinsic to the Jīvātman.

The next Sūtra: *Kṛtaprayatnāpekṣastu vihitapratiṣedhāvaiyarthyādibhyaḥ* (ii.3.42) answers the obvious objection that is bound to be taken against such a contention, that it will lead to utter futility of injunctions and prohibitions of Śāstra as the Jīvas would be reduced to the position of mere puppets at the hands of God. Allaying such wild fears, the Sūtra says that the Lord impels the Jivas to action only in accordance with the nature and tendency of their previous acts and efforts so that the injunctions and prohibitions of Śāstras are not reduced to futility in any manner. At the same time, He is not open to any charge of cruelty or partiality as He does not deal arbitrarily by them.[15]

To explain:—The Lord impels Jīvas to particular courses of action, taking full account of their beginningless Karma, efforts and intrinsic fitness. This leaves full scope for injunctions and prohibitions of Śāstras and at the same time leaves the Lord absolved of all possible charges of *Vaiṣamya* and *nairghṛṇya* as already explained in the *Vaiṣamyanairghṛṇyādhi.* (ii, 1, 35-37). Here, the Sūtrakāra is only reminding his readers of what he has said on the question so that their knowledge of the correct position may get strengthened. In this connection, M. has quoted two significant passages, one from the *Bhaviṣyat Purāṇa* and another from the *Mahābhārata* which put the matter in the clearest terms.[16]

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15. नन्वस्मिन् पक्षेऽपि दोष उक्त कर्तृत्वशक्तेरीश्वराधीनत्वे तस्यैव कर्तृत्व न जीवस्येति पुनः शास्त्रवैयर्थ्यमित्याशङ्क परिहरत्सूत्रम्। यतोऽन्य पर विधिनिषेधशास्त्रावैयर्थ्याय स्वस्य वैषम्यनैर्घृण्यपरिहाराय च जीवस्यानादिकर्मप्रयत्नयोग्यतापेक्ष एव जीव प्रेरयति, न त्वनपेक्षोऽस्तीति, न जीवशक्तेरीश्वराधीनत्वेऽपि शास्त्रवैयर्थ्यम्। अनपेक्षया प्रेरणे हि तत् स्यादिति। (*TP.* ii 3.42)

16. पूर्वं कर्म प्रयत्न च संस्कार चाप्यपेक्ष्य तु।
ईश्वरः कारयेत् सर्वं तच्चेश्वरकृत मतम्।
अनादित्वाद्दोषश्च पूर्णशक्तिरतो हरि। इति भविष्यत्पर्वणि।
'एतदेव न पाप्मेव एतदस्ति न चास्ति च' इति मोक्षधर्मे। (*Mbh.* xii. 210.32; 230, 6b)
(Q M. *BSB.* ii.3.42)

Vyāsatīrtha discusses the entire problem from all the relevant points of view and sums up the results in his clear and forcible manner:—

The Jīva *is certainly a true and a real* agent in his actions as established by reason, *perception and texts. This is not contradicted in* any way by the other pronouncement *in the Śruti that* there is no agent other than God in the world, and the *stand taken in the Itaravyapadeśādhi.* (ii.1.22-27). These pronouncements *are intended to* deny that the Jīvātman has any intrinsic agency *independently of God.* What has been esablished in the previous adhi. is that his intrinsic agency is itself *dependent on God.*

This special position of the dependence of the Jīva's intrinsic agency requires to be elucidated further to clear lingering misconceptions such as (i) that a dependent agent would automatically be thrown outside the jurisdiction of injunctions and prohibitions of Śāstras and the moral laws,—like a lifeless puppet which is made to dance to the strings pulled by the showman;[17] or (ii) that such a dependent agent will be reduced to the helpless state of a person who tho' *intelligent* is sure to be carried away *against his will-power by God to do what He* wants, — like a man who tho' *intelligent is rendered insensible by the* overpowering *influence of liquor; or like a drowning man being carried* away *by a strong current.* For, God first brings into play the Jīva's *own volition* and actuates him in his course of action.[18] Nor do the *injunctions* and prohibitions become meaningless because in addition to the Jīvas' being agents of their own actions, God also is admitted to be the causal agent. For, we find that even where two men are pulling a cart, each is bound by the rules of the road.[19] Nor can the injunctions and prohibitions become void as in the case of a bond-slave whose acts are not governed by his will. For tho' the Jīva's activity is dependent on God's will, it is also experienced to be the outcome of Jīva's own will.[20] Nor can the injunctions of Śāstra lose their meaningfulness

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17 परतन्त्रकर्तृत्वेऽपि जीवस्य विध्याद्यविषयत्वं न तावत् पुरुषेण नर्त्यमानदारुयोषावत् जडत्वात्।
(*TC.* p. 966 b)

18 नापि चेतनत्वेऽपि मत्तस्य मदेनेव दुर्बलस्य प्रबलजलौघादिनेव ईश्वरेण बलान्नोद्यमानत्वात्। ईश्वरस्य जीवगतेच्छाद्युत्पाद्यैव प्रवर्तकत्वात्। (*TC. p.* 966 b)

19 नापि जीवस्य कर्तृत्वेऽपीश्वरस्यापि कर्तृत्वात्। रथाकर्षणादौ सत्रादौ चान्यस्य कर्तृत्वेऽपि स्वस्य कर्तृत्वमात्रेण विध्यादिदर्शनात्। (*ibid*)

In a '*Sattra*'—(sacrifice) there is more than one sacrificer. Each is under the jurisdiction *of the Vidhis.*

20 नापि विष्ठिगृहीतस्येव स्वेच्छाधीनप्रवृत्त्याद्यभावात्। जीवप्रवृत्त्यादेरीशेच्छाधीनत्वेऽपि जीवेच्छाजन्यत्वस्यानुभवात्। (*ibid*)

because the Jtīva's action is *not governed by his own will.* For, the fact is that, in all cases, our actions are determined by unseen merit and other causes as well. But this does not necessarily place the individual outside the jurisdiction of injunctions. Why then should the other fact alone of its being determined by God's will be considered to place the Jīva outside the jurisdiction of injunctions and prohibitions? Nor do injunctions become futile because the Jīva's will to do is implanted by God. A son in whom the will to perform a particular religious act is implanted by the parent, does not, for that reason, cease to be within the jurisdiction of injunctions of Śāstra, so far as that act is concerned.[22] Nor does the Jīva cease to be within the jurisdiction of injunctions because his power to do anything is derived from God. For, it is established by the method of agreement and difference that the Jīva is made responsible to injunctions and prohibitions only in so far as his capacity to do anything is dependent on God and derived from Him. One may as well ask the objector here, where he has observed it that the Jīva's activity comes under the jurisdiction of Śāstric injunctions and prohibitions only when it is not dependen on God's Will and is dependent solely on his own will.[23] Nor can the injunctions become inapplicable to Jīva because their content cannot be realized by the Jīva's activity; for the facts are otherwise.[24] The Jīva has a measure of independence conferred on him by God over inanimate creation.[25] Besides God's will, Jīva's activity is brought into play by unseen merit also. We cannot also say that Jīvas fall outside the jurisdiction of *vidhis* because their acts are sometimes impeded or arrested by God.[26] Impediments cannot altogether be ruled out so long as life is what it is. They are bound to be there as much on the theory that God is totally indifferent to man's merits and demerits while still impelling him to activity as on the other theory that God remains indifferent to merit etc. only in the first instance of the individual's activity, while He becomes interested enough to *permit* him to do good or bad in accordance with the results of the first act, in his subsequent activities. The same will be the case where one does not recognize any God and the Jīva is guided only by unseen merit

21. नापि स्वेच्छामात्राधीनप्रवृत्त्यभावात्। सर्वत्रापि प्रवृत्त्यादेरदृष्टादिजन्यत्वेन तस्य विध्याद्यविषयत्वातन्त्रत्वात्। (TC. p. 966 b)

22. नापि जीवेच्छादेरपि ईशेच्छोत्पादितत्वात्। पित्राद्युत्पादितेच्छादिमतोऽपि माणवकस्य सन्ध्योपासनादिविध्यादिदर्शनात्। (ibid)

23. नापि कर्तृत्वशक्तेरीश्वराधीनत्वात्। अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामीशाधीनाया एव तस्या विध्यादिविषयत्वे तंत्रत्वात्। क्वेदमुपलब्धं भवता ईशानधीनैव सा तत्र हेतुः न तु तदधीनेति। (TC. p. 966 b)

24. नापि विध्यादिविषयस्य जीवकृत्यसाध्यत्वात्; असिद्धेः (ibid)

25. अस्ति हि जीवस्यापि ईश्वरदत्तं जडं प्रति स्वातन्त्र्यम्। (ibid)

This is known as दत्तस्वातन्त्र्यम् in M.'s doctrine.

26. नापि क्वचिदीश्वरेण जीवकृतिनिषेधनात्। (ibid)

or where not even unseen merit is recognized, and the impediments are caused by recognizable causes. Thus, on any one of these theories, there is equal probability of injunctions and prohibitions being rendered meaningless.[27] The right view to take would, therefore, be that in so far as it is within the experience of the transmigrating Jīva as an individual,—who stands sharply distinguished from inanimate things, the released souls and God, who are outside the jurisdiction of injunctions and prohibitions, — that he himself has a knowledge of his being connected with injunctions and prohibitions of the moral law, that he is also conscious of entertaining a desire born of such knowledge to secure the fruits accruing from acting in a particular way, pursuing the means leading to their realization and putting forth the activity suited to it,[28] he is a real agent.

However, even tho' such knowledge, the fruits of activity and the means and efforts connected with their realization are all known to be dependent on the Supreme Being, the Jīvātman can still remain within the jurisdiction of injunctions and prohibitions and be heir to the fruits of his activity without any difficulty. It has accordingly been made clear in the *Vaiṣamyanairghṛṇyādhi*. that even tho' the Supreme Being is the causal agent in respect of the willing and the putting forth of effort by the Jīva in regard to the activities which generate their respective merits and demerits, there is no question of the charge of partiality or cruelty being laid at the door of God as the act of rewarding or punishing of Jīvas by God is always in accordance with their beginningless natural fitness and deserts. On this view, God's independence is not compromised in any way as it is by His free and inexorable Will that tho' competent to reward or punish souls without taking into account their deserts, He still chooses to take them into account, in his dealings with them.[29]

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27. ईश्वरः (*i*) पुण्यपापादावुदासीन इति पक्षे, द्वितीयादिप्रवृत्तावनुमतृत्वेऽपि प्रथमप्रवृत्तावुदासीन इति पक्षेऽपीश्वरेण,
(*ii*) अनीश्वरपक्षेऽप्यदृष्टादिना
(*iii*) अदृष्टाभावपक्षेऽपि दृष्टहेत्वन्तरेण पाकादिकृतिविघातदर्शनेन, कस्यापि कुत्रापि नियोगानुपपत्ते
(*TC.* p. 966 b)

28 तस्मात्, जीवे विध्यविषयेभ्य ईशजडमुक्तेभ्यो व्यावृत्तस्य स्वसबन्धितया विधिज्ञानस्य तज्जन्याया फले तत्साधने चेच्छाया. साधनविषयककृतेश्चानुभवसिद्धत्वात्, तस्य च ज्ञानादे. 'नर्ते त्वत्' इत्यादिश्रुतिभिरीश्वराधीनत्वेऽपि अस्वतन्त्रकर्तृत्वमात्रेण विधिविषयत्व कर्मफलभाक्त्व च युक्तम्।
एतदेवाभिप्रेत्योक्तं भगवत्पादै गीताभाष्ये – * * * भारततात्पर्यनिर्णयेऽपि –
'प्रत्यक्षैषा कर्तृता जीवसस्था
तथागमादनुमानाच्च सर्वम्
विष्णोर्वशे तत्र हेय द्वय च
जानन् विद्वान् कुरुते कार्यकर्म 'इति। (*TC.* p. 966-67 b)

29 पुण्यपापादिजनकक्रियाविषयजीवगतेच्छाप्रयत्नादौ सर्वत्रेश्वरस्य प्रयोजककर्तृत्वेऽपि जीवनिग्रहानुग्रहयोरीश्वरस्यानादिसिद्धजीवगतयोग्यतापेक्षत्वान्न वैषम्यादीत्युक्त वैषम्याधिकरणे। कर्माद्यनपेक्ष्य फलदाने शक्तस्यापीश्वरस्य तदपेक्ष्यैव फल दास्यामीति स्वसकल्पादेव तदपेक्षितेति न स्वातन्त्र्यहानि.। (*TC.* p. 967 b)

Saṁkara's Interpretation

According to S. Sūtras 33-42 fall into three distinct *adhi-s*. In the first *adhi.* (ii.3.33-39) the Pūrvapakṣa is based on the Sāmkhya view that Buddhi is the real agent while Ātman is only the enjoyer, in the empirical state.[30] The *Kalpataru* explains that the *adhi.* removes the *conflict between texts representing* Ātman as unattached (asaṅga) (*Bṛh. Up.* iv.3.15) and others which contain injunctions to the self to perform sacrifices, give gifts and so on. The conflict is removed by showing that the Asaṅga texts are true of the released state while the others apply to the state of bondage.[31]

The Sūtra *Yahā ca Takṣobhayathā* (ii.3.40) is taken to constitute a *fresh adhi.* Here, the Pūrvapakṣa is that the Jīvātman's agency may be regarded as intrinsic to him as heat is the intrinsic property of fire. The Siddhānta is that just as a carpenter is conditioned in his agency by his tools, so also the activity of the self is conditioned by the mind or Buddhi and other adjuncts and cannot, therefore, be regarded as intrinsic to the self. The agency of the self should, therefore, be treated as being ascribed to him only adventitiously by reason of his association with Buddhi etc.

The next Sūtra *Parāttu tacchruteḥ* and the one following it, constitute the *third adhi.* where the objection is raised that this empirical agency of the self referred to in the earlier Sūtras must be taken to be independent of the Supreme B. The Siddhānta is that it is dependent on Paramātman and that this circumstance does not make the Supreme liable to partiality or cruelty.

Criticism

The conclusion about the empirical agency of Jīvātman could have been established *without opening a fresh adhi.*, on the basis of the answer to the question of Jīvātman's *bhoktṛtva* (being the enjoyer of the fruits of his Karma) which S. is likely to provide. Under the Sūtra *Tadguṇasāratvāt* (ii.3.29) he has already established that the Ātman is spoken of as *aṇu* (*atomic in size*) *not because he is so, in reality, but because of his intimate association with Buddhi as long as Samsāra lasts.* Just as no separate adhi. is needed in S.'s view to resolve the conflict between the references in the Śrutis to the Jīva's

30. ये पश्यन्त्यात्मा भोक्तैव न कर्तेति तन्निराकरणार्थः (*Bhāmati*) ये साङ्ख्याः (*Kalpataru*)

31. अत्रासङ्गो ह्ययं पुरुषः इत्यादिश्रुतीनां विध्यादिश्रुतीनां चात्मकर्तृत्वाकर्तृत्ववादिनीनां बन्धमोक्षावस्थाविषयत्वेन विरोधः परिहृयते । (*Kalpataru*)

बन्धावस्थायामाध्यासिकं कर्तृत्वं, मोक्षावस्थायां स्वाभाविकमकर्तृत्वमित्येवं विषयभेदेनेत्यर्थः :
(Appayya: *Parimala*)

bhoktṛtva (enjoyership) and *non-bhoktṛtva*, as the conflict could be set at rest by applying the guiding principle of *Tadguṇasāratva* already set forth in ii.3.29, there is no need to raise a discussion over the question of *Kartṛtva* and *non-kartṛtva* of the Jīvātman. The adhikaraṇa, therefore, becomes superfluous.[32]

The *Bhāmatī* and *Kalpataru* have, however, suggested that this *adhi.* is intended to refute the position of the Sāmkhyas that all agency belongs to Prakṛti and that the Ātman is purely an enjoyer.[33] This explanation is not adequate or convincing. *For there is not much to choose between the final position of S. that the Kartṛtva of the Jīvātman, which really belongs to the Buddhi or antaḥkaraṇa, is superimposed on the Ātman in the empirical state and the Sāṅkhya view that the Kartṛtva which belongs to Prakṛti comes to be attributed to Puruṣa for want of discrimination.* In both the philosophies of S. and the Sāṅkhyas the pure self is inactive. The difference is the difference between tweedledum and tweedledee.[34] The opposition to Vedānta doctrines from the side of the Sāṅkhyas has already been set at rest in the first Pāda of this *Adhy.* This question of refuting the Sāṅkhya contention cannot, therefore, arise here. Nor do we find any special indication in the wording of the Sūtras here that it is directed against the Sāṅkhyas.

Saṁkara's Sūtrārtha Examined.

According to S., the Jīvātman should be recognised as agent because the Śrutis refer to him as *Draṣṭā, srotā, mantā, boddhā, kartā vijnānātmā Puruṣaḥ* (*Praśna Up.* iv.8) and because it is only when the self is recognized to be an agent that the Śāstras embodying injunctions and prohibitions can be made meaningful. His wandering about in the body (*Bṛh. Up.* ii.1.18) and his taking the senses (*Bṛh. Up.* ii.1.17) are referred to in the Śrutis (Sūtras 34 and 35). Sūtra 36 shows that in the Śruti 'Vijñāna' (intelligence) performs sacrifice and it performs all acts (*Taitt. Up.* ii.5) it is the self that must be accepted as having been referred to by the term 'intelligence'; for he has been described as agent with regard to actions. If it is not the self but Buddhi that had been referred to by the term Vijñāna here, we should

32 जीवकर्तृत्वाकर्तृत्वश्रुत्योर्विरोधस्य भोक्तृत्वाभोक्तृत्वश्रुत्योरिव, त्वदुक्तेन तद्गुणसारत्वादिति न्यायेनैवौपाधिकविषयतया निरासेन एतदधिकरणस्य व्यर्थत्वात्। (*TC.* p. 967)

33 ननु, तद्गुणसारत्वादित्यनेनैव जीवस्य कर्तृत्व भोक्तृत्व च लब्धमेवेति तद्व्युत्पादनमनर्थकमित्यत आह—तद्गुणसारत्वाधिकारेणेति। तस्यैव प्रपञ्चो ये पश्यन्त्यात्मा भोक्तैव न कर्तेति तन्निराकरणार्थः (*Bhāmatī* ii.3.33)

34 नन्वेतदेवाशक्योक्त भाष्यभामत्योः तस्यैव प्रपञ्च इति चेन्न। प्रपञ्चनस्यापि व्यर्थत्वात्। ननु, प्रकृतिरेव कर्त्रीति साङ्ख्यपक्षनिरासार्थोऽयमारम्भ इति चेन्न। प्रकृतिगतस्य वान्तःकरणगतस्य वा कर्तृत्वस्यात्मन्यारोप इत्यस्य मतद्वयेऽपि समतत्वेन तन्निराकरणस्यापि व्यर्थत्वात्। (Ragh. *TCP.* p. 967)

expect the instrumental case to have been used with reference to Vijñāna, as in the case of another Śruti text "Having by his intelligence taken to himself the intelligence of these sense-organs" (*Bṛh. Up.* ii.1.17), instead of the nominative case: *Vijñānam tanute.*[35]

Now. as Sūtras 34-36 give only instances of different types of Śāstric references pertaining to the agency of the Jīva and they could all be subsumed under the first Sūtra, just as the ideas put forth in some other Śruti texts like: Whatever deed he does that he attains (*Bṛh. Up.* iv.4.5); the doer of good becomes good (*ibid*) are also comprehended by the sense of the first Sūtra, without requiring any additional Sūtra to convey them.[36]

In Sūtra 36, the Pūrvapakṣa that Buddhi should be accepted as the agent could have been silenced by citing a counter-evidence wherein Buddhi itself has been referred to in the role of an instrument instead of by the devious plea that if Buddhi had been meant by the expression Vijñāna in the Śruti *Vijñānam yajñam tanute*, it would have been put in the instrumental case.[37]

Sūtra 37 according to S. replies to an objection that if the Jīva were an agent apart from Buddhi, he would, being free, be doing only what is agreeable to him and thus be always happy and never unhappy. The answer is given that just as altho' free with regard to his perceptions, the Jīva perceives both the agreeable and the disagreeable sights so also he does both good and bad—what is agreeable and disagreeable to him, depending on exigencies of time, place and circumstances.

The objection itself is not well taken. It is not agency in the minimum or formal sense of being the locus of an activity or having the limited freedom of command over the means at one's disposal to initiate an act or make efficient use of such means that can be the guarantor of unfailing happiness to the agent in all circumstances. It is the fact of his having *complete and absolute independence of* action unfettered by every other factor such as time, place, means and circumstance and having the power to realize his objective thro' his acts, in every case, in a manner that is always agreeable to him. It has been shown (*See* Vol. I, pp. 171-172, fn. 2; p. 414; fn. 3-4) that such absolute

35. न चेत्तस्य स्यान्निर्देशविपर्ययः स्यात्। विज्ञानेन इत्येव निरदेक्ष्यत्। (S. *BSB.* ii.3.36)

36. आद्यसूत्रस्य शास्त्रार्थत्वेनैव * * 'यथाकामम्' इत्यादेरपि कर्तृत्वप्रतिपादकशास्त्रस्य ग्रहणसम्भवेन द्वितीयादिसूत्रवैयर्थ्यात्। (*TC.* p. 968 b)

37. बुद्धेः कर्तृत्वबाधिका प्रति श्रुत्यन्तरेण करणत्वोक्तिविरोधस्यैव वक्तव्यत्वेन विज्ञानमिति श्रुतौ बुद्धयुक्तौ कर्तृत्वविपरीतकरणत्वोक्तिः स्यादित्यापाततामगतेश्च। (*TC.* p. 968 b)

freedom is the prerogative of God and is not given to any human being. For this reason, the objection raised by S. or put by him into the mouth of the Sāṁkhya-Pūrvapakṣin (who by the way regards the Puruṣa as essentially indifferent and inactive) is, on the face of it, far too implausible to call for a refutation in this Sūtra.[38]

Sūtra 38 is taken by S. to convey that if Buddhi which is endowed only with the power of being an instrument of knowledge were to be accepted as the agent, there would be the reversal of power—the power of the instrument possessed by Buddhi will have to be replaced by the power of the agent. In substance, this criticism will be a repetition of the one made in Sūtra 36 about reversal of case forms.[39] Apart from this, the criticism in Sūtra 38 will have no adverse effect on the Sāṁkhya stand. For Buddhi can be assigned the role of agent—with the mind, which is a different '*tattva*' from Buddhi, acting as the instrument of knowledge. It will not be correct to say, as does the *Bhāmatī*, that the assumption of an *instrument other than Buddhi will not* alter or save the situation except in name.[40] Buddhi being different from the self would help the Sānkhya to keep the agency of the self at bay, by making itself the agent and the *mind* the instrument. The view that Buddhi is only a functional aspect of the mind and that they are not different entities is against the position of the Śruti which reckons *manas, buddhi* and *Puruṣas* as separate *tattvas.*[41] (*Kaṭha. Up.* i.3.10).

Sūtra 39 is understood by S. to say that if the Jīva is not accepted as an agent, it will not be possible to achieve the state of meditative concentration (*Samādhi*) without which there is no hope of deliverance.[42] Anyone can see that this Sūtra is superfluous for this purpose, as the injunctions regarding hearing, reflection and meditative

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38. यच्चोक्त परं –जीव वर्ता चेन्नियमेन सुखी स्यादिति शकानिरासार्थमुपलब्धीति सूत्रमिति । तन्न । क्रियावेशमात्रस्य नियतसुखाप्रसजकत्वात् । तत्प्रसजकस्य च स्वातन्त्र्यस्याभावेऽपि साङ्ख्यानभिमतक्रियावेशानुरोधेन शकानुदयात् । (*TC.* p. 968)

शकाया एवानुदयेन तन्निराकरणाय सूत्रण व्यर्थम् । (*TCP*)

39 यच्चोक्त करणशक्तियुक्ताया बुद्धे कर्तृत्वे करणकारकशक्तिविपरीता कर्तृकारकशक्ति स्यादिति 'शक्तीति सूत्रार्थ इति, तन्न । कारकशक्तिवाचिविभक्तिविपर्ययापादकेन 'न चेन्निर्देशविपर्यय' इत्यनेनास्यार्थिकपुनरुक्ते । (*TC.* 968)

40 अविपर्ययाय तु करणान्तरकल्पनाया नाम्नि विसंवादः स्यात् इति । (*Bhāmatī* ii.3.38) ननु, कर्त्री बुद्धे र्न करणशक्ति कल्प्यते, सातु कर्त्र्येव, किन्त्वन्यदस्ति तस्या साधारण कारणमत कथ शक्तिविपर्यय ? तत्राह– अविपर्ययाय त्विति । तर्हि सैवास्माकमात्मा स्यादिति नाम्नि विप्रतिपत्ति र्न त्वर्थ इत्यर्थ । (*Kalpataru.* ii.3 38)

41 बुद्धे र्जीवान्यत्वेन जीवकर्तृत्वाप्राप्ते । ननु च बुद्धिर्मनोवृत्तिविशेष एवेति चेन्न । 'मनसस्तु परा बुद्धि ' इत्यादौ मनोबुद्धिपुरुषाणा तत्त्वान्तरत्वप्रतीते । अत एव तत्त्वान्तरेत्युक्तम् । (*TCP.* p. 969 b)

42 योऽप्ययमौपनिपदात्मप्रतिपत्तिप्रयोजन समाधिरुपदिष्ट· वेदान्तेपु सोऽप्यसत्यात्मनः कर्तृत्वे नोपपद्येत । (*S. BSB.* ii.3.39)

concentration are all capable of being comprehended by the term "Śāstra" in Sūtra 33 which is broad enough to include them along with injunctions regarding giving gifts, performing sacrifices, etc.[43] If a separate Sūtra is necessary in order to bring out the idea that in the stage of Samādhi the sense of agency arising from the non-discrimination of the self from Buddhi, which is the true agent, *is no longer there*—having been transcended and left behind in the Samādhi state, it would shatter the superimposed agency of the Ātman which S. has been at so much pains to establish, by this *adhi.*, in order to safeguard the meaningfulness of Śāstra[44] Another defect in S.'s interpretation of Sūtra 38-39 is that there is no hint in the wording of those Sūtras to show that any '*Prasaṅga*" or undesirable contingency is suggested.[45] The interpretation put upon them does not, therefore, seem to be correct.

Takṣādhikaraṇam (ii.3.40)

S.'s way of interpreting *Yathā ca takṣobhayathā* as beginning a fresh *adhi.* is not proper. The wording of that Sūtra with "just as" (*yathā*) and the use of the conjunctive particle (*ca*) clearly show that the Sūtra is intended to give nothing more than an illustration with regard to the point already established and is, therefore, organically connected with the previous Sūtras and does not start a new topic. Had it been in the mind of the Sūtrakāra to *modify* what had been established in the preceding Sūtra, he would more naturally have used the particle *tu* (but) instead of (*ca*) "and".[46] Painfully conscious of this difficulty, S. tries to explain it away that this *ca* is used in the sense of "*tu*" (but) here: *Tvarthe cāyam caḥ paṭhitaḥ.* If the agency of Jīvātman were, according to the Sūtrakāra, really an imagined one due to mere superimposition, we should expect him to have given us *a more pertinent illustration based on the transference of ideas such as 'the crystal is red'* (*lohitas sphaṭikaḥ*)—on account of the proximity of the crystal to the red flower placed by its side. The illustration of the carpenter is not only unhappy but inappropriate to S.'s point of view.[47] S. is conscious of the difficulty and thinks it necessary to add—"The illustration of the carpenter is to be understood only so far, that in the

43. यागादिविधिशास्त्रस्येव समाधिविधिशास्त्रस्याप्यादसूत्रस्थशास्त्रशब्देनैव ग्रहणसम्भवेनास्य वैयर्थ्यात्। (*TC.* p. 969 b)

44. यदि समाधिदशायां कर्तृभूतबुद्ध्यविवेककृतस्य कर्तृत्वस्यायोग इतीहाभिप्रायः, तर्हि सिद्धान्त्यभिप्रेतस्यारोपितकर्तृत्वस्याप्यपवादः। (*TC.* p. 969 b)

45. 'शक्तिविपर्ययात्' इत्यस्य 'समाध्यभावात्' इत्यस्य च प्रसङ्गरूपहेतुता कल्प्या। (*TC.* p. 969 b)

46. यथेति सूत्रस्याधिकरणान्तरत्वमननुगुणम्। उक्तार्थे दृष्टान्तान्तरमात्रार्पकेण यथाशब्देन, चशब्देन च पूर्वोक्तपरामर्शात्। (ibid)

47. कर्तृत्वाध्यासे स्फटिकलौहित्यस्येव दृष्टान्तस्य सम्भवेन तक्षकर्तृत्वस्य तदयोगात्। (*TC.* p. 969 b)

case of particular acts like chopping he is an agent only thro' the particular tools but is quite inactive so far as his own body is concerned (*Svaśarīreṇa tu akartaiva*)."[48] This is not so. *The carpenetr is active thro' his body too. The body acts as much as the tools. The tools cannot act without the body acting.* The illustration of the carpenter merely shows dependence on some other factors or persons without necessarily implying that the carpenter is not actually and in himself an agent. An agent or an instrument does not cease to be an agent or an instrument simply because they depend for the production of the effect on certain other auxiliaries also.[49] We may as well *remind S. of what he himself has said* under ii.3.37 that an agent does not cease to be so because he requires assistance: न च सहायापेक्षस्य कर्तुः कर्तृत्वं निवर्तते ।

If all that is meant by the interpretation is that tho' the capacity of the Jīvātman to carry out an act is inherent, the actual accomplishment of the act is dependent on auxiliaries and is, therefore, adventitious, that can be admitted without prejudice to the acceptance of Jīvātman's agency to be intrinsic and expressed with the help of such accessories. The carpenter no doubt needs his tools. The fact that there is dependence on the tools or accessories in the production of an effect does not make the agency of the agent or the instrumentality of the accessories unreal or superimposed.

S. is anxious to shift agency completely to the mind or Buddhi in reality and keep the self clear of all touch of true agency. This cannot be made consistent with scriptural evidence also. In the parable of the senses (A.Ā. ii 1.4) we see that even when the mind made its exit "the person remained as one with eyes closed but otherwise active, eating and drinking",[50] which shows the self to be active even when the mind has made its exit from the body. Hence, agency cannot be denied to the self *per se*. We also read in the *Taitt. Up.* (ii.8) even as interpreted by S. that when the self of the Jñāni passes beyond the Prāṇamaya and the Manomaya he travels over the regions beyond, free from desires. This confirms *activity even when the mind has been left behind.* Moreover, the Śrutis and Smṛtis state clearly that the mind is only an instrument of knowledge (*karaṇa*) and not a direct agent (*kartā*). That is why we call it the inner organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*). Moreover, the state of deep sleep (*Suṣupti*) where, according to Ad-

48 तक्षदृष्टान्तश्चैतावतांशेन द्रष्टव्य –तक्षा हि विशिष्टेषु तक्षणादिव्यापारेषु अपेक्ष्यैव प्रतिनियतानि करणानि कर्ता भवति, स्वशरीरेण त्वकर्तैव । (S. *BSB.* ii.3.40)

49 नहि कार्योत्पादने सहकार्यपेक्षामात्रेण कर्तृकरणादेः कर्त्रादित्वं कल्पितं भवति । (*TC.* p. 969 b)

50. मन उदक्रामत् मीलित इवाश्नन् पिबन्नास्तैव । (*AĀ.* ii.1.4)

vaita philosophy, the Buddhi is *not* functioning, there is the act of respiration going on. The Śruti says—'the man in deep sleep breathes the words *Bhūḥ, bhūḥ*.[51] We also see from the *Chān. Up.* (viii.2.3) that reaching the Supreme Light, the released soul *'comes into his own being"* (*Svena rūpeṇa abhiniṣpadyate*) and there he goes about eating, sporting, enjoying. This means that even in the highest state of release, the Ātman *retains* his agency. It is not, therefore, right to place the mind instead of Ātman in the position of the agent. It would not stand to reason that agency belongs to the self only as qualified by or associated with the mind and not to the pure self. In that case, injunctions prescribing the means of Mokṣa will lose their force; for, the *qualified* Ātman is not the one who is to reap the benefit of following those disciplines.[52]

The agency of Ātman *as such* is clearly established by such evidences as (i) the perceptive judgment (*Aham karomi*) 'I am the doer' (ii) the inference that such activity relating to the means of Mokṣa must *inhere* in the same individual as actually attains Mokṣa and continues to be there,—which is based on the principle that the benefit of Śāstra accrues to the one who actually carries out its prescriptions (*Śāstraphalam prayoktari*) and (iii) Śrutis such as 'the Self who is the doer, the knower' (*Kartā vijānātmā Puruṣaḥ Prasna Up.* iv.9). Unless the Ātman is accepted as a real doer, there will be the futility of the Śāstra which lays down certain injunctions and prohibitions with reference to the Jīvātman who, as a sentient being is open to discipline (*śāsanayogya*) and who is liable to undergo the consequences of transgressing injunctions and prohibitions relating to those means of release. There is, therefore, no justification to dismiss the agency of the Jīvātman as arising out of a misconception.[53] The text of the *Kaṭha Up.* (i.3.4) which says: the wise speak of the Ātman in conjunction with the senses and the mind as the 'enjoyer' states only this much that in the matter of the Souls' experiencing of worldly pleasures, etc. the mind, like the body, acts as an auxiliary (*sahakāri*). It does not surely place the mind in the category of the enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*). The Gita text: Deluded by egoism, man thinks he is the doer (iii, 27) is intended to negative *independence of agency* to the individual and not

51. सुप्तौ त्वद्वैता बुद्धेरभावेऽपि उच्छ्वासादिकर्तृताया: प्रत्यक्षेण, 'सुप्तो भूर्भूरित्येव प्रश्वसिति' इत्यादिश्रुत्या च प्रसिद्धे । (TC. p. 969)

52. विशिष्टस्य कर्तृत्वे मोक्षसाधनविधिरयुक्त: स्यात् । कर्तुरिष्टसाधनत्वस्य विधिबोध्यत्वात् । (*ibid*)

53. न चाहं करोमि इति प्रत्यक्षेण, 'शास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तरि' (*PMS* iii.7.18) इति न्यायानुगृहीतेन मोक्षसाधनविषया कृति: मोक्षसमानाधिकरणा तत्साधनविषयकृतित्वात् सम्मतवत् इत्यनुमानेन, तथा 'कर्ता विज्ञानमय: पुरुष:' 'कर्तृत्वं तदभिमन्यते' इत्यादिश्रुतिभि:, तथा मोक्षसमानाधिकरणविधिनिषेधातिक्रमजन्यपापादिलेपयोग्यं, चेतनत्वेन शासनयोग्यं च शास्त्रविहितकर्मनिषिद्धाकर्मविधिनिषेधशास्त्रवैयर्थ्यान्यथानुपपत्त्या च सिद्धे आत्मन: कर्तृत्वे बाधकाभाव, तेन तन्मिथ्या स्यात् । (TC. p. 970 b)

agency as such. This is clear from the subsequent passage 'Such being the case, one who takes the self to be the sole agent (*kevalam*) independently—i.e. without the aid of the other four causes mentioned in the preceding verses (XVIII. 13-15), is misguided.

तत्रैवं सति कर्तारमात्मानं केवलं तु यः ।
पश्यत्यकृतबुद्धित्वान्न स पश्यति दुर्मतिः ॥

(XVIII.16)

The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣadic passage: 'He meditates as it were' (*dhyāyatīva* iv.3.7) does not deny agency to the self. It only underlines the fact of his *dependent activity.*[54] There is no force in the argument that if the Ātman were accepted as the substratum of activity (*kṛtyāśraya*), he will be liable to modification. (*dravyāntarāpatti*). Otherwise, for the same reason, one will have to say that Ātman is not also a substratum of knowledge (*jñānāśraya*). If Ātman can be a substratum of knowledge without fear of being exposed to modification of his essence, by the same token, he can also be accepted as the substratum of activity (*kṛtyāśraya*). Nor is there any force in the argument that since the agency of the Jīvātman is established by Pratyakṣa, it cannot be regarded as a worthy object of human aspiration (*puruṣārtha*) or as representing the import of the Śāstras.[55] There are two ways in which the Śrutis which refer to the agency of Jīvātman can be shown to have a proper import. One is that they establish the otherwise unknown truth that the agency of the Jīva is exercised subject to the control of God. The other is to interpret the Śruti so as to establish a proper import that it teaches that *the pure self also is an agent*—such agency *not* being *given* in our perceptive judgments which refer to the self taken together with its body and organs. The argument may easily be turned against S. also. One may contend for example that the Śruti which speaks of B. as *Satyam jñānam* has no reference to the pure Ātman but merely repeats what is otherwise established in our ordinary perceptions and judgments such as that the pot is real (*ghaṭas san*) "I am" (*aham asmi*) which all refer to qualified entities.[56] It is not also right to argue as does S. that the acceptance of activity to the self will expose it to much suffer-

'ध्यायतीव लेलायतीव' इत्यादिश्रुताविवशब्दोऽप्यस्वातन्त्र्यात् । (*TC.* p. 970 b)

54 'कर्ता विज्ञानात्मा पुरुष' इत्येवजातीयकमपि शास्त्रमनुवाद-

55 अविद्याकृत कर्तृत्वमुपादाय विधिशास्त्र प्रवर्तिष्यते । (S. *BSB.* ii.3.40)

रूपत्वात् यथाप्राप्तमेवाविद्याकृत कर्तृत्वमनुवदिष्यति । ईश्वरकर्तृत्वस्याप्राप्तत्वेन

56 न च जीवकर्तृत्वस्य प्रत्यक्षप्राप्तत्वात् अपुमर्थत्वाच्च न तत्र श्रुतेस्तात्पर्यमिति युक्तम् । तत्परत्वोपपत्तेश्च ।

तच्छ्रुतेः तत्परत्वस्य दुर्वारत्वात् । कर्तृत्वस्याहं करोमीति विशिष्टात्मनि प्राप्तावपि शुद्धेऽप्राप्त्या, इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षप्राप्तविशिष्टात्मसत्यतानुवादि स्यात् ।

अन्यथा, सत्यज्ञानादिवाक्यमपि 'सन् घटः' 'अहमस्मि' (*TC.* p. 970 b)

ing (*kleśa*).[57] Not all activity involves suffering. On the contrary, one may say with good reason that there is no suffering in sportive activity. There is suffering in *not* fulfilling one's duties.[58] The Śruti also says 'He acts for joy'. This shows that activity is not necessarily accompanied by suffering. The statement of the *Gītā: Na hi kaścit kṣaṇam api jātu tiṣṭhatyakarmakṛt* shows that activity is healthy and *not* fraught with suffering.[59] If this is not accepted, one will have to reject the position that Ātman is of the essence of knowledge and happiness; for even happiness and knowledge are not attained without effort and suffering—it may be argued.[60] Is there not pure knowledge and happiness in Suṣupti (deep sleep) to the exclusion of suffering? Activity also may similarly exist without entailing suffering.[61]

In the first *adhi.* S. has refuted the Pūrvapakṣa from the Sānkhyan standpoint that agency belongs only to Buddhi and the belief in the agency of Ātman is merely due to want of discrimination between the two and arises consequently from a superimposition of the agency of Buddhi on Ātman. He has then esatblished the agency of Ātman as the Siddhānta view.

In the very next *adhi.*, he establishes the view that the agency (*kartṛtva*) which legitimately belongs to Buddhi is wrongly superimposed on Ātman on the analogy of the carpenter not being an agent in himself but only as and when he is working with the help of his tools (*upādhi*). In plain language, *this means that the Pūrvapakṣa of the previous adhi. has been enthroned by S. as the Siddhānta of the subsequent adhi.* This is hardly a sign of cogency of thought or interpretation.[62]

Moreover, in the *Utkrāntyadhi.* (ii.3.19-32) S. has himself treated atomicity of the self (*aṇutva*) and exit of Ātman from the body (*utkrānti*) at death as falsely superimposed on the self on account of the connection with Buddhi. Agency or *Kartṛtva* also falls under the same category. What logic is there, then, in maintaining, as S. has

57 न च कर्तृत्वादनिर्मोक्षस्तस्यास्ति पुरुषार्थसिद्धि । कर्तृत्वस्य दुःखरूपत्वात् । (S. *BSB.* ii.3.40)
58 कर्तृत्वस्य क्लेशजनकत्वे बालस्वविषयत्व तन्त्रम् । लीलादिकरणेन क्लेशादृष्टेः । लीलादेरपवादविहितकर्मपरित्या-करणेऽपि तद्दृष्टेश्च । (*TC.* p. 970)
59 'यदा वै करोत्यथ निस्तिष्ठति नाकृत्वा निस्तिष्ठति कृत्वैव निस्तिष्ठति । नासुखं लब्ध्वा करोति सुखमेव लब्ध्वा करोति' ( ) इत्यादिश्रुतेश्च । (ibid)
60 अन्यथा, सुखज्ञानयोरपि क्लेशाविनाभावादात्मा तद्रूपो न स्यात् । (*ibid*)
61 यथा च सुषुप्तौ क्लेशाभावेऽपि ज्ञानादि, तथा कृतिरप्युपपद्यताम् । (*ibid*)
62 कर्तृ पूर्वाधिकरणे बुद्धेरेव कर्तृत्वमात्मन्यस्तु तदविवेकाध्यारोपितमिति सांख्यमतनिषेधेन आत्मनः कर्तृत्वं समर्थ्येह 'यथा च तक्षा' इत्यधिकरणे पुनः बुद्धिकर्तृत्वमेवारोप्यत इति सिद्धान्तितो पूर्वाधिकरणपूर्वपक्ष एवेह सिद्धान्त इति महदिदं व्याख्यानकौशलम् । (*TC.* p. 970)

done, that in the *Utkrāntyadhi.* such attributes (of the Ātman) as atomicity are to be relegated to the sphere of Pūrvapakṣa while in the *Kartṛadhi.* the agency of Ātman should be regarded as representing the Siddhānta view?[63] As a matter of fact S. has maintained that in spite of clear indications to the contrary, in the *Utkrāntyadhi,* all the (ten) Sūtras *beginning with Utkrāntigatyāgatīnām represent the prima facie* view (Pūrvapakṣa) and that the Siddhānta is pronounced in the eleventh Sūtra *Tadguṇasāratvāt tu* * * *. Following the same logic and procedure consistently with his own position, he should have held that all the seven Sūtras beginning with *Kartā śāstrārthvatvāt* develop the Pūrvapakṣa and that the Siddhānta is pronounced by the Sūtra *Yathā ca takṣobhayathā.* Where is the wisdom in setting up two or three adhikaranas for what after all constitutes a single topic[64]? The explanation that *Yathā ca takṣobhayathā* is intended to establish the truth about the superimposition of the agency of *Buddhi* on the Ātman, in order to refute the contention of the Sāmkhya philosophers that there is *no erroneous* knowledge in our experience is not in order. For, the Sānkhya view regarding error (*bhrama*) pertains to the field of theory of knowledge and error. It has reference to experiences like the misapprehension of nacre in shell (*idam rajatam*). But the topic under discussion in *Kartā śāstrārthavatvāt* has reference to the question of the Ātman's agency. *It is not a question connected with epistemology* but with the nature of the self (*adhyātma*). It would be a misuse of *the adhikaraṇa* to seek to utilize it for any such purpose as disproving the Sānkhya theory of Bhrama.

Parāyattādhikaraṇam (II.3.41-42)

S.'s interpretation of the next adhi. beginning with *Parāttu tacchruteḥ* in which he emphasizes that the agency of Jivātman, established in the earlier *adhi.*, is dependent on Paramātman *does not ring true* to his own metaphysical *position that the agency of Jīvātman is* caused by Avidyā and is, therefore, due to a superimposition on account of *the* proximity of the self to *antaḥkaraṇa.* In such a theory, there is very little for Paramātman to do and hardly any need for Him to be dragged into the picture.[65]

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63 त्वन्मते जीवेऽणुत्वोत्क्रान्त्यादिक यथा बुद्ध्युपाधिक मिथ्या तथा कर्तृत्वमपि। एव चोत्क्रान्त्यधिकरणेऽणुत्वादे पूर्वपक्षत्व कर्तृत्वधिकरणे तु कर्तृत्वस्य सिद्धान्तत्वमिति विभागः किङ्कृतः? (*TC.* p. 970)

64 यथोत्क्रान्त्यधिकरणे उत्क्रान्तीत्यादिसूत्राष्टकेन पूर्वपक्षयित्वा, तद्गुणसारत्वादित्यनेन सिद्धान्तित, एव कर्तृत्वधिकरणेऽपि सूत्रसप्तकेन पूर्वपक्षयित्वा यथाच तक्षेत्यनेन सिद्धान्तितमिति कस्मान्न भाष्यते? (*TC.* p. 970)

65 'परात्तु' इत्यधिकरणमप्ययुक्तम्। जीवेऽन्त करणसन्निधानादारोपितस्याविद्यककर्तृत्वस्य रूप्यादेरिव ईश्वरानपेक्षत्वात्। (*TC.* p. 970)

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

According to R. the *Kartṛadhikaraṇam* (ii.3, 33-39) includes the Sūtra *Yathā ca takṣobhayathā*. The *Parāyattādhikaraṇa* consists of two Sūtras (ii.3-40-41). In the former, the Soul's intrinsic agency is established. The Pūrvapakṣa is made from the Sānkhya standpoint.

R. reads Sūtras 34 and 35 as one and in the reverse order: *Upādānād vihāropadeśāt*. As his viṣayavākya is *Bṛh. Up.* ii.1.18, it would have been more in conformity with it, if the reading of the Sūtra had been *Upādānena vihāropadeśāt*. Sūtra 37 according to R. brings out the defect in not accepting Ātman as agent. Sūtra 38 according to him exposes the defect in accepting Buddhi as the agent instead. Since Sūtra 36 according to him deals with the difficulty which will arise on the view of the Self's *not* being an agent, we should expect Sūtra 38 to be read immediately after 36 and *before* 37.

Parāyattādhikaraṇam (ii, 3, 40-41)

This *adhi.* establishes that the activity of the Jīva proceeds from the Supreme B. as its cause. In this connection, R. has developed a distinctive theory of the manner in which the Supreme B. exercises its prerogative in shaping the career of the Souls. The colorful details and niceties of this theory have been further elucidated by Vātsya Varadārya and his pupil commentator Sudarśana Sūri. As their exposition raises some very interesting points for discussion, it deserves *special attention here*. It is also worth considering how far R.'s theory which introduces the twin ideas of 'neutality' of the Lord at the point of the initial volitional effort of the individual and '*permissiveness* in the subsequent stages' can be accepted as a satisfactory solution of the question of how far the Lord's involvement in the Jīvas' activity exposes Him to partiality or cruelty in dealing with the souls. The question is of vital interest only to Theists like R. and M. and *not to S.*

Briefly, R.'s position as elucidated by his commentators is as follows:—

Having bestowed on the Jīva the power of intelligence, the power to act and the full complement of accessories in the form of body, sense-organs etc., the Lord remains neutral in respect of the Jīva's initial volitional effort in launching on a particular course of action, good or bad. Here, the Jīva himself takes the first plunge as it were, without being prompted by the Lord. The reason for adopting such a position is this. The Lord has to prompt the Jīva to a particular course of

action only by inducing in him a desire to do so. Such a desire is to be generated in the Jīva by the presence of suitable objects of enjoyment and attraction. But the presence of these objects is governed and brought about by the power of unseen merit of the Jīva. The objects being thus brought into contact with the Jīva by his own *adṛṣṭa*, the desire to possess and enjoy them is engendered in him by the residuary vāsanās (potential impressions) lodged in him from past lives. The awakening of these Vāsanās is already accomplished at the time of the birth of each individual Jīva thro' his unseen merits which are at work from the time of the formation of the particular physical body which he is to tenant. There is thus no scope for the Lord to come into the picture at all, *at this stage*. This leaves the independence of the Jīva unencroached upon by the Lord, in respect of his initial volitional activity. It is in this way that the Jīva makes himself liable to the jurisdiction of injunctons and prohibitions and becomes a doer of good and bad and reaps their fruits.[66] It is only at the second stage of volition and effort that the Lord helps the Jīva by extending his favor and permission (*anumati*). The role of Anumantṛ consists in prompting one who has already taken the first step. At this stage, the Lord brings before the Jīva's mind such other objects of attraction and enjoyment as may not have been interposed by *adṛṣṭa* or other causes. This is what distinguishes the Lord's 'permissiveness' (*anumantṛtva*) from His role of 'neutrality' (*audāsīnya*) in the first instance.[67] As this method of the Lord's prompting and permitting the Jīva in his subsequent actions is in the nature of bestowing on the Jīva fruits in accordance with his initial effort, there is no question of the Lord's becoming exposed to partiality or cruelty in prompting the Jīva to do good or bad in accordance with the results which have already accrued to him.[68]

Thus, in respect of the subsequent volitional effort and activities of the Jīva, the Lord Himself becomes active as the prompter (*prayojaka*) in addition to being the giver of permission (*anumantā*). The text of the *Kauṣitaki Up.* (iii. 8):

एष ह्येव साधुकर्म कारयति यंयमेभ्यो लोकेभ्य उन्निनीषति।
एष ह्येवासाधुकर्म कारयति यंयमधो निनीषति।

66. *Read:*— केचित्तु–ईश्वरो जीवस्य चिच्छक्तिं प्रवृत्तिशक्तिं करणकलेबरादिसहकारिजातं च दत्वा प्रथमप्रवृत्तावुदास्ते। जीवस्तु स्वयमेव प्रवर्तते। तथाहि–विषयविशेषसन्निधिस्तावत भोगादृष्टात्। तदिच्छादिश्च वासनाविशेषात्। वासनोन्मेषश्च तत्तद्देहारम्भकादृष्टाज्जन्मकाल एव सिद्ध इति नेशापेक्षा। एवं च, प्रथमेच्छाप्रयत्नयोरभग्नस्वातन्त्र्यस्य जीवस्य विध्यादिविषयत्वं, पुण्यपापादिकर्तृत्वं, तत्फलभोक्तृत्वं च युक्तम् इति (*TC.* p. 971b)
Read also: Śrutaprakāśa ii.3.41. (pp. 377–79).

67. द्वितीयेच्छादावीश्वरोऽनुमन्ता। प्रवृत्तप्रवर्तको ह्यनुमन्ता। तदा हेत्वन्तरासन्निधापितमपि विषय बुद्धौ सनिधापयति। अयमेव चौदासीन्यावस्थातोऽनुमन्तृत्वावस्थाया विशेषः। (*TC.* p. 971b)

68. सा चानुमतिः प्रथमप्रवृत्तिफलप्रदानरूपेति नेश्वरस्य नैर्घृण्यादि। (*TC.* ibid.)

is not to be understood in an unrestricted way so as to apply to cases of initial volitional effort also, of the Jīvas. It refers only to the Lord's role as the giver of permission in the subsequent stages after the initial volitional effort has had its way and outlet and has brought about its results. Otherwise, the injunctions and prohibitions of Śāstras will cease to be meaningful, if God were to take the leading role from the very beginning.[69] The whole theme has been put in a nutshell in the following verse by Vātsya Varadācārya in his *Tattvasāra*:

आदावीश्वरदत्तयैव पुरुषः स्वातंत्र्यशक्त्या स्वयं
तत्राज्ञानचिकीर्षणप्रयतनान्युत्पादयन् वर्तते ।
तत्रोपेक्ष्य ततोऽनुमत्य विदधत्तन्निग्रहानुग्रहौ
तत्तत्कर्मफलं प्रयच्छति ततः सर्वस्य पुंसो हरिः ॥

(Ver. 46)

The verse has been quoted by Vyāsatīrtha in the *TC*.

R. too has given expression to this idea in his *Śrībhāṣya* (ii.3.41) but not so clearly or exhaustively. He insists, however, that the *Kauṣitakī* text is not to be understood in general terms. He says: "The Lord wishing to favor those who are resolved on activity such as would please Him, generates in their minds a tendency to virtuous acts which lead to Him while in order to punish those who are resolved to do things repugnant to Him, he creates in them a fascination for acts which have a downward tendency and are obstacles to attaining him". R. supports his interpretation with two citations from the *Gītā*, X.8-10; and XVI. 8-19.

Criticism

But these *Gītā* verses do not say anything about the Lord's adopting an attitude of neutrality in the initial stage of volitional effort of the Jiva. They merely signify that the Lord dispenses rewards in accordance with the varying Sādhanas of individuals.[70]

It is not necessary to accept a position such as has been envisaged by R. in order to keep the Lord's part free from involvement in partiality and cruelty. It has already been shown in the exposition of the

69. 'एष ह्येव साधुकर्म कारयति' इत्यादिश्रुतिस्तु द्वितीयादिप्रवृत्तावनुमन्तृत्वादिविषया। अन्यथा, हि, विधिनिषेधशास्त्रानर्थक्यं स्यात्। (*TC*. p. 971)

70. अत्र वयम्.—'एष ह्येव' इत्यादिश्रुतिसमर्थकेनैवास्मादप्रवृत्तावौदासीन्यकल्पनं न तावत् 'तेषां सततयुक्तानाम्' 'तानहं द्विषतः क्रूरान् क्षिपामि' इत्यादिवचनाशयोऽपि। अत्र साधनानुसारिफलदानस्यैवोक्त्या आद्यप्रवृत्तावौदासीन्यानुक्तेः (*TC*. p. 971)

Vaiṣamyanairghṛṇyādhikaraṇa (ii.1.35-37) that by making the beginningless intrinsic fitness of Jīvas the ultimate basis of the Lord's dealings with them *at all times and stages*, including the socalled 'initial stage of volitional effort' of Rāmānuja, it is possible to *keep the Lord's* part in shaping human destiny untouched by partiality or cruelty.[71] *Unless the beginningless natural fitness (anādisvarūpayogyatā)* of Jīva is made the basis of the Lord's participation in the fulfilment of human destiny, *it* will not be possible to prevent His becoming liable to partiality or cruelty, to the extent that He remains *neutral* in the initial stage of volitional effort and becomes *permissive*, in respect of subsequent activities.[72]

Since the Lord's permissiveness, after the initial volitional effort has had its outlet, is *not arbitrary* but is in conformity with the results of the initial efforts, His part in endowing the Jīvas at the initial stage itself with a measure of capacity and with their physical bodies and *sense organs of different orders of excellence and capacity may, in the* same way, be taken to be in conformity with the results of earlier and still earlier achievements of the Jīvas, as far back as the mind could reach, which is the grass-root level of Svarūpayogyatā.[73]

It is not necessary to assume any neutrality on the Lord's part in respect of the initial effort of Jīvas to avoid involving Him in partiality or cruelty. That can always be secured thro' His strict adherence to the criterion of *anādisvarūpayogyatā* of Jīvas, in His dealings with their career. Otherwise, it will be difficult to see *how tho' competent to do so, the Lord who refrains from holding back the Jīva* from plunging into a course of action detrimental to his interests or *permits him to proceed* with such activity, can be regarded as *not being cruel, or callous.*[74]

If the Lord's permissiveness at the *second stage* is only by way of bestowing the rewards of the initial effort, His enabling the Jīvas to *act in the first instance by providing* them with suitable powers and bodies etc. can likewise be construed as being done in conformity with *the achievements of still earlier karmas stretching back to a beginning-*

71. नापीश्वरस्य नैर्घृण्याद्यभावायौदासीन्यकल्पनम्, प्रथमप्रवृत्तावीश्वरस्य प्रयोजकत्वेऽपि तदभावस्य समर्थितत्वात्। (*TC.* p. 971-72b)

72 अन्यथा, महानिष्टान्निवर्तने शक्तस्यौदासीन्येन, अनुमतृत्वेन च नैर्घृण्यादि दुर्वारमेव। (*TC.* p. 971b)

73 न च द्वितीयादिप्रवृत्तावनुमतिराद्यप्रवृत्तिफलरूपा। तद्वदाद्यप्रवृत्तिप्रयोजकतापि 'नानादित्वात्' (*BS.* ii.1.35)
इत्युक्तरीत्या अनादिपूर्वकर्मफलदानरूपास्तु। (*TC.* p. 972b)

74 नापीश्वरस्य कर्मफलानन्वयाय तत्कल्पनम्। प्रयोजकत्वेऽपि विधिनिषेधानीनत्वादेव तदुपपत्ते.। अन्यथा शक्तस्याप्यौदासीन्येनानुमतृत्वेन च तदन्वयो दुर्वार.। (*TC.* ibid)

less past, as set forth in the concept of Anāditva of Samsāra in BS. ii.1.36.

Nor is it necessary to keep the Lord *aloof at the initial stage* so that He may not be a sharer in the effects of Jīva's karma. The Lord's status as transcending the jurisdiction of injunctions and prohibitions should keep Him out of having to share the fruits of Jīva-karma, tho' He prompts them to activity. Otherwise, it would be difficult to see how, as a person competent to intervene and prevent the commission of a wrong, the Lord who keeps Himself aloof or allows its being done, can be said to be entirely free from blame.

R. and his commentator have offered an explanation. The Lord is like a father, who has put his sons in possession of their share of property. It is capable of being put to a good or a bad use. Where one of the sons misuses the property given to him and the other puts it to good use, it is they who will have to take the consequences of their acts and not the father. Similar is the case with God.[75]

There is, howwever, considerable difference between the Lord's position and the position of the parent *vis a vis* his sons which R. and his commentator have failed to take into account. Whereas the human father cannot foresee how his sons will be using the property given to them, the Lord as an omniscient being, must be competent to have foreknowledge of *how each Jīva will act.* Where the father does not "permit" the misuse of the property, the Lord "permits" wrong-doing as "*Anumanty*" according to R. Unlike the parent, the Lord has contributed vitally to the initial volitional effort of the Jīva by bestowing on him the power of sentiency, of ability to do things etc.[76]

It is not necessary, therefore, to let the Lord keep Himself aloof at the initial stage in order that injunctions and prohibitions may be applicable to the Jīva.[7] That can be explained by accepting that his initial effort also flows as much due to the prompting of the Lord as his subsequent activities.[78]

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75. यथा द्वयोः पुत्रयो पित्रादिविभक्तदत्तवित्तक्षेत्रादिमत्त्वेन तत्सापेक्षत्वेऽपि कस्यचिदपथप्रवृत्तिः कस्यचित्सुपथप्रवृत्तिश्च तयोरेव फलाय भवति, तद्वदिहापि सर्वजीवानां सामान्येन चिच्छक्तिप्रवृत्तिशक्त्योः करणकलेवरादिपरिकरलाभस्य च परमात्माधीनत्वात् कर्तृत्वमात्रं परायत्तं विशेषकर्तृत्वं च परानुमतिमात्रापेक्षत्वात् परायत्तमपि स्यात्तस्माज्जीवस्य विधिनिषेधविषयत्वम्। (*Srutaprakāśa BSB.* ii.3.41)

76. पितृवदीश्वरस्य भाविमन्दप्रवृत्त्यज्ञानाभावात्। अननुमन्तृत्वाभावात्। आद्येच्छाप्रयत्नौ प्रत्यहेतुत्वाभावाच्च। (TC. p. 972b)

77. नापि जीवस्य विध्यादिविषयत्वाय तत्कल्पनम्। (*TC*)

78. इच्छादिप्रवृत्तावपि प्रथमप्रवृत्तावस्वातन्त्र्ये स्युरन्यगोत्वा नद्युपात्ते। (TC. p. 972)

Nor can the Lord be kept in the background so far as the initial volitional effort is concerned, because it can be explained on the basis of other factors without bringing Him in. If that be so, He can be kept in the background by the same token, in respect of the subsequent activities too, which can also be explained on the basis of other factors. The Śruti text which refers to the Lord's part in what the Jīva does is so worded that it can be applied to both the cases—the initial effort and the subsequent ones.[79] Moreover, as the initial effort of the Jiva, in this life, is the outcome of the Karma and Vāsanās of a previous life or lives, and as the Lord is admittedly the giver of the fruits of all karmas, it will *not be* possible to maintain the position that the Lord holds Himself *aloof in respect of the initial volitional effort.*[80]

The *Śrutaprakāśa* has argued that there is a significant difference in motivation between the Lord's keeping Himself aloof in respect of the Jīva's initial volitional effort and His subsequent permissiveness, which justifies their being treated on defferent footing. In the former case, the Lord's non-intervention is motivated only by the desire to let the Jīva take the consequences of his past deeds and *not* with the object of getting any Sādhanas productive of fresh results performed by the Jīva. In the second and subsequent efforts of the Jīva—where the Lord intervenes, the intervention is motivated by the desire to get fresh Karmas yielding fresh results performed by the Jīva.[81]

This also is not convincing. A King who inflicts capital punishment on an offender for his offences and who knows that such punishment must result in his death is not found to be indifferent to the trial and punishment of such an offender. In the same way, the Lord who makes the Jīva take to a particular course of action in consequence of his past deeds and who knows that it must be painful to the Jīva or unpalatable to him, can hardly be taken to be indifferent in his dealings with that Jīva.[82] A person who strikes a match to spot out a book in a dark room may be indifferent to an album lying there when he sees it but which he did not expect to see there. But he would not be indif-

79 नापीश्वरेतरहेतुभिरेव प्रथमप्रवृत्तेरपपत्त्या तत्कल्पनम्। तत एव द्वितीयादिप्रवृत्तावपि तत्कल्पनापातात्। श्रुतिस्तु उभयसमा। (*TC.* p. 972)

80 किं च प्रथमप्रवृत्तेरपि पूर्वकर्मफलत्वात्, त्वन्मते ऽपीश्वरस्य सर्वकर्मफलदत्वात्, कथ तन्नौदासीन्यम्? (*TC.* p. 972)

81 ननु, तत्तद्भोगादृष्टस्यापीश्वर एव फलद इति विषयसंनिधानादेरपीश्वरकारितत्वात् कथ तस्य तन्नौदासीन्यम्? अभिसन्धिविशेषाभावादिति ब्रूम –ईश्वर प्राचीनादृष्टफलभूतसुखदु खप्रदानेच्छया विषयसंनिधानादिकं प्रथममापादयति। न तु, साधनान्तरानुष्ठापनेच्छया। (*Śrutaprakāśa.* ii, 3. 41)

82. पूर्वापराधफलत्वेनैव चोरस्यातिपीडा कुर्वतः ता च मृतिहेतुतया जानतो राजादेश्चोरमृत्यादौ औदासीन्यादर्शनेन, प्राचीनकर्मफलत्वेनाद्यप्रवृत्ति कुर्वतस्ता चानर्थहेतुतया जानत ईश्वरस्य तन्नौदासीन्यायोगात्। (*TC.* p. 973b)

ferent to it if he had known that the light will reveal to him the existence of the album too.[83]

Thus, nothing short of grounding God's treatment of souls on their own distinctive and beginingless Svarūpayogyatā can help us in vindicating the Lord's impartiality of treatment of Jīvas. The solution proposed by R. and his commentators on the basis of non-intervention (audāsīnya) and permissiveness (anumantṛtva) at the first and the subsequent stages falls short of the requirements.[84]

83. घटप्रकाशनार्थं दीपमुपाददानस्य तु पुंसो दैवात्तेन पटे प्रकाशिते तत्रौदासीन्यं युक्तम्। तेन दीपेन नियमेन पटः प्रकाशयिष्यत इति ज्ञानाभावात्। तथा ज्ञाने तु, तत्रापि नौदासीन्यम्। (*TC.* p. 973b)

This is with reference to the following from the *Śrutaprakāśa:* घटनिरीक्षणाय प्रदीपमारोपयन् पुरुषः पटार्थिपुरुषान्तरप्रवृत्तावुदासीन एव।

84. तस्मात्–तत्तत्स्वभावाद्यनुसारित्वादेवेश्वरस्य न वैषम्यादि इति भाष्योक्तमेव युक्तमिति।
(*TC.* p. 973b)

CHAPTER XXXI

JĪVA IS AN AṀŚA OF BRAHMAN

18. *Aṁśādhikaraṇam* (ii.3, 43-50)

In this penultimate *adhi* of this Pāda, the Sūtrakāra gives final form to the Jīva's ontological relation to B., as its *aṁśa*. "Aṁśa" fuses into a single concept the ideas of the soul's close resemblance to B. in respect of its essential properties of knowledge and bliss and its ontological dependence on B. for its very existence, its capacity to know and to act—as established in the Sūtras: *Tadguṇasāratvāt* (ii.3.29) and *Parāttu tacchruteḥ* (ii.3.41). As it is not a physical relationship that is meant, it would be a mistake to translate "*aṁśa*" as a 'part' or a 'fraction'. The relation of the ectype to its archetype is the nearest approximation to the concept of "*aṁśa-aṁśibhāva*" as applied to Jīva and B. We shall, however, not attempt to translate the Sanskrit word *aṁśa* as used by Bādarāyaṇa into English but retain it as untranslatable.

The conflict of testimony in this case arises this way. The *Gaupavana Śruti* declares: "Aṁśas indeed are these souls. The Lord is their Aṁśī. The unchanging Lord causes all this to be done thro' His aṁśas". The *Bhāllaveya Śruti* declares: "The Jīva is no *aṁśa* whatever of the Other (i.e. the Lord). He is in no way connected with Him or helpful to Him. All the same, it is the Lord who bestows the fruits on the Jīva according to his deserts. For, the Supreme is not ruled by any other. He is the all-ruler.[1]

1. Quoted in M. *BSB.* ii 3 43.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is: It cannot be decided one way or the other if the Jīva is an *aṁśa* of the Lord or is not. We cannot decide that he is an *aṁśa* as this is directly contradicted by the other statement quoted. We cannot say that the statement 'he is not an *aṁśa* of the *other*' refers to the other Jīvas. For, the succeeding words "All the same, it is the Lord......" are against such a construction. Nor can it be established decisively that the Jīva is *not* an *aṁśa* of the Lord as the *Gaupavana Śruti* emphatically states that he is an *aṁśa*. There is no possibility here of both being true and acceptable as in the case of the injunction to offer the oblations with rice or barley. For this is a question concerning the nature of a thing—not of the manner of performance of an act and there is further the emphatic statement about the Jīva being an aṁśa of the Lord. It cannot be said that as the identity of the Jīva with B. has been refuted earlier, the Śrutis which state that the Jīva is *not* an *aṁśa* of B. are entitled to greater weight. The Souls can still be *aṁśas* of B. without being identical with B. just as a single thread tho' it is different from the cloth as a whole, is yet an *aṁśa* of the whole. Thus, as the Śrutis seem to be pulling in opposite directions, on this question, it is not possible to come to a definite conclusion on the point.[2]

Siddhānta.

The Siddhānta is embodied in the Sūtra: *Aṁśo nānāvyapadeśād anyathā cāpi dāśakitavāditvam adhīyata eke* (ii.3.43). *Properly expanded* this means: (The Jīva) is an *aṁśa* (of B.) (i) because his relationship to B. is found described (in the Śrutis) in various terms (as son, father, brother, friend, companion and so forth) and otherwise too (i.e.) as not standing in any relationship (of upajīvyatva or being the source of sustenance) to B. [but only as one drawing sustenance *from* B. (*upajīvaka*)]; and (ii) because some Śākhins speak of B. as (being identical with) the fisherfolk, the gamblers and the slaves *as well as otherwise* viz. that the Lord is other than the Jīva and that the Jīva is other than the Lord (in terms of their difference[3]).

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2. तत्र न जीवो हरेरंश नाप्यनंश इति निर्णयो युज्यत इति पूर्वः पक्षः। न तावदंशत्वनिर्णयः शक्यः; नैवांश इति श्रुतेः। न च तत्र परस्येति जीवान्तरविवक्षा। तथापीत्यादिवाक्यशेषविरोधात्। नाप्यनंशत्वनिर्णयः 'अंश एव' इति श्रुतेः। न च व्रीहियववद्विकल्पः वस्तुविकल्पायोगात्। अंश एव नैवांश इति सावधारणत्वात्। न च जीवैक्याभेदस्य प्रागेव निरस्तत्वात् अनंशत्वश्रुतिर्बलवतीति वाच्यम्। अभेदाभावेऽपि अंशत्वस्याविरोधात्। समस्तपटाद्भिन्नस्यापि एकस्य तन्तोः तदंशत्वदर्शनात्। अतः श्रुतिद्वयस्यापि नानात्वादप्रामाण्यमेवेति नोक्तः समन्वयो युक्त इति प्राप्ते * * * (*TP.* ii.3.43)

3. अंशो जीवः परस्य। पितृपुत्रादिसम्बन्धैः केवलं तदुपजीवकत्वेन नानाप्रकारेण सम्बन्धव्यपदेशात्। अन्यथा च सम्बन्धाभावेन च व्यपदेशात्। एके शाखिन अपि जीवस्य 'ब्रह्म दाशा ब्रह्म कितवा ब्रह्मैवेमे दाशाः' इति ब्रह्माभेदमधीयते। अन्यथा च 'अन्यः परोऽन्यो जीवः' इति भेदं चाधीयत एके शाखिन इति योज्यम्।
(*TDP.* ii.3.43)

In the foregoing interpretation, it will be seen that the predication that Jīva is an *amśa* of B. is supported by *two sets of reasons* in keeping with the two complementary senses in which the concept of *amśatva* is understood. The first sense of *amśatva* is drawing sustenance from 'it' (the Amśi) and therefore acting as its satellite (*tadupajīvakatvarūpam taccheṣatvam*). The second sense of Amśatvam is 'having a likeness to it (B) and yet being considerably inferior to it in its properties (*tato nyūnatve sati tatsadṛśatvam*). Jīva's *amśatva* to B. in the former sense is supported in the Sūtra by the reason: *nānāvyapadeśa* or his being described as standing in various relations of son, father, brother, friend, companion, etc. to B. *along with* being one who always draws his sustenance from B. *but never as sustaining B.*[4] In its second sense of *Tato nyūnatve sati tatsadṛśatvam* the predication is supported by the terms of identity in which B. is spoken of with reference to fisherfolk, gamblers and slaves *along with the emphasis on its difference from the Jīvātman.*[5] Such an amplification of the Sūtra is made possible by the use of the conjunctive particle *ca* there, which connects the *two evenly balanced sets of reasons* (i) nānāvyapadeśa *and its counterpart conveyed by the expression 'anyathā'* and (ii) *abhedavyapadeśa* (in terms of Brahma *dāśā* * *) *and its counterpart (of difference) conveyed by 'anyathā'*—in the wording of the Sūtra.

This will show that (i) *nānāvyapadeśa* brackted with what is contrary to it and (ii) *Dāśakitavādi* (vyapadeśa) bracketed with what is contrary to it have *severally been intended* by the Sūtrakāra to be used as distinctive *sets of reasons* to establish the conclusion that the Jīva is an *amśa* of B. We cannot agree with S. and R. that *nānāvyapadeśa* understood in the sense of 'declaration of difference' and *'anyathā'* connected *only with* 'Dāśakitavādi (vyapradeśa)' as its amplified equivalent are to be taken in unison as the reason to support the thesis of Jīva being an *amśa* of B.[6]

For then, one of the two terms: *Anyathā* or the entire sentence *Dāśakitavāditvam adhīyata eke* can be dispensed with, as being superfluous—as the intended contrast with the declaration of difference will

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4 अत्र चार्थेऽंशत्वे सौत्रनानाव्यपदेशशब्दोक्त सबन्धव्यपदेश सौत्रान्यथाव्यपदेशशब्दोक्तासंबन्धव्यपदेशसहितो हेतुः। (*TC.* p. 976b)

5. द्वितीये तु, सौत्रदाशकितवादित्वशब्दोक्तो अभेदव्यपदेश सौत्रान्यथाशब्दोक्तभेदव्यपदेशसहितो हेतुरिति द्रष्टव्यम्। (*TC.* p. 976b)

6. ज्ञो जीव. परस्याश । कुत ? i) नानाव्यपदेशात् अन्यथा च व्यपदेशादित्यन्वय । अयं च हेतुराद्येऽर्थे। अन्त्ये तु ii) 'ब्रह्म दाशा ब्रह्म कितवा ब्रह्मैवेमे दासा' इति ब्रह्माभेदमधीयते। अन्यथा च–'अन्य: परोऽन्यो जीव' इति भेद चाधीयत एके, यतोऽस्त इति योज्यम्। (*TDP.* ii.3.43)
अतो भेदाभेदावगमाभ्यामशत्वावगम (*S. BSB.* ii.3.43)
एवमुभयव्यपदेशमुख्यत्वसिद्धये जीवोऽयं ब्रह्मणोऽश इत्यभ्युपगन्तव्य । (*R. Śrībhāṣya* ii.3.42)

semblance to B. But as this resemblance to B. is only partial, the Jīva's identification with B. resting on such partial resemblance has to be treated as figurative (*gauṇa*) and not as a complete identity of essence.

It is this *incompatibility of both the relation of identity of essence and difference, in their primary senses* that gives the Sūtrakāra's concept of *aṁśa* its *raison d'etre.* M.'s Bhāṣya sums up the matter in the clearest terms:

यतो भेदेन तस्यायमभेदेन च गीयते ।
अतश्चांशत्वमुद्दिष्टं भेदाभेदौ न मुख्यतः ॥

The words *Bhedābhedau na mukhyataḥ* do *not* mean that "separateness and non-separateness ought *not* to be understood literally" as misconstrued by J. E. Carpenter (*Theism in Mediaeval India,* 1921, p. 411). The same misconstruction is to be met with in H. N. Raghavendrachar's Kannada work: *Dvaita Vedānta,* 1958, p. 279. We need not, therefore, deplore with Carpenter that "unhappily M. did not adhere to this suggestion" (*ibid*). What the words really mean is that *both* difference and identity *cannot hold true in their primary senses.* Only one of them can be accepted in its primary sense and the other must be understood in a non-primary (*gauṇa*) sense. It goes without saying that according to M. difference between Jīva and B. holds true in its primary sense and 'identity' is to be taken in the *gauṇa* sense of *aṁśa.* The commentary of J. makes this crystal-clear:

तत्संबन्धित्वमेव तदंशत्वमिति वक्ष्यामः । श्रुतिद्वयान्यथानुपपत्त्या भेदमंगीकृत्य, अभेदस्थाने अंशत्वं वक्तव्यमिति भावः । (*TP.* ii.3.43).

The advantage of the concept of aṁśa is that while rejecting once for all the irrationality of Bhedābheda relationship between Jīva and B. it preserves the fundamental distinction of essence between them grounded on all the Pramāṇas and accepts identity in the senses of (i) *Tadupajīvakatvarūpam taccheṣatvam* and (ii) *Tato nyūnatve sati tatsadṛśatvam.* Recognizing the logical inconsistency between *bheda* and *abheda* in their primary senses as difference of nature and identity of essence,[10b] the Sūtrakāra fuses *bhinnatva* (difference of nature) and *sādṛśya* (similarity of attributes) into a unitary concept and presents it as summing up the essence of the relationship between Jīva and B.

भिन्नत्वे जीवे तन्निष्ठवद्धर्मसंयोगित्वं त्रिचतुरादौ संकुचितम् । (*TC.* p. 977 b)

The Sūtrakāra next turns his attention to remove the misconception that the use of his term *aṁśa* to describe the Jīvas' relation to B.

may give rise to, in as much as the personal manifestations of B. as Avatars are also found to be accepted and designated as Its "*amśas*", in the Khila Śrutis, the Epics and the Purāṇas. The question, would, therefore, arise if the Jīvas are to be accepted as "*amśas*" on a par with the Avatars or if they differ from the Avatars *as amśas*, in what sense or particulars they differ. *As a Samanvayācārya of the authentic traditions and received literature of the Vedānta, the Sūtrakāra owes it to himself to go into this question.* This he does in the next few Sūtras of this *adhi.* (46-50).

The Sūtra: *Prakāśādivan naivam Paraḥ* (ii.3.46) and the next: *Smaranti ca* (ii.3.47) make it clear that the personal manifestations of the Supreme as Avatars are *not "amśas" in the same sense as* the Jīvas: *Naivam Paraḥ.* They are what may be called "Svarūpāmśas" of the Supreme while the Jīvas are "Bhinnāmśas". The difference between these two orders of *amśas* has been clearly explained in the following passages from the *Varāha* cited by M.: "Amśas are of two orders: the Svarūpāmśa and the Bhinnāmśa. Whatever is the nature, power and condition of supremacy etc. of the Amśin (original) the same holds true of the Svarūpāmśas. *There is not even an iota of difference between the Svarūpāmśa and its Amśin. But the "Bhinnāmśa" is of limited power and has resemblance with the Amśin to a very slight degree".*[11]

A famous passage in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*:

एते स्वांशकलाः पुंस. कृष्णस्तु भगवान् स्वयम् ।
इन्द्रारिव्याकुलं लोकं मृडयन्ति युगे युगे ॥ (i.3.28)

refers to the numerous Avatars of the Supreme Being as "Kalās of its essential aspect" (*Svāmśakalāḥ*) which are said to be the same as Bhagavān Kṛṣṇa *Himself*—"*Kṛṣṇa*" being understood here in the ultimate sense of "Mūlarupī" (See J. *MGBt.* x.41) and which in every age appear to protect and bless the world affected by the enemies of Indra".

The preceding verse here:

ऋषयो मनवो देवा मनुपुत्रा महौजसः ।
कलाः सर्वे हरेरेव सप्रजापतयः स्मृताः ॥ (*Op. cit.*, i.3.27)

speaks of the Manus, Ṛṣis, Prajāpatis, etc. only as "Kalās", in general, of the Supreme. We find here a distinction between the "Svāmśa Kalās" and the "Kalās". The text further down (i.3.31) refers to

11 स्वांशश्चाथ विभिन्नांश इति द्वेधांश इष्यते ।
अंशिनो यत्तु सामर्थ्यं यत्स्वरूपं यथा स्थितिः ॥
तदेव नाणुमात्रोऽपि भेदः स्वांशांशिनोः क्वचित् ।
विभिन्नांशोऽल्पशक्तिः स्यात् किंचित्सादृश्यमात्रयुक् ॥
इति वाराहे । (M. *BSB.* ii.3.47)

Jaḍasṛṣṭi[12] and *then* describes the "Jīvas" (already mentioned as "Kalās" of the Supreme in i.3.27) as "*other than* the Supreme Being and matter (*ataḥ param*), subtle in character, never bereft of the properties of jñāna, ānanda, etc. but obliged to undergo transmigration for failure to go thro' the discipline of Śravaṇa, manana and acquire vision of the Supreme Reality (*Vastu*).[13]

It is clear from these passages that there is a vital distinction between these two orders of Aṁśas of the Lord—the Svarūpāṁśas and the Kalās. M. uses the terminology of Svarūpāṁśa and Bhinnāṁśa current in the Purāṇas, cited by him, to denote these two orders of *aṁśas*. The Avatars of the Supreme are its Svarūpāṁśas in the sense already defined and the Jīvas as a class are Bhinnāṁśas. The fact of *aṁśatva* within the meaning of the definition *Tato nyūnatve sati tatsadṛśatvam is common* to both of them.[13a]

The Sūtra *Prakāśādivan naivam Paraḥ* answers the question how in spite of being *aṁśas* of the same B. there should be this difference be-

12. एतद्रूप भगवतो ह्यरूपस्य चिदात्मनः।
मायागुणैर्विरचित महदादिभिरात्मनि।
यथा नभसि मेघौघा रेणुर्वा पार्थिवेऽनिले।
एव द्रष्टरि दृश्यत्वमारोपितमबुद्धिभिः॥ (i.3.30-31)
For the meaning of these ślokas see Satyābhinava's *Durghaṭabhāvadīpikā.*

13. अतःपरं यदव्यक्तमव्यूढगुणबृंहितम्।
अदृष्टाश्रुतवस्तुत्वात् स जीवो यः पुनर्भव॥
यदतः परमुरुपाद्भिन्नमकार्यमनाद्यनन्तगतसत्त्वादिगुणकं चैतन्य स जीवः, यश्चादृष्टाश्रुतभगवत्स्वरूपत्वात् संसरतीति (TP. ii.3.47)

13a. The *TC* explains that tho' the Svarūpāṁśa is essentially identical with the Aṁśin, it is still formally *an adjunct* to the Aṁśi. Tho' it has all the properties of the Aṁśi these are *not manifested* in it while they are in their potential state (*śaktyātmanā*) whereas in the Aṁśi they are always in a fully manifested condition (*vyaktyātmanā*). The Bhinnāṁśa is actually inferior to the Aṁśin in all respects and is dependent on it and bears similarity only in respect of a few attributes to the Aṁśin. Leaving aside the identity and difference of the Svarūpāṁśa and the Bhinnāṁśa with the Aṁśin, both of them have this in common—viz. the similarity in respect of their properties of *sattā, jñāna, ānanda,* etc. (wholly in one case and only partly in the other). Further the Bhinnāṁśa bears a similarity to the Svarūpāṁśa as it has its existence in virtue of the existence of the Aṁśin—like the Svarūpāṁśa itself—tho' even here there is a subtle distinction that the reality of the Svarūpāṁśa is the same as the reality of the Aṁśi while the reality of the Bhinnāṁśa is dependent on the reality of the Aṁśin. (*tatsattādhīnasattā*). For this reason then the application of the term "*aṁśa*" to denote the Bhinnāṁśa also (as in the case of Svarūpāṁśa) is to be regarded as a *Gauṇaprayoga*: Read:
स्वरूपांशस्याप्यभेदेऽप्यंशत्वादेवांशिन प्रत्युपसर्जनत्वमस्त्येव। स्वरूपांशस्यापि शक्त्यात्मना महत्त्वेऽपि, अंशिवत् व्यक्त्यात्मना तदभावात् ततो न्यूनत्वम्। भिन्नांशे बहुत्व त्रिचतुरादौ सङ्कुचितम् (*TC.* p. 977b)
सत्य मत्स्यादिष्वभेदनिमित्तकोंऽशशब्दः तथापि मुख्यांशसादृश्य तत्सत्तयैव सत्तावत्त्वलक्षणमेव जीवस्यांशत्वम् गौणोऽयमंशशब्द इति यावत् (*NS.* p. 453b)
यद्यपि, मुख्यांशे मत्स्यादावैक्यात् सत्तयो स्वसत्तयैव सत्तावत्त्व, जीवे च तत्सत्ताधीनसत्तावत्त्वमित्यस्ति वैषम्यं, तथापि, मुख्यांशे मत्स्यादावमुख्ये जीवे च भगवत्सत्तया सत्तावत्त्व सामान्यमक्षतमेवेत्यभिप्रायेणैवमुक्तमिति
(*NS. SVC.* ii.3.adh.18)

tween the Jīvas and their *Amśi* (B) while there is no difference between the Avatars (which are also Amśas of B.) *and their Amśi* (B) with the help of an illustration with particular reference to the higher Abhimāni-Devatās[14] of fire, water and earth celebrated in the Upaniṣads and the Purāṇas and certain *inferior* Abhimāni *Devatās* accredited to lower grades of the said elements.

The higher order of deities like Agni, Varuṇa and Dharādevī are recognized as the presiding deities of fire, water and earth. These *Amśis have their own Svarūpāmśas presiding over Kālāgni* (the terrible world-consuming fire celebrated in mythology), the ocean and Mt. Meru. Similarly, certain inferior deities called Apabhraṣṭa-Devatās *have been recognized to be the presiding deities of inferior* forms of fire, water and earth such as the glow of the firefly, urine and stool. The Abhimānidevatās of Kālāgni, ocean and Meru are identical with *their Amśis but the inferior deities presiding over the* light of glow-worm, urine and stool, are not identical with the Amśis but are different and entirely dependent on them.[15] In the same way, the Jīvas *are different from and dependent on their Amśi (B) while the Avatars* are identical with their Amśi.

The next Sūtra: *Anujñāparihārau dehasambandhāj jyotirādivat* (ii.3.48) explains the rationale of this differenc of status between the Svarūpāmśas of B.—*viz. the Avatars and the Bhinnāmśas viz. the Jīvas.* The difference is due to the fact that in the case of the Jīvas all their activities in their mundane career and their attainment of freedom *(parihāra)* from bondage *are under the control and direction of the* Supreme Being (*Parānujñā*) because of their connection with physical embodiment (*dehasambandha*) brought about by their own karma and *not by those of their Amśi.*[16] The Avatars have no physical bodies composed of the material elements. So the 'bodies' they assume are not the outcome of the Karma of their *Amśis.*[17] They are neither subject *to* Karma, birth or death, bondage and release. They are ever free, without birth, death and embodiment.[18]

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14. जीवानां मत्स्यादीना च भगवदशत्वाविशेषेऽपि मत्स्यादिरूपी पर परमात्मा नैवविधः जीववत् भिन्नाशो न, *किन्तु एवंविधः, स्वरूपांश इत्यनुवृत्त्या योजना* (*BD*)
15. यथा तेजोऽशस्यैव कालाग्ने. खद्योतस्य च नैकप्रकारता। यथा जलाशस्यामृतसमुद्रस्य मूत्रादेश्च। तथा, पृथिव्यशस्य मेरोर्विष्ठादेश्च। **अभिमानिदेवतापेक्षयैतत्** (*M. BSB.* ii.3.46)
16. परानुज्ञया प्रवृत्ति परतो बन्धनिवृत्तिश्च जीवस्यच प्रतीयते, अशत्वेऽपि देहसबन्धात्। न तु परस्य (*M. BSB.* ii.3.48)

    तथा च पक्षे विशेष्याभावेन, दृष्टान्ते विशेपणाभावेन विशिष्टाभावोऽनुगत इति भाव (Raghu. *TPB.* ii, 3, adh. 18. p. 287)
17. In elucidation of this point M.'s bhāṣya has cited passages from the *Mokṣadharma* (*Mbh.* xii. 347, 11-13) where after the mention of various Avatars, the text speaks of the Jīvas "in this world" (*iha loke*) as being subject to embodiment thro' the elements and Karma which shows the Avatars are not subject *to such embodiment.*
18. See *Caturveda Śikhā* Q. by M. *BSB.* ii.3.48.

The last part of the Sūtra (*Jyotirādivat*) illustrates this point. The presiding deity of the solar orb viz. the Sun-god is the Amśī and his Svarūpāmśa is the presiding deity of the splendour of the solar orb. These two are on a par. The former does not control the latter. The case is, however, different with the presiding deity of the eye—an inferior Devatā who is the *amśa* (in the sense already defined) of the Sun-god. This inferior deity does not enjoy the same power and status as Āditya. He is subject to the control of Āditya and looks up to him to shake off the obscuration of the darkness of gloom which affects the eye. The Apabhraṣṭadevatās are also affected by the ills of the body of souls with which they are associated, to some extent. The position of Jīvas as Bhinnāmśas of B. is thus analogous to the position of these inferior *amśas* of the major abhimāni-devatās.[19]

The expression '*ādi*' in 'Jyotirādivat' has been explained by M. with another illustration relating to the presiding deity of the ocean of pure water which surrounds the universe,—Varuṇa and his Svarūpāmśa who is the presiding deity of the sea of pure water within the universe of whom the latter is *not* subject to any control or direction by his *Amśi*. But the inferior presiding deity of phlegm which is a by-product of water is an Apabhraṣṭadevatā who is, however, a Bhinnāmśa of Varuṇa. This inferior deity is affected by the distempers of the body of the person wherein his jurisdiction lies. He finds the remedy of his distemper in the same water of which Varuṇa is the Abhimānidevatā and by his grace thro' the neutralising action of bile.[20]

The next Sūtra *Asantateścāvyatikaraḥ* (ii.3.49) makes it clear that tho' they are *amśas* of B., the Jīvas are not on a par with the Avatars —(the Svarūpāmśas of B.) because of the limited range of their power.[21] This is supported by a quotation from the *Caturvedaśikhā*[22] where it is stated that the Supreme B. has innumerable forms like Kṛṣṇa, Rāma, Kapila, etc. that all of them are perfect, unlimited, incomparable and that the Jīvas who are inferior beings are imperfect and bound and some of them get released.

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19 मुख्ये च ज्योतिरादिवत्। यथादित्यो विमृज्य तत्प्रकाशांशेनाकार 'मुख्यं कृष्णं करोतिका' (*AĀ.* ii.1.5)
इति तदंशस्याप्यंशो देहसम्बन्धात् नाडी भवति। तदनुग्राह्यत्वं तेनैवादित्येनास्य (M. *BSB.* ii.3.48)

20 यथा वारुणमुख्यस्यानुग्रहस्य चैतन्य गतस्यापि श्लेष्मगतस्यानुग्राह्यत्वं, तेनैव पित्तोपनिवृत्तिश्च (M. *BSB.* ii.3.48)
विरोधी पित्तात् (*TP*)

21 अपूर्णशक्तित्वाच्च जीवस्य न मत्स्यादिसाम्यम् (M. *BSB.* ii.3.49)
सम्यक् नति मत्स्यादि पूर्णत्व। तस्योक्तिः सम्यक्त्वान्वये तद्गतस्ये चापूर्णशक्तित्वादित्यर्थः। (*BD*)

22 'तस्य ह वा एतस्य परमस्य यानि रूपाणि कृष्णो राम कपिल इति। तस्य ह वा एतस्य परस्य पञ्च रूपाणि दश रूपाणि सर्वाणि पूर्णानि, सर्वाण्यनन्तानि * * * अथापरा सर्वे एवापूर्णाः सर्वे च बध्यन्ते, तत्र मुच्यन्ते केचन' (M. *BSB.* ii.3.49)

The last Sūtra: *Ābhāsa eva ca* (ii.3.50) adduces another reason why the Jīva, tho' he happens to be an *amśa* of the Supreme is not and cannot be identical with the *Amśī* (B) like the Avatars. The answer is—because he is *only* an "Ābhāsa" of B. unlike the Avatars—which are self-subsistent.

M. understands this term *'ābhāsa'* of the Sūtrakāra in the sense of Pratibimba or Pratibimba-amśa. He finds in the famous Ṛg-Vedic verse:

रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो वभूव
तदस्य रूपं प्रतिचक्षणाय ।
इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते
युक्ता ह्यस्य हरयः शता दश ॥ (vi.47.8)

the *locus classicus* of his doctrine of the Jīvas as Pratibimbas of the Lord.[23] As understood by him this verse means:—

"Every member of the community of Souls stands as a reflection in relation to a particular Form (of the Supreme). That Form (of the Lord called Bimba-form) is to be visualised by this one (Jīva). By His powers, the Supreme Lord (Indra) is known to have assumed countless forms—in groups of ten, hundred and thousand, known as Haris."

It should be clear from all that has been said in the foregoing adhikaraṇas about the Jīvas' atomicity, his dependence on B. and his agency under the direction of the Supreme and his being an *amśa* of the Lord that his description as an "Ābhāsa" of the Lord in *this Sūtra*, whatever else it may signify, cannot possibly be intended to reduce him to a lifeless reflection like the reflected image of the face in mirror or of the Sun in the waters. Advaitic commentators have no doubt looked upon this Sūtra as a Godsend. R. evidently thought it best to avoid a confrontation on the question of the correct interpretation of this Sūtra *vis-a-vis* the Jīva's true relationship to B., consistent with his being an *amśa* as proclaimed in the opening Sūtra. He has, therefore, suggested that this word has been used in the sense of "hetvābhāsa" or a fallacy in reasoning.

It is M. who has the resourcefulness to take the bull by the horns and offer a fresh and *thoughtful* interpretation of this expression 'Ābhāsa' as applied to the Jīvātman in relation to B. *His interpretation is one that will make every Jīva feel truly proud of being an Ābhāsa of B. and wish to continue to be so, for ever*: "Yāvadātma-

23. *In this connection see Chap. XXXVI of my Philosophy of Sri Madhvacharya.* It may be noted that RV. vi. 47.16 speaks of the *three classes of men* (souls) whom Indra (the Supreme Being) deals with *in three different ways.*

bhavitvena", to put it in the Sūtrakāra's own thrilling words earlier. It prevents vulgarization of philosophical thought which reduces the personality of the Jīvātman to a *lifeless reflection* by raising the Jīva's status to that of a living self who shines forth by the light of B. and who bears at the core of his selfhood a human form divine thro' close kinship with B. as 'Tadguṇasāra'. Ābhāsa stands for a mighty philosophical idea:—

तत आभासते नित्यं तद्वदाभासतेऽपि च ।
भानमस्तित्वमपि चैवास्मन्ताद्यतस्ततः ॥ (M. AV. iii.2.50)

that the Jīvātman shines forth, even unto himself, *only* by the light of B.—that he bears a fundamental affinity with and resemblence to B. (See BS. ii.3.29) and that his very capacity to *be, to act and to be able to enjoy his own blissful nature* and be able to asy "*cogito ergo sum*" are all derived from B. and are sustained by B. throughout.[24]

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

According to S. the Pūrvapakṣa poses the difficulty of determining the true relationship between Jīva and B. as taught in the Śrutis in terms of their identity or difference.[25]

Pūrvapakṣa

The *Bhāmatī* argues the Pūrvapakṣa at great length. The relation of benefited and benefactor, master and servant, ruler and ruled, seeker and the sought, supporter and supported go against the identification of B. with all sorts of persons as fisher-folk, slaves and gamblers. There is difficulty in conceiving of the Jīvas as aṁśas of B. As B. is without parts, the Jīvas cannot be regarded as its aṁśas in the sense of being organic parts of B. Otherwise, B. will have to share the pain and sufferings of the Jīvas just as Devadatta is affected by the pain in several parts of his body.[26] In the circumstances, the Jīva who attains release will be in a worse state of misery than in Samsāra; for

24. ब्रह्माभासत्वादिति हेतौ ब्रह्माधीनत्वात्, तत्सदृशत्वाच्चेत्यर्थः । ननु सूर्यकादिवत् प्रतिबिम्बत्वादिति । तेन परमात्मना निमित्तेन आभासते, प्रतीतो भवति, इति प्रतीतो तदधीनत्वमुच्यते । तद्वत् ब्रह्मवत् आभासते इत्यनेन तत्सदृशत्वम् (*NS.* p. 505)
Cf. तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति (*Mund. Up.* ii.2.10)
"Niruktirasikas" will find J"s etymological exposition illuminating:
भान ज्ञान, अस्तित्व सत्त्वम् । भा च सा च भासे । ता सर्वकालवर्तिन्यो भासे आभासे, परमात्माधीने यस्यासौ जीवः परमात्माभास (*NS.* p. 506)

25. प्रकारान्तरा विनिगमनाहेत्वभावादनियमो प्रतिभाति इत्युक्तम् (*Bhāmatī* ii.3.43)

26. ईशितृईशितव्यभावस्य अन्वेष्टृअन्वेष्टव्यभावस्य भेदानुभावस्य, नियन्तृनियन्तव्यभावस्य आधाराधेयभावस्य न जीव परमात्मनाभेदेऽवकल्पते । न च 'ब्रह्मदाशा' इत्यादाव श्रुत्या जीवानां ब्रह्मणो भेदोऽवकल्पते । * * * न हि शरीरस्यावयव निरंशस्य जीवा अंशभवितुमर्हन्त्यना । जीवानां ब्रह्मांशत्वे तद्गता वेदना ब्रह्मणो भवेत्, पादादिगता इव वेदना देवदत्तस्य (*Bhāmatī* ii.3.43)

whereas in the state of Samsāra he has to suffer only a limited amount of pain and misery that falls to his individual lot, in release he will be obliged to take in the sufferings of the entire fraternity of Jīvas who constitute the organic parts of B.[27]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta, therefore, is that the Śruti need not be held to have any interest in purporting to convey or confirm as a fact the difference between Jīva and B. which is already conveyed to us by Pratyakṣa. We should rather hold that as the relationship of identity between *Jīva and B. is something not communicated* to us by any other source of knowledge, except Śruti, it should be accepted as the real purport which it is the privilege of Śruti to convey to deluded humanity.[27a]

Criticism

It appears from the key word *amśa* used in the opening Sūtra of the Siddhānta that the purpose of the present *adhi.* is to resolve the conflict of testimony in regard to the Jīvas' being represented as *amśas* of B. in some places in the Śruti and in some other places as standing in no particular relation at all to B. Accordingly, it would be proper to *hold that the Sūtrakāra offers a suitable explanation of those texts in* which the Jīva is sometimes spoken of as standing in no specific relationship to B. and *confirms* his *amśatva* in a sense commensurate with the relation in which the Jīva's agency (*kartṛtva*) has been pronounced to be derived from B. in the previous *adhi.* We cannot accept an interpretation like S.'s which practically repudiates the Sūtrakāra's position by reducing *amśatva* to a euphemism: *amśa iva amśaḥ* and making *amśatva dependent on the upādhi of Avidyā*[28], instead of presenting it as an intrinsic and indissoluble relation.

If the intention of the Sūtrakāra had been anything else such as to pronounce identity as the true relationship between Jīva and B. we *have a right to expect him to* have worded the opening Sūtra as *Abhinno nānāvyapadeśāt* * * * *. The expression *amśa* in the Sūtra

27 ततश्च ब्रह्मभूयगतस्य समस्तजीवगतवेदनानुभवप्रसग इति, वरं ससार एव मुक्ते· । तत्र हि स्वगतवेदनामात्रानुभवान्न भूरि दु खमनुभवति । मुक्तस्तु सर्वजीववेदनाभागिति प्रयत्नेन मुक्ति परिहर्तव्या स्यात् (*ibid*)

27a इति प्राप्तेऽभिधीयते–अनधिगतार्थावबोधनानि प्रमाणानि, विशेषत शब्द· । तत्र भेदो लोकसिद्धत्वान्न शब्देन प्रतिपाद्य । अभेदस्त्वनधिगतत्वादधिगतभेदानुवादेन प्रतिपादनमर्हति । तस्मादद्वैते भाविके स्थिते, जीवभावस्तस्य ब्रह्मणोऽनाद्यनिर्वचनीयाविद्योपधानभेदादेकत्वस्येव बिबस्य दर्पणाद्युपाधिभेदात् प्रतिबिबभेदा. । एवमविद्योपधानापगमे जीवे ब्रह्मभाव: इति सिद्ध जीवो ब्रह्मांश इव तत्तन्त्रतया; नत्वंश:, इति तात्पर्यार्थ: (*Bhāmatī* ii.3.43)

28. Cf. the words of *Bhāmatī*: जीवो ब्रह्मांश इव तत्तन्त्रतया, न त्वंश: इति तात्पर्यार्थ : (*Bhāmatī* ii.3.43)

cannot be of any help to S. in forwarding his interests either as a synonyom of identity—which it is *not*; or as a concomitant of identity-relation—as a single thread which is an *amśa* of the cloth as a whole is still *different* from the cloth as such.[29] However, if *amśatva* should stand for the relation of both identity and difference as in the case of several threads and the cloth as a whole, then, by the same token, the relation between Jīva and B. would be one of both identity and difference *on the same par.*[30] *That* would hardly endorse S.'s position that as between Jīva and B. *identity alone is real and difference is but an appearance.*

It should be obvious that the concept of *amśatva* has no place in S.'s philosophy as a correct description of the Jīva's relationship to B. in any of its accepted senses of (i) being a constituent (*ārambhaka*), as B. has no beginning and is not a product; or (ii) a fraction of it as B. is indivisible or (iii) a member of an aggregate, lest the aggregate should dwindle into nothingness as each member of it gets separated from it when it gets released from Samsāra. As B. is without parts, *amśatva* cannot be conceived as an organic part of B.—except in a fictitious sense as S. himself has been forced to admit at the end.[31] But a little reflection would show that when the Sūtrakāra deliberately establishes it as his considered view by resolving the conflict of testimony on the point that the Jīva *is* an *amśa* of B. he *means it* in a very real and meaningful way and *not* in a fictitious sense to get away from an awkward position.

Nor can *amśatva* be regarded as an imaginarily conceived constituent part of B. just as space circumscribed by the presence of a pot is viewed as a part of space,[31a], *tho' space is one indivisible whole.*[32] Such an explanation would not fit in with the position accepted by S. under the Sūtra *Ābhāsa eva ca* (ii.3.50) that the Jīvātman is a Pratibimba or reflection of B. like the reflection of the Sun in the water.[33]

29. न ह्यंशत्वमेवाभिन्नत्वम्; नापि तद्व्याप्तम्। पटांशस्याप्येकस्य तन्तोः पटात् भेददर्शनात् (*TC.* p. 977)

30. ननु, अंशत्वं भिन्नाभिन्नत्वम्। एकैकस्य तंतोः पटात् भेदाभेदवत्त्वेन भेददर्शनोपपत्तेरिति चेत्, तर्हि इहापि तत्रैव भेदाभेदौ समसत्ताकौ स्याताम्; न तु भेदोऽसत्योऽभेदः सत्य इति दोषः स्पष्टः (*TCP.* p. 978b)

31. किं च, त्वन्मते सूत्रोक्त जीवस्यांशत्वं, न तावत् आरम्भकत्वम्, ब्रह्मणोऽनादित्वात्। नापि खण्डत्वम्; अच्छेद्यत्वात्। नापि समुदायित्वम्, समुदायिनन्यत्वात् समुदायस्य, व्यवहारदशायामपि जीवान्यब्रह्मत्वायोगात्। एकैकस्य जीवस्य मुक्तावेकैकस्य कथाभागस्यापगमे कथाया इव, ब्रह्मणो ह्रासप्रसङ्गात्। नाप्यवयवत्वम्, तन्तोः पटं प्रतीव निरवयवं ब्रह्म प्रति अवयवस्य तस्यायोगात्। अत एव परेण भाष्यम्—"अंश इवांश नहि निरवयवस्य मुख्योंऽशः सम्भवति" इति (*TC.* p. 978b)

31a. नापि घटाकाशस्याकाशं प्रतीव कल्पितावयवत्वम् (*TC.* p. 978b)

32 For the contrary view that space has intrinsic parts which the *upādhis* merely render explicit and recognizable to the eye, see M.'s *Upādhikhaṇḍana* (Ver. 4): विद्यमानस्य भेदस्य ज्ञापको नैव कारकः (उपाधि)

33. प्रतिबिम्बत्वे तदयोगात् (*TC.* ibid)

The other theory of the self as a limitation of B. (*Avacchedavāda*), thro' Avidyā has been rejected by the *Vivaraṇa*. Moreover, any explanation that the Jīva is an *aṁśa* of B. only in a fictitious sense would be against the position of Śrutis and Smṛtis like *Pādo'sya viśvā bhūtāni; Mamaivāṁśo Jīvaloke Jīvabhūtaḥ* quoted by the Sūtrakāra and his own description of the Jīva as an *aṁśa* of B. *in all seriousness* as his Siddhānta view.

Ranade's Novel Interpretation Examined.

Prof. Ranade has come out with an ingenious explanation that the Sūtrakāra seems to "enumerate three views (i) plurality in *Aṁśo nānāvyapadeśāt,* (ii) unity in *Anyathā cāpi dāśakitavāditvam adhīyata eke* and (iii) illusion, in *Ābhāsa eva ca*—the last synthesizing the first two views."[34] This cannot be taken as a serious contribution to the discussion of the problem,[35] as it unnecessarily breaks the coordination between the two parts of the reasoning envisaged by the Sūtrakāra by the use of *ca*. The *ca.* in *Ābhāsa eva ca* also shows that it adduces only *one more reason* why the Jīva should be accepted as an *aṁśa* of B. It cannot, therefore, be taken to *change or modify* the relationship of *aṁśatvam* predicated in the Siddhānta Sūtra to any extent, in order to "synthesize" the first two views. *For Aṁśatva itself represents the Sūtrakāra's synthesis between nānāvyapadeśa and anyathāvyapadeśa and there is no point in looking for a synthesis apart from aṁśatva.* That would be doing an injustice to the wording of the opening Sūtra which shows no marks of a Pūrvapaksa Sūtra and which by all accounts is a Siddhānta Sūtra, which by its own dialectic of *anyathānupapatti* points to *aṁśatva* as the key to the resolution of the conflict of views To give the last Sūtra any right of going beyond the position of the opening Sūtra, which is a Siddhānta Sūtra, as Ranade seeks to do, would only violate the oneness (*aikarūpya*) of the upakrama and *upasaṁhāra*. It may suit S. to accept *aṁśatva* ostensibly and qualify it with an "*as it were*"; but that is nevertheless an interference with the wording of the Sūtra. Ranade cannot do so as he has accepted that *aṁśa* used in the Sūtra "means separate" (*Op. cit.*, p. 133).

S. cannot afford to explain that *aṁśatva* signifies identity relation as that would conflict with his recognizing that '*nānāvyapadeśa*' (declaration of difference) is also used in Sūtra 43 conjointly with the identity-relation (*anyathā vyapadeśa*) as the reason (*hetu*) in the Sūtra proposition. However, the manner in which S. R. and Bhāskara have clubbed together *nānāvyapadeśa* and *anyathā*(*vyapadeśa*) as consti-

34 *Vedanta the Culmination of Indian Thought*, p. 133.

35 By amalgamating *aṁśa* with *nānāvyapadeśāt* as embodying one of his alternatives, Ranade has, without knowing it, deprived the Sautra proposition of its predicate! (नानाव्यपदेशादन्यथाच व्यपदेशात् (न.) अश:

tuting the entire reason for the Sautra-predication of *aṁśatva* does not seem to be commensurate with the wording of the Sūtra as a whole. As construed by S. one of the two terms: *anyathā* and *Dāsakitavādit-vam adhīyata eke* will be sufficient to convey the desired sense and the other would be superfluous.[36] This shows there is good reason to connect *anyathā* by 'Dehalīdīpanyāya' with *both* the preceding and the following *'nānāvyapadeśāt'* and *Dāśakitavāditvam adhīyate eke* and expand the *Sautra hetus* into two complete and well-balanced sets of complementary units:

(i) nānāvyapadeśāt: *anyathā* vyapadeśāc *ca*

(ii) Dāśakitavāditvam adhīyata eke; *Anyathā* ca (adhīyata eke).

S.'s contention in the opening Sūtra that the Śrutis have no interest whatsoever in actually conveying difference between Jīva and B.[37] and that, therefore, *aṁśatva* ultimately is equivalent to identity relation is out of harmony with the use of *api* in the Sūtra connecting the two *hetus* which shows that both difference and identity are kept within the scope of Tātparya by the Sūtrakāra, without of course infringing the law of contradiction—under the concept of *aṁśatva* and *not only one of them.*

S. will have to clarify if the Jīva is to be regarded as *aṁśa* of pure consciousness or of the conditioned "*Īśvara*". Having stated at the beginning of the present *adhi.* that it seeks to propound an *aṁśām-śibhāva* between Jīva and B. *in order to sustain the position of Īśvara as the causal agent in the activity of the individual self taught in the* Sūtra: *Parāttu tacchruteḥ,* he cannot go back on that and treat the Jīva as an *aṁśa of pure consciousness.*[39] That would also be inconsistent with the Viṣayavākyas of the two succeeding Sūtras (44 and 45) which make the Jīva an *aṁśa* of "*Īśvara*" and *not of pure consciousness.*[40]

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36 यत्—नानाव्यपदेशात् द्वासुपर्णेत्यादिभेदव्यपदेशात् अन्यथा भेदादन्यथा ऐक्येनेति यावत्. दाशकितवादित्वमधीयते अतो भिन्नाभिन्नत्वाज्जीवोंऽश इति व्याख्यानं, तत्तु न सूत्रकृतोऽभिप्रेतम्। तथा सति, नानाव्यपदेशात्, ऐक्यव्यपदेशाच्चेत्येवावक्ष्यत्। एके दाशकितवादित्वमधीयते, एकेऽन्यथा चाधीयत इति सूत्रखण्डस्य वैयर्थ्यमिव स्यात्
(Vādirāja, *TPG.* p. 105)

37. See fn. 27.

38. यच्चोक्तं–भेदश्रुतिः प्राप्तविषयेति, तन्न। यौक्तेनानिरुद्धेनाभेद इव भेदेऽपि तात्पर्यप्रतीतेः (*TC.* p. 978)

39. जीवेश्वरयोरुपकार्योपकारकभाव उक्तः। स च सम्बद्धयोरेव लोके दृष्टो यथा स्वामिभृत्ययोर्यथाग्निविस्फुलिङ्गयोः। ततश्च, जीवेश्वरयोरप्युपकार्योपकारकभावाभ्युपगमात् किं स्वामिभृत्यवत् सम्बन्ध आहोस्वित् अग्निविस्फुलिङ्गवदित्यस्यां विचिकित्सायाम् (S. *BSB.* ii.3.43)
उपकार्योपकारकभाव. प्रयोज्यप्रयोजकभाव (*Bhāmatī*)

40. 'परात्तु तच्छ्रुतेः' इति पूर्वसूत्रे ईश्वरस्य नियन्तृत्वस्य सिद्धवत् जीवेश्वरयोः सम्बन्ध उच्यते इति स्वयमेव भाषितत्वेन, वचनानुगुण्यात्। द्वितीयसूत्रोक्तं 'पादोऽस्य विश्वा भूतानि' इति मन्त्रवर्णं इत्यनेन सहस्रशीर्षत्वादिना विशिष्टब्रह्मणोऽस्य तृतीयसूत्रोक्तं 'ममैवांश' इति स्मरणं च ईश्वरप्रयुक्तास्मज्जीवेश्वरस्यैवांशत्वं
(TC. p. 979b)

It is equally difficult from S.'s point of view to make the Jīva an *amśa* of "Īśvara" within the meaning of standing in an identity-relation with Him—as required by the Sautra reason: *anyathāvyapadeśāt* as that phrase has been understood by him. For, the Jīva and "Īśvara" are qualified by mutually incompatible attributes and they cannot be brought under the identity relationship.[41] S. himself admits under ii.3.45 that Īśvara who is endowed with superexcellent limiting adjuncts rules over the Jīvas who are endowed with inferior adjuncts only. *This makes it clear that both Jīva and Īśvara are "Upahita"*, circumscribed by adjuncts. In the circumstances, it is hardly possible for one conditioned being to be the *amśa* of *another conditioned being* —just as space circumscribed by a small part of a house cannot be the *amśa* of space conditioned by the whole house—but only of *unconditioned space as such*.[42] It cannot be that just as space circumscribed by a school building is further circumscribed by a pot as "*ghaṭākāśa*", when consciousness which is first circumscribed by 'Īśvaropādhi' is further circumscribed by Jīvopādhi the Jīva becomes an *amśa* of Īśvara.[43] In that case, the Jīva who becomes freed from his upādhi will forge an identity only with Īśvara and never with the unconditioned B.—as required by the Advaita theory.[44]

Moreover, *amśatva* cannot be posited of the Jīva as a being '*characterised*' by the limitations of Avidyā, antaḥkaraṇa, etc. No identity with B. can be predicated by *such a being*, as required by the terms of the reason: *anyathāpi* * * * * *.[45] Nor can identity be affirmed with reference to pure consciousness which is qualified *per accidens* by Avidyā, antaḥkaraṇa, etc. For, in pure consciousness there is no element of difference, even of an imaginary kind, and to that extent the other reason: *nānāvyapadeśāt* in the Sūtra, understood in the sense of *bheda-vyapadeśāt by S., would become incongruous.*[46]

According to S. the Sūtra: *Prakāśādivan naivam Paraḥ* (ii.3.46) is intended to show how Īśvara tho' He is the *amśi* of the Jīvas, is *not* affected by their imperfections and sufferings[47]—just as light is not

41. नान्य – त्वन्मतेऽपि विरुद्धधर्मवतो जीवेश्वरयोरभेदाभावेनाभेदव्यपदेशस्यायोगात् (*TC.* p. 979b)

42 त्वया "निरतिशयोपाधिसपन्नश्चेश्वरो हीनोपाधिसपन्नान् जीवान् प्रशास्ति" इति भाषितत्वेन ईश्वरस्याप्युपहिततया, महागृहाकाश प्रत्यल्पगृहाकाशस्येव, ईश्वर प्रति जीवस्यांशत्वायोगाच्च (*TC.* p. 979)

43. न च मठाकाश: पुनर्घटेनेवेश्वरोपाधिनावच्छिन्न चैतन्य पुनर्जीवोपाधिनावच्छिद्यते (*TC. ibid*)

44 तथात्वे, हि मुक्तस्य शुद्धब्रह्मत्वं न स्यात् (*TC. ibid*)

45. किंच, न तावदविद्यान्त करणाद्युपाधिविशिष्टस्यांशत्वम्। तत्राभेदव्यपदेशायोगात् (*TC. ibid*)

46. नापि तदुपलक्षितस्य चिन्मात्रस्य। तत्र काल्पनिकभेदस्याप्यभावेन नानाव्यपदेशायोगात् (*TC.* p. 979)

47 ननु, जीवस्येश्वरांशत्वाभ्युपगमे तदीयेन ससारदु खोपभोगेनांशिन ईश्वरस्यापि दु खित्व स्यात् यथा लोके हस्तपादाद्यन्यतमागगतेन दु खेन अंगिनो देवदत्तस्य दु खित्व, तद्वत् * * * अत्रोच्यते– प्रकाशादिवन्नैव पर.
(*S. BSB.* ii.3 46)

affected by the shape of things it touches. The all-pervading Sun looks straight or bent when it comes into contact with particular objects. The reflected image of the Sun in the water shakes while the Sun in the sky does not.[48] Bhāskara has a similar explanation.

The problem, then, before S. in this Sūtra is—how is it that of two sentient beings: Jīva and Īśvara, given by the Śruti as standing in the relation of *aṁśa* and *aṁśi,* the latter is entirely free from the imperfections and sufferings which affect the former. If this is to be clarified by an illustration, we should expect the illustration applicable to a similar category of sentient beings given by scripture standing in an *aṁśāṁśi* relation but where the *aṁśi* does not suffer with His *aṁśas.* Judged by this criterion, S.'s illustration is beside the point —as the Sun and its reflection, light and its distortions, are all of them insentient things. The question of any of them going thro' any experience of pleasure or pain and suffering *does not arise.* For, experiencing of pleasure or pain is possible only in the case of sentient beings. How then could the Sūtrakāra expect to convince anybody by giving such irrelevant analogies[49]? The illustration of certain Abhimānidevatās of some forms of elements standing in *aṁśāṁśi*-relation given by M. to illustrate the point he seeks to explain thro' this Sūtra is pertinent and meets the requirements of the case, as the Abhimānidevatās and their *aṁśas* are all of them sentient beings. They are, like Jīva and B. given by scripture. The inferior *aṁśa*-devatās alone are subject to part of the suffering of the bodies in which they exercise their abhimāna over inferior forms of elements in the body while their Aṁśis are not touched by such sufferings. At the same time, these *inferior abhimānidevatās possess the predicated property of aṁśatva* with the other abhimānidevatās presiding over higher forms of the same elements.

S.'s illustration reduces the fact of suffering of the aṁśas, to an illusory phenomenon, instead of accounting for it as a real fact of experience.[50] This is not fair. The same idea of reflection of the Sun in the water is *again* brought up by S. under Sūtra ii.3.50 thus making the Sūtras overlap. From S.'s point of view, both the Sūtras 46 and 50 explain that the sufferings of the Jīvas are illusory being due to identification with Upādhis. Sūtra 46 does *not explain* what it proposes to explain in the preamble,—viz. how it is that in spite of identity with the

48. यथा चाम्बुचलनात् तद्गतं सूर्यप्रतिबिम्बे कम्पमानेऽपि न तद्वान् सूर्यः कम्पते (S. *BSB.* ii.3.46)

49. निर्वाच्यविवक्षुःप्रतिबिम्बबिम्बयोर्दृष्टान्तयोः जडयोरचेतनयोः चेतनौ प्रति सुखदुःखाभावप्रतिपादकतास्तिवक्तव्यायां दृष्टान्तत्वासंभवात् (TC. p. 960)

50. अविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापितनामरूपकृतदेहेन्द्रियाद्युपाध्यविवेकभ्रमनिमित्त एव दुःखाभिमानो न तु पारमार्थिकोऽस्ति (S. BSB. ii.3.46)

aṁśas, the *aṁśi* does *not* suffer the miseries affecting the *aṁśas*. Leaving that point unexplained, S. merely harps on the illusory nature of the Jīvas experiences—in both the Sūtras. The defect in interpretation lies in not giving distinctive treatment to these two different Sūtras.

The Śrutis and Smṛtis cited by him under Sūtra ii.3.47—merely show that the Jīva and B. are acknowledged to be different. They do *not show* that the Jīva's experiencing the pain and sufferings of Saṁsāra can be justified by accepting the Jīvas to be really identical with B. The question as to why in view of their factual identity, the Aṁśi is *not* subject to the same illusory suffering like the *aṁśas*, remains *unanswered* in S.'s interpretation of Sūtra ii.3.47, *tho' that Sūtra according to him has been introduced with the avowed purpose of explaining that point.*[51] (See fn. 47 on page 285).

Sūtra 48 according to S. explains how in spite of their identity of essence with B. only the Jīvas are liable to injunctions and prohibitions and not B.—their Aṁśi. It is because of the connection of Jīvas with physical bodies and the resulting attachment to them,—just as the Sun's light falling on impure things is avoided while sunlight falling on pure ground is welcomed. Fire in the funeral pyre is avoided while the sacrificial fire is accepted. Cow's urine is held to be sacred but not that of other animals.[52]

Here again, there is the same incongruity of the illustration with the point at issue in the Sūtra according to S. himself which concerns two sentient beings Jīva and Īśvara who stand in the relation of *aṁśa* and *aṁśi*—of whom only one—the *aṁśa* is subject to injunctions and prohibitions while the Aṁśi Īśvara is *not*. Because of their insentiency, the things mentioned by S. as illustrations cannot be related to the predicate and the reason in the Sautra-pratijñā. They have, therefore, no relevance to *the point at issue* and cannot be accepted as proper illustrations.[53] The case is different with the illustrations from the domain of abhimānidevatās given by M. which satisfy the conditions of sentiency and the connection with the predicate and the reason embodied in the Sūtra.[54]

51. ईशेऽपि जीववत् ससारित्वापादकमिथ्यादुःख स्यादिति शकाया अनेनापरिहारात् (*TC.* p. 981b) तत्परिहारार्थतयैवास्य सूत्रस्य त्वयावतारितत्वादिति भाव (Ragh. *TCP*)

52 तस्मात् पर एवैक सर्वेषा भूतानामन्तरात्मा, जीवभावेनावस्थित इत्यतो वक्तव्या अनुज्ञापरिहारोपपत्ति । ता ब्रूम· * * यथा ज्योतिष एकत्वेऽपि अग्नि क्रव्यात् परिह्रियते नेतर यथा मूत्रपुरीष गवा पवित्रतया परिगृह्यते तदेव जात्यन्तरे परिवर्ज्यते, तद्वत् (S. *BSB.* ii.3.48)

53. चेतनस्य चेतनं प्रति दृष्टान्तत्वसंभवे, विध्यादिबद्धत्वरूपसाध्येन, देहसंबन्धरूपहेतुना च रहितस्य दृष्टान्तत्वायोगात् (*TC.* p. 981)

54 मम रीत्या अंश्यधीनत्वरूपसाध्येन, देहसंबन्धरूपेण साधनेन च युक्तस्य 'यथा सूर्यप्रभाक्षिणी' इति स्मृतिसिद्धस्य चेतनस्य चेतनं प्रति दृष्टान्तत्वसंभवे (*TC.* p. 981)

affected by the shape of things it touches. The all-pervading Sun looks straight or bent when it comes into contact with particular objects. The reflected image of the Sun in the water shakes while the Sun in the sky does not.[48] Bhāskara has a similar explanation.

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49. सिसाधयिषितदुःखादिसम्बन्धराहित्ययोः तार्किकयोरचेतनयोः वैदिकौ चेतनौ प्रति सुखासुखाद्युपपादकतादिवैलक्षण्यव्यवस्थायां दृष्टान्तत्वस्यासंभवात् (*TC*. p. 980)

50. जीवस्याप्यविद्याकृतनामरूपनिर्वृत्तदेहेन्द्रियाद्युपाध्यविवेकभ्रमनिमित्त एव दुःखाभिमानो न तु पारमार्थिकोऽस्तीति (S. BSB. ii.3.46)

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Sūtra ii.3.49 according to S. establishes that as the Jīvātman is connected only with a particular physical body and organs and not being, therefore, all-pervasive, he is not liable to share the sufferings of other selves also.[55] But then, if such enjoyership belongs to the self conceived as a being that is circumscribed by Upādhis, it will not be possible to establish coordination between the states of bondage which relates to the circumscribed self and release which pertains to the pure self as pertaining to the same entity—in the Advaitic position.[56] It will not be possible to save B. from contact with physical bodies in that shade of Advaitic thought which makes B. itself transmigrate on account of Avidyā. If to avoid the risk, such liability to suffering is attributed to the pure self thro' contact with *Upādhis*, the contingency of its having to share the sufferings of all other bodies will be confirmed as the pure self is, by hypothesis, all-pervasive.[57]

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R. defines *amśatva* as *Ekavastvekadeśatvam*[58] or what forms part of a single substance.[59] The Jīva is always in an adjectival relation to B. as B. is ontologically qualified by having the Jīvas as its attributes (*Jīvaviśiṣṭam Brahma*) and body. In this sense, the Jīva answers to the above definition of amśa.

This is a loose way of defining *amśatva* and it is sure to cut both ways by making B. too an *amśa* of Jīva. For an attributive relationship can be expressed either way—as (i) the cloth is white; or (ii) the whiteness of the cloth. It should be equally possible to speak of B. as the *amśa* of Jīva and B. also can be a "Viśeṣaṇa" of the Jīva when we speak of the Jīva as being qualified by B.[60] Moreover, as not only Cit (Jīva) but Acit (jaḍa) also is inseparably connected with B. as its other Viśeṣaṇa in R.'s ontological theory, it will be open to us to treat all Jaḍatattvas also as *amśas* of B. There will be no reason or special merit then in devoting an *adhi*. to assign this position to the Jīvas alone.[61] By the same token, B. which is part of the *Viśiṣṭa* and included in it can also be treated as an *amśa*.[62]

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55. नहि कर्तुर्भोक्तुश्चात्मनः सन्ततः सर्वैः शरीरैः सम्बन्धोऽस्ति । उपाधितन्त्रो हि जीव इत्युक्तम् । उपाध्यसन्तानाच्च नास्ति जीवसन्तानः ततश्च कर्मव्यतिकरः फलव्यतिकरो वा न भविष्यति (S. *BSB*. ii.3.49)
56. दुःखादिभोक्तृत्वस्योपाधिविशिष्टगतत्वे, बन्धस्य शुद्धगतमोक्षसामानाधिकरण्यायोगात् (*TC*. p. 982b)
57. उपाधिसंबन्धात् शुद्धगतत्वे साङ्कर्यापरिहारात् (*TC*. p. 982b)
58. *Śrībhāṣya* ii.3.45.
59. विशिष्टस्यैकस्य वस्तुनो विशेषणमंश एव (*ibid*)
60. शुक्लः पटः, पटस्य शौक्ल्य इति विशेषणविशेष्यभावस्य कामचारित्वेन, ब्रह्मविशिष्ट जीवं प्रति ब्रह्मणोऽप्यंशत्वप्रसंगात् (*TC*. p. 982)
61. स्वविशिष्टब्रह्मैकदेशस्य जडस्यापि ब्रह्मांशत्वप्रसंगाच्च (*TC*. p. 982)
62. विशिष्टान्तर्गतस्य विशेष्यस्य ब्रह्मणोऽप्यंशत्वापाताच्च (*ibid*)

Moreover, in the Śruti quoted under Sūtra 43 the Jīva is referred to an *amśa* of B. conceived only in its distinctive *viśeṣya* or substantival aspect of being the overlord of the released souls. Similarly in the *Smṛti* quoted in Sūtra 44, he is described as an *amśa* of B. in its distinctive substantival aspect[63] and *not* as the *amśa* of B. conceived in its *Viśiṣṭa aspect* of being already qualified by the inseparable Viśeṣaṇa of Jīvas. R. will have, therefore, to make clear what the statement: *Jīvaviśiṣṭam Brahma*—"B. stands ever-qualified by the Jīvas"—is intended to convey. Does it mean that the *substantival element* (*viśeṣyāṁśa*) *as such is not B.*; that it become eligible to be treated as B. only when it becomes qualified or integrated with Jīva; or that only the substantival being is B. and the Jīva is only a qualifying adjunct to it?[64] On the first view, while the Jīva will remain a part of B., Brahman as such will cease to be the inner ruler of the Jīvas, their Śeṣi, the Lord of the released souls and author of the world; for these are characteristics of B. *only in its viśeṣya aspect,* but the qualificand or Viśeṣya is not supposed to be B., on this view, *till it becomes qualified by the Jīvas (Jīvaviśiṣṭa).*[65]

If the name "Brahman" is to be given only to a composite whole viz. that 'something' which is necessarily qualified by the Jīvātman as its inseparable Viśeṣaṇa, the latter's being controlled by Brahman—as we are told in the Śruti—will be equivalent to his being controlled by Something that is qualified by his (Jīvātman's) own self and being, and not by B. pure and simple,—as there is no such entity, looked at from R's point of view. Apropos the principle that what holds true of the "Viśiṣṭa" is true of its "Viśeṣaṇa" also,

विशिष्टस्य यत् भवति, तत् विशेषणस्यापि भवति

one will have to attribute this controllership (*niyāmakatvam*) to the Jīvas also. But that is not possible as the Jīva is only the controlled (*niyāmya*) and not the controller (*niyāmaka*). Thus, if the term "Brahman" should denote (as R. wants it to) only a composite whole or that something which is necessarily qualified by the Jīvātman, such a composite whole cannot be conceived as the controller of the Jīvas in as much as the Jīva himself happens to be the constitutive element in Brahman's 'being' or its becoming "Brahman":[66]

63. द्वितीयसूत्रोक्ताया 'पादोऽस्ये' ति श्रुतावंशशब्देन पूर्वप्रकृतस्य मुक्तनियामकस्य निष्कृष्टस्य तृतीयोक्ताया 'ममैवांश' इति स्मृतावप्यस्मच्छब्देन 'तत्तेजो विद्धि मामकम्' इत्याद्युत्तरवाक्य इव निष्कृष्टस्य विशेष्यस्य ब्रह्मण एवांशित्वोक्तेश्च (*TC.* p. 982)

64. किंच 'जीवविशिष्टं ब्रह्म' इतिकोऽर्थः । किं विशेष्यमब्रह्मैव, तत्तु जीवविशिष्टं सत् ब्रह्म भवतीति वा, किंवा, विशेष्यमेव ब्रह्म, तस्य तु जीवो विशेषणमिति (*TC.* p. 982)

65. आद्ये, जीवस्य ब्रह्मैकदेशत्वसिद्धावपि ब्रह्मणो जीवान्तर्यामित्वतच्छेषित्वमुक्तनियामकत्वजगत्कारणत्वादयो न स्युः (*ibid*)

66. नहि नियम्यजीवविशिष्टः तन्नियामकः (*TC.* p. 982)

ब्रह्मपदस्य जीवविशिष्टयत्किंचिद्वस्तुरूपविशिष्टार्थत्वे, ब्रह्मणः स्वघटकविशेषणीभूतजीव-नियामकत्वं न भवेत् ।

On the other view, that B. is only the Viśeṣya-aspect, tho' It may; without difficulty, be the Antaryāmi, Śeṣi, etc. the Jīvaśrupa cannot be established as forming a part of that Viśeṣya-B in the sense of *Ekavastvekadeśatvam.* For, an attributive adjunct of a given substance or entity cannot be a part of that substance or entity in any spatial sense.[67]

According to R. the expression *'anyathā'* in the opening Sūtra signifies the declaration in terms of oneness of Jīva with B. as in *Tat-tvam asi.*[68] The description of B. as the fishers, the slaves and so forth is only an elucidation of this identity in its widest form of application to all creatures.[69] Thus, both the declaration of difference and the declaration of oneness of all with B. *together constitute* the reason why the Jīva is to be accepted as an *amśa* of B.

But then, to R. the Jīva does not stand in the relation of Bhedābheda to B. It will not, therefore, be proper for him to introduce this dual relationship as the Sūtrakāra's reason for establishing the Jīva's *amśatva.* As R. defines the Jīva's *amśatva* as consisting in his forming part of a single entity called "Brahman":

एकवस्त्वेकदेशत्वं ह्यंशत्वम् । विशिष्टस्यैकस्य वस्तुनो विशेषणमंश एव ।
(*Śrībhāṣya* ii.3.45)

such *amśatva* can be maintained on the basis of identity-relation alone.[70] The other relation of difference can, therefore, be dispensed with in the Sūtra. If 'difference' is to be recognized as a fact, *amśatva* will have to be defined in some sense other than that of imposing an intra-organic and intra-spatial relation of *Ekavastvekadeśatvam* between Jīva and B. such as: तदुपजीवकत्वरूपं तच्छेषत्वम् as in M.

Sūtra ii.3.45 *Prakāśādivattu naivam Paraḥ* has been understood by R. also as explaining why if the soul is an *amśa* of B. all the imperfections of the former are not shared by B. This is answered by the illustration of a luminous body like the Sun or a luminous stone which are different from their light and sheen. This is open to the same objection of unsuitability on account of the insentiency of the things mentioned as illustrations.

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67. अन्ये च, ब्रह्मणोऽन्तर्यामित्वादिसिद्धावपि जीवस्य ब्रह्मैकदेशत्वासिद्धिः। नहि विशेषण विशेष्यस्यैकदेशः

68. अन्यथा चाभेदेन व्यपदेशोऽपि, तत्त्वमसि इत्यादिभिर्दृश्यते (R. BSB. ii.3.42)

69. दासकितवादित्वमधीयत एके शाखिनः । सर्वजीवव्यापित्वादभेदोपदेशस्य तत्राप्यादरः
(*Vedāntadipa* ii.3.42)

70. भिन्नाभिन्नत्वानभ्युपगमात् जीवविशिष्टब्रह्माख्यवस्त्वेकदेशत्वरूपांशत्वस्य अभेदोपदेशमात्रेण हेतुनोपपत्तेः
(Ragh. *TCP.* p. 980b)

Sūtra 46 is explained by R. as adducing evidence from Smṛti and Śruti that Jīva as the "body" of B. is its *amśa*. But the texts of the Smṛtis and Śrutis cited while speaking of the Jīvas (and Jaḍas) as the 'body' of B. do *not say anything about their being "amśas" of B.*

Sūtra 47 has been introduced by R. as explaining how it is that tho' all the Jīvas are equally the *amśas* of B. some of them are allowed to study the Vedas while some others are prohibited from doing so.[71] This is answered with the illustration that fire is readily fetched from a Brahmin household but not from the funeral pyre. Food is accepted without objection from a Brahmin but not from a low person.[72] The incongruity of the illustration to the point at issue concerning sentient beings is obvious.

Sūtra 48 according to R. answers the objection as to how the Jīvas, tho' all alike are *amśas* of the same B., are not subject to *one another's sufferings*. The answer is given that each of them is of atomic size and resides in a separate body.[73]

While such a doubt can arise in a monistic philosophy like S.'s where all the Jīvas are essentially one, the Souls in R.'s philosophy being distinct individuals without Svarūpaikya among themselves,

Cf. जीवस्वरूपं * * * ज्ञानानन्दैकगुणम् ।
तस्यैतस्य * * * स्वरूपभेदः वाचामगोचरः स्वसंवेद्यः । (*Vedārthasaṅgraha*)

there is hardly any possibility of such a doubt about the Jīvas sharing one another's sufferings arising in his position. A Sūtra to refute such an objection is not, therefore, called for, in his case.[74] Sensing this difficulty, R. has held that the Sūtrakāra has introduced this Sūtra here to show how impossible it will be for the Advaitic theory of Ekātmavāda to avoid this inevitable mixing up of the experiences of the individual self and the Supreme and of the several individual souls themselves.[75] If such were the purpose of this Sūtra, its proper place

71 ब्रह्मांशत्वेन च सर्वेषामात्मना समत्वात् वेदाध्ययनादौ केषाञ्चिदनुज्ञा केषाञ्चित् परिहारश्च कथमित्यत आह (*Vedāntadīpa* ii.3.47)

72. अग्निर्यथा श्रोत्रियागारादाह्रियते, श्मशानादेस्तु परिह्रियते, यथाचान्नादि श्रोत्रियादेरनुज्ञायते, अभिशस्तादेश्च परिह्रियते तद्वत् (*ibid*)

73. ब्रह्मांशत्वेनैकरूपत्वे सत्यपि, जीवानामन्योन्यभेदादणुत्वेन प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नत्वाच्च भोगव्यतिकरोऽपि न भवति (*Śrībhāṣya* ii.3 48)

74. रामानुजमते तु, परमत इव स्वरूपैक्याभावेन जीवानां भगवदंशत्वेऽप्यन्योन्य भोगाव्यवस्थानप्रसक्त्ययोगेन तन्निरासार्थमिदं सूत्रं व्यर्थम् (*TC.* p 983b)

75 भ्रान्तब्रह्मजीववादे चोपहितब्रह्मजीववादे च जीवपरयोः जीवानां च भोगव्यतिकरादयः सर्वे दोषाः सन्तीत्यभिप्रायेण स्वपक्षे भोगव्यतिकराभाव उक्तः (*Śrībhāṣya* ii 3.48)

would not be here but in Pāda ii, which exposes the defects of other schools of thought.[76]

R. interprets Sūtra 49 as pointing out that the reason(s) by which the diversities in the experiences of Jīvas have been regulated and accounted for in the Advaita theory by attributing such diversities to the play of unreal adjuncts (*upādhis*) of embodiment etc. is (are) fallacious.[77]

This involves a needless importation (*adhyāhāra*) of the word *hetuḥ* before *ābhāsaḥ* as the desired sense could easily have been conveyed by the use of the ablative "*ābhāsatvāt*" as in *asantateḥ* earlier, which could then be syntactically connected with the predicate *avyatikaraḥ*[78] in Sūtra 48. It may, however, be noted that in M.'s interpretation, the partial break-up (from *ābhāsatvāt avyatikaraḥ*) and the change of case from the ablative to the nominative in the Sūtra is designed to facilitate its being syntactically connected as the predicative element in the opening Sūtra of the next *adhikaraṇa:* (Jñaḥ *adṛṣṭāniyamād abhāsa eva*.[79]

Thibaut finds himself in a quandary in trying to settle the meaning of the Sūtra: *Ābhāsa eva ca*. He is dissatisfied with S.'s rendering of it as "amśa iva amśaḥ" and finds R.'s rendering also "which is accepted by several other commentators also *not* particularly convincing" (*Op. cit.* xcviii). It is however, not true to say that the Sūtrakāra unfortunately offers no other clues "on the ground of which we might settle the meaning to be ascribed to the term *ābhāsa*. We have sufficient grounds (See P. 299, para 4) to guide us in settling the meaning of *ābhāsa*" used to describe the Jīva's relation to B. in a manner consistent with the Sūtrakāra's pronouncements on the Jīva's atomicity and his deriving his power as a real agent from B. It is in such difficult situations that M.'s commentary leads us to a deeper perception of the truth by unfolding the significance of the specialized forms of expression in which the Sūtrakāra's ideas happen to be clothed.

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76. तथात्वे, पूर्वपाद एव निवेशापातेन इहासंगतिरिति दोषो ध्येयः (*TCP.* p. 982b)

77. ननु, भ्रान्तब्रह्मजीववादेऽप्यविद्याकृतोपाधिभेदात् भोगव्यवस्थादय उपपद्यन्ते। अत आह– 'आभास एव च'। स्वरूपतिरोधानपूर्वकोपाधिभेदोपपादनहेतुः आभास एव। 'आभासा एव' इति वा पाठः। तथा सति, हेतव आभासाः (*Śribhāṣya* ii.3.49)

78. तन्न युक्तम्। असन्ततेश्चाव्यतिकरः। आभासाच्चाव्यतिकरः इति पूर्वोक्तसाध्येनैवास्यान्वयसंभवे, विशेष्याध्याहारेण 'व्यवस्थापकहेतु' रित्यनेनान्वयायोगात् (TCP. p. 982b)

Bhāskara's interpretation अविद्याभासा एव वेदबाह्या दर्शनभेदाः also involves similar importation.

79. आभास एव च। योगविभागः प्रथमानिर्देशश्च उत्तरार्थः (*TDP.* ii.3.50)
आभास एवेति ज्ञ इति चास्ति (*ibid.* ii.3.51)

CHAPTER XXXII

JĪVAS AS PRATIBIMBAS VARY INTRINSICALLY ACCORDING TO THEIR SVARŪPOPĀDHIS

19. *Adṛṣṭādhikaraṇam* (ii.3, 51-53)

This *adhi.* meets an objection against the acceptance of the Jīvas as Pratibimbas of B.,[1] on the ground that the inherent variations in their nature cannot be explained, if they are to be reflections of the same B. which is uniform in nature.[2] The objection is answered by explaining that such variatious among Pratibimbas of the same Bimba are an expression of the intrinsic variatious in the Svarūpopādhi of each individual by which his relation as Pratibimba of B. is determined (See under Sūtra ii.3.30 *ante*). It is this Svarūpopādhi that expresses itself in the form of what has been cumulatively described by M. as *anādividyākarmavaicitryam*, in his *Bhāṣya.*[3] The Sūtrakāra refers to this whole complex by the significant capsulated expression *'adṛṣṭāniyama'* or "variation in unseen merit". This point has been ably brought out by Rāghavendra Yati in his *TPB* (ii.3.53):—

स्वरूपोपाधिवैचित्र्यस्यैव अदृष्टानियमपदेनाभिप्रेतत्वात्

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1. अशत्वेऽपि जीवस्यावतारसाम्य नेत्यत्र हेत्वन्तरेण पूर्वोक्तं प्रतिबिम्बत्वमाक्षिप्य समाधीयत इति सगतिः (*TCP.* p. 983b-983)

2. *अस्ति खल्वयं जीवानामन्योन्यं भेदः सुरनरतिर्यगादिरूपः। न चैकप्रतिबिंबाना मिथो वैचित्र्य सभवति* (*TP.* ii.3.51)

3 Read: विद्याकर्मणोरितिभाष्ये विद्यापदेन तत्त्वज्ञानं मिथ्याज्ञानं मिश्रज्ञानं चोच्यते। कर्म पुण्यपापरूपम्। आदिपदेन तत्तद्योग्यतादिक गृह्यते। तत्तत्स्वरूपाख्योपाधौ अनादिकालमारभ्योक्तविधया ज्ञानवैचित्र्यात् कर्मवैचित्र्यात् तदुभयनिदानीभूतयोग्यतावैचित्र्याच्च उच्चनीचमध्यमत्वादिभाववैचित्र्यमित्यर्थः
(Vādirāja *TPG.* p. 109). This shows the depth of meaning which M.'s brief statement carries.

This unseen merit is not something *adventitious*, as it cannot then explain the *beginningless and endless relation of Bimbapratibimba-bhāva between Jīva and B.* As the relation subsists in Mokṣa too, it cannot be traced to Karma or such other contingent factors.[4] It has been clarified by M. elsewhere in his AV that by regressive reasoning the acceptance of adṛṣṭa or unseen merit as the cause of '*existing variations*' in equipment, endowment and opportunities leads to the conclusion that ultimately such *adṛṣṭa* has to be equated with and grounded *anādisvarūpayogyatā* or the Svarūpopādhi of the Jīvas:—

यद्यनादिर्विशेषो न सांप्रतं कथमिष्यते ?
अदृष्टादेव चादृष्टे स्वीकृतं सर्ववादिभिः ।
आकस्मिको विशेषश्चेददृष्टे क्वचिदिष्यते ।
सर्वत्राकस्मिकत्वं स्यान्नादृष्टापेक्षिता क्वचित् ।
अदृष्टाच्चेद्विशेषोऽयमनादित्वं कुतो न तत् ?[5] (M. *AV*, iii, 4, adhi. 5-6)

He has briefly illustrated the thesis from the fact of the pre-eminent position among top-ranking souls which Hindu theology has assigned to Hiraṇyagarbha who is credited with four intrinsic spiritual superexcellences of Jñāna, Vairāgya, Aiśvarya and Dharma. It stands to reason that this present preeminence of Hiraṇyagarbha should flow from his earlier asset of preeminence and that from an earlier one of a previous Kalpa and so on—as far back as our imagination can take us, thus leading to the acceptance of an original intrinsic nucleus of such an asset which must naturally be recognised to be his intrinsic beginngless asset. Similar assets in the case of other beings distributed over a vast range of sliding scale of values in the descending order from Hiraṇyagarbha will have to be recognized, for the same reasons. As no event can be explained without a cause and as there is no room for accidents in the moral realm, the search for earlier and still earlier links of assets will have to end in recognizing such nuclei of intrinsic individual assets, which for want of a better name, we may

4. Cf. नन्वनादिप्रतिबिम्बवैचित्र्यस्यागन्तुकादृष्टवैचित्र्यनिमित्तत्वानुपपत्तेः तद्वैचित्र्यस्यापि किंचिदनादिवस्तुवैचित्र्यनिबन्धनत्वावश्यंभावाच्च, मुक्तौ कर्माभावाच्च प्रागुपलक्षितपूर्वपक्षस्य यथाश्रुतटीकादिना परिहारायोगाच्च अत आह—अयं भाव इति (*TCP*. p. 983b-983)
See also Vol. I. p. 409.

5. J. has lucidly explained the points at issue in his *NS:*
सर्वोत्कर्षहेतोः विशिष्टादृष्टस्य तथाविधप्राक्कृतादृष्टानपेक्षोत्पत्तिकत्वेऽसिद्धान्तः स्यात् । यदि किमपि विशिष्टमदृष्टं तथाविधादृष्टनिरपेक्षमेवोत्पद्येत तर्हि सर्वत्र फलादावप्याकस्मिकत्वमङ्गीकार्यं स्यादविशेषात् । विशिष्टादृष्टकारणकलापोऽपि तस्य कुत इति वाच्यम् । निर्निमित्तश्चेदतिप्रसङ्गः । स्वभावनिमित्तश्चेत् सिद्धं नः समीहितम् । यथा विरिञ्चस्य सर्वोत्कर्षकारणं विशिष्टमदृष्टं तथाविधपूर्वादृष्टहेतुकं तथा तदपि तथेति स्वीकार्यम् । समानन्यायत्वात् । तथा चानादिविशिष्टादृष्टप्रवाहाश्रयत्वं तस्यैव कुत इत्यनुयोगस्य नास्त्युत्तरं अनादेर्विशिष्टस्वभावात् । तत्तत्फलप्राप्त्युपाययोः प्रयत्नादृष्टयोरागन्तुकयोः बीजभूतोऽनागन्तुकस्वभावविशेष एव अनादियोग्यतेत्युच्यते । यथोक्तं—
'स्वभावाख्या योग्यता या हठाख्या' इति (*Op. cit.* p. 586-87)

as well agree to call "Anādisvarūpayogyatā", after Madhva. To refuse to recognize the logic of this argument is to recognize that things can happen without sufficient causes. If they do, they may be expected to do so in all cases and there will no more be any explanation as to why all advantages do not accrue to all but only some to a few. If variations are to be regulated by the fitness of individuals and their deserts, the case for Svarūpayogyatā stands vindicated.

The Jīvasvarūpa itself is thus capable of acting as its own *upādhi* in capturing and reflecting upon itself the measure of similarity in respect of attributes and dependence on its Bimba—which constitutes its Pratibimbatva—thro' the help of "Viśeṣas".[6] The *Upādhi* is not necessarily what *causes* a reflection but what helps to reflect or mirror forth on what stands close to itself certain features akin to those of the Bimba. It is in this sense that the Jivopādhi functions as an *upādhi*:

जीवतद्गुणयोरभेदेऽपि विशेषबलात् अभेदेऽप्युपाधिप्रतिबिम्बभावस्य संभवात् । (*TC.* p. 983)

Tho' in ordinary reflections, the *upādhi* is different from the Pratibimba itself, this need not be so in all cases. For, the figure of pratibimba as applied to the Jīva is not to be taken in its conventional sense but in a purely symbolic or technical (*pāribhāṣika*) sense—as already explained. If we insist upon other external conditions also being applied to this concept, it may be difficult to see how for instance, in the Advaita theory, Avidyā and *antaḥkaraṇa* which are not "*udbhūtarūpa*" can be taken to be able to reflect or how B. which is not a substance open to visual perception can be taken to be "reflected" in Avidyā and to appear as Jīva thereby. The Advaitin's view that the Pratibimba must be deemed to be non-different from the Bimba has been shown to be unsustainable in the *TC.*

Sūtra 52: *Abhisandhyādiṣu caivam* shows that even if differentiation of Jīvas (as Pratibimbas) into gods, asuras and human beings etc., is ascribed to the play of affections like desire, aversion, delusion and so on, the play of these in its turn will have to be traced back to the operation of diversity of *adṛṣṭas* (in the sense defined), in the last analysis.[7]

The last Sūtra: *Pradeśād iti cenna antarbhāvāt* (ii.3.52) points out that the differentiation of Jīvas (as Pratibimbas) into gods, asuras,

6. Cf. उपाध्युपाधिमद्भावो विशेषबलादित्यर्थः (J. *MGBt.* ii.18)

7. किं वैचित्र्यस्यादृष्टकारणकल्पनया ? रागद्वेषमोहादीनां दोषाणामेव तन्निमित्तत्वोपपत्तेरित्याशङ्कां परिहरत्सूत्रमुपन्यस्य व्याचष्टे—अभिसन्ध्यादिष्विति । न दोषवैचित्र्यात् वैचित्र्यं वाच्यम् । तस्यापि सादित्वेन कारणान्वेषणेऽदृष्टस्यैव ग्राह्यत्वात् (*TP.* ii.3.52)

humans etc. cannot be explained on the basis of their territorial distribution as denizens of particular regions. For the only answer to the question as to why these should be denizens of different regions will have to be—"because of diversity of their *adṛṣṭas* (in the sense defined) *which* shapes their destinies.[8] Further, even among denizens of the same region as heaven or this world there is to be seen a wide range of rising and falling scales of experience of pleasure, pain and such other affections.[9] The only explanation as to why these should hold the selves in their power will have to be found in the variations in their Svarūpayogyatā, otherwise known as *adṛṣṭa*.

The *Abhinavacandrikā* considers an interesting objection here that these three Sūtras look very much like being part of the *Aṃśādhi*. because (i) they address themselves to disarming objections against there being intrinsic diversities among souls who are all alike Pratibimbas of the same B. and (ii) because the opening Sūtra makes no separate predication. They are not, therefore, entitled to be treated as a separate *adhi*.

The objection is answered by pointing out that as the term Pratibimba has been applied to the Jīvas only in its special sense of *Tadadhīnatve sati tatsadṛśatvam* and not in its conventional sense, there is no difficulty whatsoever in such beings possessing intrinsic variations of natures. Hence the question of disarming objections to their being accepted as Pratibimbas of B. does *not* arise. These Sūtras cannot therefore be treated as part of the *Aṃśādhi*. They are, therefore, constituted into a separate *adhi*. by way of *Kṛtvācintā* or Abhyupagamavāda,[10] for purposes of clarifying the true position.

The *TC* points out that there is no overlapping between the theme of this *adhi*. and that of the *Sthānaviśeṣādhi* (iii.2.35-36). In the latter, it is established that it need not be presumed that as the bliss of B. happens to be the archetype of the bliss of Jīvas like Brahmā, it must be subject to similar variations as theirs. For variations in the nature of Pratibimbas are due not only to the variations in the Jnāna, Bhakti and other characteristics of their Svarūpopādhis but also to the power of the Bimba as the Supreme Lord. The Sun's rays passed thro' the sunstone is able set aflame any object placed within the focus of the sunstone. But the moon-beams passed thro' the same stone do nothing of the kind.

8. न स्वर्गनरकभूम्यादिप्रदेशविशेषात् वैचित्र्यम् । तत्प्राप्तेरदृष्टापेक्षत्वात् (M. *BSB*. ii.3.53)

9. एकदेशस्थितानामेव वैचित्र्यदर्शनाच्च (M. *BSB*. ii.3.53)

10. The absence of "ca" in Sutra 51 is also another indication that it is not intended to form part of the preceding *adhi*.

JĪVAS AS PRATIBIMBAS VARY ACCORDING TO SVARŪPOPĀDHIS

Interpretations of Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja

S. and R. interpret these three Sūtras as part of the *Amśādhi.* itself. S. holds that after having shown in Sūtras 49-50 that there is no possibility of confusion or overlapping of results of actions arising in Aikyavāda, the Sūtrakāra turns to point out in Sūtras 51-53 how such confusion and overlapping (*bhogāvyavasthā*) is unavoidable in the position of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sānkhya realists who accept a plurality of pervasive selves.[11] While agreeing with S. that the three Sūtras form part of the *Amśādhi.,* R. interprets them as showing that as in the case of Māyāvādins, the confusion and overlapping of results of actions among selves will be equally difficult to get rid of, for those other philosophers like Bhāskara who believe in *Satyopādhikṛtasatyabheda*—that the differences between Jīva and B. are caused by *real* Upādhis, and are, therefore, real.[12]

S.'s contention that fixity of enjoyment of results of actions can be explained by admitting identity of selves and B. but not their intrinsic difference is, to say the least, topsyturvy. Apart from this consideration, his interpretation of the Sūtra: *Adṛṣṭāniyamāt* involves the importation (*adhyāhāra*) of a fresh predicate—*Sāmkhyādīnām mate avyavasthā*: "(there is) no fixity of enjoyment of results of action among selves in the system of the Sāmkhyas and others."[13] In R.'s interpretation, there is the importation of the predicate—*Pāramārthikopādhyupahita-brahmajīvavāde api avyavasthā*: "there will be the same confusion in the theory of the individual soul being B. in so far as determined by real limiting adjuncts". These compare unfavorably with the way in which the Sūtra *Adṛṣṭāniyamāt* has been interpreted by M. *without importing any fresh predicate* at all and managing with the predicate *ābhāsa eva* following naturally by *anuvṛtti* from the preceding Sūtra.

11. बहुष्वात्मसु आकाशवत् सर्वगतेषु * * सांख्यानां न प्रत्यात्मं सुखदुःखोपभोगस्य नियामकमुपपद्यते । कणादानामपि . . . एष एव दोषः (S. *BSB.* ii.3.51)

12. पारमार्थिकोपाध्युपहितब्रह्मजीववादे अनाद्यदृष्टवशात् व्यवस्था भविष्यतीत्याशंक्याह अदृष्टानियमात् (R. *BSB.* ii.3.50)

13. 'सांख्यादिमतेऽव्यवस्थे'ति साध्याध्याहारायोगात् (*TC.* p. 985)

PĀDA IV

INTRODUCTION

This Pāda removes conflicts presented by Śrutis supported by special reasonings in regard to other texts with particular reference to "Adhyātmic"[1] principles such as the senses, the mind, Mukhya-Prāṇa and the physical body. The conflicts relate to questions of their genesis, number, status, composition, etc.

It should be noted that the resolution of such conflicts is made here on the basis of decisive texts carrying special reasonings. This dispels the objection that no discussion is necessary where Śrutis supported by reasonings are pitted against other Śrutis, as in such cases the latter ones will have to admit of a secondary meaning or Gauṇārtha.[2]

The discussions in this Pāda are, by and large, about the "Prāṇas", understood in the sense of the "senses",[3] both collectively and severally.[4]

There are thirteen adhikaraṇas in this Pāda. They fall into five units or Peṭikās. The first unit of five adhi-s. is concerned with the

1. The term "Adhyātma" here means what exists for the benefit of the Ātman—such as the senses, mind, Prāṇa and body. Cf. आत्मानं जीवमधिकृत्य यदस्ति जीवोपकारित्वेन वर्तमानं देहेन्द्रियान्तःकरणरूपम् (Ragh. Gitāvivṛti viii, 3)

2. Cf. ननु * * * यत्र युक्तिसहिताभिः श्रुतिभिः श्रुतयो विरुध्यन्ते तत्र न विचारणावकाशः, बलवद्विरोधे गौणार्थत्वाश्रयणस्य प्राप्तत्वात् । अत सिद्धार्थत्वात् कृतमत्र मीमांसयेति । नायं दोषः । सयुक्तिकाभिरेव निर्णयश्रुतिभिः परिह्रियमाणत्वात् विरोधस्य, विषयविवेकस्य वा प्रदर्शयिष्यमाणत्वात्, तत्र तत्र (*TD.* ii.4.1)

3. Vādirāja explains how the term "Prāṇa" from pra+ *ana* is appropriately applied to the senses:
दर्शनस्पर्शनादिप्रकृष्टचेष्टाहेतुत्वात् स्वविषयं प्रति प्रवणाख्यचेष्टाधिकरणत्वात् वा, इन्द्रियाणि प्राणा इत्युच्यन्ते (*TPG.* p. 110)

4. अस्मिन् पादे प्राय प्राणाः समस्ता व्यस्ता वा विषयः (*TD.* ii.4.1)

subject of Prāṇas or the senses. Of these, the first adhi. deals collectively with the question of the conflict of testimony regarding their origination and the second with a similar conflict with regard to the mind and the third with that of speech. The fourth resolves the conflict of texts regarding the number of the senses and the fifth goes into the question whether they are pervasive or minute. The next unit of four adhi.s is about Mukhya-Prāṇa and resolves conflicts of testimony about his origination, status (of dependence on B.), lordship over the five Prāṇas and his *parimāṇa*—whether pervasive or minute. The tenth adhi. establishes that the senses act as instruments of knowledge and activity of the self, only under the control of the Supreme B. The eleventh *adhi.* shows that Mukhya Prāṇa stands aside of the twelve (other) *indriyās* tho' the number of 'indriyas' appears in some places to be given as thirteen. The last two *adhi.s* deal with the conflict of testimony regarding the physical body (i) whether it is created by Hiraṇyagarbha or the Supreme B. and (ii) its elemental composition.

The order of discussion of topics here, calls for a word of explanation. Tho' among the adhyātmic principles, Mukhya-Prāṇa as the chief one deserves priority of treatment, precedence has been given to the discussion of the senses in general as it is proper to take up the overlordship of Mukhya-Prāṇa only after the issues connected with the genesis and other matters relating to the senses have been fully dealt with. For similar reasons, the topic of origination of the senses is followed by the discussion about their number. The question of the genesis of the mind and speech is taken up after the basic question of the genesis of the senses has been discussed.

CHAPTER XXXIII

GENESIS OF THE SENSES AND THEIR ABHIMĀNIDEVATĀS

1. *Prāṇotpattyadhikaraṇam* (ii.4.1-3)

This *adhi.* resolves the conflict of testimony regarding the origination of the *indriyas* and their Abhimānis. The conflict is seen between the Śrutis: "From It are born the Prāṇa and the sense organs, ether, air, etc. (*Muṇḍ.* Up. ii.1.3) and "the breaths alone were in the beginning of the world. From them the elements came forth; out of these elements the cosmic egg and within that egg the worlds were created" (*Kāṣāyaṇa Śruti*). The non-origination of the senses is supported by the reasoning provided in the *Bhaviṣyat-Purāṇa*—"The senses are taken to be unoriginated *as they have no material cause;* for all creation is made out of material causes, as is observed in the world of effects". The conflict is resolved by the Sūtrakāra holding that the senses too "likewise" have their origination from B. The term "likewise" (*tathā*) in the first Sūtra suggests the extension of the predicate and the reasons from the *Viyadadhi* (ii.3.1-7).[5]

The genesis posited here is one of *Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti* in so far as the germinal forms of the senses are open to development (*upacaya*) thro' association with the elements (*bhūtas*) at the time of creation. The second Sūtra: *Gauṇyasambhavāt* is specially necessary here in order to set aside a supervening doubt that the non-genesis of the senses

5. Vādirāja (*TPG.* p. 111) explains the absence of parallelism in the correlation of the *utpatti* and *anutpatti* Śrutis between Viyad in its fourfold connotation and the germinal and gross forms of Prāṇa, justifying the introduction of the fresh Sūtra *Gauṇyasambhavāt* (ii.4, 2). He also similarly justifies the introduction of Sūtra ii.4, 3 in its modified form as compared with the earlier ii.3, 6.

must be taken in an unqualified sense as no genesis is possible in view of the reported absence of material causes of their genesis in the Śruti. The objection is overruled that in view of the governing character of the Śsuti "(He) created all this" (Taitt. Up. ii.6) and others referring to the genesis of the senses from B. already quoted and the fact of the *upacaya* of senses by association with the elements which serve as the material cause of their genesis,[6] the texts which speak of them as unoriginated are to be viewed in a gauṇa-sense—viz., that they are unoriginated only in their *germinal forms*.[7]

The third Sūtra: *Pratijñānuparodhācca* shows that the senses must be admitted to have a genesis in order that the governing statement about B.'s having created "all this" may be sustained. This Sūtra is *not* read by S. Bhāskara, R. and others.

6. भूतान्येवोपादानानीति न तदभावोऽपि (*BD.* ii.4.2)

7. सूक्ष्मरूपेणानादित्वमेव गौणानादित्वम् (ibid)

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7. सूक्ष्मरूपेणानादित्वमेव गौणानादित्वम् (*ibid*)

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE GENESIS OF THE MIND

2. *Tatprāgadhikaraṇam* (ii.4, 4)

This *adhi.* resolves the conflict in the genesis of the mind as a sense. The *Gaupavana-Śruti* speaks of two classes of senses. It describes the mind as permanent and places the other senses in the category of the impermanent.[1] This lends weight to the *Pūrvapakṣa* that the mind is not at all created. This is further strengthened by the adverse contingency implicit in the reason embodied in that Śruti text—'the Soul indeed cannot be without the mind'—that without an active mind, there cannot be any transmigration of the creatures.[2] This contingency is met by shownig that there is no transmigration in Pralaya when the mind is in an undeveloped state (*anupacita-avasthā*).[3] The Siddhānta, therefore, shows that the placing of the mind in a separate category is *not* because it is absolutely uncreated, but because its development by accretion of bhūtas (*bhūtopacaya*) takes place *before the development of the other senses.* Its being described as *nitya* (uncreated) in the Śruti is to be understood in the sense that it is liable to only a minimum degree of elemental accretion:—

तदनुत्पत्तिवचनमल्पोपचयकारणात्

(*Vāyuprokta* QM. *BSB.* ii.4.4)

1. 'द्विधा ह्येवेन्द्रियाणि नित्यान्यनित्यानि च। तत्र नित्यं मनोऽन्यादित्वात्। न ह्यमनाः पुमान् तिष्ठति। अनित्यान्यन्यानि' (Q. M. *BSB.* ii.4.4)

2. 'न ह्यमना' इति विपर्ययपर्यवसानमुक्तिनात्कदाचिन्मनोहीनेनादिपुरुषेणावस्थानञ्च स्यात्, तथात्वे च तदा संसाराभावप्रसङ्गादित्यनिष्टप्रसङ्गाभिधानाच्च युक्तिरुक्तेति भाव. (*BD.* ii.4.4)

3. प्रतिसृष्टिकाल उपचयसत्त्वात् तदैव संसारो, न प्रलये; तदोपचयाभावेऽपि दोषाभावादित्युक्त एव परिहारः (ibid)

The expression *'Tat'* in the Sūtra refers to the other *Prāṇas* (senses) and *Tatprāk* to *what precedes them*—viz. the 'mind'.[4] It is for this reason that the word *manaḥ* is not read as a part of the Sūtra.[5] The predicate "*na anutpattimat*" follows by *anuvṛtti* from the predicate of the opening Sūtra of the *Viyadadhi.* The entire Sūtra thus signifies—the mind (which is declared in the Śrutis to have had its genesis prior to the other senses) is not to be treated as being without genesis.

4. प्राक्शब्देनैव मनसो लाभात् सूत्रे मन.पदाभाव· (*TC.* p. 990b)

5. सिद्धान्तेऽपि 'तत्प्राक् मन.श्रुते , इति निर्देश स्यादित्यत आह—मम मते त्विति (TCP. p. 990b)

CHAPTER XXXV

GENESIS OF SPEECH-SENSE

3. *Vāgadhikaraṇam* (ii.4, 5)

This *adhi.* establishes the genesis of Vāgindriya from B. thro' the mind. The conflict of testimony in this case is to be seen in the following Śrutis: "Speech is indeed unborn; for therein the Vedas are embedded" (*Pauṣyāyana Śruti*) "The mind is the prior form and speech the subsequent one" (*AĀ.* iii.1.1).

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa draws special support from the reason given in the Śruti '*Asyām hi Śrutir avatiṣṭhate*'. It contends that this can only mean that the capacity to articulate the Vedas is always present in speech-indriya and that being so, there is no need to recognize any *upacaya* or development in Vāgindriya to account for such capacity. There is thus no need to explain away the Śruti which regards speech-indriya as unborn, as a figurative statement (*gauṇa-prayoga*).

Arguing the Pūrvapakṣa at some length, J. *inter alia* disposes of a possible contention that (i) the term Vāk in the Śruti: *Vāg vāva nityā* may be understood in the sense of the Vedas themselves in as much as in the supporting complementary text from Paiṁgi:

श्रुतिर्वाव नित्या अनित्या वाच स्मृतय:

Vāk has been classified as eternal and non-eternal—the former being identified with the Vedas and the latter with the Purāṇas etc:—

'नित्यानित्यया स्तौमि ब्रह्म तत्परमं पदम्'

and (ii) that such an interpretation will be in conformity with the

texts which speak of the genesis of Vāk as an indriya. The Pūrvapakṣin argues his point that a careful attention to the wording of the concluding part of the text in question viz.: *Asyām hi Śrutir avatiṣṭhate* will be sufficient to discredit such a plea; for it will not make any sense to say that 'the Śruti is embedded in the Śruti.'

The Pūrvapakṣin therefore argues that if vāgindriya should have any origination, the statement in the Śruti that it is the support of the Vedas will be inappropriate. For, the Śrutis are admittedly eternal and what is eternal will *not* obviously have to be supported by the non-eternal. It is equally out of the question to regard vāgindriya as uncreated in its germinal form (*śūkṣmarūpeṇa*) and having a genesis in terms *of upacaya.* Any such explanation, says the Pūrvapakṣin, will be out of tune with the statement of the Śruti that the Vedas are embedded in Vāgindriya—which can only mean that Vāgindriya always possesses the capacity to articulate the Vedas. Else, there will be no point in saying that the Vedas, which are an established order and arrangement of sounds which are *ex hypothesi* eternal and all-pervasive, are *embedded in Vāgindriya.*

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that speech has its genesis from the mind, as stated in the Śruti—*Manaḥ pūrvarūpam vāg uttararūpam*—the terms *pūrva* and *uttara* standing for cause and effect. The Siddhānta explains that the other text *Asyām hi Śrutır avatiṣṭhate* only means that *Vāgindriya* is '*nitya*' in the sense that it has the fitness for having proximity to the Vedas (in order to be able to articulate them) which expresses itself *when it is in a developed* (*upacita*) *form.*

This is no doubt a secondary sense; but it is the only one which will be in conformity with the spirit of the text: *Asyām hi Śrutir avatiṣṭhate* which seeks to elucidate the basis of the figurative statement 'Vāk is verily eternal'. This can be clearly seen from the complementary text (samākhyāśruti) which describes the same "Vāk" as eternal and non-eternal according as it is related to the Vedas or the Smṛtis. Such a decription would be contradictory, unless *nityatva* of vāgindriya in respect of the Śrutis is understood in the sense of *nityaśrutyuccāraṇayogyatvam.*[1]

1. समाख्याश्रुतावनित्या वाव स्मृतय इति वागिन्द्रियाश्रयस्मृतीनामनित्यत्वोक्तेरत्रापि तदाश्रयत्वेनैवानित्यत्वं विवक्षित, न तु स्वरूपेणेत्यर्थः। अन्यथा, स्वरूपेणैव नित्यत्वानित्यत्वविवक्षाया विरोधादिति भावः
(Ragh. *TPB.* ii.4.5)

Śaṁkara's Interpretation

S. treats Sūtras ii, 4.1-4 (omitting '*Pratijñānuparodhācca*' of M.) as dealing with the genesis of the Prāṇas. It would appear from the non-mention of their genesis in the context of creation in the *Chān. Up.* (vi.5.4) that they have no origination. They are, however, mentioned as originating from B. in several other texts like *Bṛh. Up.* ii.1.10; *Muṇḍ. Up.* ii.1, 2.8; *Praśna Up.* vi.4. There is thus a conflict of testimony. But the topic cannot be deemed to be covered by the conclusion established already in regard to similar conflicts of testimony in connection with Viyad, Mātariśvan etc. For, here there is room for a supervening doubt (*abhyuccayāśaṅkā*). These Prāṇas are found to be described in a passage in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*[2] (vi.1.1.1) as the 'Ṛṣis' who existed even in the state of Pralaya, before the origination of other things. A fresh adhikaraṇa is, therefore, called for to settle the question.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that as no reason can be found for deciding the question either way, it may be left an open one; or else the texts referring to the origin of the Prāṇas may be understood in a metaphorical sense.[3]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the origination of the Prāṇas already mentioned in *several* Upaniṣadic texts is entitled to final acceptance. The other text (from the *Śatapatha*), predicating their existence before the coming into existence of other things in creation, is to be understood as referring to their existence in the state of *minor dissolution* (*avāntarapralaya*) and not the great dissolution (*mahāpralaya*). The Ṛṣis are the Prāṇas of Hiraṇyagarbha who endures in Avāntarapralaya and who is the Adhikāri who has to bring into existence the accessories of the sacred fire (*cito'gni*) such as the pebbles (*śarkarās*) as may be seen from the given context in the *Brāhmaṇa*. The expression "likewise" (*tathā*) in the opening Sūtra refers not to the immediately preceding topic of the last section which is the plurality of the selves, but to the genesis of ether etc., dealt with *still earlier*.

2. 'असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत् तदाहुः किं तदसदासीत् इति, ऋषयो वाव तेऽग्रेऽसदासीत्। तदाहुः के ते ऋषय इति, प्राणा वाव ऋषयः', इत्यत्र प्रागुत्पत्तेः प्राणानां सद्भावश्रवणात् (S. *BSB.* ii.4, 1)

3. श्रुतिविप्रतिषेधादन्यतरनिर्धारणकारणानिरूपणादप्रतिपत्तिः प्राप्नोति। अथवा, प्रागुत्पत्तेः सद्भावश्रवणात् गौणी प्राणानामुत्पत्तिश्रुतिरिति प्राप्नोति (S. *BSB.* ii.4, 1)

4. एतावन्तु—स्यादेतदेव यदि सर्गादौ प्राणसद्भावश्रुतिरनन्यथासिद्धा भवेत्। अन्यथाप्येषा सिद्ध्यति। अवान्तरप्रलये हिरण्यगर्भस्य सृष्टिवंशवर्णितं [illegible]। तत्राधिकारी पुरुषः प्रजापतिरनष्ट एव, त्रैलोक्यमात्रं [illegible] श्रुतिरवसेया (*Bhāmatī* ii.4, 2)

The second Sūtra according to S. rebuts the Pūrvapakṣa contention that the texts referring to the genesis of Prāṇas may be regarded as figurative statements (*gauṇī*) by showing the impossibility of such an interpretation, as it would offend the very thesis of 'Ekavijñānena sarvavijñānam' as already explained in the Viyadadhikaraṇa. The next Sūtra says, in the *Muṇḍ. Up.* (ii.1.3):

एतस्माज्जायते प्राणो मनः सर्वेन्द्रियाणि च ।
खं वायुर्ज्योतिरापश्च * * * * * * ॥

the same expression *jāyate* (is born) is found connected with the Prāṇas and the others which precede—'Ākāśa' (*kham*) Vāyu, etc. in the enumeration. It would not be proper to interpret the same predicate Jāyate, used only once in the text and which is to be connected with all its subjects in their respective turn, in two different senses of 'literal' in all other cases and metaphorical *only* in respect of Prāṇas.[5]

The fourth Sūtra according to S. refutes the contention of the Pūrvapakṣa that in the context of creation in the *Chān. Up.* (vi.5.4) and *Taitt. Up.* (ii, 1.1) there is no mention of the genesis of the Prāṇas by showing that it is unsustainable as the organ of speech etc. are preceded by the elements of Tejoabanna. To explain—we read in the same context that the mind consists of earth (food), breath consists of waters and speech of Tejas. This establishes that speech and others are produced from Tejas etc. This text shows that the organs etc. are products of the elements Tejoabanna which, in their turn, spring from B.[6]

Criticism

The recognition given to the Pūrvapakṣa on the slender ground of non-mention of the Prāṇas in the *Chān. Up.* in the context of creation, tho' it is mentioned in various other Śrutis is *inadmissible*. For, silence is not tantamount to a contradiction of an express statement elsewhere.[7] As there is therefore really no conflict, the matter can be settled *without opening a fresh adhi.*, on the basis of the *Viyadadhi* itself: As for the supervening doubt pleaded by S., it will be seen that the texts like—"Vāyu and Ākāśa are immortal" (*Bṛh. Up.* ii.3.3) 'these waters existed in the beginning (*agre*) of the world' ( )

5 जायते इत्येक जन्मवाचिपद प्राणेषु प्राक्श्रुत सदुत्तरेष्वाकाशादिष्वनुवर्तते । आकाशादिषु मुख्यं जन्मेति प्रतिष्ठापितम् । तत्सामान्यात् प्राणेष्वपि मुख्यमेव जन्म भवितुमर्हति । न ह्येकस्मिन् प्रकरणे एकस्मिश्च वाक्ये एकः शब्दः सकृदुच्चरितः बहुभि सबध्यमान क्वचिन्मुख्य क्वचित् गौण इत्यध्यवसातुं शक्यम्
(S. *BSB.* ii.4, 3)

6. अस्मिन्नेव प्रकरणे तेजोऽबन्नपूर्वकत्व वाक्प्राणमनसां आम्नायते; अतो वर्तत एव ब्रह्मप्रभवत्वम्
(S. *BSB.* ii.4.4)

7. एतस्मादिति श्रुतावुत्पत्तौ श्रुतायामपि क्वचिदश्रवणमात्रेण पूर्वपक्षानुदयात् (*TC.* p. 989b)

are there confronting the genesis of Ākāśa, Vāyu, the waters etc. Nevertheless, the genesis of Ākāśa, Vāyu and the waters has been established in the first, second and fifth *adhi.s* of the previous Pāda of this Adhyāya. Surely, the *adhikāśaṅkā* posed by the text cited from the *Śatapatha Br.* is *not in any way more formidable* than any of the earlier ones in respect of Ākāśa, Vāyu, etc.[8] Why then could this matter be not taken to be covered by the rulings already given is respect of Ākāśa etc.? If the immortality (unoriginatedness) of Vāyu and Ākāśa and the existence of the 'waters' prior to the creation of the world signify only a sort of 'relative' (*āpekṣikam*) immortality, the same meaning can be accepted in the present case, without further ado and the opening of the fresh *adhi.* for Prāṇas, *dropped.*[9] *This shows the grounds on which S. has justified the opening of this adhi. are not adequate.* In M.'s interpretation, on the other hand, we see that the *adhikāśaṅkā* justifying the opening of this adhi. is based on other grounds of the reported statements in the Śrutis and Smṛtis about the elements (*bhūtas*) themselves being produced from the senses (which renders the genesis of the senses from the Bhūtas improbable) and the alleged absence of material causes of the senses. *These are fresh grounds not traversed in connection with the earlier adhis.*[10]

S.'s Siddhânta that the senses are created in essence (*svarūpeṇa*) runs counter to the evidence of the Smṛtis that they are eternal in their germinal forms. See Page 301 ante and *TC.* p. 989 b.

. किंच, प्राणानां स्वरूपेण सादित्वसिद्धान्तो 'नित्यान्येतानि सौक्ष्म्येण' इति भाष्योक्तस्मृतिविरुद्धः (*TC.* p. 989b).

. As regards the second Sūtra, it will be seen that there is a striking parallelism in thought and wording between it and Sūtra ii.3.3 of the *Viyadadhi.* In view of the presence of texts referring to the unoriginated existence of the Prāṇas, this Sūtra deserves to be interpreted *from the Siddhānta point of view* as saying that such unoriginatedness is to be understood in a metaphorical sense and not in a literal sense as their absolute unoriginatedness is untenable. Such an interpretation will also be free from the necessity of having to import by *adhyāhāra* an entire clause, representing the subject of the Sautra proposition:

उत्पत्तिश्रुतिः नामुख्यार्था ।

8. आकाशवाय्वादिष्वपि—'वायुश्चान्तरिक्षं च तदमृतम्' 'आपो वा इदमग्र आसुः' इति श्रवणेन, इह ततोऽप्यधिकाशङ्काभावाच्च (*TC.* p. 989b)

9. तत्रामृतत्वासत्त्वयोरापेक्षिकत्वे, इहाप्येतत् तथास्तु (*TC.* p. 989b)
उत्पन्नो वायुरिति सिद्धान्तः। अस्तमयप्रतिषेधोऽप्यग्निविषय आपेक्षिकः (*S. BSB.* ii.4, 8)

10. मम तु, भाष्योक्तश्रुतौ स्मृतौ च, प्राणानां भूतकारणत्वोक्तेः उपादाननिषेधस्य भूयस्त्वोऽधिक इति पूर्वपक्षोदयः (*TC.* p. 989b)

which is to be connected with the reason *Gauṇyasambhavāt* (taken as a compound term)[11] The way in which the statement of the reason is understood by S. also involves a needless strain of involving the genitive case relationship between *Gauṇī* and *asambhavāt,* which again requires the first member of the cpd. to be construed in its abstract sense of *gauṇatva.*

His interpretation of the third Sūtra obliges him to look for the antecedent of the pronoun *Tad* in *Tatprāk śruteśca* in Ākāśa and others which *are not given* in the preceding *Sūtras.*

Under Sūtra ii.4.3 S. lays down the principle that the predicate jāyate which is found connected with more than one subject in *Muṇḍ. Up.* (ii.1.3) will have to be understood in one uniform sense everywhere and *not* in its primary sense in some cases (such as with reference to Ākāśa, Vāyu, etc.) and in a metaphorical sense with reference to Prāṇas alone as the Pūrvapakṣin would have it. S. recognises that this principle is applicable to other cases also where a predicate like *'vyuccaranti'* placed at the tail-end of a passage (unlike jāyate placed at the head-end in the *Muṇḍaka* (ii.1.3) stands connected with a number of subjects like Prāṇas, the worlds, the gods and elements, as in *Bṛh. Up.* ii.1.10:—

एतस्मादात्मनः सर्वे प्राणाः सर्वो लोकाः सर्वे देवाः सर्वाणि भूतानि व्युच्चरन्ति[12]

To be able to apply to both these modes of predication, the Sūtra will have to be amended into *Tatsahaśruteśca.*[13] For, the wording *Tatprākśruteśca* by its very terms of reference excludes cases falling under the scope of *Paścāt Śruti* as of "Vyuccaranti"[14] in *Bṛh. Up.* (ii.1.10). It was evidently because R. felt the inadequacy of S.'s approach here, that he preferred to read Sūtras ii.4.2 and 3 as one and interpret the words *Tatprākśruteḥ* as meaning that scripture declares that before creation the highest self only exists.

11 वियदधिकरणस्थेन, गौण्यसंभवात् इति सूत्रेणेवाद्वत्येनापि तेनावश्यवक्तव्यस्यानादित्वश्रुतिर्गौणीत्यस्यार्थस्य प्रतिज्ञाध्याहारादिकं विनैव संभवे * * * (*TC.* p. 989)
उत्पत्तिश्रुते गौणत्वस्यासंभावादित्यस्यार्थस्य "नामुख्यार्थी" इति प्रतिज्ञाध्याहारेण * * * (*ibid*)

12 यत्रापि पश्चात् श्रुत उत्पत्तिवचन शब्दः पूर्वैः संबध्यते, तत्राप्येष एव न्यायः, यथा 'सर्वाणि भूतानि व्युच्चरन्ति' (*Bṛh. Up.* ii.1.10)
इत्ययमन्ते पठितो व्युच्चरन्तिशब्दः प्राणादिभिः संबध्यते (S. *BSB.* ii.4.3)

13 सर्वाणि भूतानि व्युच्चरन्ति इति श्रुत्यन्तरे श्रुतस्य व्युच्चरन्तिशब्दस्य पूर्वैः प्राणादिभिः संबन्धाङ्गीकारेण तत्संग्रहार्थं 'तत्सहश्रुतेश्च' इत्येव सूत्रणीयत्वेन 'तत्प्राक्श्रुतेश्च' इति सूत्रणस्यायोगाच्च (*TC.* p. 990b)

14. Read— तत्प्राक्श्रुतेरित्युक्त्या, एतस्माज्जायते इत्यस्यैव ग्रहणापत्त्या, व्युच्चरन्ति इत्यस्यापि संग्रहार्थं तत्पश्चात् श्रुतेश्च इत्युक्तौ तच्छब्दस्य पूर्वसूत्रप्रकृतप्राणपरत्वसंभवेऽपि, एतस्माज्जायत इति प्राक्श्रुतजन्मवाचिपदोपेतश्रुत्यसंग्रहापत्तेरुभयसंग्रहाय सौत्रतच्छब्दस्य पूर्वसूत्रप्रकृतप्राणपरत्वाय, तत्सहेत्येव सूत्रणीयम्। तैः प्राणैः सह भूतानां जन्मश्रुतेरिति वा, तैः भूतैः सह प्राणानां जन्मश्रुतेरिति वा व्याख्यानसंभवादित्यर्थः. (Ragh. *TCP.* p. 990b)

are there confronting the genesis of Ākāśa, Vāyu, the waters etc. Nevertheless, the genesis of Ākāśa, Vāyu and the waters has been established in the first, second and fifth *adhi.s* of the previous Pāda of this Adhyāya. Surely, the *adhikāśaṅkā* posed by the text cited from the *Śatapatha Br.* is *not in any way more formidable* than any of the earlier ones in respect of Ākāśa, Vāyu, etc.[8] Why then could this matter be not taken to be covered by the rulings already given is respect of Ākāśa etc.? If the immortality (unoriginatedness) of Vāyu and Ākāśa and the existence of the 'waters' prior to the creation of the world signify only a sort of 'relative' (*āpekṣikam*) immortality, the same meaning can be accepted in the present case, without further ado and the opening of the fresh *adhi.* for Prāṇas, *dropped.*[9] *This shows the grounds on which S. has justified the opening of this adhi. are not adequate.* In M.'s interpretation, on the other hand, we see that the *adhikāśaṅkā* justifying the opening of this adhi. is based on other grounds of the reported statements in the Śrutis and Smṛtis about the elements (*bhūtas*) themselves being produced from the senses (which renders the genesis of the senses from the Bhūtas improbable) and the alleged absence of material causes of the senses. *These are fresh grounds not traversed in connection with the earlier adhis.*[10]

S.'s Siddhānta that the senses are created in essence (*svarūpeṇa*) runs counter to the evidence of the Smṛtis that they are eternal in their germinal forms. See Page 301 ante and *TC.* p. 989 b.

. किंच, प्राणाना स्वरूपेण सादित्वसिद्धान्तो 'नित्यान्येतानि सौक्ष्म्येण' इति भाष्योक्तस्मृतिविरुद्धः (*TC.* p. 989b).

As regards the second Sūtra, it will be seen that there is a striking parallelism in thought and wording between it and Sūtra ii.3.3 of the *Viyadadhi.* In view of the presence of texts referring to the unoriginated existence of the Prāṇas, this Sūtra deserves to be interpreted *from the Siddhānta point of view* as saying that such unoriginatedness is to be understood in a metaphorical sense and not in a literal sense as their absolute unoriginatedness is untenable. Such an interpretation will also be free from the necessity of having to import by *adhyāhāra* an entire clause, representing the subject of the Sautra proposition:

उत्पत्तिश्रुतिः नामुख्यार्था ।

8. आकाशवाय्वादिष्वपि–'वायुश्चान्तरिक्षं च तदमृतम्' 'आपो वा इदमग्र आसुः' इति श्रवणेन, इह ततोऽन्यविशेषाभावाच्च (*TC.* p. 989b)

9. तत्रामृतत्वाग्रत्वयोरापेक्षिकत्वे, इहाप्येवञ्च तथास्तु (*TC.* p. 989b)
उत्पद्यते वायुरिति सिद्धान्तः । अस्तमयप्रतिषेधोऽपरविद्याविषय आपेक्षिकः (S. BSB. ii.4, 8)

10. अत्र तु, भाष्योक्तश्रुतौ स्मृतौ च, प्राणानां भूतकारणत्वोक्तिः, उपादाननिषेधश्च भूतेभ्योऽधिक इति पूर्वपक्षोदयः (*TC.* p. 989b)

which is to be *connected with the reason Gauṇyasambhavāt* (taken as a compound term)[11] The way in which the statement of the reason is understood by S. also involves a needless strain of involving the genitive case relationship between *Gauṇī* and *asambhavāt*, which again requires the first member of the cpd. to be construed in its abstract sense of *gauṇatva*.

His interpretation of the third Sūtra obliges him to look for the antecedent of the pronoun *Tad* in *Tatprāk śruteśca* in Ākāśa and others which *are not given* in the preceding *Sūtras*.

Under Sūtra ii.4.3 S. lays down the principle that the predicate jāyate which is found connected with more than one subject in *Muṇḍ. Up.* (ii.1.3) will have to be understood in one uniform sense everywhere and *not* in *its* primary sense in some cases (such as with reference to Ākāśā, Vāyu, etc.) and in a metaphorical sense with reference to Prāṇas alone as the Pūrvapakṣin would have it. S. recognises that this principle is applicable to other cases also where a predicate like *'vyuccaranti'* placed at the tail-end of a passage (unlike jāyate placed at the head-end in the *Muṇḍaka* (ii.1.3) stands connected with a number of subjects like Prāṇas, the worlds, the gods and elements, as in *Bṛh. Up.* ii.1.10:—

एतस्मादात्मन: सर्वे प्राणा: सर्वो लोक: सर्वे देवा· सर्वाणि भूतानि व्युच्चरन्ति[12]

To be able to apply to both these modes of predication, the Sūtra *will have to be amended into Tatsahaśruteśca.*[13] For, the wording *Tatprākśruteśca* by its very terms of reference excludes cases falling under the scope of *Paścāt Śruti* as of "Vyuccaranti"[14] in *Bṛh. Up.* (ii.1.10). *It was evidently because R. felt the inadequacy of S.'s* approach here, that he preferred to read Sūtras ii.4.2 and 3 as one and interpret the words *Tatprākśruteḥ* as meaning that scripture declares that before creation the highest *self only exists.*

11. वियदधिकरणस्थेन, गौण्यसभवात् इति सूत्रेणैवात्रत्येनापि तेनावश्यवक्तव्यस्यानादित्वश्रुतिर्गौणीत्यस्यार्थस्य प्रतिज्ञाध्याहारादिक विनैव सभवे * * * (*TC.* p. 989)
उत्पत्तिश्रुते गौणत्वस्यासभावादित्यस्यार्थस्य "नामुख्यार्था" इति प्रतिज्ञाध्याहारेण * * * (*ibid*)

12 यत्रापि पश्चात् श्रुत उत्पत्तिवचन शब्द पूर्वै सबध्यते, तत्राप्येष एव न्याय:, यथा 'सर्वाणि भूतानि व्युच्चरन्ति' (*Bṛh. Up.* ii.1.10)
इत्ययमन्ते पठितो व्युच्चरन्तिशब्द प्राणादिभि सबध्यते (*S. BSB.* ii.4.3)

13. सर्वाणि भूतानि व्युच्चरन्ति इति श्रुत्यन्तरे श्रुतस्य व्युच्चरन्तिशब्दस्य पूर्वै. प्राणादिभि: सबन्धाङ्गीकारेण तत्सग्रहार्थं 'तत्सहश्रुतेश्च' इत्येव सूत्रणीयत्वेन 'तत्प्राक्श्रुतेश्च' इति सूत्रणस्यायोगाच्च (*TC.* p. 990b)

14 Read— तत्प्राक्श्रुतेरित्युक्त्या, एतस्माज्जायते इत्यस्यैव ग्रहणापत्त्या, व्युच्चरन्ति इत्यस्यापि सग्रहार्थं तत्पश्चात् श्रुतेश्च इत्युक्तौ तच्छब्दस्य पूर्वसूत्रप्रकृतप्राणपरत्वसभवेऽपि, एतस्माज्जायत इति प्राक्श्रुतजन्मवाचिपदोपेत- श्रुत्यसग्रहापत्तेरुभयसग्रहाय सौत्रतच्छब्दस्य पूर्वसूत्रप्रकृतप्राणपरत्वाय, तत्सहेत्येव सूत्रणीयम्। तै: प्राणै: सह भूताना जन्मश्रुतेरिति वा, तै: भूतै: सह प्राणाना जन्मश्रुतेरिति वा व्याख्यानसभवादित्यर्थ.
(Ragh. *TCP.* p. 990b)

We may reasonably expect a discussion on the question of the genesis of the 'mind' after the general discussion on the Prāṇas—as the mind is a special cognitive sense and there is *adhikāśaṅkā* challenging its genesis which needs to be met in a separate *adhikarṇa*.[15] And *Tatprāk śruteśca* would serve this purpose admirably well, as the term "*Tatprāk*" can readily denote the mind.[16]

S. treats the fourth Sūtra also as part of the same Prāṇādhikaraṇa and holds that it is intended to answer the objection that the genesis of the vital airs has not been specifically mentioned in the context of creation in *Chān. Up.* (vi.2.3).[17] The Sūtra *Tatpūrvakatvād vācaḥ* (ii.4.4) therefore points out that their genesis can readily be deduced from the fact of speech and others mentioned in that context as having been produced from Tejas, āpaḥ and annam. The text referred to is *Chān. Up.* (vi.5.4):

> "*Annamayam hi somya manaḥ. Āpomayaḥ Prāṇah.*
>
> *Tejomayī vāk.*"[18]

Such an interpretation obliges S. to make the pronoun Tat stand for Tejobanna and resort to Lakṣaṇā in taking *vāk* to stand for *vāk*, *Prāṇa* and *manas*.[19] As a matter of fact, the Śruti text "*Annamayam hi somya manaḥ*,.... does *not* and *cannot* establish that the mind, Prāṇa and Vāk are products by modification of the subtle elements: Tejobanna. For the mind, Vāk and other sense organs are recognised to be modifications of Taijasa-Ahaṁkāra and not of the *bhūtas*. The real sense of the Upaniṣadic text: *Annamayam manaḥ* etc. is that the mind, Prāṇa and Vāk are replenished every day by the subtlest portions of the food etc. consumed by the individual.[20] This point has been referred to earlier on P. 111, fn. 34. There is thus, no basis in this Śruti to assume that the mind, speech etc. are products of the subtle elements of Tejobanna and are *generated* by them.

Further, as the breaths are modifications of Vāyu, they can hardly be regarded as products of water, as S.'s interpretation would require it.

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15. इन्द्रियोत्पत्तिश्रुतिविरोधनिरासानन्तरमधिकाशङ्कयोत्थितस्येन्द्रियविशेषमनोनित्यत्वानित्यत्वश्रुतिविरोधस्यापवाद-निरसनीयस्य निरासेनाधिकरणान्तरत्वसम्भवे * * * (TC. p. 989)
16. See P. 303 fn. 4.
17. यद्यपि तत्तेजोऽसृजतेत्येतस्मिन् प्रकरणे प्राणानामुत्पत्तिर्न पठ्यते (S. BSB. ii.4.4)
18. तथापि, अस्मिन्नेव प्रकरणे तेजोऽबन्नपूर्वकत्वं वाक्प्राणमनसामाम्नातं– 'अन्नमयं हि सोम्य मनः, आपोमयः प्राणस्तेजोमयी वाक्' इति * * * ततो वर्तत एव ब्रह्मप्रभवत्वम् (S. BSB. ii.4.4)
19. तच्छब्दस्य तेजोऽबन्नपरत्वं, वाक्– शब्दस्य वाक् प्राणमनोलक्षकत्वं चाश्रित्य * * * (TC. p. 990)
20. 'अन्नमयं हि सोम्य मन.' इत्यादावप्यवयवैः उपचय एव मनः प्रभृतेरुच्यते, न तु भूतविकारत्वमित्यत्र हेतुराहङ्कारिकत्वमिति (TCP. p. 990)

It will be too far-fetched to claim that the breaths (*Prāṇas*) are the modifications of Vāyu thro' waters which are an evolute of Agni, the parent of Vāyu.[21]

Instead of all this vain exploration, it would be much better to recognize a separate *adhi.* in *Tatpūrvakatvād vācaḥ,* devoted to resolving the conflict of testimony over the genesis of Vāgindriya as such. After the inquiry into the genesis of indriyas, in general, followed by a similar inquiry into the special 'Jñānendriya' viz. the mind, a similar inquiry, occasioned by a relevant *adhikāśaṅkā,* about the chief of the karmendriyas viz. Vāk would certainly be in order in this Sūtra, as M. has suggested.[22]

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R. treats the *Prāṇādhi* as consisting of Sūtras ii, 4, 1-3 the second one being made up of Sūtras 2 and 3 of S. *Unlike* S. Bhāskara and M., he regards the opening Sūtra *Tathā Prāṇāḥ* as *representing the Pūrvapakṣa.*

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that just as the Jīva is beginningless in essence, the Prāṇas (senses) too should be accepted as being without origin[23] because of the Śruti—'Non-being truly was this in the beginning." "The Ṛṣis indeed were the non-being. The Prāṇas are the Ṛṣis' (*Śatapatha Br.* vi. 1.1.1). The plural 'Prāṇāḥ' shows that only the organs and the vital airs are meant by the term.[24] This passage declares that the Ṛṣis (the Prāṇas) existed before the creation of the world. Such a statement cannot be explained away in the sense that they endure for a very long time, just as Vāyu and Ākāśa have been said to be immortal.[25] For the words—"non-being indeed was this in the beginning means much more viz. that the Prāṇas continued to exist even at the time when the whole world was under dissolution.[26]

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21. किं चापोमयः प्राण इत्यस्यानुपपत्तिरेव । तस्य वायुविकारत्वात् । न चाब्द्वारा तद्विकारत्वं प्राणस्य शक्याहं भवतीत्याह– (नहि वायुविकारस्येति) (*TCP.* p. 991b)
22 मम रीत्या, सूत्रस्थतच्छब्दस्य पूर्वसूत्रप्रकृतमनःपरत्वं, वाक्शब्दस्य केवलवाक्परत्वं चाश्रित्यासाधारणज्ञानेन्द्रिय मनोनित्यत्वानित्यत्वश्रुतिविरोधपरिहारे, अभ्यधिकाशङ्कयोत्थितस्यासाधारणकर्मेन्द्रियवाङ्‌नित्यत्वानित्यत्वश्रुति-विरोधस्यावश्यनिरसनीयस्य निरासेनाधिकरणान्तरत्वसंभवे * * * (*TC.* p. 990)
23. जीववदेवेत्याह पूर्वपक्षी–तथा प्राणा इति (R. *BSB.* ii.4.1)
24. प्राणशब्दे बहुवचनादिन्द्रियाण्येवेति निश्चीयते (R. *BSB.* ii.4.1)
25. न चेयं श्रुतिः, वायुश्चान्तरिक्षं * * * इतिवत् चिरकालावस्थायित्वेन परिणेतुं शक्या (*ibid*)
26. असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत् इति कृत्स्नप्रपञ्चप्रलयवेलायामप्यवस्थितत्वश्रवणात् (*Śrībhāṣya* ii.4.1)

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is proclaimed in the second Sūtra: *Gauṇyasambhavāt tatprākśruteśca* that the plural form "Prāṇāḥ" must be understood in a secondary sense. For according to the Śrutis B. is the only being that exists in the state of dissolution and there is no room for Prāṇas also so existing as there is no plurality of existence in Pralaya.[27] The third Sūtra is explained as supplying *one more reason* why the Prāṇas cannot be presumed to exist in the state of Pralaya.[28] As all names (*vācaḥ*) or words of speech, which have for their objects of reference "things apart from and other than B.", can operate only within a world of elements, ether and so forth, which have been brought into existence; and as in the state of Pralaya no such world of name and form is in existence, there is no scope for the play of the organs of speech, action and sensation then. Hence, it cannot be inferred that these organs (Prāṇas) themselves existed in that state.[29]

Criticism

The Siddhānta that the senses do have their genesis could very well have been *founded on the opening Sūtra* itself—on the analogy of the genesis of the other inanimate principles like Viyad and Mātariśvan etc. *as established by R. in the first few adhis of the third Pāda.* There is no need to locate the Siddhānta in the *second* Sūtra which carries no recognizable mark of Siddānta, such as the presence of *tu* or *vā* to distinguish itself from the preceding one as the Pūrvapakṣa.[30]

It is difficult to accept the explanation of the *Vedāntadīpa* quoted by *Śrutaprakāśa* here that the *ca* in Sūtra 3 has been used in the sense of "but" (*tu*) to indicate its being a Siddhānta Sūtra. The *Śrībhāṣya* itself explains the *ca* after *Tatprākśruteḥ* as a particle emphasing that *only* B. existed in the state of Pralaya:[31]

तस्यैव परमात्मनः सृष्टेः प्रागवस्थानश्रुतेरेव।

According to R.'s commentator, there is proximity between the present *adhi.* and the preceding Atmādhikaraṇa (ii.3.18) which justifies

27. बहुवचनश्रुतिर्गौणी; बहुत्वासंभवात्। तस्यैव परमात्मनः सृष्टेः प्रागवस्थानश्रुतेरेव (ibid)
28. तत्र प्राणशब्दः परमात्मवचनः (*Śribhāṣya* ii.4.1)
29. 'वाचः' परमात्मव्यतिरिक्तविषयस्य नामधेयस्य वाग्विषयभूतवियदादिसृष्टिपूर्वकत्वात् * * * नामरूपभावानभावात् तदानीं वागिन्द्रियकार्याभावाच्च तानि न सन्तीत्यर्थः (ibid)
30. अत्र प्राणेषु अस्पष्टस्य उत्पत्तिमत्त्वेन वियदादिवत्साम्यात् सिद्धान्तत्वसम्भवे, उत्तरत्र सिद्धान्तद्योतकतुशब्दादेरभावे च, 'तर्हि' त्रिसूत्र्या पूर्वपक्षत्वावगमात् (TC. p. 991)
31. एतेन 'तुशब्दार्थे चशब्देन सिद्धान्तद्योतनमित्युक्तं दीपे' इति श्रुतप्रकाशोक्तं निरस्तम्। तद्भाष्येऽवधारणार्थत्वोक्तेश्च भाव. (Ragh. *TCP*. p. 991)

the extension (*atideśa*) of the Pūrvapakṣa about the absence of genesis of Prāṇas on the analogy of absence of genesis of the Jīvātman (*Jīvānutpatti*) taught in that adhi., to the Prāṇādhikaraṇa and locating the said Pūrvapakṣa in the opening Sūtra: *Tathā Prāṇāh.*[32] On the other hand, the *atideśa* of the Siddhānta itself from the conclusion of the *Viyadadhi* and others, to *Tathā Prāṇāh* as proposed by S. and others will be separated by a wide gap.

But then, the *Ātmādhikaraṇa* where the non-genesis of Jīva is taught is also widely separated from the *Prāṇādhi* by several intervening adhikaraṇas like the *Jnādhi. Kartradhi. Parāyattādhi.* and *Aṁśādhi.*, even as the latter (*Prāṇādhikaraṇa*) is separated widely from the *Viyadadhikaraṇa* etc. In the circumstances, if an *atideśa* of the Pūrvapakṣa can be made from the Siddhānta of the Atmādhikaraṇa to the *Prāṇādhi.*, a similar *atideśa* of the Siddhānta itself in *Tathā Prāṇāḥ* can also be made from the *Viyadadhi* to the *Prāṇādhi* and located in the opening Sūtra *Tathā Prāṇāḥ.*

R.'s commentator has, however, tried to overrule this point with his plea that the Jñādhikaraṇa and others following it being in the nature of *incidental discussions* (*Prāsaṅgikavicāras*), they do not really interpose any gap between the Ātmādhikaraṇa and the Prāṇādhikaraṇa and that, therefore, an *atideśa* of the Pūrvapakṣa is not open to objection.[33]

A little reflection will show that while the Viyadadhi and others are "contextual" in the sense of upholding B.'s causality of the universe as formulated in B. S. i.1.2, the establishment of the non-genesis of Jıvātman formulated in the *Ātmādhi.* (according to R.) cannot be invested with any "contextual" connection with the thesis of B.'s causality of the Universe and must, therefore, like the Jnādhi., Kartradhi. etc., be put down as an *incidental topic.*[34] That being so, the *Prāṇādhi* can be directly linked in thought to the *Viyadadhi.* and others preceding these incidental discourses and an *atideśa* of the Siddhānta can without the slightest difficulty be made from them to the *Prāṇādhi* justifying *Tatha Prāṇāḥ* to be taken as a Siddhānta Sūtra, instead of as a Pūrvapakṣa Sūtra.[35]

32. अव्यवहितजीवानुत्पत्त्यतिदेशेन पूर्वपक्षसूत्रत्व स्वारसिकम् (*Śrutaprakāśa* ii.4.3)
33. प्रासगिकाधिकरणान्तरव्यवधिस्तु न दोष (*Śrutaprakāśa* ii.4.3)
34. जन्मादिसूत्रनिर्वाहकवियदाद्युत्पत्त्यनन्तरस्य तदनिर्वाहकस्य जीवानुत्पत्त्यादेरपि प्रासगिकत्वात् (*TC.* p. 991) It may be noted in this connection that in M.'s interpretation the *Ātmādhi* is not connected with the Jīva while the *Jnādhi* expressly establishes the Jīva's genesis from B. in terms of Parādhīnaviśeṣapti. The other *adhis* also underline various aspects of Jīva's *dependence on B. implicit in the conception of B.* as '*Sṛṣṭyādyaṣṭakartṛ*'.
(See fn. 2. P. 123 ante Introd. to Pada iii).
35. तथा– 'नात्मा' इत्येतदपि तत पूर्वोक्तवियदादिसाम्यपरामर्शाव्यवधायकमिति, तत्साम्योक्त्या सिद्धान्तसूत्रमेव स्यादिति भावः (*TCP.* p 991)

Coming to R.'s interpretation of the second Sūtra, it may be that the plural Prāṇāḥ may be understood in a *gauṇārtha* if that term in the *Śatapatha* text is to be understood *only* in the sense of B. as R. would want it to be. But the same explanation cannot be extended to other Śrutis like:

प्राणा एवेदमग्र आसुस्तेभ्यो भूतानि जज्ञिरे, भूतेभ्योऽण्डमण्डस्यान्तरिमे लोकाः । अथ प्राणा एवानादयः ।

cited from other sources by M. in his Bhāṣya, which refer to the evolution of the bhūtas from these Prāṇās.[36]

The *anāditva* of the senses as referred to *in these other types of texts* has necessarily to be explained as 'metaphorical'. There is thus no special advantage in converting the opening Sūtra into a Pūrvapakṣa Sūtra.

It is difficult to accept R.'s interpretation of the Sūtra: *Tat prāk.* It would be more appropriate to identify that which has been referred to as "Tatpūrvaka" in the Sūtra, with *an indriya which temporally precedes the other Prāṇas (indriyas) in their evolution* and which has been referred to in the previous Sūtra—viz. the 'mind'. We also find from *Chān. Up.* (vi.15.1) that the organ of speech merges in its source viz.—the mind.[37] This would be a much better way of understanding the Sūtra *Tatprākśruteḥ* than dissociating the adverb '*prāk*' from '*tat*' and trying to find the antecedent of *tat* in B.

In trying to include the Sūtra: *Tatpūrvakatvād vācaḥ* in the Prāṇotpattyadhikaraṇam, instead of treating it as a separate *adhi.* dealing with the genesis of the sense of speech (*vāk*), R. is forced to understand the expression Vāk used therein in a very *circumscribed sense* of "word(s) denoting things other than Brahman" (*Paramātmavyatiriktanāmadheya*) and seek the antecedent of "*Tat*" in "the creation of Ākāśa and others" (*Viyadādisṛṣṭi*)*-pūrvakatvād.*[38]

This seems to be a needless strain; for, in any case, R. himself has to accept the survival of Jīvas, Prakṛti, Karma, Saṁskāras, etc. in the state of Pralaya. Nothing will be lost if, in addition to these, the survival of the Prāṇas in their germinal forms is also conceded in Pralaya,

36 'प्राणा वाव ऋषयः' इति वाक्ये बहुत्वस्य गौणत्वे ऽपि 'प्राणा एवानादयः' इति प्राणानादित्वश्रुतेर्गौणत्वं विनोत्पत्त्य-[illegible], गौणीति श्रुतेरनादित्वश्रुतिर्गौणी इत्येव वक्तव्यत्वात् (*TC.* p. 991)

37. मौख्यस्य तत्पूर्वकस्य पूर्वसूत्रनिर्दिष्टावस्थवचनस्य [illegible] ऽसम्भवे, तत्प्रकृतावस्थावचनस्य प्राक्-[illegible] (*TC.* p. 991)

38. मौख्यस्य तत्पूर्वकस्य पूर्वसूत्र[illegible]ऽसम्भवे, [illegible]दित्यस्य, वाक्शब्दे [illegible] स्यार्थी-[illegible] (*TC.* p. 992b)

on the authority of the Śrutis and the references to their *anāditva* in that sense understood as a *gauṇaprayoga*. The acceptance of the survival of Jivas, Prakṛti, Karma, etc. in principle, in Pralaya, will naturally presuppose the provenness of *words applicable to them*. The difficulties can be avoided by constituting *Tatpūrvakatvād vācaḥ* into a fresh *adhi.*, dealing with the origination of Vāk as the chief Karmendriya after the turn of Manas.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE NUMBER OF SENSES

4. *Saptagatyadhikaraṇam* (ii. 4, 6-7)

This *adhi.* resolves the conflict of testimony regarding the *number* of the senses, by way of stabilizing the Samanvaya of Śrutis in B.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is: in *Muṇḍ. Up.* (ii.1.8) we read of the seven Prāṇas emerging from B. But in the *Kaundinya Śruti* we read: 'Twelve indeed are the Prāṇas,—for there are twelve months in the year; twelve are the Suns, twelve Rāśis and twelve the cups of Soma'. These Śrutis are apparently evenly matched. It cannot be held that because the Abhimānidevatâs of the Prāṇas are only seven, the Prāṇas too must be seven in number and that, therefore, the Śruti which gives their number as seven is to be adjudged as decisive.[1] This argument can cut both ways; for we read in another Śruti—"Twelve indeed are the Prāṇas, twelve the months and twelve the cups[2] of Soma offered to the presiding forms of the Lord" connected with the twelve months, in the Ṛtuyājas prescribed in the Śruti:

षड्ऋतुनेति यजन्ति प्राणमेव तद्यजमाने दधति[3] (*A.B.* ix, 5.2)

1. अभिमानिनां सप्तत्वाच्च प्राणानां सप्तत्वं, अभिमान्यभिमन्यमानयोः समसंख्यात्वनियमादिति

2. The twelve cups in which Soma juice is to be offered to the deities in the Jyotiṣṭoma are the following: *Upāmśu*, *antaryāma*, *aindravāyava*, *maitrāvaruna*, *āśvina*, *śukra*, *manthin*, two *ṛtupātras* and three *atigrāhyas*. The *amśu* and the *adābhya* cups have not been taken into account, as they are optional and are not connected with the acts of *Sādana*, *Upasthāpana* etc.

3. This text is quoted in the *TD*. and according to the *BD* the twelve *grahas* (vessels) pertain to the Ṛtuyājas. It adds however: अत्र त्रिंशो नावक्लृप्तः (ii.4.6)

The number of the abhimānidevatās will have to correspond with that of the abhimanyamānas. The number of Prāṇas can neither be more nor less than twelve. Moreover, unless there is some basis for constituting a 'group' of seven Prāṇas, they cannot also be conceived as forming part of a larger group of twelve.[4a] So far as we can see, there is no such basis.

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the number of Prāṇas is indeed twelve.[4b] But in the *Muṇḍaka* text, the senses of hearing, sight, touch, taste, smell, *mind and understanding have been taken together as forming* one group having regard to their role as cognitive senses (*jñānendriyas*).[5] This may be seen from the latter part of the text: (ii.1.8).

गुहाशया निहिताः सप्त सप्त ।

"the seven have been placed *in each body with a view to the acquisition of knowledge.*"[6] The expression '*viśeṣitatvāt*' in the Sūtra thus refers to the special part played by this group of seven Prāṇas.[7]

The next Sūtra: *Hastādayastu sthite ato naivam* points out that the other five senses of activity—the hands, the feet, speech and the excretary organs have been distinguished from the other seven as they are karmendriyas and have not therefore been mentioned along with the seven.[8] The particle *tu* (but) in this Sūtra draws attention to this basic functional difference among the Prāṇas.[9]

M.'s Bhāṣya throws refreshing light on the significance of the key words *gati* and *sthiti* in Sūtras 1 and 2 here by quoting an explantaion from the *Vāyuprokta*.

संसारस्थितिहेतुत्वात् स्थितं कर्म विदो विदुः ।
तस्माद्‌दुद्धृतिहेतुत्वात् ज्ञानं गतिरिहोच्यते ॥

4a. द्वादशत्वे कारणविशेषमन्तरेण सप्तत्वोक्तेरयोगात् (*TP.* ii.4 6)
तदर्थं द्वादशत्वे सप्तत्वसंख्यावच्छेदक नास्त्युतास्तीति (चिन्ता) (*TC.* p. 992)

4b. For the reconciliation of the एकादशत्व and the द्वादशत्वपक्ष Vide *TC.* p. 994
यद्यपि * * * एकादशत्वं चोच्यते, तथापीह सूत्रे ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणि सप्तोक्त्वा, पुन पचकर्मेन्द्रियोक्ते भेदेन द्वादशत्व विवक्षितम्

5. The expression *gateḥ* in the Sūtra as pointed out by the BD is an elliptical ablative:
गतेरिति ल्यब्लोपनिमित्ता पचमी । गतिशब्दश्च ज्ञानसाधनेन्द्रियपर । तथा च, गतिमपेक्ष्य ज्ञानकरणेन्द्रियाण्यपेक्ष्य सप्तत्व इति सौत्रप्रतिज्ञाशो व्याख्यात (*BD.* ii 4 6)

6. 'गुहाशया' इत्युद्देश्यद्वितीया (*BD*)

7. ज्ञानेन्द्रियापेक्षया सप्तत्वम् । गुहाशया निहिता सप्त सप्त इति विशेषणात् (*M. BSB.* ii.4.6)

8. हस्तादीनां कर्मविषयत्वान्न सहपाठ (*M. BSB.* ii.4 6)

9. सूत्रे तुशब्दो वैलक्षण्यार्थं (*BD*)

The hands and other organs are of a different character from the Jñānendriyas as they contribute generally towards activity which leads to staying on in the world of transmigration. Knowledge is the means of uplifting the selves from the world of action and helping them to 'go beyond' towards deliverance from transmigration. Hence, the two sets of Prāṇas (viz. the Jñānendriyas and the Karmendriyas) have been *aptly described as* "gati" conducive to progress and "sthiti" causing stagnation, in these two Sūtras and in the authorities behind them. *This is indeed a penetrating explanation which shows to advantage the power of suggestion behind the Sūtrakāra's simple-looking terminology.*[10] For a similar example of this kind see M.'s explanation of the term *ambuvat* in BS. iii.2.19.

Here, M.'s commentator J. raises a pertinent question as to how far it would be permissible to speak of karmendriyas and Jnānendriyas as leading the selves to transmigration and release thro' spiritual upliftment when it is an accepted fact that Nivṛtta-karma is conducive to upliftment and Mokṣa whereas knowledge of things other than B. given by the Jñānendriyas *is far from being helpful to Mokṣa.*[10] He explains that these terms *sthitam* and *gati* may be extended to Nivṛtta-karma and worldly knowledge on the basis of their generic affinity to karma and Jñāna. We have an example of this in the *A.A.* ii.1.4., in the application of the expression *'prapada'* to the tip of the feet of human beings tho' it is applied in the Śruti originally to the tip of the feet of the four-faced Brahmā, called Puruṣa, whom (whose body) the Supreme B. is stated to have 'entered' thro' the tip of his feet.[11] The same expression is used for that part of the limb of human beings only thro' affinity of nature, whereas other terms like claws and hoofs are used for those of birds and animals.[12]

Śaṁkara's Interpretation.

According to S. the opening Sūtra: *Saptagater viśeṣitatvācca* raises the Pūrvapakṣa that the number of Prāṇas is "known" (*gateḥ*) from *Muṇḍ. Up.* ii.1.8, as being only seven and this is also specified by an-

10. ननु, निवृत्तकर्मणः समारब्धित्वहेतुत्वात्, अब्रह्मज्ञानस्य च तस्मादुद्धृत्यहेतुत्वात् कथं स्थितिगतिशब्दावत आह– 'सजातीयत्वेनान्यत्रापि शब्दः' इति (*TC.* p. 993b)

11. सजातीयत्वेनान्यत्रापि शब्दः प्रपदशब्दवत् इति ज्ञातव्यम् (*TP.* ii.4.7)

12. Read: यथा 'स प्रपदाभ्यां प्रापद्यत ब्रह्मेमं पुरुषं यत्प्रपदाभ्यां प्रापद्यत ब्रह्मेमं पुरुषं तस्मात् प्रपदे तस्मात् प्रपद इत्याचक्षते' (*A.A.* ii, 1, 4)

इति श्रुतौ, पुरुषशब्दवाच्यचतुर्मुखस्य देहस्य यत् पादाग्रं तद्द्वारा ब्रह्म प्रापद्यत पुरुषशब्दवाच्यब्रह्मशरीरान्तः प्रवेशं प्राप्तमभूत्, तस्मात्कारणात् प्रपदे प्रपदे इत्याचक्षते इति सर्वपुरुषपादाग्रस्यापि प्रपदशब्दवाच्यत्वमुच्यते । तत्र ब्रह्मप्राप्तिहेतुत्वलक्षणसाधर्म्यं चतुर्मुखपादाग्र एव सत्त्वेऽपि, अन्येषां पादाग्रेऽपि केवलं तत्सजातीयत्वेन प्रपदशब्दः प्रयुज्यते; ननु विजातीयानां पशुपक्षिणाम्–'शफाः खुरा इत्यन्येषां' (*AA*) इति श्रुत्यैव कथनात्
(Vādirāja *TPG.* p. 113)

other text: Seven indeed are the organs in the head (*T.S.* v.1.7.1). The next Sūtra rebuts this *and establishes that* the hands etc. are also referred to as sense organs in the Śrutis and so "it is not like this"—i.e. they are *not merely seven in number* (but *eleven* with with the addition of the hands, feet and the excretary organs).[13]

Criticism.

As the expression *gati* in the first Sūtra means according to S. that "it is understood" from Śruti passages that the number of Prāṇas is only seven, as stated in: *Sapta vai śīrṣaṇyāḥ Prāṇāḥ (Taitt. Saṃhitā* v.1.7.1) as much as in *Muṇḍ. Up.* (ii.1.8 ad), the expression *Viśeṣitatvāt* seems to be superfluous in the Sūtra.[14] Moreover, even counting the ears, eyes, nose and speech, their number will be only *four* tho' their *'golakas'* may be seven in all.[15] It seems, therefore, more proper to take the opening Sūtra as a Siddhānta Sūtra answering the objections *raised externally,* that the number of indriyas cannot be limited to seven while their actual number is twelve, as known from other sources,—unless there is some convincing explanation of the basis on which a *subgrouping of seven is accommodated within a larger group of twelve.* Such an objection can be easily shown to be met, then and there, by the key-words of the opening Sūtra itself—*'gateḥ'* and *'Viśeṣitatvāt'* drawing attention to the significant role played by the seven Jnānendriyas in the spiritual uplift of the self. It does not stand to reason to treat the opening Sūtra, in which these two key words understood in this way would themselves embody the answer to the Pūrvapakṣa, as a Pūrvapakṣa Sūtra.[16] The sense of the second Sūtra, as S. would have it, is complete without the 'sthite' which is superfluous and which further needs the importation of a Viśeṣya with

13. किं तावत् प्राप्तम्? सप्तैव प्राणा । कुत.? गतेरवगते, श्रुतिभ्य सप्त प्राणा प्रभवन्ति इत्यादिभ्य । न केवलं श्रुतिभ्योऽवगति:। विशेषितत्वाच्च–सप्त वै शीर्षण्या. प्राणा इति। ये सप्त शीर्षण्या. श्रोत्रादयस्ते प्राणा इत्युक्ते, इतरेषामशीर्षण्याना हस्तादीना अप्राणत्व गम्यते। एवं प्राप्ते उच्यते–हस्तादस्तु स्थितेऽतो नैवम्। न सप्तैव, किंतु हस्तादयोऽपि प्राणा । प्रमाणान्तरादेकादशत्वे स्थिते, अतोऽस्मिन् सति, सार्वविभक्तिकस्तसि.। नैव लाघवात् प्राथम्याच्च सप्तत्वमित्यर्थ (*Bhāmatī* ii.4.5-6)

14 श्रौतावगतिवाचिना सौत्रेण गतिशब्देनैव सप्त प्राणा इत्यस्या इव सप्तैव शीर्षण्या: प्राणा इत्यस्यापि श्रौतावगतेर्वक्त शक्यत्वेन 'विशेषितत्वाच्च' इत्यस्य वैयर्थ्याच्च (*TC.* p. 993)

15. न च द्वे श्रोत्रे द्वे चक्षुषी द्वे नासिके एका वागिति श्रोत्रादिचतुरिन्द्रियाधिष्ठानगोलकाना सप्तत्वे, इन्द्रियेषु तत्सिद्ध्यति (*TC.* p. 993)

This is admitted by the *Bhāmatī:*

शीर्षण्याना प्राणाना यत्सप्तत्वाभिधान, तदपि चतुष्ट्वेव व्यवस्थापनीयम्। न खलु द्वे चक्षुषी; रूपोपलब्धिलक्षणस्य कार्यस्याभेदात्। एतेन घ्राणश्रोत्रे अपि व्याख्याते (*ibid*)

16. प्राणाना सप्तभ्योऽधिकसङ्ख्यत्वे 'सप्त प्राणा' इति श्रुतिरयुक्ता, महासङ्ख्यायामवच्छेदकविशेष विनान्यसङ्ख्याव्यवहारायोगादिति शङ्किते, घ्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वक् श्रोत्रमनोबुद्धिषु ज्ञानेन्द्रियत्वरूपविशेषो गुहाशया इति वाक्यसूचितो ऽस्तीति अवश्यवक्तव्यपरिहारोक्त्या सप्तेति सूत्रस्य सिद्धान्तत्वसंभवे परिहारोक्तिसूचितपूर्वपक्षपरत्वायोगात् (*TC.* p. 993)

which it can be connected viz. (*saptatvātireke*) *sthite.*[17] Moreover, if the five comprising the vocal organ, hands, feet and the excretary organs are contained in the group of seven counted by the Pūrvapakṣin, his contention that there are *only seven Prāṇas* will *not* be refuted. If they are in addition to the seven, the number of indriyas in the Siddhānta will be twelve and *not eleven as S. would have it.*[18] The number eleven cannot be arrived at by counting speech and the six jñānendriyas as one unit of seven and adding to them a group of four karmendriyas *excluding the vocal organ.*[19] That would be a random grouping without one distinctive common determinant behind the grouping; for speech is a karmendriya and the other six are Jñānendriyas. They cannot, therefore, be brought together as one group of seven in the opening Sūtra. For a like reason, the expression "*ādi*" in the second Sūtra cannot be permitted.[20] There is, moreover, ample evidence in the Śrutis and Smṛtis to take the number of indriyas to be twelve in all.

Cf. इन्द्रियेभ्यः परा ह्यर्था अर्थेभ्यश्च परं मनः ।
मनसस्तु परा बुद्धिः (*Kaṭha. Up.* i.3.10)
इन्द्रियाणि हयानाहुः *** (i.3.4)
बुद्धिं तु सारथिं विद्धि मनः प्रग्रहमेव च (*Op. cit.* 1.3.3)
यदा पंचावतिष्ठन्ते ज्ञानानि मनसा सह ।
बुद्धिश्च * * *** (*Kaṭha.* ii.3.10)
श्रोत्रादीनि तु पंचैव तथा वागादिपंचकम् ।
मनोबुद्धिसहायानि द्वादशैवेन्द्रियाणि तु ॥

S. has also gone in for an additional interpretation of the two Sūtras. According to it, the Pūrvapakṣa in Sūtra 5 is that the indriyas must be held to be only seven in number because it is seen to be so from the *Bṛh. Up.* (iv.4.2) which refers to the exit of the senses, where tho' it is said that all the Prāṇas depart from him, it can be deduced from the other passage—'They say he does not see, he does not touch" (*Bṛh. Up.* iv.4.2), that only the indriyas of sight, smell, taste, speech hearing, *mind and buddhi* are referred to. This is refuted in the next Sūtra which according to S. means—"thus as it is settled that on the evidence of other Śrutis like—"these ten Prāṇas and the antaḥkaraṇa

17. हस्तेति सूत्रेऽपि 'हस्तादयोऽन्यथा नैवम्' इत्येतावतैव पूर्णत्वात् स्थितेऽतः इति शब्दो व्यर्थः (*TC.* p. 993)

18. किंच, हस्तादयः पंच, पूर्वपक्षाभिमतसप्तान्तर्गताश्चेन्न पूर्वपक्षनिरासः । अतिरिक्ताश्चेत् द्वादशत्वेनैवसिद्धान्तो वाच्यः, न एकादशत्वेन (*TC.* p. 993)

19. न च वाक्सहितानीन्द्रियाणि सप्त, गत्यादिसूत्रे विवक्षितानि । हस्तेतिसूत्रे तु चत्वारि वागन्यकर्मेन्द्रियाणि तथा चैकादशत्वसिद्धिः वाच्यम् (*TC.* p. 993)

20. यत सप्त, ज्ञानेन्द्रियवत् हस्तादिषु कर्मेन्द्रियत्वस्य तन्मते एकादशत्वसंख्याभावेन, आदिसूत्रे गत्यनुपपत्तेः, द्वितीये आदिशब्दस्य धर्मांशात् (*TC.* p. 993)

when they depart from the body, they make us cry" (*Bṛh. Up.* iii.9.4) that all the eleven indriyas depart from the body, the Pūrvapakṣin's contention that the number of Prāṇas which depart (at the time of *utkrānti*) is only seven is *not* correct. In this interpretation also, there is need to import the additional word *'utkramaṇe'* before *'sthite'*.[21]

Rāmānuja's Interpretation.

According to R. the first Sūtra puts forward the Pūrvapakṣa that the Prāṇas are only seven because at the time of birth and death only seven Prāṇas accompany the soul as borne out by various texts. The second Sūtra establishes the Siddhānta that the number of the sense organs is eleven and not seven only as the hands and feet and so on also assist *the soul when he is abiding in the body.*[21]

In this interpretation, the expression *sthite* in the second Sūtra turns out to be superfluous, as the point that there are four more indriyas is conveyed without the further need to go into their function or purpose. In order to give it a proper syntactic connection in the Sūtra R. is obliged to *import* two more words: representing the *adhikaraṇa* and the *viśeṣya*—viz. śarīra and Jīva.

हस्तादीनामपि (शरीरे) स्थिते (जीवे) तस्य भोगोपकरणत्वात् ।

(*Śrībhāṣya* ii.4.5)

On the whole, an interpretation which is able to explain the actual wording of the Sūtras, in a meaningful way and without recourse to *adhyāhāras* (importations) has a better claim to our acceptance.

21. तस्मात् श्रुत्यन्तरेभ्य· स्मृतेश्च सर्वशब्दार्थसंकोचाच्च सर्वेषामुत्क्रमणे स्थिते ऽस्मिन्नेव – यदुक्तं सप्तैवेति (*Bhāmatī* ii.4.6)

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE SENSES ARE MINUTE

5. *Aṇvadhikaraṇam* (ii.4.8)

This *adhi.* resolves the conflict of testimony regarding the size of the sense organs after the question of their number has been settled.[1] The present conflict arises this way. *Ṛgveda* i, 22.20, speaks of the Supreme B. as pervading the sky like the eye: *Divīva cakṣur ātatam.*[2] It appears from this that the senses must *all of them*[3] be pervasive—as only an established fact can be cited as an illustration.[4] Their pervasive nature stands supported by the reasoning based on our being able to see things situated far away and hear far off sounds.[5] Moreover, the senses have to go out to their objects to give us knowledge.[6] Otherwise, they cannot function as instruments of knowledge. There is no evidence that instead of the senses having the power to go out to their objects, the latter leave their places and establish contact with the senses.[7]

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1. पूर्वत्र प्राणानां सङ्ख्या विचारिता । तदनन्तरं परिमाणं विचार्यत इति सगति

2. *The significance of the comparison* has been explained as follows by J. in his Ṛg-B.t.

   यथा चक्षुर्दिवि आकाशे आततं व्याप्तमपि न दृश्यते किन्तु, विषयोपलब्धिलक्षणेन फलेनानुमीयते, तथा परमेश्वर-स्वरूपं सर्वगतमपि न दृश्यम्; किन्तु, अस्वतन्त्राणां पदार्थानां सत्ताप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिभिर्विज्ञायते

3. The expression *cakṣuḥ* in the Śruti is taken by the Pūrvapakṣa to apply by upalakṣaṇa to other senses as well because they also come within the scope of the same Pūrvapakṣa nyāyas. *See* Ragh. *TPB.* ii.4.8 and *BD.*

4. प्रसिद्धं हि दृष्टान्तत्वेनोपादीयते (*TP.* ii.4.8)

5. दूरस्थवस्तुदर्शनादियुक्तिश्च (M. *BSB.* ii.4.8)

6. इन्द्रियाणां प्राप्यकारित्वात्, अन्यथा करणत्वविरोधात् (*TP.* ii.4.8)
   प्राप्यकारत्व एव करणत्वात् विषयप्राप्तिकल्पनमिन्द्रियस्यैव प्राप्यकारित्वात् (Raghu. *TPB.*)

7. न च स्वस्थानं विहाय विषयैरिन्द्रियं प्राप्यत इति किंचित्प्रमाणमस्ति (*TP.* ii.4.8)

There are, however, other texts which proclaim "He sees, hears, smells, etc. with the help of the minute ones and does things with the help of the minute senses of action" (*Kaundinya Śruti*).[8] The Pūrvapakṣa contends that as the texts in favor of the pervasiveness of the senses are supported by the aforesaid reasoning, their view must prevail.

The Siddhānta is that the senses are minute (*aṇavaḥ*) in essence but being constituted of Taijasa substance they are able to pervade beyond their position by the power of their natural radiance. This is confirmed by the *Śāṇḍilya Śruti* which says "The sense of sight is minute; but its lustre is pervasive. Similarly, the Jīva who is atomic in essence is pervasive by his quality of intelligence." The Ṛgvedic text (i, 22, 20) speaks of the pervasion of the senses. *This can be understood in terms of pervasion thro' their radiance.* But the other Śruti: *Yathā aṇunas cakṣasaḥ prakāśo vyātataḥ* is more precise in that while affirming that the *indriyas* are minute (*aṇu*) it explicitly says that *their radiance is pervasive* (*prakāśo vyātataḥ*) which resolves the conflict.[9]

J. also observes that if the senses are to be accepted as pervasive in their essence (*svarūpeṇa*) and not merely by virtue of their radiance, there will be the adverse consequence of our being obliged to see, hear and smell all things always and be deprived of the restfulness of deep sleep, etc.[10]

While discussing the point raised by the Pūrvapakṣa about 'Dūradarśana' and 'Dūraśravaṇa', he explains M.'s position that the senses tho' minute in themselves can establish direct contact with their appropriate objects thro' their "rays"[11]—*a very suggestive expression which is amenable to many interpretations.* In this connection J. criticizes the Nyāya position of explaining the perception of sound with the help of the Vīcītaraṅga or Kadambamukulanyāya. He disagrees with the Nyāya view of Śabdajaśabda being born and becoming grasped when it finally reaches the portion of ether limited by the cavity of the ear known as *śrotram.* The main point of his criticism is that there is no evidence of a fresh articulation being engendered at the other end after

8. 'अणुभिः पश्यत्यणुभि कृणोति, प्राणा वा अणव.' (M. *BSB.* ii.4 8)

9 Read: 'दिवीव चक्षुराततम्' इति श्रुतिश्चक्षुषो व्याप्तिमात्रमाह। तच्च स्वरूपव्याप्त्यापि घटते, प्रकाशव्याप्त्या वा अतः सा सामान्यश्रुतिः। 'अणुनश्चक्षस' इति श्रुतिस्तु चक्षुषोऽणुत्व स्पष्टनुक्त्वा, तत्प्रकाशस्य विशिष्य व्याप्ततामाह। एव च विशेषश्रुतित्वेन प्रबलत्वात् एतदनुसारेण सैव श्रुतिर्योजनीयेति भावः
(Vādirāja *TPG.* p. 114)

10. यदीन्द्रियाणि स्वरूपतो वितत्यावस्थितानि, तदा सर्वग्रहण च प्रसज्येत, सुप्त्याद्यभावश्च (*TP.* ii 4 8)

11. सर्वेन्द्रियाणा स्वस्वविषयैः स्वप्रतियोगिकाभावेन च साक्षादेव रश्मिद्वारा सन्निकर्षः. (*J. PP.* i 28)
* * * तादृशसन्निकर्षस्य च सदा सत्वात् सर्वदा च ग्रहणं स्यादित्याह सुप्त्याद्यभाव इति (Raghu. *TPB*)

a series of śabdas have been produced as our experience is that it is the same sound articulated by the speaker that is being heard by the listener and not a new-born one. The objection of *ākāśa* being "*amūrta*" and, therefore, incapable of successive movements to carry over the first-born sound is also rejected by drawing attention to the acceptance of *bhūtākāśa* in M.'s system as distinguished from *avyākṛtākāśa*—the former admitting of movement. With this impediment removed, it is possible to conceive of śrotrendriya too going out to its object thro' its rays: *Cakṣurvat śrotrasyaiva gamanopapatteḥ*[12] (*TP.* ii.4.8). However, J.'s concluding remark: *Yad vā cakṣurviṣaya eva tadabhyupagamaḥ* (*TP.* ii.4.8) leaves the door open to other explanations in regard to the perception of *śabda*.[13]

Saṁkara's Interpretation.

S.'s commentator raises the Pūrvapakṣa from the point of Sāmkhya philosophy that as the *indriyas* are products of Ahamkāra and as the latter pervades the globe, the indriyas also must be pervasive. The Siddhānta is that they are only minute ones. Otherwise, the scriptural statements about their passing out of the body, going and coming will not make sense.[14]

Criticism.

The subject matter of this Pāda being one of *resolution of conflict of testimony entirely within the realm of Śrutis,* it will be outside the jurisdiction of this Pāda to discuss a conflict with the Sāmkhya position.[15] Nor can the Pūrvapakṣa be sustained from the point of view of S's own philosophy. For according to him, the mind which is a product of either Suddha-Brahman, or B. conditioned by Avidyā or of Avidyā itself is of aṇuparimāṇa in the sense that it has *mahatparimāṇa* while its source is of a different parimāṇa.[16]

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12. Commenting on this the *AC* writes:
[illegible] (ii.4.8)

13. The Indian philosophical schools do not seem to have anticipated the modern scientific theories of light rays from objects and of sound being carried by air thro' successive undulations of air particles.

14. [illegible] (*Bhāmatī* ii.4.7)

15. Appayya Dīkṣita, concedes the point of the criticism saying:
[illegible] (*Parimala* ii.4.7)

16. [illegible] (*TC.* p. 905)

CHAPTER XXXVIII

GENESIS OF ĀDHYĀTMIKA-MUKHYAPRĀṆA

6. *Śreṣṭhādhikaraṇam* (ii, 4, 9-10)

The earlier Mātariśvādhikaraṇam had dealt with the genesis of Mukhya-Vāyu as an Adhidaiva principle.[1] The present *adhi.* resolves the conflict of testimony regarding the genesis of the same deity Mukhya-Vāyu with special reference to his vital role as Adhyātma-*Prāṇa, who sustains the lives of all creatures from within their bodies,* from birth to death.[2]

The conflict is presented this way. We read in one of the texts: This Prāṇa does not rise or set. He stands absolute and unchanged between birth and death—i.e. is always in the prime of life. Therefore, the wise ones call him the 'middle' (*madhyamaḥ*).[3] As against *this, we have the statement in the Praśna Up. (ii.3): From the Ātman* the Prāṇa is born. But the other Śruti which refers to the non-origination of Mukhya-Vāyu is supported by the reasoning adduced in a passage of the *Vāyuprokta*:

यत्प्राप्तिर्यत्परित्याग उत्पत्तिर्मरणं तथा ।
तस्योत्पत्तिर्मृतिश्चैव कथं प्राणस्य युज्यते ?

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1. *The TD explains that in the earlier Mataríśvādhi, the Sūtrakāra had dealt* with the question of the genesis of Mukhya Vāyu as an *adhidaiva* principle *and as an element (bhūta) at the same time without clearly drawing the line* of distinction between them:

   तत्र भूतकारणत्वात् भूतमुख्ययोः समुच्चो विचार, इह केवलो मुख्यविषय इति भेद. (ii.4.11)

2 देहस्थितप्राणरूपस्य (अखिलोत्पत्तिमरणकारणत्वेनोत्पत्त्याद्ययोगात्) बाह्यमुख्यवायुरूपस्य तु नैतन्माहात्म्यमिति, भवति ततोऽत्र विशेषशङ्केति भाव (Ragh. *TPB.* ii.4.9)

3 'नैष प्राण उदेति, नास्तमेति, एकल एव मध्ये स्थाता, अथैनमाहुर्मध्यम.' (Q. M. *BSB.* ii.4.9)

"By whose entering the body creatures are born and by whose leaving it they die, how is it possible to think of such a One as being himself born or of dying"? This shows that being himself the cause of the birth and death of creatures, Mukhya Prāṇa cannot, in his turn, be subject to birth and death. The source of all life cannot itself be born *or create itself, only to undergo avoidable suffering.* The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, concludes that as the Śruti in favor of the non-genesis of Mukhya Prāṇa has to be accepted as decisive and as the other one speaking of his genesis will have to be rejected as invalid, the Samanvaya of Śāstra in B. turns out to be unsustainable.

The Siddhānta is that like the other Prāṇas, the Chief Prāṇa (*"Śreṣṭhah"*) also has his own genesis.[4] His subtle essential form is nevertheless permanent. Hence the *Gaupavana Śruti* says: He is both subtle and gross. By nature he is subtle and in other forms he is gross. *Therefore, they say he has a beginning and has no beginning.*[5]

The next Sūtra: *Na vāyukriye pṛthagupadeśāt* disposes of the objection that as the Śruti referring to the non-origination of Mukhya-Prāṇa is on stronger ground, the texts which speak of its origin may be understood as referring to the external element of air or to motion in general as the word "Prāṇa" has these two meanings also besides denoting Mukhya-Prāṇa. The Sūtra points out that in *Praśna Up.* (vi. 4) we have a separate mention of the genesis of ether, air, light, waters, Vedas and activity (motion: in general '*Karma*') from B. *after the mention of the* genesis of "Prāṇa". Hence this term Prāṇa cannot be taken in the sense of air or motion once again. In conclusion M. draws attention to a text from the *Vāyuprokta* which proclaims:

भूतानि चेष्टा मंत्राश्च मुख्यप्राणादिदं जगत् ।
मुख्यः प्राणः परस्माच्च न परःकारणान्वितः ॥

"The elements, motion, as such, the Vedas, and all the world have come forth from Mukhya-Prāṇa. He has come forth from the Supreme. The Supreme is uncaused".

Interpretation of Śaṁkara.

According to S. tho' the origination of Mukhya-Prāṇa or vital breath (Jaḍa-Vāyu) had been dealt with earlier the question is re-opened here as there is possibility of an *adhikāśaṅkā*. For, we read in

4. उत्पत्तिश्रुतेर्देहपरतया व्यवस्थितत्वात् (*TP.* ii.4.8)

5. सौक्ष्म्येण ह वा एषोऽवतिष्ठते, स्थूलत्वेनोदेति, सूक्ष्मत्वात् स्थूलत्वाच्च । तस्मादाहुः सूक्ष्मो ऽन्यतः स्थूलो ऽन्यतः सादित्वादनादित्वादिति (*Gaupavana Śruti*)

6. 'अन' चेष्टायामिति धातोः प्राणः प्राणनं सर्वजीवानां चेष्टा, बाह्यवायुः स्वात्मरूप इत्यर्थः. (Vādirāja *TPG.* p. 114)

one of the verses of the famous Nāsadīya Sūkta of *Ṛgveda* (x. 129, 2c) that during the state of Mahāpralaya the activity of "breathing" *was still going on* on the part of the One Supreme:

आनीदवातं स्वधया तदेकम्

It would follow from this that Chief breath or Mukhya-Prāṇa *must* have been in existence even then, when the world was still in the womb of the future. It must, therefore, be accepted as uncreated. This *adhi.* disposes of the Pūrvapakṣa based on this *adhikāśaṅkā* and establishes that vital breath also is born from B.[7]

Criticism.

There is no possibility of any such *adhikāśaṅkā* arising here, firstly because breathing has been predicated of the Supreme B. also in:

Ko hyevānyāt kaḥ prāṇyāt
Yad eṣa ākāśa ānando na syāt (*Taitt. Up.* ii.7)

and it can very well be that the *ananam* (breathing) spoken of in the verse of the *Nāsadīya Sūkta* is B.'s own breathing windless by its own power, as can be seen from the expression *avātam* there. It is not possible to associate this breathing with the presence of chief breath here as the Śruti expressly rules out the existence of the element of air in the state of Mahāpralaya, when it says *Ānīd avātam svadhayā tad ekam.* In the circumstances, an *adhikāśaṅkā* about the survival of chief breath in that state can hardly arise, warranting a fresh adhi. by way of *atideśa.*[8]

Rāmānuja's Interpretation.

R. treats Sūtras 7-8 of S. as one (*Prāṇāṇutva*) adhikaraṇam. It is difficult to see in that case how two different themes—one relating to the *minuteness* of the Prāṇas and the other to the *genesis of the chief vital air* can be treated under *the same adhi.* The reference to the Śruti "*Ānīd* (*avātam*) under the Sūtra *Śreṣṭhaśca* by R. is equally indefensible for the same reason as in respect of S. tho' R. does not use it for making out an *adhikāśaṅkā.*

7. किमर्थः पुनरतिदेशः ? अधिकाशंकापाकरणार्थः । नासदासीये हि सूक्ते 'आनीदवतात' इत्यानीदिति प्राण-कर्मोपादानात् प्रागुत्पत्ते. सन्तमिव प्राण सूचयति । तस्मादज प्राण इति जायते कस्यचिन्मतिः । तमति-देशेनापनुदति । (S. *BSB.* ii 4 8)

8. को ह्येवान्यात् कः प्राण्यादित्यादिश्रुतौ ब्रह्मण्यप्यननश्रवणात्, इह चावातमिति निषेधात् तेनाधिकाशकायोगात् (*TC.* p. 996b)

CHAPTER XXXIX

STATUS OF MUKHYA-PRĀṆA

7. *Cakṣurādyadhikaraṇam* (ii.4.11-12)

This *adhi.* resolves the conflict of testimony regarding the status of Mukhya-Prāṇa and it arises by way of bringing up an objection to his genesis established earlier, on the ground that he is represented in some Śrutis as enjoying a completely independent position.[1] Some Śrutis *make it appear that he is absolutely independent* while some others show that he is dependent on the Supreme B. like everything else in finite reality. The conflict arises in this way: *The Agniveśya-Śruti* reads:

"From Prāṇa all this (world) has sprung. He sustains all. It merges in him. He is not dependent on any one". This makes Mukhya-Prāṇa *virtually independent. This is reinforced by the* reasoning contained in the statement made in the following verse of the *Mahābhārata:*

"He in whom lies the source of all activity of this world *how can that Prāṇa be dependent on another?"*[3] As against this, we read in the *Paiṅgi Śruti*: This is all under Prāṇa's control; but Prāṇa is under the control of the Supreme Lord. *The Lord does not rest upon the support of any other. He is Supreme".*

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1. पूर्वोक्तप्राणस्योत्पत्तिरिह पूर्वपक्षे स्वातंत्र्यादाक्षिप्यत इति सङ्गतिः (TC. p. 996)
2. प्राणादिदमाविरासीत्, प्राणो धत्ते, प्राणे लयमभ्युपैति, न प्राणः किंचिदाश्रितः (Q. M. *BSB.* ii.4.11)
3. 'यदाश्रयादस्य चेष्टा सोऽन्यं कथमुपाश्रयेत् ?
   यथा प्राणस्तथा राजा सर्वस्यैकाश्रयो भवेत् ।
   इति युक्तिर्भारते (M. *BSB.* ii.4.11)

Pūrvapakṣa.

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that Mukhya-Prāṇa must be deemed to be absolutely independent. The other sets of texts cannot take away his independence as he is credited with the majesty of activising the whole world and this is supported by the reasoning that he *should remain independent of another. It cannot* be argued that as one who has origination cannot be independent, the Śruti which makes Prāṇa dependent on the Supreme is also based on sound reasoning. The objector who takes Prāṇa to be independent, will naturally be *not* inclined to recognize that Prāṇa ever originates from another and he would naturally argue that such Śrutis also should be held invalid in so far as they contradict the others which represent Prāṇa to be independent. Or, it may be that tho' without genesis, Prāṇa may take on a body for sport. Thus, since this contradiction with the more powerful text making Prāṇa independent cannot be got over, the Samanvaya of Śāstra in B., as the One Independent Real and the source of all, becomes unsettled.[4]

Siddhānta.

The Siddhānta is pronounced by the Sūtra: *Cakṣurādivat tu tatsahaśiṣṭyādibhyaḥ that Mukhya-Prāṇa also has his genesis from B.* like the other organs of the senses such as of sight (*cakṣurādivat*) as he too is spoken of as springing from B. along with them and there are other evidences also pointing in the same direction.

The Gaupavana-Śruti, for instance, declares: "All this is entirely dependent on the Supreme—the Chief Prāṇa and the other Prāṇas and beings. The Supreme is One who absolutely leads them to life and death, lifts them up and, therefore, they are under His power."[5]

While Śrutis pertaining to the question of genesis admit of reconciliation on the basis of genesis thro' Upādhis and non-genesis of essence, *the fact of (Prāṇa's) ontological dependence (pāratantrya)* on B. *cannot be resolved likewise.* The only correct solution in respect of the question of dependence of status is that it is unqualified and absolute as in the case of the other Prāṇas.[6]

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4 न चोत्पत्तिमत. स्वातन्त्र्यायोगात् पारतन्त्र्यश्रुतिरपि युक्तियुक्तेति वाच्यम्। स्वातन्त्र्यवादिनो जन्मासप्रतिपत्तेः। तच्छ्रुतीनामपि स्वातन्त्र्यश्रुतियुक्तिविरोधेनाप्रामाण्यात्। लीलया विग्रहग्रहणोपपत्तेश्च (*TP.* ii.4.11)

5 सर्वं ह्येवैतत् परमेश्वतिष्ठते, प्राणश्च प्राणाश्च प्राणिनश्च, स ह्येक एव तान् नयत्युन्नयति, वशीकरोति (*M. BSB.* ii.4.11)

6. न चोत्पत्ताविव पारतन्त्र्येऽपि काचन व्यवस्था, अपि तु, चक्षुरादिवदेव सर्वात्मना तैः सह परमात्मवशत्वोक्तेरिति भावः (*TP.* ii.4 11)

The Āgniveśya-Śruti which speaks of Prāṇa's sovereignty and his being under no other's control offers no serious difficulty as it can be properly interpreted in the light of the following:

The Chief Prāṇa, tho' the author of all, rests on the support of the Supreme. How could he be different (i.e. independent)? *For there cannot be two independent Lords of the world*".[7] The correct way of understanding the "independence" of Mukhya-Prāṇa is, therefore, as indicated in the following:—

"The expression 'sovereign Lord' appled to Mukhya-Prāṇa should be understood from the point of view of his being *immediately next in power.* For this reason, he is spoken of as the 'middle one' (*madhyamaḥ*) *as he is between all the beings on the one side and the Supreme B. on the other.*[8] In the circumstances, the statement that he is without another Lord means only that he has none *other than the Supreme as his ruler.* The principle of correct interpretation demands that a general statement (*samatāvacaḥ*) must always be understood in the light of other special statements where they are in evidence, as in the present case."[9]

The expression '*ādi*' in the Sūtra refers to other reasonings presupposed in other Śruti texts like *Nānyo 'tosti draṣṭā, nānyo'tosti śrotā* (*Bṛh. Up.* iii, 7, 23) "there is no other but He who sees, no other but He who hears".[10]

The next Sūtra meets the objection that if Mukhya-Prāṇa is also dependent on the Supreme like the other senses, like them he too cannot have any sort of intermediate sovereignty (*avāntareśvaratvam*) *over other beings.*[11] The Sūtra points out that there is something in the position of Mukhya-Prāṇa which distinguishes his status from that of the other senses. It is this that the other senses function as the Jīvātman's instruments of knowledge *only* when he puts forth the necessary effort to direct them in their functions. This is clear from

7. सर्वकर्तापि सन् प्राणः परमाधारतः स्थितः ।
कथमेवान्यथा स स्यात् यतो नैवेश्वरद्वयम् ।

8. अवान्तरेश्वरत्वेन तस्येश्वरवचो भवेत् ।
अतो मध्यमतामाहुः तस्य वेदेऽपि वेदिनः ॥

9. अनन्येश्वरता प्राणे तदन्येश्वरवर्जनात् ।
यतो विशेषवाक्येन ह्रियते समतावचः (M. *BSB.* ii.4.11)

10. इत्यादिवचनयुक्तयश्च आदिशब्दोक्ताः (M. *BSB.* ii.4.11)

11. यदि चक्षुरादिवद्देवेश्वराधीनत्वं मुख्यप्राणस्य नहि, तस्यावान्तरेश्वरत्वासंभवेन स्वातन्त्र्यश्रुतिर्व्यर्था स्यादित्याशङ्कां परिहरत्सूत्रम् (*TP.* ii.4.12)

the fact that in Suṣupti, where there is no active effort on the part of the Jīvātman, these senses are *not* in a position to function as effective instruments of knowledge. *But the activity of Mukhya-Prāṇa continues unabated even in the state of dreamless sleep when there is no conscious and active effort or direction on the part of the Jīvātman to carry on the activity of respiration etc.* This is sufficient to establish the fact that Mukhya-Prāṇa is not on the same footing as the other senses. He can, therefore, be credited with the distinctive position such as has been conferred on him in the Śrutis as *avāntareśvara.*[12]

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12. प्राणस्य चक्षुरादीना चेश्वरवशत्वसाम्येऽपि, कर्तृप्रयोज्यत्वाप्रयोज्यत्ववैलक्षण्येनातिशयोपपत्तेर्नोक्तदोषः (*TC.* p. 996)

सुषुप्तौ जीवप्रयत्नाभावे चक्षुरादीना व्यापारादर्शनात् जीवप्रयोज्यत्वम्। मुख्यप्राणस्य तु, तदा व्यापारदर्शनात् तदप्रयोज्यत्वमिति भावः (*TC.* p. 996)

CHAPTER XL

MUKHYA-PRĀṆA'S RELATION TO THE FIVE PRĀṆAS AND THEIR DEITIES

8. *Pañcavṛttyadhikaraṇam* (ii.4.13)

The present topic of the five forms (*vṛtti*) of Mukhya-Prāṇa in their relation to the working of the five breaths is brought up in the wake of the topic of Mukhya-Prāṇa considered in the previous *adhi.*[1] This adhi. resolves the conflict of texts about *the relation of Mukhya-Prāṇa to the other five Prāṇas:*

The *Kauṇḍinya Śruti* says: "All these other Prāṇas viz.: Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Udāna and Samāna are servants of Mukhya-Prāṇa. He is their sovereign Lord". The *Vāyuprokta* corroborates this by saying that they carry out their respective functions at his behest.[2]

On the other hand, the *Gaupavana Śruti* says: The five Prāṇas are identical forms of the Chief Prāṇa. It is He that dwells day in and day out in the five forms within the body.[3]

Pūrvapakṣa.

The conflict leads almost to a stalemate. The Pūrvapakṣa thinks that as the Śrutis are thus evenly matched and seem to be irreconcil-

1. मुख्यप्राणप्रमुखत्वनियामिताः प्राणादयोऽत्र विषयः (*TP.* ii.4.13)
Read: प्राणनामकेन्द्रियाणां पादमारभ्य प्रसङ्गेऽपि, प्राणापानादीनां प्रागप्रस्तुतत्वात् मुख्यप्राणप्रमुखत्वनियामिता इत्युक्तम् (Vādirāja *TPG.* p. 115)
2. सर्वे वा एते मुख्यदासाः –प्राणोऽपानो व्यान उदान. समान इति । अथ प्राणो वाव सम्राट् (M. *BSB.* ii.4.13)
"प्राणापानादयः सर्वे मुख्यदासा यतोऽनिशम् ।
अतस्तदाज्ञया नित्यं स्वानि कर्माणि कुर्वते ॥" (*ibid*)
3. मुख्यस्यैव स्वरूपाणि प्राणाद्याः पंच वायवः ।
स एव प्राणिनां देहे पञ्चधा वर्ततेऽनिशम् ॥ (M. *BSB.* ii.4.13)

able both the versions are to be rejected and the Samanvaya of Śāstra in B. based on such foundations is to be set aside as unworthy of acceptance.[4]

The view that the other Prāṇas are servants of Mukhya-Prāṇa is supported by the reason that they do his bidding and has the support of the Śruti: *Sa eṣa Prāṇa itarān Prāṇān pṛthak pṛthak sannidhatte* (*Praśna Up.* iii.4). The other view also, that they are identical with Mukhya-Prāṇa receives support from the reasoning that *they manifest in their working the outstanding qualities of Mukhya-Prāṇa* (*vyaktasadguṇāh*).[5] This will not be possible if they are only his servants; for the servants do *not* manifest the outstanding qualities of the master. However, if both of them should manifest the same outstanding qualities, there is no point in dubbing the one the master and the others his servants.[6] Nor can it be that the other Prāṇas are both the servants of Mukhya-Prāṇa and are also identical with him in essence.

Siddhānta.

The difficulty is solved by making it clear that in one sense of the word the five Prāṇas constitute the five 'forms' (*vṛttis*) of Mukhya-Prāṇa himself carrying on the five functional activities in the body by which He sustains the lives of creatures (*vyāktasadguṇa*) and *in another sense* they refer to the five functionary deities (and five vital airs) bearing the same names of Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Udāna and Samāna and carrying on the same functional activities—*but in a dependent sense under the overall direction of the five forms of Mukhya-Prāṇa present in them.*[7]

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4 एव च, श्रुतिद्वयस्यापि समानवलत्वेन विरुद्धत्वाच्चाप्रामाण्यम् । न चोभय युक्तम्, वस्तुविकल्पापातात् । अतो न समन्वयो युक्त इति (*TP.* ii.4.13)

5. प्राणादयो मुख्यप्राणस्वरूपाण्येव; व्यक्तसद्गुणत्वात् इति युक्तियुक्तत्वात् (*TP. ibid*)
These are (1) controlling the movement of breath in the eyes, the ears, mouth and nostrils (*Prāna*) at the excretary zones (*Apāna*) distributing the essence of food and drink equitably all over the body (*Samāna*) moving thro' the nāḍīs in the body (*Vyāna*) and leading the Jīva to other worlds (*Udana*). (*Praśna Up.* iii.5)

6. न चैतत् व्यक्तसद्गुणत्व दासेषु सभवति । उभयत्रापि सद्भावे स्वामिभृत्यभावानुपपत्ते. (*TP.* ii.4.13)

7. न केवल प्राणादयो मुख्यदासा एवापि तु तद्वृत्तयो ऽपि। न च वस्तुविकल्पप्रसग. । पृथगुभयविधाभ्युपगमात् (*TP.* ii.4.13). The term *Vṛtti* is explained in the sense of "Forms" (rūpāṇi) as well as functions.
Read: पचवृत्तय: प्राणापानव्यानोदानसमानाख्यरूपाणि यस्य स प्राणादिपचरूपवान् इत्यर्थः । उपलक्षणमेतत् । प्राणादिपचदासवानित्यपि बोध्यम् (*TDP.* ii 4.13)
न ब्रूमो वयम्–प्राणादयो दासा एव स्वरूपाण्येवेति वा, येन श्रुत्यो. परस्परविरोधेनानिर्णय स्यात् । किनाम 'अथ पचवृत्त्यैतत्प्रवर्तते' इति श्रुत्यवष्टभेन, मनोवत् द्विविधा: प्राणादय. – स्वरूपाणि दासाश्चेति । ततश्च श्रुत्यो भिन्नविषयत्वेन न विरोध: (Satyanātha, *AC.* ii 4.13). *Cf.* also
'प्राणाद्वाव प्राणोऽपानादपानो व्यानात् व्यान उदानादुदान: समानात् समान.' (Śruti q. M. *BSB.* ibid)
अशेषगुणपूर्णानि मुख्यरूपाणि पच च ।
तद्दासा: पच चान्येऽपि प्राणाद्या.सद्गुणैर्युता: ॥" (ibid)

व्यक्तसद्गुणत्वं दासानामपि किंचित्।

Ragh. *Nyāyamuktāvali.* ii.4.*adhi.*8)

The Sūtra clarifies this phenomenon by citing the analogy of how Manas which has its five essential phases of thinking, understanding, attachment, recollection and all-comprehensive thought operates thro' specially adapted organs of mind, buddhi, ahaṁkāra, memory, etc. which are, in their turn, dependent on those essential characteristics of Manas:—

'यथाह वै मनः पंचधा व्यपदिश्यते–मनो बुद्धिरहंकारश्चित्तं चेतनेति। तेभ्यो वा एतेभ्यः पंच दासाः प्रजायन्ते–मनसो वाव मनो बुद्धेर्बुद्धिरहंकारादहंकारश्चित्तात् चित्तं चेतनाया एव चेतना एवमिति'। (Śruti Q. M. *BSB.* ii.4.13)

अत्रापि मनआदिशब्दैर्देवता उच्यन्ते; उत्तरवाक्ये दासत्वोक्तेः। टीकायां जडलक्षणत्वोक्तावपि तदभिमानितया चेतनानामपि लक्षितत्वान्न तद्विरोधः। (*BD.* ii.4.13)

Saṁkara's Interpretation.

(*Na Vāyukriyādhikaraṇam* ii.4.9-12)

According to S. Sūtras ii, 4, 9-12 constitute one *adhi.* determining the nature of Mukhya-Prāṇa.[8] The Pūrvapakṣa is that Mukhya-Prāṇa is either air pure and simple or the combined function of all the sense organs, as in the Sāṁkhya-system.[9] (*Vide Sāṁkhya-kārikā* 29. *cd*)

The Siddhānta is that it is neither. For in *Muṇḍ. Up.* (ii.1.3) the genesis of Mukhya-Prāṇa is mentioned *apart* from the genesis of Vāyu and elsewhere apart from the activity of the organs. It is not also possible that all the organs together should have one function and that such a function can be "Prāṇa"; for each organ has its own distinctive function and the aggregate of the organs has no active power of its own.[10] We have, therefore, to consider that Mukhya-Prāṇa is air passing into the ādhyātmika-state dividing itself fivefold and thus abiding in a specialized condition in the body.[11]

The second Sūtra meets an objection to this that as Prāṇa has been eulogized in the Śrutis in various ways as the 'best' (*Jyeṣṭha* and *Śreṣṭha*) and the organs such as speech have been subordinated to it,

8. स पुनर्मुख्यः प्राणः किंस्वरूप इतीदानीं जिज्ञास्यते

9. तत्र प्राप्तम्–श्रुतेर्वायुः प्राण इति। अथवा, तन्त्रान्तरीयाभिप्रायात् समस्तकरणवृत्तिः प्राण इति प्राप्तम् (S. *BSB.* ii.4.9)

10. न च समस्तानां करणानामेका वृत्तिः संभवति। प्रत्येकमेकैकवृत्तिमत्त्वात्; समुदायस्य चाकारकत्वात् (S. *BSB.* ii.4.10)

11. वायुरेवायमध्यात्ममापन्नः पञ्चव्यूहो विशेषात्मनावतिष्ठमानः प्राणो नाम भण्यते; न तत्त्वान्तरं; नापि वायुमात्रम् (S. *BSB. ibid*)

it may have to be recognized to be independent in the body like the Jīvātman himself. In that case, there will be two independent principles in the same body in consequence of which the body is sure to be constantly pulled in opposite directions and crushed in the bargain.[12]

This objection is answered by the tenth Sūtra which points out that as Prāṇa has been spoken of along with the eye, ear and other organs, in the colloquy of the Prāṇas in the Upaniṣads (Cf. *Chān. Up.* v.1.6-7) it cannot be independent of the Jīva.[13] The expression *'ādi'* in the Sūtra refers to other reasons which militate against the independence of Prāṇa—such as its being an unintelligent principle (*acetana*).[14]

The third Sūtra meets a further objection that if Prāṇa is also to be treated as an instrument of the Jīva, because of its being mentioned along with the eye etc., it will have to be provided with a distinctive sense-object (*viṣaya*) analogous to color etc. as in the case of the other senses. That would militate against the acceptance of only eleven senses and sense-objects.[15]

The reply to this objection is given that as Prāṇa *is not an instrument,* the difficulty does not arise. This does not mean that Mukhya-Prāṇa is a useless appendage;[17] for it has its own distinctive part to play in the service of the Jīvātman—viz. nourishing the body and keeping it alive even if one or more of the senses are defunct—as may be seen from the colloquy of the Prāṇas.[18]

The last Sūtra adduces one more reason to show that Mukhya-Prāṇa is not without performing a distinctive function (*kāryam*) of his own.[19] It is designated in the Śrutis as performing the five functions of aspiration, inspiration, distribution of the juices of food equitably thro' all parts of the body etc., like the mind performing its fivefold function.

12. यथा चक्षुरादीना जीवं प्रति गुणभूतत्वाज्जीवस्य श्रेष्ठत्वाज्जीवः स्वतन्त्र, एव प्राणोऽपि प्राधान्यात् श्रेष्ठत्वाच्च स्वतन्त्रः प्राप्नोति। न च द्वयो स्वतन्त्रयोरेकस्मिन् शरीरे एकवाक्यत्वमुपपद्यत इत्यपर्यायं विरुद्धानेकदिक्क्रियतया देह उन्मथ्येत इति प्राप्त उच्यते (*Bhāmatī* ii.4.10)

13. चक्षुरादिभि सहैव प्राणः शिष्यते प्राणसवादादिषु समानधर्माणा च सहशासन युक्तम् (S. *BSB.* ii.4.10)

14 आदिशब्देन सहतत्वाचेतनत्वादीन् प्राणस्य स्वातन्त्र्यनिराकरणहेतून् दर्शयति (*ibid*)

15 चक्षुरादिभिः सह शासनेन करण चेत् प्राण, चक्षुरादिविषयरूपादिवत् अस्यापि विषयान्तरं वाच्यम्। न तच्छक्य वक्तुम्। एकादशकरणपरिगणनव्याकोपश्चेति दोष परिहरपि– अकरणत्वाच्चेति (*Bhāmatī* ii.4.11)

16. न तावत् विषयान्तरप्रसगो दोषः; अकरणत्वात् प्राणस्य (S *BSB.* ii.4.11)

17. न चास्यैतावता कार्याभाव एव (*ibid*)

18. देहेन्द्रियादिविधारणकारणं प्राणः, तच्च श्रुतिप्रबन्धेन दर्शितम् (*Bhāmatī ibid*)

19. इतश्चास्ति मुख्यस्य प्राणस्य वैशेषिक कार्यं, यत्कारणं पचवृत्तित्य व्यपदिश्यते श्रुतिषु (*ibid*)

Criticism.

It is not justifiable to introduce the Pūrvapakṣa in the opening Sūtra taking a leaf from the Sāmkhya-Smṛti as the present Pāda is confined to resolving conflicts of testimony from within the sphere of Śrutis.[20] It would be more pertinent to treat the opening Sūtra as part of the previous *Śreṣṭhādhi.* and utilize it to refute an objection that the genesis of Mukhya-Prāṇa referred to in the Śruti may be explained as pertaining to the origination of air and movement of all kinds in general. The wording of Sūtra 9 is quite in keeping with such a realigment, as may be seen from other examples such as *Nānumānam ataccha̍bdāt* (i, 3.3) which take up the thread of the previous Sūtra.[21]

Apart from this, the way in which S. has *relegated Mukhya Prāṇa* to the realm of *Jaḍatattvas* by representing him in his Pūrvapakṣa as simple air or the combined activity of the sense organs and in his Siddhānta as air in its ādhyātmika set-up, with its fivefold function, is decidedly against the high position accorded to Mukhya Prāṇa in the Śrutis and Smṛtis as a sentiment principle (See *Isa.* 4.) as can be seen from the colloquy of the Prāṇas too.[22] The expression Mukhya Prāṇa is seldom used in the Śrutis to designate a *Jaḍatattva.*[23]

The objection raised by S. thro' the first half of the second Sūtra about the independence of Mukhya Prāṇa on a par with the Jīvātman is hardly consistent with his own conclusion in the first Sūtra that Mukhya Prāṇa is *only a Jaḍatattva.*[24]

If the inanimate character of Mukhya Prāṇa (according to S.) is to be questioned in this part of the Sūtra, because of the colloquy of the Prāṇas, by the same token the insentiency of the senses of sight etc. also will have to be questioned in the same way.[25] S.'s further statement that the term ādi (and so on) in Sūtra 10 refers to other reasons refuting the independence of Mukhya Prāṇa *such as its insentiency* misses the point that such 'insentiency' according to him should be obvious from the very fact of its mention along with the eye and other organs and needs no special attempt by the Sūtrakāra to bring it out by another word. This clearly shows this term can be put to better use.

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20. साङ्ख्यमतनिरासस्येहागमने (*TC.* p. 997b)
21. अयमधिकरणमिदस्य पूर्वोक्तप्राणोत्पत्तिश्रुतेर्वाय्वादिविरलत्वस्येह निरासेन, नानुमानमतच्छब्दात् इत्यादिरिव च, न वायुक्रिये' इत्यस्य सूत्राक्षरानुसारेण पूर्वशेषत्वसम्भवे * * * (*TC. ibid*)
22. प्राणसंवादादिना चेतनत्वेन निर्णीतमुख्यप्राणे जडत्वारोपकारेण वायुक्रियात्वपूर्वपक्षो, वायुविकारत्वसिद्धान्तश्चायुक्तः (*TC.* p. 997b)
23. नहि जडे श्रुतिषु क्वापि मुख्यप्राणशब्दो दृष्टः (*TC.* p. 997b)
24. पूर्वसूत्रे वायुविकारत्वेन जडतया निर्णीतमुख्यप्राणे जीववत् कर्तृत्वशङ्कानुदयात् ।
25. प्राणसंवादादिना मुख्यप्राणस्यांशतश्चेतनत्वाभ्युपगमे च, चक्षुरादीनामपि तेनैव तदाशङ्कासम्भवात् (*ibid*)

There is no need for S. to raise the objection about Mukhya Prāṇa being otherwise of no particular benefit to the self—after having stated that it is not an instrument (*karaṇam*). The concrete beneficient role played by Mukhya Prāṇa is a matter of universal experience and is also writ large on the upshot of the colloquy of the Prāṇas. There is no room for any legitimate doubt on the point. There is, therefore, no need for any one to labor the point and seek to utilize the words: *Tathā hi darśayati* so as to clear a doubt that as it cannot be accepted as an instrument of knowledge, with a special sense-object of its own (*paricchedyaviṣayāntara*), Mukhya Prāṇa is a useless appendage.[26]

The words *Tathā hi darśayati* as construed by S. do not substantiate the point actually established in the earlier part of the Sūtra (*akaraṇatvām na doṣah*).[27] They introduce a *fresh point* that Mukhya Prāṇa performs a most useful service to the self. While that is true enough, it is not a detail of information *directly connected with the point at issue whether Mukhya Prāṇa has a distinctive sense-object of its own*, if it is to be admitted as an instrument. The information supplied under *Tathā hi darśayati* by S. can come in only in answer to a further question as to what *other* function Mukhya Prāṇa carries out *if it does not function as a karaṇa*. That would necessitate the importation of the words: *Avacchedyaviṣayābhāvena* before *'akaraṇatvāt'* in the Sūtra. As no such question has been raised in the Sūtra, the answer that its function is the upkeep of the body is *not relevant*.

S. interprets the last Sūtra as *adducing another reason* to show that Mukhya Prāṇa has its own special work (*vaiśeṣikam kāryam*). The absence of a copulative *ca* in this Sūtra makes it doubtful if it is to be taken as part of the same *adhi.* and topic still under discussion.[28] As a matter of fact, the concluding words of the preceding Sūtra *Tathā hi darśayati* can very well comprehend this point, thus rendering the last Sūtra unnecessary[29] The way in which S. has drawn upon the Yoga theory of Manas and its functions to illustrate the five Vṛttis of Mukhya Prāṇa is far from happy as the Yoga school has been censured by the Sūtrakāra. It would be more pertinent to elucidate the Sūtrakāra's words *Manovat* with the help of a text and an illustration from the literature of the Vedānta itself, as R. and M. have done.

26. अनुपकारकत्वशकायाश्च स्पष्टेन दृष्टशास्त्रविरोधेनानुदयात्। दृश्यते ह्यन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्या चक्षुरादे रूपादिज्ञानमिव, प्राणस्य शरीरधारणाद्युपकारः, श्रूयते च प्राणसवादादिषु (*TC.* 997)

27. "तथाहि दर्शयति" इत्यस्य 'अकरणत्वाच्च न दोष' इति पूर्वोक्तार्थपरत्वाभावेनास्वारस्याच्च' (*TC.* p. 998b)

28. सूत्रे चशब्दाभावेन हेत्वन्तरत्वस्यास्वरसत्वात् (*TC.* p. 998)

29 'तथाहि दर्शयति' इति पूर्वसूत्रभागेनैवास्यापि कार्यविशेषस्य वक्तुं शक्यत्वेनास्य वैयर्थ्यात् (*TC.* p. 998)

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R. agrees with S. in treating the four Sūtras as one *adhi.* His interpretation of the opening Sūtra is more or less the same as S.'s with one important difference of detail from him that he substitutes the motion of air itself for the combined function of the senses as one of the alternatives with which Mukhya Prāṇa may be identified.[30] The Siddhānta is that Mukhya Prāṇa is air which has assumed a special condition.[31]

The objection raised against S.'s relegating Mukhya Prāṇa to the realm of Jaḍtattvas applies equally to R.

According to R. the second Sūtra raises the issue whether Mukhya Prāṇa is to be recognized as a distinct physical *element* like fire, earth and so on if it is really a modification of air[32] and answers it by stating that it is *not a distinct element but only a special instrument* (*upakaraṇa*) *of the soul.*[33]

Since (Jaḍa)-Prāṇa is experienced to be essentially of the nature of air, there is no reasonable possibility of any doubt arising that it may be a different element from air.[34] If the possibility is conceded in the case of Mukhya Prāṇa there is no reason why it cannot be extended to the eye and others also.[35]

According to R. Sūtra 10 means: If, on account of Mukhya Prāṇa's not exercising any activity helpful to the soul, it is contended that *there will be the flaw of the earlier stand,* (that Mukhya Prāṇa is not a distinct element other than air but only a special instrument of the soul) *having to be set at naught,* we say such a flaw will not arise, as the Śruti shows clearly how Mukhya Prāṇa performs the activity of supporting the body with all its organs, which is most beneficial to the Soul.

Such an interpretation is open to several objections. In the first place, the beneficient role of Mukhya Prāṇa in maintaining the body intact is well within the personal experience of all. As in the case of the eye and other organs, a doubt that it does not exercise any acti-

30. सोऽयं प्राणः किं महाभूततृतीयवायुमात्रं, तस्य वा स्पन्दरूपा क्रिया, अथवा वायुरेव कञ्चन विशेषमापन्नः इति विशये (*Śrībhāṣya* ii.4.8)

31. न वायुमात्रं, न च तत्क्रिया। वायुरेवावस्थान्तरमापन्नः प्राणः (*ibid*)

32. किमयं प्राणो वायुविकारः सन्, अग्निवत् भूतान्तरम्? (*ibid*)

33. नेत्याह—नायं भूतविशेषः। अपि तु, चक्षुरादिवत् जीवोपकरणविशेषः (*ibid*)

34. प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधेन प्राणे भूतान्तरत्वशङ्कानुदयात् (*TC.* p. 997)

35. विशेषहेत्वभावेनाग्न्यादिविकारस्य चक्षुरादेरपि तथात्वशङ्कानिरासायोगाच्च (*TC.* *ibid*)

vity helpful to the soul *cannot arise*. It is, therefore, unnecessary to combat it in a special Sūtra.[36]

Secondly, his way of construing the words of the Sūtra is very far-fetched. He dislodges the reason *akaraṇatvād* from its legitimate place in what is after all a Siddhānta-Sūtra and appropriates it in favor of the Pūrvapakṣa:

Cf: अकरणत्वादिति पूर्वपक्षहेतुः (*Śrutaprakāśa*, ii.4.10)

by putting up a roundabout syntactic relationship between the words *akaraṇatvād* and *doṣah*[37]:—

अकरणत्वात्=अकार्यत्वात् (चक्षुरादिवज्जीवोपकरणविशेप एव, न तु भूतान्तरं इति प्रागुक्तप्रमेयभंगरूपो) यो दोषः, स न

instead of the direct relationship: *akaraṇatvān na doṣaḥ*. This is a crucial point to which Vyāsatīrtha draws pointed attention:

सिद्धान्तसूत्रस्थकरणत्वहेतोः स्वतःप्राप्तसिद्धान्तहेतुत्वत्यागेन, व्यवहितान्वयेन च, पूर्वपक्षहेतुत्वकल्पनायोगाच्च । (*TC.* p. 998)

Thirdly, R.'s way of construing the term karaṇa in the sense of *kriyā* (activity) and the compound akaraṇatvāt as a Bahuvrīhi[38] is also open to question. For, looking to the presence of the term *cakṣurādivat* (like the eye etc.) in the preceding Sūtra and having regard to the right of precedence of the Karmadhāraya-Samāsa over the Bahuvrīhi, it would seem more proper to take the expression *akaraṇatvāt* in the sense of Mukhya Prāṇa's not being an instrument of the Soul like the other well-known instruments such as the eye.[39]

That would naturally change the complexion and drift of the Sūtra and make it inadmissible to ascribe the meaning of "being devoid of any special activity by way of helpfulness to the Jīva" to the term *akaraṇatvāt* in the Sūtra.

R. explains the last Sūtra as follows. Prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna and samāna are not different principles from Prāṇa even as the mind is not different from its functions of desire, purpose, etc. This overlooks the fact that Prāṇa cannot be a function of Prāṇa itself—unless as in M., Mukhya Prāṇa is distinguished from the guardians of the other five Prāṇas.[40]

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36. स्फुटप्रत्यक्षविरोधेन चक्षुरादेरिवानुपकारकत्वशकानुदयस्योक्तत्वात् (*TC.* p. 998b)
37. अस्य प्राणस्य जीवं प्रत्युपकारविशेषरूपक्रियारहितत्वाच्च यो दोष उद्भाव्यते, स नास्ति (*Śribāṣya*, ii.4.10)
38. 'अकरणत्वात्' । करणं क्रिया; अक्रियत्वात् (*Śribāṣya*, ii.4.10)
39. पूर्वसूत्रस्थचक्षुरादिशब्दसन्निधानात् बहुव्रीहितः कर्मधारयस्य बलवत्त्वात् च, अकरणशब्देन प्रसिद्धकरणत्वाभावस्यैव प्रतीतौ, बहुव्रीह्याद्याश्रयणेनोपकाररूपक्रियाविशेषराहित्यपरत्वकल्पनायोगाच्च (*TC.* p. 998)
40. प्राणस्य प्राणवृत्तित्वायोगात् (*TC.* p. 999b)

CHAPTER XLI

MUKHYA PRĀṆA'S PARIMĀṆA

9. (*Mukhya*) *Prāṇāṇutvādhikaraṇam* (ii.4.14)

This *adhi.* resolves the conflict of testimony regarding the size of Mukhya Prāṇa. The *aṇutva* of his essence may of course follow from the establishment of the *aṇutva* of the Jīva in ii.3.20-26. But this *adhi* is necessary to show that Mukhya Prāṇa is of atomic size *in respect of his body within the bodies of the creatures he sustains* while in his adhidaiva-form as Mukhya Vāyu *outside the bodies of creatures,* he has bodily pervasion as far as Mahattattva pervades the world[1] Again, tho' the Svarūpāṇutva of Mukhya Prāṇa may be clear from the establishment of the *aṇutva* of the Prāṇas as such in ii.4.8, this *adhi.* is still necessary to show that he pervades externally thro' his body and unlike the other senses he has a superior position in *not* being amenable to control by the Jīvas[2]:— अणुत्वे चास्य महत् वैलक्षण्यं गम्यते, पृथक्सूत्रात् (*TD.* ii.4.14)

The conflict of testimony is presented by the following texts: "Prāṇa is below, Prāṇa is overhead. He is in the middle and on all sides. He is the sustainer of all this".[3] The *Vāyuprokta* supports this position with a reasoning. "The universe is sustained in position because Prāṇa stands pervading all. How else could it be sustained, who

1. जीवानुगतस्य उत्क्रान्तिगत्यागतीनामित्यादिनैव सिद्धत्वात्, बहिरपि मुख्यवायोः कथं व्याप्तत्वमिति चेत्, सत्यम्। प्राणिनां देहान्तर्बाह्यविस्तारैकत्वाप्यणुः; प्राणिनां देहात् बहिर्वायोर्महत्तत्त्व मुख्यवायोः देहस्यापि व्याप्यत्वात् व्याप्तिरिति प्रमेयभेदात् सतावेति भाव्यम् (Vādirāja *TPG.* p. 116)

2. मदन्यवशवर्तित्वनेनेह मतार्थं, मुख्यस्यापि प्राणत्वात्; तथाप्यस्य बहिर्देहस्यापि व्याप्तेः गत्वात् कार्यतोऽन्यत्वेन इन्द्रियनियमनत्वाच्च अणुत्वेऽपि पृथगनुगमनार्थं पृथगिति भिन्नम् (*BD.* ii.4.14)

3. प्राण एवाधस्तात् प्राण उपरिष्टात् प्राणो मध्ये प्राणः सर्वत्र प्राण एवेदं सर्वम्

can support it?"[4] But as against this we have the *Sautrāyaṇa Śruti*: "This is all created by the minute one (Prāṇa) and it is absorbed into him. Prāṇa is the minute one and by Prāṇa alone is all this creation".[5]

The Pūrvapakṣa feels the Śruti which ascribes pervasion to Mukhya Prāṇa is also supported by a reasoning that Mukhya Prāṇa sustains the whole world: सप्तस्कन्धगतो लोकान् यो बिभर्ति महाबलः[6]

(*Harivaṁśa*)

The Siddhānta is that Mukhya Prāṇa is only atomic in essence but outside the bodies of creatures he is pervasive thro' his body in his form as Mukhya-Vāyu:

देहान्तर्बहिर्वर्तमानप्राणवायुशब्दितरूपभेदेनाणुत्वमहत्वयोर्व्यवस्थोक्तेः

(Ragh: *Nyāyamuktāvali*)

This is because he is the ruler of all others than himself and the Supreme B. and is ruled by the Supreme:

प्राणो वा ईशितव्येश ईशो ह्यसौ सर्वस्य ईशितव्यश्च परस्य (*Kauṇḍinya Śruti*)

Interpretation of Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja

According to S. this *adhi.* establishes that tho' pervasiveness of Mukhya Prāṇa is referred to in *Bṛh Up.* i.3.22: "He is equal to a gnat, a mosquito, an elephant and to all these world's," this is to be understood with reference to its universal aspect as the cosmic Prāṇa or Hiraṇyagarbha, while in its individual aspect as ādhyātmika-Prāṇa it is limited.[7] It is difficult to accept this explanation as neither Hiraṇyagarbha nor his Buddhi is really all-pervading.[8]

According to B., Mukhya Prāṇa is said to be all-pervading in the sense of being the source of activity (of breathing) of all living beings.[9]

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4. यतः सर्वं जगद्व्याप्य तिष्ठति प्राण एव तु ।
अतो धृतं जगत्सर्वमन्यथा केन धार्यते ?

5 अणुनैतत्सृज्यते ऽणुनैतद्धार्यतेऽणौ लयमभ्युपैति प्राणो वा अणु प्राणैर्ह्येतत् भवति (*ibid*)

6. The BD explains the propriety of the term *Saptaskandha* with reference to the grouping of the fortynine Maruts into groups of seven and their being supported by Pradhāna-Vāyu. According to *AC* this expression simply means: *Pātālādisaptabhūmivivaragataḥ.*

7. अधिदैविकेन समष्टिव्यष्टिरूपेण हैरण्यगर्भेण प्राणात्मनैवैतत् विभुत्वमाम्नायते; नाध्यात्मिकेन (S. *BSB.* ii.4.13)

8 तन्न; हिरण्यगर्भस्य तद्बुद्धेर्वा परिच्छिन्नत्वेन सर्वगतत्वोक्त्ययोगात् (TC. p. 999)
also हिरण्यगर्भस्य तच्छरीरपरिच्छिन्नप्राणसमष्टेश्च, वृत्तेश्च शरीरावच्छिन्नत्वादेव विभुत्वायोगात् (*Śrutaprakāśa* ii.4.12)

9. सर्वस्य प्राणिजातस्य प्राणायत्तस्थितित्वेन वैभववादोपपत्तिः (*Śrībhāṣya* ii.4.12)

But then the mind also as the source of thinking activity of all will be eligible to such recognition. As Mukhya Prāṇa has been shown to be far superior to the indriyas and the mind his pervasiveness deserves to be explained from quite a different standpoint as has been shown by M.[10]

10. 'अन्तर्वा अणुर्बहिर्महान्' इति श्रुत्युक्तसमाधौ सति, मनआदिसाधारण्येन सर्वप्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वेन सर्वगतत्वोक्तेरयोगात् (TC. p. 999)

CHAPTER XLII

SENSES ARE JĪVĀTMAN'S INSTRUMENTS ONLY UNDER BRAHMAN'S DIRECTION

10. *Jyotirādyadhikaraṇam* (ii.4.15-17)

After having exhaustively dealt with the topics of the vital airs, the senses and Mukhya Prāṇa, the Sūtrakāra now discusses the question whether the senses function as instruments of Jīvātman under his own absolute direction or at the direction of the Supreme B.[1] The role of the other Prāṇas as instruments may be seen to have been established already in Sūtra ii.4.12 in the very act of showing that Mukhya Prāṇa is *not* an instrument, by the force of the expression *ca* therein. Hence, it is quite in order to take up the question here, whether these senses are instruments of the Jīvātman in his *own* right; or whether they are B.'s instruments operated by B. for the benefit of the Jīva and in *that sense only, his* instruments. This point has been ably brought out by Raghūttama Tīrtha in his *TPB.*[2] p. 308.

The objection, that as the present topic relates to the *indriyas*, it, should have been taken up before the *Śreṣṭhādhi.* (ii.4.2-10) where the issues regarding the genesis, number and size of the *indriyas* have been dealt with, one after the other, is not well-founded. For, the

1. प्राणान् मुख्यप्राण च निरूप्येह तेषा क प्रति करणत्वमिति चिन्त्यत इति सगति · (*TC.* p. 999)
2. ननु, प्राणानां करणत्वे सिद्धे, ब्रह्माकरणत्वादिविचारावसर', तदेव कुतः सिद्धमित्यत आह्–अधिकरणसगतिरिति। नन्वकरणत्वाच्च' इति सूत्रेण मुख्यप्राणस्याकरणत्वमेवोक्तमिति कथ 'करणत्व' प्राणानामुक्तम्' इति ? अत आह्– चशब्देनेति। अत एव इतरेषा प्राणाना करणत्वात्' इति तत्सूत्रभाष्य उक्तम् (*ibid*)
The readings अकारणत्वाच्च (twice) and कारणत्व (once) on p. 308 of the printed Edn. of the *TPB* (Madras GOS. C. vlii) are erroneous and should be amended into अकरणत्वात् and करणत्वात् to make proper sense.

question debated here—whether the senses are instruments[3] of the Jīva or B. can arise only after the specific reference to the instruments *as such* has been made in the Sūtra and such a reference is to be met with only in Sūtra ii.4.12. It would not, however, be proper to place the present discussion immediately after ii.4.12; for the issue raised in *this adhi.* can legitimately arise *only after the theme of Mukhya Prāṇa has been finally concluded.* For, the pith of the argument in this *adhi.* lies in this that the senses are all of them to be recognized as being directed by B. for the simple reason that Mukhya Prāṇa who is the lord of the senses and their energiser *is himself under the direction of the Supreme B.*[4]

The conflict of testimony, here, is as follows: The *Sautrāyaṇa Śruti* says: "The wise ones hold that these senses are the instruments of the Jīvātman; for, they are experienced to be under their own personal control by all creatures". This adduces a reasoning in support of the position. As against this, the *Kāṣāyaṇa Śruti* observes: "These indriyas —the eye, ear, speech and mind, are the instruments of B. For, B acts thro' them".[5]

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that the former text is stronger as it is backed by the reasoning deriving support from personal experience of creatures.

The Siddhānta is pronounced by the Sūtra:

ज्योतिराद्यधिष्ठानं तु तदामननात् (ii.4.15)

"B. which indwells in light (eye) and the other elements, the same B. causes the various functions to be accomplished for the Jīva by these instruments. This is taught in passages like "Who, indwelling in Prāṇa directs it ********** who indwelling in Tejas directs it" (*Bṛh Up.* iii, 7, 16; 14).

Here, the words Tejas' etc., refer also to their *abhimānidevatās.* As the organs of sight etc. are made of Tejas etc., it follows that they too are similarly understood to be indwelt by B. and acting under its overall

3. Defined in the sense of कर्तृप्रयोज्य (Ragh. TCP. p. 999)

4. एतेनास्य विचारस्य प्राणविषयत्वात् श्रेष्ठस्येत्यतः पूर्वमेवोत्पत्तिसङ्ख्यापरिमाणचिन्तापेटिकाया निवेशः स्यादिति शङ्का परास्ता। करणत्वोक्त्यनन्तरमेवास्याक्षेपोदयात्। तर्हि, तदनन्तरमेव निवेशः स्यादिति न वाच्यम्; वस्तुतः मुख्यप्राणचिन्तासमाप्त्यनन्तरमेवास्योत्थानौचित्यात्। सर्वप्राणप्रेरकमुख्यप्राणप्रेरकत्वात् ब्रह्मणः तत्करणत्व युक्तमित्येवस्यत्वादस्य विचारस्य (Ragh. TPB. ii.4.15)

5. 'ब्रह्मणो वा एतानि करणानि, चक्षुः श्रोत्रं मनो वागिति, तदेभिः कारयति' इति काषायणश्रुतौ (M. BSB. ii.4.15)

इन्द्रियाणि कर्म कुर्वन्ति तैस्तु कारयतीति करणे कर्तृत्वोपचारः एतैस्तु करोतीति फलितार्थः (BD. ii.4.15)

direction. M. in his commentary here has referred to the text *Yaḥ Prāṇe tiṣṭhan* (*Bṛh. Up.* iii, 7.16) to emphasise the point that as the Chief Prāṇa who energises the senses is himself stated to be acting under the direction of B. it is all the more clear that these senses are also working at B.'s supreme direction. His commentator here disposes of an incidental objection to the Sūtrakāra's referring to "Jyotis" as heading the series of principles in which B. indwells. For, if the Sūtrakāra's intention is to refer to the serial order of the elements adopted by himself in Pāda iii adhis 1-2 *et seq.*, we should expect him to have said "*Ākāśādyadhiṣṭhānam*". If he has in mind the order followed in the Śruti, we should expect the words: *Pṛthvyādyadhiṣṭhānam*" (See *Bṛh. Up.* iii.7, 3-23). J. explains the position that as the Sūtrakāra has already in the present context used the words: *Cakṣurādi* (ii.4.11) not far away and as the term *cakṣuḥ* appears at the head of others in a series in the Śruti relating to the present issue, he has here thought it fit to use the expression "*Jyotirādi*" to pinpoint the fact that the organ of *cakṣus* is formed of the element of *Tejas* or *Jyotis* which has been mentioned in the Śruti as being directed by B. The *TDP* of Rāghavendra shows by a judicious use of *āvṛtti* of the opening word of the Sūtra how this interpretation lies self-contained in the wording of the Sūtra:

ज्योतिराद्यधिष्ठानं ब्रह्म तत्तु = तदेव (ज्योतिराधधिष्ठानं) = (ज्योतीरूपचक्षुराद्यधिष्ठानं) आमननात्

The next Sūtra: *Prāṇavatā śabdāt* explains how, in the circumstances, the other Śruti which refers to the *indriyas* as *instruments of the Jīvātman himself* is to be reconciled. Such a description, it says, is to be attributed to the fact that B. itself enables the Jīvātman (*Prāṇavān*) to perceive, smell, taste and so on by means of the *indriyas* which *are* B.'s own by right of sovereignty over them (within the meaning of their being *svātantryeṇa kartṛprayojya*). There is thus no contradiction between the two different views of the Śruti that these indriyas belong to B. as well as to the Jīva. This is supported by the clearly worded Śruti *Eṣa hyanena ātmanā cakṣuṣā darśayati*: "B. itself enables the Jīvas to see with the eyes, hear with the ears" and so on.

An objection may be put forward that if these senses are instruments of B., by right of sovereignty, then Mukhya-Prāṇa for the same reason will have to be recognized and treated as one of the instruments of B. in which case, the earlier stand taken in Sūtra ii.4 12, that *Mukhya Prāṇa is not a 'karaṇa' will be violated.*[6] The objector's point

6. Read: यद्येतानि ब्रह्मणस्तर्हि मुख्यप्राणस्याप्येतत् सभवतीति, अकरणत्वहेतुना प्राण एवाकरणस्तस्मान्मुख्य इत्युक्तं मुख्यत्वं विरुद्ध स्यात् (*TP.* ii.4.16)

here is that the earlier stand that Mukhya Prāṇa is *not* an instrument, can only be sustained by admitting that the *indriyas are instruments* of *Jīvātman* so as to rule out Mukhya Prāṇa from being treated as one of the instruments of Jīvātman.[7]

The objection is answered by pointing out that what is intended by the statement that Mukhya Prāṇa is not an instrument in Sūtra ii.4.12, is that he is not *an instrument operable by the Jīvātman*—as he is *superior to the Jīvātman* and not that he is not or cannot be operated by the Supreme B. as an instrument *for the benefit of the Jīvātman*.[8]

The concluding Sūtra: *Tasya ca nityatvāt* brings out the idea underlying the first Sūtra that the instruments of an essentially dependent agent like the Jīvātman, tho' themselves dependent on another, are still regarded as the Jīvātman's instruments only in the limited sense that they serve his needs. This may be illustrated by an example. When a man chops wood with an axe which belongs to another, the axe is still undoubtedly his instrument for the time being, *tho' its ownership may belong to another.*[9] In the same way, the senses can be referred to as instruments of the Jīvātman. A permanent relationship exists between the Jīvātman and his instruments—viz. the senses,[10] as long as the Jīvātman continues to be in the world of Samsāra.[11] It is from the point of view of such a relationship that the other Śruti speaks of the senses as instruments of the Jīvātman.[12]

Śamkara's Interpretation

According to S. this *adhi.* discusses whether the organs of speech etc. carry out their functions by their own intrinsic powers; or only in so far as they are guided by their Abhimānidevatās.[13] The Pūrvapakṣa

7. इन्द्रियाणां जीवकरणत्वे तदुपपत्तिरित्यत आह (*TP.* ii.4.16)

8. तस्य सर्वजीवोत्तमत्वेन जीवप्रयोज्यत्वरूपकरणत्वाभावादिति भावः । तावता कथमुक्तशंकानिवृत्तिरित्यत आह–जीवापेक्षयेति । जीवोत्तमत्वेन तत्प्रयोज्यत्वरूपकरणत्वं तत्राकरणत्वाच्चेति सूत्रे विवक्षितम् । तदभावाच्च मुख्ये संभवतीत्यर्थः (Ragh. *TPB.* ii.4.16)

9. यथा परकीयकुठारेणापि छिन्दतोऽसौ तत्करणमुच्यते, एवमस्वतन्त्रकर्तृ करणान्यन्याधीनान्यपि साधनत्वात् तत्करणानीत्युच्यन्ते (*TP.* ii.4.16)

10 अनादिनित्यत्वाज्जीवकरणसम्बन्धस्य, युज्यते तत्करणत्वश्रुतिः (M. *BSB.* ii.4.17)

11 मुक्तिपर्यन्तं सदा विद्यमानत्वादित्यर्थः । (*BD.* ii.4.17)

12 एतेनानुभवोऽपि आभिमानिकतया व्याख्यातः (*TP*) अनादिसम्बन्धनिबन्धनोऽत्र व्यवहारः श्रौत इति । कुत एतदित्यत आह–अपेति (*TP.* ii.4.17)
Read: यथा च परकीयेऽपि बहुकालसम्बन्धिनि वस्तुनि उपचारः तदीयत्वव्यवहारदर्शनादत्रापि भगवदीयेष्वपीन्द्रियेषु बहुकालीनजीवसम्बन्धित्वात् तत्करणत्वश्रुतिः प्रवर्तते, श्रुतेरुपचरितार्थत्वमिति भावः
(*BD. ibid*)

13. ते पुनः वागाद्याः प्राणाः किं स्वमहिम्नैव स्वस्मै स्वस्मै कार्याय प्रभवन्ति, आहोस्विद् देवताधिष्ठिताः इति विचार्यते
(S. *BSB.* ii.4.14)

is that they do so by their own powers and the Siddhānta is that the activities of the organs are guided by the divinities which animate them (Cf. *AĀ.* ii.4, 2-4). The second Sūtra meets the objection that if the senses are to be guided by their divinities, it would be those divinities and not the individual soul who will have to go thro' the enjoyments and sufferings caused by the functioning of these senses,[14] by stating that this enjoyment *thro' the organs* is of the individual soul and not of the divinities—as the organs are connected with the one possessing them viz. the individual self.

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The concept of Abhimānidevatās has already been propounded by the Sūtrakāra in ii, 1.5 and there is no need to propound it over again, here. Tho' S. has interpreted *that* Sūtra as a Pūrvapakṣa, he has *not* altogether rejected it while expounding his Siddhānta in the *Navilakṣaṇatvādhi.*[15] *He has himself made use of it earlier for his own purposes* in his C. on BS. i.3.33 *as an accepted doctrine of Vaidika Siddhānta.* The fact that the Jīvātman it is who makes use of the organs *has also been* established in ii.3.34-35. As the organs in question are not situated within the bodies of the Abhimānidevatās, there is no reason to suppose that those Devatās will have to be recognized as enjoyers thro' them and refute such a supposition. It is only the sense organs of one's own body that can function as means of one's enjoyment. In any case, the objection can easily be covered and met by the expression 'Viśeṣa' in the Abhimāni-Sūtra (ii.1.5) in the light of the principle of distinction already laid down on the ground of *vaiśeṣyāt* (distinction of nature) in the Sūtra: *Sambhogaprāptir iti cenna vaiśeṣyāt* (i, 2, 8)—thus rendering the present Sūtra (ii.4.15) quite unnecessary here.[16]

Rāmānuja's Interpretation.

R. reads Sūtras 14-15 of S. as one and establishes that the Śruti teaches that the organs, *together with their presiding deities and the individual self* depend in all their doings on the will (*saṅkalpa*) of the Supreme B. as is borne out by the Śruti 'He who abiding in the self * * * etc. (*Bṛh.* Up. iii.7 22 *Mādhyandina*).[17]

14. यदप्युक्तम्—देवतानामेवाधिष्ठात्रीणा भोक्तृत्वप्रसंगो न शारीरस्येति, तत्परिह्रियते– 'प्राणवता शब्दात्' (S. *BSB.* ii.4.15)

15. 'अभिमानिव्यपदेशस्तु' इत्यत्रैवाभिमानिदेवतासमर्थनात् । त्वन्मते तस्य पूर्वपक्षसूत्रत्वेऽपि सिद्धान्ते तस्या-निरासेनानुमतत्वात् (*TC.* p. 1000b)

16 'वैशेष्यात्' इत्युक्तन्यायेन अभिमानिसूत्रस्य 'विशेष' शब्देनैव (तस्य) निराससभवात् (*TC.* p. 1000b)

17. 'प्राणवता' जीवेन सह ज्योतिरादीना अग्न्यादिदेवताना प्राणविषयमधिष्ठान परमात्मन सकल्पादेव भवतीत्यर्थः इन्द्रियाणा साभिमानिदेवताना ,जीवात्मनश्च स्वकार्येषु परमपुरुषमननायत्तत्वशास्त्रात् (*Śrībhāṣya* ii.4.13)

here is that the earlier stand that Mukhya Prāṇa is *not* an instrument, can only be sustained by admitting that the *indriyas are instruments* of *Jīvātman* so as to rule out Mukhya Prāṇa from being treated as one of the instruments of Jīvātman.[7]

The objection is answered by pointing out that what is intended by the statement that Mukhya Prāṇa is not an instrument in Sūtra ii.4.12, is that he is *not an instrument operable by the Jīvātman*—as he is *superior to the Jīvātman* and not that he is not or cannot be operated by the Supreme B. as an instrument *for the benefit of the Jīvātman*.[8]

The concluding Sūtra: *Tasya ca nityatvāt* brings out the idea underlying the first Sūtra that the instruments of an essentially dependent agent like the Jīvātman, tho' themselves dependent on another, are still regarded as the Jīvātman's instruments only in the limited sense that they serve his needs. This may be illustrated by an example. When a man chops wood with an axe which belongs to another, the axe is still undoubtedly his instrument for the time being, *tho' its ownership may belong to another*.[9] In the same way, the senses can be referred to as instruments of the Jīvātman. A permanent relationship exists between the Jīvātman and his instruments—viz. the senses,[10] as long as the Jīvātman continues to be in the world of Saṃsāra.[11] It is from the point of view of such a relationship that the other Śruti speaks of the senses as instruments of the Jīvātman.[12]

Śamkara's Interpretation

According to S. this *adhi.* discusses whether the organs of speech etc. carry out their functions by their own intrinsic powers; or only in so far as they are guided by their Abhimānidevatās.[13] The Pūrvapakṣa

7. इन्द्रियाणां जीवकरणत्वे तदुपपत्तिरित्यत आह (*TP.* ii.4.16)

8. तस्य सर्वजीवोत्तमत्वेन जीवप्रयोज्यत्वरूपकरणत्वाभावादिति भावः। तावता कथमुक्तशंकानिवृत्तिरित्यत आह–जीवापेक्षयेति। जीववशत्वेन ब्रह्मप्रयोज्यत्वरूपकरणत्वं तन्नाकरणत्वाच्चेति सूत्रे विवक्षितम्। तदभावाश्च मुख्ये संभवतीत्यर्थः (Ragh. *TPB.* ii.4.16)

9. यथा परकीयकुठारेणापि वृश्चतोऽसौ तत्करणमुच्यते, एवमस्वतंत्रकर्तुः करणान्यन्याधीनान्यपि साधनत्वात् तत्करणानीत्युच्यन्ते (*TP.* ii.4.16)

10. अनादिनित्यत्वाज्जीवकरणसंबन्धस्य, युज्यते तत्करणत्वश्रुति (M. *BSB.* ii.4.17)

11. मुक्तिपर्यन्तं सदा विद्यमानत्वादित्यर्थः। (*BD.* ii.4.17)

12. एतेनानुभवोऽपि आभिमानिकतया व्याख्यातः (*TP*) अनादिसंबन्धनिबन्धनोऽयं व्यवहारः श्रौत इति। कुत एतदित्यत आह–अर्थेति (*TP.* ii.4.17)
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Criticism.

This point that the doings of the Jīvātman are all dependent on the will of the Lord has been firmly established in the Sūtra: *Parāttu tacchruteḥ* (ii.3.40) by R., quoting among others the very same text from the *Bṛh. Up.* There is thus no need to make the same point here, over again, thro' the last part "*Prāṇavatā*" of the present Sūtra (ii.4.13).[18] His commentator tries to get over this difficulty by explaining that tho' the dependence of the Jīvātman on B. for his doings has already been established in *Parāyattādhi*, the Jīvātman has been cited here by the term *Prāṇavatā* ('together with the one to whom the Prāṇas belong') *just by way of illustration.*[19] This is far from convincing; for such an illustration serves no useful purpose, as it adds nothing to the point at issue.[20] However, if the Sūtrakāra intended to refer to the Jīva by way of illustration, he would have used the commensurate expression *Prāṇavad yathā*[21] instead of *Praṇavatā* in the instrumental case. As the Abhimānidevatās are also Jīvas, the fact of their doings also being dependent on the will of the Lord would automatically follow from the conclusion established in the *Parāyattādhikaraṇa.* The entire Sūtra ii.4.13 of R. would thus be superfluous.[22]

The way in which R. construes '*Prāṇavatā*' in the sociative sense (*sahayoga*) necessitates the instrumental case to be understood in the sense of an *upapadavibhakti* which compares unfavorably with its more direct way of being construed as a *kārakavibhakti*, which enjoys the right of precedence over the other.[23]

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18. 'परात्तु तच्छ्रुते' रित्यत्रैव 'य आत्मानम्' इत्यादिश्रुत्या जीवकर्तृत्वमीश्वराधिष्ठानमित्युक्तत्वात् (*TC.* p. 1000)

19. 'परात्तु तच्छ्रुते' रित्यधिकरणे जीवस्य परायत्तकर्तृत्वे सिद्धेऽप्यत्र प्राणवच्छब्देन जीवस्योपादान दृष्टान्ततयेति मन्तव्यम् । (*Śrutaprakāśa* ii.4.13)

20. दृष्टान्तोक्तेर्फलाभावात् (Ragh. *TCP.* ii.4.17)

21. 'प्राणवत् यथा' इति निर्देशापाताच्च (*ibid*)

22. अग्न्यादीनामपि जीवत्वेन तेनैव सिद्धेः (*ibid*)

23 प्राणवतेति तृतीयाया कारकविभक्तित्वसंभवे, सहयोगसापेक्षोपपदविभक्तित्वकल्पनायोगात् (*TC.* p. 1000)

'Kārakavibhakti' is a grammatical case prescribed independently of association with particular words while 'Upapadavibhakti' is a case prescribed in the event of association with particular words *e.g. Rāmeṇa bāṇena hato Vālī*: *Putreṇa* (*saha*) *āgataḥ pitā* (both instrumental) where the latter is a case of *Upapadavibhakti* The dictum is उपपदविभक्तेः कारकविभक्तिर्बलीयसी.

CHAPTER XLIII

MUKHYA-PRĀṆA IS *NOT* ONE OF THE SENSES

11. *Indriyādhikaraṇam* (ii, 4, 18-20)

This *adhi.* examines the question whether Mukhya Prāṇa is to be recognized as one among the senses (indriyas) or not. In the previous *adhi.*, it was clarified why he is not to be looked upon as an instrument of the Jīvātman, like any of his (Jīva's) other instruments. It may still be insisted that Mukhya Prāṇa must be regarded as an *indriya* in so far as he answers to the definition of one[1]—viz. that which flows or moves towards its appropriate objects (*idamdravaṇam*)[2] as is implicit in the meaning of the very term Pra+ana which is shared by Mukhya Prāṇa. with the other Prāṇas (indriyas).

The conflict of texts is presented by the following. The *Pautrāyaṇa Śruti* says: "All the Prāṇas are *indriyas* (senses) for they go to this (their appropriate object)". Here, the term *indriya* is applied to all the Prāṇas in general with an indication of the reason justifying the appellation. The *Kāṣāyana Śruti*, on the other hand, says: "Twelve only are the senses,—the mind and the intellect making the eleventh and the twelfth."[3] In view of this conflict, the doubt arises whether we should accept all the Prāṇas without exception to be sense organs or accept only twelve of them as *indriyas.*

1. पूर्वोक्त मुख्यप्राणस्य जीवं प्रत्यकरणत्वमयुक्तम्; तस्यापीन्द्रियत्वेन त प्रति करणत्वादिति पूर्वपक्षोत्थानात् सगतिः (*TC.* p. 1000)

2 Cf. 'विषयद्रवणात्तेषामिन्द्रियत्वमुदाहृतम् ।

3 द्वादशैवेन्द्रियाण्याहुर्मनोबुद्धी तु द्वादशे (*Kāṣāyana Śruti*). M. *BSB.* ii.4.18. The (elliptical) cpd. *dvādaśe* (neu. dual) has been variously explained by different scholiasts. For these interesting explanations see *BD.* ii.4.18.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa holds that it is not possible to exclude any one. It cannot be said that the general statement (*sāmānyavacanam*) may be superseded by the special one specifying the number of indriyas as twelve. It is not possible to exclude Mukhya Prāṇa to make up the number. One may as well exclude any other organ—say of sight, as there is nothing to distinguish the indriyas *qua* indriyas from one another, so far as their characteristic of *idamdravaṇam* and their dependence on B. (as its *karaṇam*) are concerned.[4] Their individual peculiarities such as the sentiency of Mukhya Prāṇa or the special capacity of the eyẹ or the ear to grasp one particular quality should not cloud the issue.[5] The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, argues that since the Śruti which refers collectively to all the "Prāṇas" (including Mukhya Prāṇa) as *indriyas* is based on a proper reason (of *idamdravaṇam*), the other (*Kāṣāyaṇa*) *Śruti* restricting the number of *indriyas* to twelve is invalid. Therefore, the Samanvaya of Śruti in B. established in Adhy. I, is open to question.

Siddhānta.

The Siddhānta is given in: "*Ta indriyāṇi tadvyapadeśāt*" that "barring the Chief Prāṇa (*anyatra Śreṣṭhāt*); they (*te*) the other (twelve Prāṇas) are *indriyas*, because the Scripture speaks to that effect".

The commentary of M. makes clear what the scriptural statement in question is:

"Only twelve are the senses. The Chief Prāṇa is *not* a sense organ, as he is the master and the guide of the organs which run to their appropriate objects". The The *Bṛhatsamhitā* endorses the same—"The indriyas are only twelve in number—the ear, and the other four Jñānendriyas and speech and the other four Karmendriyas, aided by Manas and Buddhi. These twelve are designated as *indriyas* because they run towards their appropriate objects. Mukhya Prāṇa standing firm in his own place (without moving from there) guides them all".

The next Sūtra: *Bhedaśruteḥ* adduces the evidence of a clear text showing how Mukhya Prāṇa stands distinguished from the indriyas. The text quoted shows that he guides and regulates the activities of

4. अन्यतमनिवारणस्यानवसरत्वात् मुख्यप्राणो नेन्द्रियमिति चेन्न। तथात्वे चक्षुषोऽप्यनिन्द्रियत्वं किं न स्यात्? नहि मुख्यप्राणचक्षुषोः कश्चन विशेषोऽस्ति, येन मुख्यप्राणो नेन्द्रियं, चक्षुरिन्द्रियमिति निश्चिनुमः उभयोरपीदंद्रवणत्वाविशेषात्। प्राणित्वविशेषस्तु श्रोत्रादिष्वपि साम्यात् (*TP.* ii.4.18)

5 मुख्यप्राणस्य चेतनत्वात् कथमिन्द्रियत्वमित्यत आह–प्रातिस्विकेति • • (*Vādirāja TPG.* p. 117)

the senses *from where he is*—without having to move (*dravaṇam*)' from there. The *Pautrāyaṇa Śruti* says: "Without moving from where he is, Mukhya Prāṇa does all this—he causes all this to be done. He acts with strength, bestows strength on all the rest, supports all this and enables it to support. So, they call him the powerful Lord.[6] The organs of sense are not steady. They do nothing, they cause nothing to be done. They are not strong, they do not support or enable others to support. They are really weak and so they say they are instruments (*karaṇāni*)".

The concluding Sūtra answers a further objection that if Mukhya Prāṇa is himself dependent on B. he cannot but be regarded as being an indriya like the others.[7] For, not being independent, the indriyas are equally devoid of self-directed activity towards their objects and not moving from their places of their own accord. If Mukhya Prāṇa is not dependent on B., then the statement in Sūtra ii, 4, 11 likening him to other "indriyas" will be open to question.[8]

The answer points out that tho' both the indriyas and Mukhya Prāṇa are alike dependent on B., there is this important point of difference in the nature of their dependence—viz. that *while the indriyas oprate in accordance with the will and effort of the Jīvātman.[9] the activity of Mukhya Prāṇa is independent of the volition and effort of the Jīvātman* in the body. This may be gathered from the description of the state of Suṣupti in the *Praśna Up.* (iv.2.) where it is said that in that state the individual who is asleep is unable to hear, see, smell, taste, touch, talk or handle things and so on. After showing that the organs cease functioning there, the Śruti goes on to say "only the five forms of Mukhya Prāṇa's energy are awake and at work there:"

प्राणाग्नय एवैतस्मिन् पुरे जाग्रति (iv.3)

While the second Sūtra here cites scriptural evidence in support of the distinction of Mukhya Prāṇa from the indriyas, the third one cites the perceptual experience of Suṣupti to the same effect. There is thus no overlapping between the two Sūtras.[10] The *TC* points out

6 अनेन मुख्यस्य सर्वकर्तृत्वकारयितृत्वबलत्त्वबालयितृत्वधर्तृत्वधारकत्वादिविशेषोक्त्या ईश्वरसाम्यमुक्तम् (*BD.* ii.4.19)

7. नन्वयं मुख्यप्राणः परमात्मवशो, न वा ? आद्ये न तस्यैवानिन्द्रियत्वसिद्धिः, ईश्वरवशत्वसाम्यात् (*TP.* ii.4.20)

8 द्वितीये 'चक्षुरादि' इत्युक्तिविरोध इत्याशका परिहरत्सूत्रं पठित्वा व्याचष्टे–वैलक्षण्याच्चेति (*TP.* ii.4.20)

9 प्राणाना प्रवृत्तेर्जाग्रत्येव भावेन, सुप्तावभावेन जीवायत्तत्वं प्रत्यक्षसिद्धम् (*TP.* ii.4 20)

10. 'स्वपितीत्याचक्षत' इतीन्द्रियाणा सुप्तौ प्रवृत्त्यभावमभिधाय 'प्राणाग्नय' इति मुख्यप्राणरूपाणां पुरुषप्रयत्नानपेक्षा भगवदधीना प्रवृत्तिरुच्यते । नहि सुप्तस्य प्रयत्नो ऽस्ति (*TP.* ii.4 20)

that tho' man is more often than not at the mercy of his mind, still with intensive effort the mind can be made to act in accordance with our will. This is not the case with Mukhya Prāṇa. This is seen from the fact that unlike the mind, Prāṇa is at work in Suṣupti where there is no individual effort.[12]

Saṁkara's Interpretation.

According to S. the question raised in this *adhi.* is whether speech and the other senses are also but different modes of the vital air like Prāṇa apāna, vyāna, etc. or are distinct principles or entities. The Pūrvapakṣa is that they are only different modes of vital breath. The Siddhānta is that speech and others are different entities from Prāṇa because they are referred to separately from Prāṇa (*tadvyapadeśāt*) in the Muṇḍ. Up. text (ii.1.3). Excepting the chief breath, then, the other Prāṇas have been referred to in the Śruti as indriyas.

Criticism.

This way of interpreting the opening Sūtra involves three major defects: (i) The statement of the proposition requires the importation (*adhyāhāra*) of the word "Tattvāntarāṇi" (meaning, 'different entities') to convey the intended meaning. (ii) The words *Tadvyapadeśāt* therein, as interpreted by S., becomes redundant in the light of what the second Sūtra *Bhedaśruteḥ* purports to say—viz. that Prāṇa is shown in the Śruti to be different from *Vāk* etc. (iii) The expression *'Tad'* in the compound *Tadvyapadeśāt* has to be syntactically connected with *"Tattvāntarāṇi"* which has to be brought in thro' importation, as already shown.

Feeling, therefore, dissatisfied with this interpretation of S. the *Bhāmatī* has rejected it and has proferred a different one in its place to avoid these defects.[13]

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11. 'भेदश्रुते' रिति सूत्रेण प्राणस्येन्द्रियान्तरात् भेदे श्रुतिरुक्ता । 'वैलक्षण्या' दिति सूत्रे तु प्रत्यक्षमिति भेदः
(*TC.* p. 1001b)

12 मनोऽपि सत्यतिप्रयत्ने पुमधीनप्रवृत्त्येव । नहि सुप्तौ पुम्प्रयत्नाभावेऽपि प्राणस्येव मनसः प्रवृत्तिरस्ति
(*TC.* p. 1001b)

13. The *Kalpataru* leaves no room for doubt that in Vācaspati's opinion S.'s way of construing the first Sūtra is *untenable*:
एवं चाद्यसूत्र एव यद्भाष्यकारैरिन्द्रियाणां प्राणवृत्तित्वनिरसनमकारि, तन्मात्रं अयुक्तं इत्युक्तं भवति
(*Kalpataru* ii.4.19)
The *Kalpataru* observes if it is overstepping the limits of a commentary to dare to correct the original, let this be treated as a 'Vārtika'
(उक्तानुक्तदुरुक्तचिन्ता वार्तिकम्) तर्हि वार्तिकत्वमस्तु । Surely, a Vārtika has no horns:
न हि वार्तिकस्य शृङ्गमस्ति (*ibid* ii.4.19).
Appayya Dikṣita in his *Parimala* has tried his best to explain away the criticism of the *Bhāmatī* and its open rejection of S.'s interpretation of the first Sūtra.

The new interpretation of the first Sūtra as given by Vācaspati is: The question raised in this Sūtra is whether the indriyas are only speech and the others (eleven in all); or whether Chief Prāṇa is also an *indriya*—the term indriya being understood in the sense of a mark of inferring the Soul (*indraliṅgam*) as its etymology has been given by Pāṇini (*Pan.* v.2, 93) and not in the epistemological sense of what serves as an instrument of the cognition of color, taste, smell etc., lest even light should have to be considered an *indriya,* as it helps in the perception of color. The Pūrvapakṣa is that the term *indriya* must be restricted to that which being constituted of an element, serves as a mark of inferring the Soul. In this sense, the chief breath will be entitled to be accepted as an indriya like speech and others.[14]

The Siddhānta is that the *indriyas* viz. speech and others *are other than Prāṇa* (chief breath) because they alone are universally designated by the term *'indriyas'.*[15] The explanation of the term *indriya* in terms of *indraliṅga* is purely etymological. Its appellative basis (*pravṛttinimitta*) is different—viz., that which being located in the body acts as a means of perceiving objects and their properties. This will prevent the overpervasion.[16]

The *Kalpataru* points out that the *Bhāmatī's* objection is only to S.'s interpretation of the *first Sūtra.*[17] It suggests that the last two Sūtras are to be viewed as a separate *adhi.*[18]

The revised interpretation of *Bhāmatī* and R.'s interpretation of the *adhi.,* put up the number of indriyas as eleven which has been shown to be in disagreement with other scriptural facts.[19]

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14. किमेकादशैव वागादय इन्द्रियाण्याहो प्राणोऽपीति विशये, इन्द्रस्यात्मनो लिंगमिन्द्रियं तथा च, वागादिवत् प्राणस्यापीन्द्रलिंगतास्ति। न च रूपादिविषयालोचनकरणता इन्द्रियता; आलोकस्यापीन्द्रियत्वप्रसंगात्। तस्मात् भौतिकमिन्द्रलिंगमिन्द्रियमिति वागादिवत् प्राणोऽपीन्द्रियमिति प्राप्तम् (*Bhāmatī* ii.4-17)
15. तेनेन्द्रियशब्देन तेषामेव वागादीना व्यपदेशात्; नहि मुख्ये प्राणे इन्द्रियशब्दो दृष्टचरः (*ibid*)
16. इन्द्रलिंगता तु व्युत्पत्तिमात्रनिमित्तम्; यथा गच्छतीति गौरिति। प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं तु, देहाधिष्ठानत्वे सति रूपाद्यालोचनकरणत्वम्। तथाच, नालोकस्येन्द्रियत्वप्रसंग. (*Bhāmatī* ii.4-17)
17. See f.n. 13.
18 द्वे इमे अधिकरणे इत्यर्थः (*Kalpataru* ii.4.19)
19. तत्रेन्द्रियस्यैकादशत्व प्रागेव निराकृतम् (*TC.* p. 1001)

CHAPTER XLII

MICROCOSM OF THE BODY AND ITS ORGANS ARE ALSO FASHIONED BY THE SUPREME BRAHMAN

12. *Saṃjñāmūrtikḷptyadhikaraṇam* (ii.4.21)

The present *adhi.* resolves conflict of testimony as to who fashions the gross physical body and its organs falling within the world of name and form.[1] As the physical body and the senses are mainly sustained by Mukhya Prāṇa, one may naturally expect this question to be taken up and discussed in the unit of *adhi.s* relating to Mukhya Prāṇa, after the previous adhi. relating to him.[2] As Hiraṇyagarbha is the alter-ego of Mukhya Prāṇa in Vedāntic theology,[3] it is but proper that the subject of fashioning of names and forms associated with Hiraṇyagarbha is taken up after concluding the discourse on Mukhya Prāṇa *as such.*[4]

The conflict of texts here arises this way: The *Gaupavana Śruti* has it "Viriñca it is who creates and supports all this. The fourfaced Brahmā (Hiraṇyagarbha) is Viriñca. By him are names and forms fashioned." The *Brahma Purāṇa* adduces a reason in support of this:

1. नामरूपात्मकप्रपञ्चमध्ये शरीरस्यापि प्रविष्टत्वात् तस्य प्रकृतेन्द्रियाश्रयत्वात् तद्विचारस्याध्यात्मविचार-पादेऽन्तर्भावोपपत्तेः। यद्वा, रूपशब्दो देहार्थपरः, नामशब्दश्च तद्वाचकशब्दपरः इति नासंगतिः (*BD.* ii.4.21)

2. न केवलं चिन्ताविषयस्य शरीरस्य प्राणाश्रयत्वात् पेटिकाधिकरणसंगतौ (*TC.* p. 1002b)

3. *Cf.* नमस्ते वायो त्वमेव प्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मासि (*Śānti Mantra*) वायुर्हैव प्रजापतिः तदुक्तमृषिणा–'पवमानः प्रजापतिः' (*A.B.* iv.4)

4. किञ्च, विरिञ्चस्य मुख्यप्राणत्वाच्चेत्यपि द्रष्टव्यम् (*TC*)
The TD lays special stress on this point:
न चात्र चतुर्मुखस्याप्रसक्तिः शङ्क्या। स्वयमेवायं भगवान् प्राणादूर्ध्वं चतुर्मुखपदमधिष्ठास्यतीति ज्ञापयन् प्राणानन्तरनिरूपणावसरे चतुर्मुखं प्रसञ्जयति।

He (Hiraṇyagarbha) is called Viriñca because he brings forth (*virecayati*) all this. The four-faced Brahmā is the sole creator of the world."[5] As against this, the *Āgniveśya-Śruti* runs: "Why is He known as the Supreme Being? It is from the Supreme that the world of name and form springs forth. Brahman is Supreme because it is perfect and full of excellences as the Creator of the world of names and forms".

The Sūtra: *Saṁjñāmūrtikḷptistu trivṛtkurvata upadeśāt* resolves this conflict by showing that the fashioning of names and forms is done only by the Supreme Being. For, the *T.Ā.* (ii, 12) says: "The supremely wise one (*dhī-raḥ*) creates all forms, gives them names and makes use of them (names). Whoever knows the Supreme thus, attains immortality".

The Sūtra accordingly means: "The fashioning of names and forms (bodies) *proceeds from* the Supreme Being, the author of the tripartite mixture (of the subtle elements of Tejo'banna), as is seen from the teaching of the Śruti".

The adjectival phrase *trivṛtkurvataḥ* (ablative) carries within itself the reason why the Supreme B. is to be accepted as the fashioner of names and forms.[6] The reason is that the fashioning of names and forms presupposes the act of energizing the subtle elements of *Tejas*, *ap* and *anna* so as to bring about their tripartite mixture called *trivṛtkaraṇam*. It is the Being which causes this *trivṛtkaraṇam* that has to be recognized as the fashioner of names and forms. The Śruti leaves us in no doubt as to who is responsible for this act of *trivṛtkaraṇa*. For, it says: The Supreme Deity thought 'Let Me enter into these three divinities (of Tejobanna) with this My life-supporting Being (*anena jīvena ātmanā*) and develop names and forms and having thus entered it made each of them threefold". (*Chān. Up.* vi.3).

Here we have to note that tho' the act of developing names and forms mentioned in the Śruti *is followed by* the reference to tripartition, the two should be understood to stand in their order of sense[7] as in the interpretation of the *Vidhivākya*: *Agnihotram juhoti yavāgūm pacati*. "He offers Agnihotra and (he) cooks the rice-gruel". In other words, *trivṛtkaraṇa* is the prerequisite of developing names and forms

5. विरिञ्चो वा इद विरेचयति, विदधाति, ब्रह्मा वाव विरिञ्च एतस्माद्धीमे रूपनामनी (*Q. M. BSB.* ii.4.21)

6. त्रिवृत्कुर्वत इति हेतुगर्भं (*M. BSB.* ii.4.21)
त्रिवृत्कुर्वत इति विशेषणनिर्देशो हेतुगर्भः वाच्यो यस्य स हेतुगर्भो लिङ्गवाचीत्यर्थः (*BD.* ii.4.21)

7. नामरूपे व्याकरोत्। तदर्थं त्रिवृतमकरोदित्यर्थः (*TD.* ii.4.21)

(*namarūpavyākaraṇam*)[8] and it is the prerogative of the Supreme B. to bring about *trivṛtkaraṇam*.[9]

The reference in the Purāṇas and some other sources to Hiraṇyagarbha[10] as the one who brings about the evolution of the world is to be understood purely from a subordinate point of view meaning that it is the Supreme B. which acts thro' Hiraṇyagarbha and the other divinities, making use of them as its media (*dvāra*);

सर्वनाम्नां च रूपाणां व्यवहारेषु केशवः ।
एक एव यतः स्रष्टा ब्रह्माद्यास्तदनन्तराः ॥
(इति पाद्मे Q. M *BSB.* ii.4.21)

इत्यनेनेतरेषां द्वारकारणत्वरूपामुख्यकर्तृत्वमेवोक्तम् । (*BD.* ii.4.21)

Saṁkara's Interpretation.
Pūrvapakṣa.

According to S. (and R.) this *adhi.* consists of three Sūtras (ii.4.20-22). In the opening Sūtra the Pūrvapakṣa is that the development of names and forms referred to in *Chān. Up.* (vi.3.2-3) is accomplished by the individual soul because of the qualification conveyed by the words "Let me develop names and forms entering these three divinities of Tejobanna *with* this living self (*anena jīvena ātmanā anupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaravāṇi*)." When a king says 'Let me count the strength of the enemy's forces by entering his camp thro' my spy,' the actual spying is done by the secret agent and the kind acts only as the causal agent (*hetukartā*).[11] Similarly, here, the actual development of names and forms is carried out by the individual self—the Supreme Lord acting merely as a causal agent. The "Me" in 'Let

8. नामरूपादिकरणं त्रिवृत्करणापेक्षम् । त्रिवृत्करणमन्तरेण रूपोत्पत्त्यभावस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वात्, तदभावे नामानुपपत्तेः (*TP.* ii.4.21)

9. Explaining the concise statement of Jayatīrtha त्रिवृत्कर्तृत्वं च विष्णोरेव (*TP*) Rāghvendra Tīrtha points out that the principle of Samanvaya laid down by the Sūtrakāra in शरीररूपकविन्यस्तगृहीतेः (i.4.1) has necessarily to be applied to the understanding of the passages: तत्तेज ऐक्षत, ता आप ऐक्षन्त etc. If this is done, students and translators of the Upaniṣads need not be puzzled by the references to so many deities and their fields of *abhimāna*, in such contexts.

10. ब्रह्मा वाव विरिञ्च एतस्माद्धीमे रूपनामनी (Q. *MBSB.* ii.4.21)
ऋषीणां नामधेयानि याश्च वेदेषु दृष्टयः ।
शर्वर्यन्ते प्रसूतानां तान्येवैभ्यो ददात्यजः ॥ (*Viṣṇu Purāṇa* i.5.65)

11. तत्र संशयः किं जीवकर्तृकमिदं नामरूपव्याकरणमाहोस्वित् परमेश्वरकर्तृकमिति । तत्र प्राप्तं जीवकर्तृकमेवेदं नामरूपव्याकरणमिति—'अनेन जीवेनात्मना' इति विशेषणात् । यथा लोके चारेणाहं परसैन्यमनुप्रविश्य संकलयानीत्येवं प्रयोगे, चारकर्तृकमेव सत् सैन्यसंकलनं हेतुकर्तृत्वाद्राजा आत्मन्यध्यारोपयति संकलयानीत्युत्तमपुरुषप्रयोगेण, एवं, जीवकर्तृकमेव नामरूपव्याकरणं हेतुकर्तृत्वाद्देवता आत्मन्यध्यारोपयति (*S. BSB.* ii.4.20)

me evolve...' " goes with the living self—the Jīva-ātmā.[12] We also see the Jīva is capable of developing names like Devadatta and Yajñadatta and forms like jars and cups. He may, therefore, be taken to be the agent in the larger sense also of *Saṁjñāmūrtiklpti* of the world.

Siddhānta.

The Siddhānta is that the evolution of names and forms of the world is the work of Parameśvara, the Supreme Lord and *not* of the individual self because the Śruti expressly ascribes such work to the Supreme Lord referred to at the commencement of the section by the words "That divinity thought" (*Chān. Up.* vi.3.2) and using the first person of the verb: *vyākaravāṇi* with reference to the willing and acting of the same Being. The words "Jīvena ātmanā" *do not go with* "Let Me evolve", *but with* "having entered" (*anupraviśya*).[13]

Criticism.

If the term "Jīvā-Ātman" in the Śruti text quoted for the Pūrvapakṣa should refer to a qualified being with a name and a form of its own—such a Being not being the author, at the same time, of *its own name and form,* will have to owe them to some other source. The same source can very well be the author of the name and form not only of this "Jīvā-Ātman" but of the rest of the world—in which case, the Pūrvapakṣa will abort.[14]

If the expression "Jīvā-Ātman" should denote 'pure consciousness', the Siddhānta that it evolves names and forms would be untenable; for by hypothesis 'pure consciousness' (*cinmātram*) is devoid of all activity.[15] Further, the state of Jīvahood being consequent on entry understood in the sense of reflection of cinmātra in Tejobanna etc., it would be putting the cart before the horse to speak of cinmātra *entering Tejobanna in the guise of "Jīvā-Ātman" (anena Jīvenātmanā anupraviśya)* in order to develop name and form.[16] Both the Pūrvapakṣa and the Siddhānta are thus unsustainable.

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12 योग्यत्वात् 'अनेन जीवेन व्याकरवाणि'इति प्रधानक्रियया सबध्यते, न त्वानन्तर्यादनुप्रविश्येत्यनेन (*Bhāmatī* ii.4.20)

13. येय सज्ञामूर्तिक्लृप्तिः सा परमेश्वरस्यैव कृति. उपदेशात्। 'सेय देवतैक्षत' इत्युपक्रम्य, व्याकरवाणीत्युत्तमपुरुषप्रयोगेण परस्यैव ब्रह्मणो व्याकर्तृत्वमिहोपदिश्यते। जीवेनेत्येतदनुप्रविश्येत्यनेन सबध्यते; आनन्तर्यात्। न व्याकरवाणीत्यनेन (S. *BSB.* ii.4.20)

14 जीवेश्वरशब्देन नामरूपवद्विशिष्टविवक्षाया तस्य स्वनामरूपकर्तृत्वाभावात् * * जीवकर्तृत्वपूर्वपक्षायोगात् (*TC.* p. 1002b)

15 चिन्मात्रविवक्षाया च, तस्याकर्तृत्वात् * * * ईश्वरकर्तृत्वसिद्धान्तस्य चायोगान् (*TC.* p. 1002)

16 जीवभावस्य प्रतिबिंबनरूपप्रवेशाधीनत्वेन, जीवरूपेण प्रवेशोक्त्ययोगाच्च (*TC.* p. 1002)

Rāmānuja's Interpretation

R. puts up the Pūrvapakṣa on behalf of Hiraṇyagarbha on the basis of the same text of *Chān. Up.* as S. viz., *Anena Jīvena ātmanā anupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaravāṇi.*[17] The difficulty, however, it that *"Jīva" being too wide a term* cannot, by itself, provide enough grist to sustain a Pūrvapakṣa on behalf of Hiraṇyagarbha.[18] He should have gone in for more specifically worded texts supporting the claims of Hiraṇyagarbha *as such.*

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17. यात्वियं नामरूपव्याकरणात्मिका प्रपंचव्यष्टिसृष्टि: सा किं समष्टिजीवरूपस्य हिरण्यगर्भस्यैव कर्मोत हिरण्यगर्भशरीरकस्य ब्रह्मण इतीदानीं चिन्त्यते। किं युक्तम्? समष्टिजीवस्येति। कुत:? अनेन जीवेनात्मना अनुप्रविश्य * * * इति जीवकर्तृकत्वश्रवणात् (*Śrībhāṣya* ii.4.17)

18. जीवशब्दमात्रेण हिरण्यगर्भप्राप्ते:? (*TC.* p. 1003)

CHAPTER XLIII

ELEMENTS OF WHICH PHYSICAL BODY IS COMPOSED

13. *Māmsādhikaraṇam* (ii.4.22-23)

The present *adhi.* goes into the question of the elements of which the physical body is composed and resolves the conflict of testimony regarding such composition.[1] The conflict leads to a serious doubt whether the body is composed entirely of one of the primal subtle elements of water, food (*annam*) and *tejas* or of all the three.[2] There are Śruti texts supporting each of these positions.

The *Kauṇḍinya Śruti* makes the following statement: "From water is all this born" and supports it with the reason: "Waters build up flesh and bones—nay the body as a whole. Therefore, the body is *all water*."[3] The following verse from the *Mahābhārata* also corroborates this by saying—"Flesh is a product of water and that is why gratification arises from the flesh."[4] For, it is the qualify of water to gratify by reducing heat.[5]

There is equal support for the other view that the body is composed of earth. The *Bṛh. Up.* (iii.2.13) says: When a man dies, his speech merges in Agni, breath in air, sight in the Sun, hearing in the

1. पूर्वं देहादे· कर्तोक्तः इहोपादानमुच्यत इति सगति· (*TC.* p. 1002)
2. किमाप्य: किवा पार्थिव, उत तंजसो, भूतत्रयात्मको वेति सन्देह: (*TP.* ii.4 22)
3 अद्भ्यो हीदमुत्पद्यते, आपो वाव मासमस्थि च भवन्त्याप: शरीरमाप एवेदं सर्वम् (Q. *MBSB.* ii.4.22)
4. अम्मयं तु यतो मासमतस्तृप्तिश्च मासत:
5 Cf. क्लेदनं पिण्डन तृप्तिः प्राणनाप्यायनोन्दनम्।
तापापनोदो भूयस्त्वमंभसो वृत्तयस्त्विमा: (*Bhāg.* ii.27, 45)
"Moistening, adhesion, satisfaction energisation, gratification, condensation, reducing of heat and preponderance—these are the properties of water". (Tr.)

quarters and the self enters Brahman."[6] Similarly, there is evidence for the third view that the body is composed wholly of Tejas. We read in the *A.B.* (vii.8): "The sacrificer becoming golden-bodied thro' Agni, the nourisher of the gods, on account of the offerings made by him, ascends to the heavenly worlds".[7] There is also support for the view that the physical body is composed of all the three elements (*Tejo 'banna*) and *not of only one of them* in its entirety: "Learn from me how each of these three divinities of *Tejas, ap* and *anna,* reaching the human becomes threefold" (*Chān. Up.* vi.4.7).

Pūrvapakṣa.

There is thus room for all the three Pūrvapakṣas. The first one in terms of water has its own claim to acceptance—as it is said the waters are the flesh. This cannot be rejected on the ground of opposition from other Śrutis as it is supported by a well-grounded reason that flesh provides gratification and this is the special attribute of water. The other view that the body is composed entirely of earth has its support in the Śruti—"the body merges in the earth" and this is reinforced by the fact that the body possesses the characteristics of hardness and odor. The third Pūrvapakṣa in favor of its being Taijasa in composition can be supported by the text cited and also because heat is felt in the body. The fourth view that it is composed of all the elements tho' voiced in the Śruti is not pressed as it cannot be reconciled with the other specific statements representing the body as one composed wholly of water, earth or *tejas.* As there is thus room for more than one view on the question, one cannot decide in favor of any one of them, without sufficient reason. When several persons are present in a room, one cannot make a special statement that Devadatta is present unless there is some special reason for so doing.[8] In the present case, there is nothing to choose between the different views. The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, concludes that as such conflict of views undermines the validity of the Śrutis, their Samanvaya in B. built on their foundations has no staying power.

Siddhānta

The Sūtra: *Māmsādi bhaumam yathāśabdam itarayośca* resolves this conflict of views and gives the correct solution of the difficulties

6. Ragh. *TPB.* construes *ātmā* here as *Jiva* (and *ākāśa* as Paramātman). The BD. does not agree and prefers to take *ātmā* in the sense of the Supreme B. in the body (merging in His *mūlarūpa*) and cites *Bṛh. Up.* C. in support.

7. सोऽग्नेर्देवयोन्या आहुतिभ्य सम्भूय हिरण्यशरीर ऊर्ध्वं स्वर्गलोकमेति (*Q. TP.* ii.4.22)

8. सर्वथा पृथ्वोऽपि न चतुर्णामपि मुक्तः शरीरे भूतानां मिश्रतायामप्युपेतायामापः शरीरमित्यादिविशेषोक्त्ययोगात्, विधवादेर। नहि बहुषु विद्यमानेषु कारणविशेष विनात्र देवदत्तो विद्यत इति विशेषोक्तिर्दृष्टा। न चात्र कारणविशेषं पश्यामः (TP. ii.4.22)

raised. It says: Whichever part of the body is hard (such as flesh and bone) only that much is to be recognized as composed of earth and not the entire body; for in the same body there are present products of water and *tejas*—such as blood and marrow.[9]

The Śruti clarifying the attributes of the elements composing the body says: Whatever is hard and offers resistance in the body is of earth; whatever is flowing is water; whatever feels hot is Tejas.[10] Only the fleshy part partakes of the nature of earth and *not* the whole body. It is only this way of explaining things that will conform to the position of the Śrutis (*yathāśabdam*). We have, therefore, to recognize the presence in the body of the products of water and tejas.[11]

M.'s C. clarifies how flesh etc. have been put down as constituted of earth etc. in the Sūtra, notwithstanding the statement of the Śruti: *Āpo vāva māmsam (flesh is of the essence of water). The clarification* is that even in the composition of the flesh, there are ingredients pertaining to the other two elements, as borne out by the evidence of the Śrutis: "The elements are really compounds. Flesh etc., in the body are necessarily composite products of earth, water and tejas. Hence they are called "*bhūtas*" (produced)—*Kāṣāyaṇa Śruti*. This is further clarified by the *Vāyuprokta:*

"Everything in the world is compounded of the five elements. However, a particular product is spoken of as a product of earth, or water as the case may be, from the point of view of one particular predominating element in its composition, in Vedic descriptions. A product is said to be of the earth on account of its possessing the properties of resistance, of water on account of transparence or of fire on account of its brilliance. Similar is the statement in regard to the bones".[12] (Cf. *Chān. Up.* vi.5.3).

The next Sūtra: *Vaiśeṣyāt tu tadvādas tadvādaḥ*[13] answers the question which follows from the above statements—"If the physical

9 मासादीति सावधारणम्। कार्यमिति शेष, अंगीकार्यमिति च। प्रस्तुतदेहस्थं मासाद्येव कठिन वस्तु भौमं पार्थिव; न सर्वशरीरम्। किंतु, इतरयोश्चाप्तैजसोश्च कार्यं यथाशब्दमगीकार्यम् (*TDP.* ii.4 22)

10 यत्कठिनं सा पृथिवी, यद् द्रवं ता आपो यदुष्णं तत् तेज (*Garbha Up.* 4).
(Q. M. *BSB.* ii.4.22)

11. मासाद्येव भौम, न सर्वं शरीरम्। अप्तेजसोश्च कार्यं यथाशब्दमगीकर्तव्यम् (*M. BSB.* ii.4.22)

12. पचभूतात्मकं सर्वं तदप्येकविवक्षया।
एकभूतात्मकत्वेन व्यवहारस्तु वैदिके॥
भौममित्येव काठिन्यात् शौक्ल्यादौदकमित्यपि
तेजिष्ठत्वात्तैजस च यथास्थ्ना वचनं श्रुतौ॥ (Q. M. *BSB.* ii.4 22)

13. The repetition of the last word marks the conclusion of the Adhyāya. For other purposes served by such *Dvirukti* see M. *BSB.* ii.4.23.

body is not composed of one single element, how are the specific descriptions of bodies as Pārthiva, Āpya and Taijasa (composed of earth, water or Tejas) found in scriptural literture to be explained *and in what proportion are the three elements to be understood to enter into composition to produce different types of bodies?*[14] The ablative *Vaiśeṣyāt* in the Sūtra is to be explained in an *elliptical sense* meaning 'from the point of view of the specific proportion of the elements in composition.[15]

भूतानां विशेषसंयोगादेव विशेषव्यवहारः । (M. *BSB.* ii.4.23)

The Bhāṣyakāra quotes relevant authorities clarifying the ratio of their composition in the different types of bodies spoken of, from the *Bṛhatsaṁhitā:*[16]

The bodies of the denizens of earth consist of earth by one half. Of the other half, three-fourths is composed of water and one-fourth of Tejas. Similar is the basis of composition of the bodies of the Taijasa and Āpya bodies of the denizens of Svarga[17] and of Varuṇaloka (and of the aquatic creatures).[18]

एवं चैकैकशरीरपरीक्षायां तत्र तत्र तस्य तस्य वैशिष्ट्यम् । संभूय शरीरत्रिके अंशगणनायामपामेव भूयस्त्वं चास्ति । तथाहि * * * एवं च मिलित्वा शरीरत्रिके दशांशयुक्ता आपः । अतः संभूय सर्वशरीरेष्वद्भ्यः पादद्वयोना पृथिवी पृथिव्याः पादद्वयोनं तेजः आपस्तु तेजसः पादचतुष्टयाधिकाः * *

(Vādiraja *TPG.* p. 118).

These details have not been given to us or so fully explained by any other Bhāṣyakāra. Vādirāja in his *TPG* has, therefore, paid a tribute to M. for his detailed treatment of this question and has in a special note thrown light on the teleological necessity of maintaining this proportion:

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14 पूर्वं स्मृतावेवविवक्षया विशिष्टव्यवहार इत्युक्तेरपि तत्तद्भूतविशेषसंयोगो हेतुरित्ययमेवार्थो ज्ञातव्य इत्यर्थः
(Ragh. *TPB.* ii.4.23)

15 वैशेष्यशब्दस्य स्वार्थे ष्यञन्तो वा, विशेषिणा भाव इति भावे ष्यञन्तो वा भूतानां धर्मिणां विशेषसंयोगपरः । पञ्चमी ल्यब्लोपनिमित्तेति सूचितम् (*BD.* ii.4.23)

16. पार्थिवानां शरीराणामर्धेन पृथिवी स्मृता ।
इतरेऽर्धे त्रिभागिन्य आपः, तेजस्तु भागतः ॥
इति सामान्यतो ज्ञेयं भेदाच्च प्रतिरूपकम् ।
स्वर्गस्थानां शरीराणामर्धं तेज उदाहृतम् ॥

17 अर्धं तेज, इतरेऽर्धे त्रिभागिन्य आपः, पृथिवी तु भागतः. (*TP.* ii.4.23)

18. एवं वरुणानां शरीरेऽर्धमापः, इतरेऽर्धे त्रिभागिनी पृथिवी, भागमात्रं तेज इत्यपि द्रष्टव्यम्
(*BD.* ii.4.23)

ननु, तेजसि त्रिभागिन्य आपः, अप्सु त्रिभागिनी पृथिवीति च कुतः कल्प्यत इति चेन्न । तैजसे पृथिव्यास्त्रिभागत्वेऽपामेकभागत्वे तेजस औष्ण्यवशात् पृथिवीभागस्य भस्मीभावः स्यात् । अतः तच्छ-मनायापामेव भागत्रयं वक्तव्यम् । आप्ये पृथिव्याः त्रिभागत्वाभावे मत्स्यादिशरीरेषु काठिन्यं न स्यात् । अतस्तत्रापि त्रिभागिनी पृथिवी । एवं च, गूढाभिसन्धेर्व्यासस्य चमत्कारं पंचरात्रवक्ता मूल-रूपी नारायण एव वेद । तत्प्रसादान्मध्वाख्यो भाष्यकारोऽपि वेद; येनोभयोर्हृदयमनुसन्धाय घटनेयं रचिता । (Vādirāja *TPG.* p. 119)

Śaṁkara's Interpretation.

According to S. the Sūtra: *Māmsādi bhauman yathāśabdam itarayośca* states that all elemental modifications such as of the flesh are products of the elements which have been subjected to the process of tripartition, with a view to presenting the subject matter of the next Sūtra: *Vaiśeṣyāt tu tadvādaḥ;*[19] so as to enable *that Sūtra* to make clear how if everything is the product of the three elements subjected to tripartition, these products are to be distinguished as this is Taijasa, that is Pārthiva and that is Āypa[20]—the answer being that such distinctions are to be explained on the basis of the predominant element in the composition of the substance in question.[21]

Criticism.

As flesh, marrow, bone, etc. are all products of the three subtle elements which have gone thro' the process of tripartition, the difficulty of distinguishing the precise constitution of products would follow from the very terms and circumstances of Trivṛtkaraṇa itself even without the Sūtra *Māmsādi* * * * * to bring it up for consideration. The objection as to how, in the circumstances, the products are to be classified as Āpya, Taijasa, etc. can of course be answered by the last Sūtra that such classification is based on the preponderance of the particular element in the constitution of the subsatnce in question. The second Sūtra *Māmsādi bhaumam* can thus be dispensed with, without any gap in thought and only the last Sūtra retained.[22]

The *Bhāmatī* has, however, tried to justify the retention of the second Sūtra on the ground that it is necessary to dispose of the con-

19 अत्र भाष्यकृतोत्तरसूत्रशेषतया सूत्रमेतद्विषयोपदर्शनपरतया व्याख्यातम् (*Bhāmatī* ii.4.21)

20. यदि सर्वमेव त्रिवृत्कृत भूतभौतिकमविशेषश्रुते', किंकृत तर्हि विशेषव्यपदेश', इद तेज इमा आप इदमन्नमिति । तथाध्यात्ममिदमन्नस्याशितस्य कार्यं मासादि, इदमपा पीताना कार्यं लोहितादीति अत्रोच्यते– (S. *BSB.* ii.4.22)

21. वैशेष्य भूयस्त्वमिति यावत् । सत्यपि त्रिवृत्करणे, क्वचित् कस्यचित् भूतधातोर्भूयस्त्वमुपलभ्यते । वैशेष्यादेव तेजोऽबन्नविशेषवादो भूतभौतिकविषय उपपद्यते (S. *BSB.* ii.4.22)

22. मासादेः त्रिवृत्कृतभूतकार्यत्वात्, सूत्रेण विनापि भूताना भौतेन त्रिवृत्कृतत्वमात्रेण मासादेरपि तेन त्रिवृत्कृतभूत-कार्यत्वेनाव्यवस्थाशकाया', भूयस्त्वेन व्यवस्थेति समाधेश्च सभवेन मासादिसूत्रस्य निष्फलत्वात् (*TC.* p. 1003b)

tentions of the Nyāya and Sāṁkhya philosophers that among the gross elements, the mind is an eternal substance and not a product while speech and mind are evolutes of Ahaṁkāratattva and not of *Tejas* and *annam*, as accepted in the Śruti-Siddhānta. The Sūtra: *Māmsādi bhaumam* * * * is intended to overthrow these objections.[23]

The wording of the Sūtra is ingeniously construed by Vācaspati to elicit such a meaning by treating *māmsādi* as an elliptical illustration to analogically establish that *just as* flesh etc., (i.e. marrow and blood) are products of earth etc. (i.e. Tejas and water), *even so* speech and mind are products of Tejas and *annam*.[25]

If the purpose of the Sūtra *Māmsādi* * * * is to establish as against the Nyāya and Sāṁkhya contentions that *Vāk* and *manas* are products of *Tejas* and *annam*, the question arises as to how the Sūtra speaks of flesh and others (*māmsādi*) instead of *Vāk* and *manas*. Vācaspati's answer to this is that as it is well-established and accepted without demur that flesh is a product of *annam*, by referring to marrow and blood along with flesh, the true nature of the origin of *Vāk* and mind (under dispute) from Tejas and *annam* can be established at one stroke.

Vācaspati's valiant attempt to dispose of Nyāya and Sāṁkhya contentions here is *not warranted in this Pāda* whose theme is nothing but removal of conflict of testimony from within the Śrutis.[26]

The Śrutis also are not against the position that the mind is an evolute of Ahaṁkāratattva as may be seen from the reference to the merger of all the *indriyas* in *Ahaṁkāratattva*, in the *Subālopaniṣad*:

इन्द्रियाणि तन्मात्रेषु, तन्मात्राणि भूतादौ लीयन्ते (Q. R. *Śrībhāṣya* i.4.27)

It is also surprising that in his eagerness to offer a fresh interpretation of this Sūtra, to avoid an obvious difficulty, Vācaspati should have failed to see that in the light of the fully articulated interpretation of the words of the Sūtra *Māmsādi bhaumam* given by him, the

23. शङ्कानिराकरणार्थत्वमस्य प्रकृत्य वक्तुम्–तथाहि, योऽन्नस्याणिष्ठो भागस्तन्मन तेजसस्तु योऽणिष्ठो भागः स वागिति । अत्र हि काणादाना साङ्ख्यानां चास्ति विप्रतिपत्तिः. तत्र काणादा मनो नित्यमाचक्षते, साङ्ख्यास्त्वाहङ्कारिके वाङ्मनसी । तदेतदनुपपत्तिस्थं–मांसादीति (*Bhāmatī* ii.4.21)

24. वाङ्मनसी इति वक्तव्ये मांसादिनिदर्शनं निदर्शनं सह मांसस्यान्नस्य दृष्टान्तताभाव (*Bhāmatī*)

25. यथा मांसादि भौमादि, एवं वाङ्मनसौ अपि तैजसभौमे इत्यर्थः (*Bhāmatī* ii.4.21)
As explained in the *Kalpataru* the term *ādi* after *māmsa* is intended to refer to marrow and blood, the products of Tejas and water.

26. शास्त्रान्तरविरोधपरिहारस्याप्रकृतत्वं (TC. p. 1003b)

succeeding words of the Sūtra: *Yathāśabdam itarayoḥ* become redundant.[27]

CONCLUSION

Taking a bird's eye view of the contents of the third and the fourth Pādas of this Adhyāya, Vādirāja brings out in a very impressive manner, how these two Pādas serve not only to stabilize the Samanvaya of Śrutis in B. by resolving all conflicts of testimony within the domain of the Śrutis, but directly also highlight the supreme majesty of B. thro' numerous adhikaraṇas, as the bestower of genesis thro' Parādhīnaviśeṣāpti even on eternal verities like space, Mukhya-Vāyu and Jīva, as the one truly beginningless and eternal principle ruling over the entire universe, controlling the Jīvas, being their Bimba and being the creator of the physical body, the senses and Mukhya-Prāṇa.[28]

He observes with deep feeling that this true significance of the Sūtrakāra's exposition can be felt in the very texture and disposition of the Sūtras. He also draws pointed attention to the fact that following the Sūtrakāra's lead, Madhva has in his *Aṇu-Bhāṣya* first of all shown how the contents of these two Pādas emphasize the supreme majesty of B. and then concluded the Pādārtha with the words:

(अत एव 'न वियदश्रुतेः,' 'एतेन मातरिश्वा व्याख्यातः' 'असंभवस्तु सतोऽनुपपत्तेः,' 'ज्ञोऽत एव' इत्याद्याकारेणैव सूत्ररचना) भाष्यकृताप्यणुभाष्ये—

'आकाशादि समस्तं च तज्जं तेनैव लीयते ।
सोऽनुत्पत्तिलयः, कर्ता जीवस्तद्वशगः सदा ।
तदाभासो, हरिः सर्वरूपेष्वपि समः सदा ।
मुख्यप्राणश्चेन्द्रियाणि देहश्चैव तदुद्भवः [29]
मुख्यप्राणवशे सर्वं स विष्णोर्वशगः सदा ।
सर्वदोषोज्झितः तस्माद् भगवान् पुरुषोत्तमः ।। (*Aṇubhāṣya* ii.)

इति प्रथमत एव निरूप्य–
अन्ते–

उक्ता गुणाश्चाविरुद्धाः तस्य वेदेन सर्वशः.[30] ।। इत्युक्तम् ।

27 सौत्रेण भौमशब्देन तैजसत्वाद्युपलक्षणे "यथा शब्दमितरयोः" इति व्यर्थम् (*TC.* p. 1003b)

28. इद पादद्वय न केवलं श्रुतिविरोधपरिहारद्वारा समन्वयाध्याय एवोपयोगि । किंतु, नित्यत्वेनाभिमतनभोजनकत्व-मुख्यवायुजनकत्वभगवदनादिनित्यत्वजगत्पालकत्वजीवनियामकत्वबिम्बत्वदेहेन्द्रियादिस्रष्टृत्वसर्वाधिकमुख्यप्राणस्रष्टृत्वादिमहामाहात्म्यमपि साक्षादेव प्रतिपादयितुमिति ज्ञेयम् (Vādirāja. *TPC.* p. 119)

29. *Ānandamālā* reads 'तदुद्भवा'

30. सर्वथा as read in *Ānandamālā*.

तृतीयाध्यायप्रथमपादीयसूत्रपाठः

* तदन्तरप्रतिपत्तौ रंहति संपरिष्वक्तः प्रश्ननिरूपणाभ्याम्

* त्र्यात्मकत्वात्तु भूयस्त्वात्

* प्राणगतेश्च

* अग्न्यादिगतिश्रुतेरिति चेन्न भाक्तत्वात्

* प्रथमेऽश्रवणादिति चेन्न ता एव ह्युपपत्तेः

* अश्रुतत्वादिति चेन्नेष्टादिकारिणां प्रतीतेः

* भाक्तं वानात्मवित्त्वात्तथाहि दर्शयति

* कृतात्ययेऽनुशयवान् दृष्टस्मृतिभ्याम्

* यथेतमनेवं च

* चरणादिति चेन्न तदुपलक्षणार्थेति कार्ष्णाजिनिः

आनर्थक्यमिति चेन्न तदपेक्षत्वात्

सुकृतदुष्कृते एवेति तु बादरिः

* अनिष्टादिकारिणामपि च श्रुतम्

संयमने त्वनुभूयेतरेषामारोहावरोहौ तद्गतिदर्शनात्

स्मरन्ति च

* अपि सप्त

* तत्रापि च तद्व्यापारादविरोधः

* विद्याकर्मणोरिति तु प्रकृतत्वात्

* न तृतीये तथोपलब्धेः

स्मर्यतेऽपि च लोके

दर्शनाच्च

तृतीये शब्दावरोधः संशोकजस्य

स्मरणाच्च

* तत्स्वाभाव्यापत्तिरुपपत्तेः

* नातिचिरेण विशेषात्

* अन्याधिष्ठिते पूर्ववदभिलापात्

अशुद्धमिति चेन्न शब्दात्

* रेतःसिग्योगोऽथ

* योनेःशरीरम्

III. SĀDHANA-ADHYĀYA

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

This Adhyāya considers the means of attaining Mokṣa. The science of B. expounded by Bādarāyaṇa consists of two broad parts or units of Adhyāyas. The substance of the entire Śāstra has been summed up in the three words of the opening Sūtra: *atha, ataḥ* and *Brahmajijñāsā* representing the means, the fruit and the subject of inquiry. The second Sūtra has defined B. and this definition has been elaborated in the first Adhyāya. Objections and opposition to the terms of this definition and to the conception of B. as set forth in the first Adhyāya have been met in the second Adhyāya. At this stage, the seeker of truth is bound to ask himself what he should do next. The answer is provided by this Adhyāya that he should now concern himself with the means of realizing B.[1] They are (i) *Vairāgya* or detachment from worldly attractions (ii) *Bhakti* or devotion to B. (iii) pursuit of Śravaṇa, manana and other forms of Upāsanā conducive to the birth of (iv) direct vision of B. (*Aparokṣajñāna*).

It may be interposed that as Mokṣa is the aim of the Śāstra, and as its attainment depends entirely on the pursuit of Sādhanas, priority of attention should have been given to the treatment of Sādhanas, with absorbing interest, at the very commencement of Bādarāyaṇa's work. The *TD* answers this point by saying that this may be so *if Mokṣa has been conceived in Bādarāyaṇa's philosophy as depending solely on the efficiency of Sādhanas*—as in the system of the Karma-Mīmāmsakas.

1. अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति सूत्रे संक्षेपेण शास्त्रार्थे सूचिते, किं तत् ब्रह्मेति शकाया, तत्स्वरूप द्वितीयसूत्रे निगदितम्। तदध्यायशेषेण समर्थितम्। तद्विरोधाश्च द्वितीये परिहृताः। एव चेत् किं मया कार्यमित्याशकाया अथब्रह्मजिज्ञासा-पदाभ्यां मोक्षसाधनानि विहितानि तेषा साधनानामस्मिन्नध्याये विचारो वर्तिष्यते। (*TP.* iii. 1.1)

But we have seen how in the Vedānta system not only the fulfilment of the Sādhanas but the very realization of their own intrinsic nature and of their Svarūpānanda by the Jīvas, in Mokṣa are, *in the last analysis*, dependent on the grace of B.[2] It should be clear from this that the subject of Sādhanas can come up only after the true nature of B. has been fully understood by the Seeker.[3] It is for this reason that Bādarāyaṇa has given the first place to the exposition of the real nature and attributes of B. After upholding the correctness of his views on B. by refuting possible objections and counter-theories, in the greater part of the second Adhyāya, he has concluded with an appropriate discourse on the privileged position of Mukhya-Prāṇa and his role in forwarding the efforts of Adhikarins in earning the grace of B. *The Sādhana-Adhyāya is, thus, rightly placed where it ought to be.*[4]

The Sādhanas begin with Vairāgya and find their fruition in Aparokṣajñāna or immediate vision of B. which is to be attained thro' Upāsanā or deep contemplation and or rumination of Śāstrārtha. Such Upāsanā helps to neutralize the effects of Karma and Vāsanās. The way of Upāsanā is thro' Bhakti; for B. does not reveal itself to the meditations of those who have no consuming love for B. Such complete devotion to B. can be developed only in an atmosphere of serene Vairāgya[5] or non-attachment to worldly values. A mind given to worldly pursuits is not a congenial soil for Bhakti to take root and sprout. Vairāgya is thus the *sine qua non* of true and purposeful spiritual life. These four Sādhanas are thus progressive steps leading to Mokṣa. They are, accordingly, dealt with in the four Pādas of the present Adhyāya.[6]

However, as Vairāgya is an attitude of the mind it cannot be imposed from without by way of a command to be executed. It can only be awakened in the heart of the seeker by creating a propitious climate. This is sought to be done in the opening Pāda by focussing attention on the limitations and miseries of transmigratory life, the sojourns in heaven and hell and the travails of birth and death. Thinking men and women may be expected to outgrow their attachment to this life

2. यत्तु नारायणप्रसादादेव हि मोक्ष तत्साधनानुष्ठानं वा ब्रूम. (TD. iii. 1.1)

3. यत्प्राप्तिरूपो मोक्षः यद्विषयाणि च साधनान्यनुष्ठेयानि विधीयन्ते, यद्दर्शनं च साक्षान्मोक्षसाधनं सत् तत्स्वरूप-निर्धारणायत्तं, यदिच्छया च सर्वं, स एव नारायणः प्रथमविचार्यः (*ibid*)

4. तद्गुणपूर्तिविरोधे च परिहृयमाणे, प्राणस्वरूपपरीक्षायां प्राप्तायां तद्याथात्म्यसंवेदनेन तद्देवताप्रसादमापाद्य यतमानस्य वैराग्यादि तत्प्राप्त्युपायश्चिन्त्यत इत्यतिसुन्दरम् (*TD.* iii.1.1)

5. सा चैकान्तिकी विना सम्यग्वैराग्यान्न परिपच्यते (*ibid*)

6. साधनानामानुपूर्व्येण वैराग्यभक्तिविचारजनितोपास्तिज्ञानानां निरूपणपरं तृतीयाध्यायम् (*STC.* p. 6)

and the rewards of heaven etc. after realizing their shortcomings and worthlessness.[7] Hence, the detailed review of these experiences in this Pāda:

साधनविचारोऽत्राध्यायः । वैराग्यार्थं गत्यादिनिरूपणा प्रथमपादे (M. *BSB.* iii.1.1)

According to M., there are twenty adhikaraṇas in the Vairāgya Pāda. These may be brought under five homogeneous units (*peṭikās*). The first six adhi.s establish that there is no isolation of the Jīvātman from the elements at death or in his peregrinations after. This means that without the practice of Sādhanas, the Jīvātman cannot shake off the envelopment of the elements and attain Mokṣa which is freedom from the Prākṛtic bonds. The second unit of two *adhi.s* establishes the indispensability of Vairāgya and other Sādhanas by showing that Mokṣa cannot be achieved thro' Karma or other means. The third unit of three *adhi.s* deals with the return of Jīvas to rebirth. The next deals with the punishment of sinners in various hells. The last five *adhi.s* refer to the vicissitudes of returning Jīvas and their passing from the father's seed into the mother's womb to take birth. The *STC* has given expressive titles of Bhūtapeṭikā, Gatipeṭikā, Āgatipeṭika, Pāpapeṭika and Puṇyapāpapeṭikā to the foregoing units. All the adhi.s of this Pāda are naturally expected to converge on the point of Vairāgya by demonstrating its indispensability thro' well-chosen Pūrvapakṣas and their refutation. Any interpretation of any of the *adhi.s* which is unable to pass this test will have to forfeit its claim to our acceptance.

7. गत्यादेः खलु दुःखस्वरूपता श्रुत्वा भावयतोऽधिकारिणः स्वर्गादावपि रागो विच्छिद्यत इति भावः
(*TP.* iii. 1.1)

VAIRĀGYA PĀDA

CHAPTER XLIV

JĪVAS NOT COMPLETELY ISOLATED FROM ELEMENTS AT DEATH

1. *Tadantarādhikaraṇam* (iii.1.1)

This adhi. justifies the need for Vairāgya and other Sādhanas by making it clear that the Jīvātman is not released from Samsāra automatically at death.[1] Death in its accepted sense is not equivalent to becoming free from the envelopment of the elements and attaining release. The Sādhanas designed to help in the attainment of Mokṣa cannot, therefore, be dispensed with. *Till final release is attained, the Jīvātman remains enveloped by the elements* and goes out of the physical body at death *still enveloped by the elements, in part,* to secure further embodiment.[2] It should be clear from this that as Mokṣa is to be attained thro' a set of causes entirely different from death in the ordinary sense of the term, the subject of Sādhanas is bound to be very much alive and meaningful. This *adhi.* in effect emphasizes the indispensability not only of Vairāgya to begin with but of the other Sādhanas as well, in its wake, for the attainment of Mokṣa.[3]

Pūrvapakṣa

M. accordingly takes his stand on a suitable text from the *Varāha Purāṇa* to provide a *significant Pūrvapakṣa.* The text chosen equates

1 स्वाभाविकमरणमेव मुक्तिरिति न मन्तव्यम् (*NV.* iii. 1 1)

2 शरीरान्तरप्रतिपत्तौ भूतपरिष्वक्त एव गच्छति (M. *BSB.* iii. 1.1)

3 भूतपरिष्वक्तता मरणानन्तरं मरणोत्पन्नया मोक्षस्य मरणातिरिक्तकारणजन्यत्वं प्रदर्श्य, साधनविचारस्य प्रयोजकत्वप्रतिपादनात्मकमिदमधिकरणं स्वर्गादिगतिनिरूपणतो वैराग्यादिसाधनप्रतिपादनात्मकं च भवति

(*TD.* ibid)

bondage with the Jīva's envelopment by the subtle material elements and Mokṣa or release as getting free from such involvement.[4] On the basis of this, the Pūrvapakṣa is introduced that as dissociation from this environment occurs at death—as is confirmed by another passage from the *Mbh.* which says that death is the Soul's escape from the elements[5] and birth its intimate association with them,—it may be concluded that as death is natural and inevitable to man and as it does not stand in need of any special Sādhanas to be brought about, there is no compelling necessity to prescribe or to practise any of the Sādhanas to attain Mokṣa and that, therefore, the Sādhanādhyāya itself is uncalled for.

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta takes its stand on the famous text of the *Chān. Up.* (v.3, 3) where the question is asked: Do you know in what order, manner and form the fifth oblation—viz. "water" comes to be called "man" and the answer is given (v.4-9) "For this reason and in this way water is called 'man' ". The context is that of the Pañcāgni-Vidyā in the *Chān. Up.* where heaven, Parjanya, this world, father and mother are metaphorically conceived as the five fires thro' which the transit of the Jīva is effected by the gods till he passes to the mother's womb. The transits are viewed as so many oblations offered by the gods.[6]

It is gathered from this account that there is really no isolation at all of the elements from the Jīvātman at death or subsequent to it, during his peregrinations. The expression "waters" is to be taken to signify the Jīvātman enveloped by "water" and the other elements too.[7]

This point is this: tho' Mokṣa is the complete isolation of the Jīva from all his material envelopments there is no such complete isolation from them when the Jīva makes his usual exit from the body at death. The prepositions *sam-pari* (*ṣvaktaḥ*) in the Sūtra are intended to show that the envelopment by the subtle material elements persists till final Mokṣa. The objection may be taken that as the elements have fulfilled their function of providing means of enjoyment of life, there is no need to assume their accompanying the Jīvas beyond death. This is met by pointing out that the continued association with the

4 'भूतबन्धस्तु ससारो मुक्तिस्तेभ्यो विमोचनम्'।

5 'भूताना विनिवृत्तिस्तु मरण समुदाहृतम्'।

6 स्वर्गलोकादीना योषिदन्ताना पञ्चाना पञ्चाग्नित्व वर्णयित्वा तत्र तत्र देवैर्जीवस्य प्रापणमाहुतित्वेन वर्णयित्वा, स्वर्गादिर्वाक् क्रमेणागतस्य जीवस्य योषिदग्नौ रेतोरूपेण जीवप्रापणरूपाया पचमाहुतौ कृतायामित्यर्थः (*Vādirāja TPG.* p. 120-21)

7. मरणानन्तर जीवेन सह गता', पुन.सहागता भूतत्रयात्मिका आपः पुरुषशब्दवाच्या भवन्तीति (*BD.* iii. 1.1)
अप्शब्द तद्युक्तजीवोपलक्षक (Raghu. *TPB*)

elements is essential for the acquisition of subsequent births and bodies.[8] This significant detail emerges from the conclusion of the dialogue between Śvetaketu and Pravāhaṇa in the *Chān Up.* to which special reference is made in the wording of the Sutra: *Tadantarapratipattau raṁhati sampariṣvaktaḥ praśnanirūpaṇābhyām.* The locative *pratipattau* is to be understood as signifying purpose: *tādarthye saptamī:* After death, the Jīva goes inextricably enveloped by the subtle elements so that he can get into another body (*BD*).

WATER IS COMPOUNDED OF ALL THE THREE ELEMENTS

2. *Tryātmakatvādhikaraṇam* (iii.1.2)

In the previous *adhi.* we had only a general statement that the Jīva goes out (*raṁhati*) at death fettered by the elements (*sampariṣvaktaḥ*). It is not clear from this if his envelopment is by *all the subtle material elements or by only one of them.*

The Pūrvapakṣa is that only the waters envelop the outgoing Jīva as this is supported by a specific reference in the Sruti. Otherwise, we should expect there the use of the term "elements" (*bhūtaiḥ*) instead of "waters". The upshot of the Pūrvapakṣa is that as the outgoing Jīva is not enveloped by all the elements and as a single element enveloping him will not be in a position to form a new body for him, death will automatically end his Samsāra and release him. The Sādhanas can, therefore, be dispensed with.

This is refuted by the Sūtra: *Tryātmakatvāttu bhūyastvāt* which means: the outgoing Jīva is indeed enveloped by one and all of the subtle elements. The specific reference to waters is due to the fact that (i) 'Water' is a compound of the three elements—fire, water and earth; and (ii) the proportion of water in all the three kinds of bodies (Pārthiva, Āpya and Taijasa) taken together, is greater than of the other two.[9] This is supported by the authority of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*

तापापनोदो भूयस्त्वमंभसो वृत्तयस्त्विमाः (iii.27.45)[10]

SUBTLE ELEMENTS GO WITH JĪVA AND PRĀṆAS

3. *Prāṇagatyadhikaraṇam* (iii.1.3)

This *adhi.* meets the objection that it is not possible to hold that all the subtle elements accompany the Jīva at death, as the evidence

8. न च वाच्यम्-भूतानां शरीरे भावात् प्रधान परिमाणत्वात् सर्वं जीवेन सहगमनमिति । शरीरान्तरप्राप्त्यर्थत्वा-दिति भाव. (*TD.* iii.1.11)

The pronoun *Tad* in '*Tadantara...*' refers to the 'body' alluded to in Sūtra ii.4. 22-23.

9. This point has already been elucidated under B.S. ii.4.23.

10. *See* P. 353 fn. 5 for translation of the verse.

on this point is inconclusive. The statement regarding the waters becoming man in the fifth oblation does not expressly say that all the subtle elements go with the self. At best, it is only a presumption which will have to be corroborated by some other specific evidence.[11] As no such evidence is available, it follows that death in the natural course is Mokṣa. This makes the Sādhanas quite unnecessary.

The Siddhānta establishes that all the subtle elements do accompany the Jīva and that this can be corroborated by reasoning thro' the premise of the established concomitance between the presence of the elements and the senses (*Prāṇāḥ*).[12] The Śrutis also affirm that the Prāṇas accompany the outgoing Jīva.[13] Putting these facts together, it can safely be deduced that all the subtle elements necessarily accompany the outgoing Jīva.[14] The need for the Sādhanas thus remains unaffected.

MERGER OF PRĀṆAS IS ONLY IN PART

4. *Agnyādigatyadhikaraṇam* (iii.1.4)

This *adhi.* answers the further objection that there is no proof that the elements go out along with the Prāṇas accompanying the Jīva at death. For the Śruti (*Bṛh. Up.* iii.2.13) speaks of the Prāṇas of the outgoing self being merged in their respective deities. This makes it impossible for these subtle elements to go enveloping the Jīvas. The concluding part of the Sūtra (*bhāktatvāt*)[15] answers this point by clarifying that the merger of the Prāṇas mentioned in the Sruti is only *in part*. These parts rejoin the self at its next embodiment. This is seen from statements to the effect in the *Brahma Purāṇa* and others.[16]

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11 आर्थिककल्पनायाश्च विशेषप्रमाणमन्तरेणासंभवात् (*TP.* iii.1.3)

12 अस्ति तावत् भूतानामिन्द्रियाणां चाविनाभावः 'यत्र वाव भूतानि तत्र करणानि' इति (भाल्लवेय) श्रुतेः (*TP.* iii. 1.3)

13. प्राणानां चास्ति जीवेन सह गतिः–'करणैर्वाव न वियुज्यते' इति श्रुतेः (*TP. ibid*)

14 प्राणगतेस्तदविनाभूतभूतानां चास्ति जीवेन सह गतिरिति ज्ञायत इति भाव. (*TP. ibid*)

15 The derivation and explanation of this term is the same as given already under B S. ii. 3 16.

16 न प्राणानां जीवेन सह गतिरिति चेन्न । भागतोऽग्न्यादिप्राप्तेः–

पुरुषस्य मृतौ ब्रह्मन् प्राणा भागत एव तु ।
अधिदैवं प्राप्नुवन्ति भागतोऽनुव्रजन्ति तम् ।
पुनः शरीरसंप्राप्तौ तमेवानुविशन्ति च ॥
इति ब्राह्मे (*M. BSB.* iii. 1.4)

ब्रह्माण्डे च—

मृतिकाले जहत्येनं प्राणा भूतानि पञ्च च ।
भागतो भागतस्त्वेनमनुगच्छन्ति सर्वशः ॥
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5. *Prathamādhikaraṇam* (iii.1.5)

This *adhi.* arises by way of an objection against the view that the subtle elements accompany the Jīva at death. The objection is that the passage from the *Chān. Up.* merely says that by way of the first oblation, the Devas offer the Jīva clad in 'faith': *Tasmin etasmin agnau Devāḥ śraddhām juhvati.* The text does not mention anything about the elements also being offered together with the Śraddhā-clad Jīva. This shows the elements have not gone up with the Jīva and have been left behind.[17] As this isolation of the Jīva from them is itself Mokṣa, there can be no more need for Sādhanas.

The objection is refuted by pointing out that it is clear from the wording of the concluding statement (*upasamhāra*) that it is the elements which have kept company with the Jīva clad in Śraddhā, at the time of the first oblation that, after passing thro' the subsequent oblations, are referred to as emerging at the fifth oblation, with the Jīva, under the name of "man"[18]. The wording *Āpah Puruṣavacaso bhavanti* shows that the waters (i.e. elements in general) have been in the picture right from the beginning. It will not be doing justice to the concluding statement to construe it in the sense that during his downward journey, after the last oblation, the Jīva *acquires* tenement in a body freshly constituted by all the elements signified by the use of the term 'Āpaḥ' and that, therefore, this statement is not competent to prove that all the elements have been (in part) *keeping company with him right thro'*.[19] Such a construction cannot be put on the concluding passage *Pañcamyām āhutau āpaḥ Puruṣavacaso bhavanti* (i) because it is *not* said at the beginning of this section that the Jīva *relinquishes* all contact with the subtle elements, once for all, at the time of his going up,[20] and (ii) because the text does not also say that the Jīva merely comes into contact with the waters (and other elements) *for the first time*, (again after death) at the final oblation.[21] In that case, we should expect some such statement as (*Tasya āhutir*) *āpas sambhavanti* as in the earlier cases of *somo rājā sambhavati, Varṣas sambhavati*, etc. The divergence in wording viz. *Āpaḥ Puruṣavacaso bhavanti* shows that as there can be no *anuvāda* in the *Upasaṁhāravākya* in terms of (*Tā*) *āpaḥ* (Cf. *tā eva hi* in the Sūtra) of what has *not* been "given" in the

17 यदा गृह्णातीति तपसाप्तो भूतं, न भूतानि गृह्णातीति जनो नेति चेन्न (M. *BSB.* iii. 1.5)

18 Cf. श्रद्धामयोऽयं पुरुषः (*Gītā.* xvii. 3).

19 न चाप्यनन्तरमार्गविषयत्वमुपसंहारस्य वाच्यम् (*TP.* iii. 1.5)

20 तदुपसंहारस्य जननमार्गविषयत्वे तर्हि मरणानन्तरं भूतानां जीवेन सह गमनाभावमिदमर्थं 'उत्क्रान्तो भूतानि त्यजति' इति वक्तव्यं स्यात् (Raghu. *TPB.* iii. 1.5)

21 Cf. अन्यत्र सोमादिवदुत्पत्तिवचनेऽपि तत्र 'आपः भवन्ति' इत्यन्याहृत्य भवनाभिधानाद् नामधेयोऽपि निरस्तः (Rāgh. *TPB.* iii. 1.5)

Upakrama-vākya,[22] it must be *the same* 'Śraddha-oriented-person' clad in the waters (and other elements)[23] that comes to acquire the appellation of "man" at the completion of the fifth oblation. This proves that the elements have accompanied the Jīva, in part. Hence, the need for Sādhanas to be completely rid of them, to attain Mokṣa, remains unaffected.

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23. Cf. अयं खलु शब्दोऽजहल्लक्षणया श्रद्धया अद्भिश्च युक्त जीवमाह। तत्कुत ? उपसहारे अपा जीवेन सह गतिश्रवणात् तदनुसारेणैवोपक्रमार्थकथने तदुपपत्ते· (*TP.* iii. 1.5)

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24 यथा खलु प्राणानामग्न्यादिगति साक्षात् श्रूयते तथा श्रुत्यभावात् आर्थिकश्रवणादपि नियमेन प्रत्यक्षश्रुत्यभावस्य बलवत्त्वात्। सति हि विशेषश्रवणे युक्तयोऽपि प्रवर्तन्ते (*TP.* iii.1.6)

25 It is Vādirāja who brings up this point:—
यद्यपि 'अग्न्यादिश्रुते' रिति सूत्रे भाष्ये च भागतो जीवगतेरार्थिकत्वेनाभिप्रेतत्वेऽपि साक्षात् भागतोऽग्न्यादिप्राप्तेरेवोक्तत्वात् पुनराशका। स्मृतौ भागतो जीवेन सहगतेः स्पष्टमुक्तत्वेऽपि श्रुतावनुक्तत्वाच्च श्रुतिमीमासायां प्रवृत्तस्य सूत्रकारस्य पुनरारम्भ इति भावेनोक्तम्–प्रत्यक्षाश्रवणादिति (*TPG.* p. 121-22)

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19 न चायमनन्तावधिसम्परिष्वङ्गपरत्वं वाक्यस्य (*TP.* iii. 1.5)

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and claim that death marks the end of Samsāra and that for this reason the Sādhanas have no *locus standi*.

The Siddhānta rejects these pleas. Even a conclusion derived as a natural corollary from other data is competent to set aside a purely negative evidence.[26] A person partaking of *unwholesome food* cannot, for that reason, be said to be eating 'nothing'. Corollaries do not operate in a vacuum. They rest on Vyāpti and presence of the probans in the *pakṣa*. In the present case, such evidences *have been given*[27]

Apart from this, the concluding part of the Sūtra: *Iṣṭādikāriṇām pratīteḥ* (iii.1.6) refers to a *positive evidence from the Śruti itself*, in this respect—"The elements do not forsake the one who performs sacrifices and such other acts (*iṣṭādikārin*). He goes with the elements. He enjoys with the elements. He is born again with them and does good and evil with them". (*Kauṇṭharavya Śruti.* Q. M. *BSB.* iii.1.6). This settles the question once for all and establishes the indispensability of Sādhanas for the attainment of Mokṣa.[28]

JUSTIFICATION FOR SEVERAL ADHIKARAṆAS ON THE SAME TOPIC.

Tho' all these six *adhi.s* establish the same point that all the elements accompany the Jīva at death, each succeeding one is rendered necessary by the exigency of a different *adhikāśaṅkā*.[29] This point has been well brought out by Raghūttama Tīrtha in his *TPB*. To illustrate: The first adhi. establishes that the elements accompany the Jīvas, as may be seen from the question and answer. But then, in the wording of the question and the answer thereto there is mention only of the waters. The objection is sure to arise as to how it can be taken as evidence of all the elements accompanying the Jīva. This gives rise to the second *adhi.* It clears the point by showing that the expression 'waters' is to be understood in a wider sense embracing the other elements and that this is because water is compounded of all the three subtle elements and its overall proportion is greater among the three types of bodies taken together. A fresh objection is now raised that notwithstanding these considerations, it cannot be assumed that all the elements accompany the Jīva, unless there is some special evidence in favor of such an assumption. This kind of evidence is cited by the

26. भाविकल्पकस्याप्यबलबाधकत्वात् (*TP.* iii. 1.6)

27. [illegible] (*TP.* ibid)

28. [illegible] (*STC.* iii. 1.6)

29. [illegible] (*TP.* iii. 1.6)

third *adhi.* in the form of a corollary from the concomitance between the elements and Prāṇas. It may also be objected *inter alia* that as the corollary drawn from the concomitance between the elements and the Prāṇas will be *sufficient to establish that the term "waters" figuring in the question and the answer is to be understood in a broader sense of all the elements, the second *adhi.* will turn out to be superfluous. But a litte reflection will how that even a collateral corollary can be pressed into service to prove what is *plausible*. This plausibility is confirmed by the fact of the waters being compounded of all the elements and their (waters') proportionate preponderance, in the manner indicated in the second adhi. The third *adhi.* cannot, therefore, be dispensed with as superfluous. The fourth *adhi.* necessitates a fresh inquiry due to an *adhikāśaṅkā* that the assumption of the elements accompanying the Jīva is not sustainable as the reasons presupposed in the third *adhi.* are inadmissible; for the evidence of Śruti shows that the Prāṇas merge in their sources (viz. fire, etc.) which shows they cannot be accompanying the Jīvas. This in its turn upsets the presumption of the elements going with the Jīvas. These objections are suitably answered by the fourth *adhi.* The nature of *adhikāśaṅkās* in the fifth and the sixth *adhi.s* also have been similarly explained and shown to necessitate fresh *adhi.s* in Raghu's *TPB*.

Another objection has been anticipated by Vādirāja in his *TPG*. The sixth adhi. furnishes explicit evidence that all the subtle elements accompany the Jīva at death. *Will this not suffice to sweep away* the multifarious objections raised in the previous *adhi.s*? Why then should the Sūtrakāra not have played this trump card at the outset and *done away with the rest of the adhi.s?* Because, he is *not a dogmatist* —answers Vādirāja. The employment of reason plays an important part in the Sūtrakāra's methodology. Objections and counter-objections have to be thrashed out in a meaningful discussion of any topic. It is for this reason the Sūtrakāra has proceeded in a logical way to arrive at his *chosen positions in* a manner that would convince 'Yuktirasikas' also. The present context is no exception. Here, the Sūtrakāra has first harmonized the opening and concluding statements, regarding the elements' accompanying the Jīva and elucidated it in the first three *adhi.s.* Between them and the last *adhi.* he has interposed two more *adhi.s in which reasons* derived from the Śrutis are utilized to support the Siddhānta.[30]

30 युक्त्या श्रुतिविचारात्मकमीमासाया प्रवृत्त सूत्रकारो युक्तिरसिकत्वात् युक्त्या 'इति तु पचाम्यामाहुतौ' इति श्रुतेः पूर्वोत्तरविरोध परिहृत्यार्थसमर्थनाय * * त्रिसूत्रीमसूत्रयत्। तत्सहगन्तृप्राणाविनाभूतत्वादिति श्रौतयुक्त्या च भूताना जीवेन सह गतिसमर्थनार्थं 'प्राणगतेश्च' 'अग्न्यादिश्रुते' रित्यधिकरणद्वय मध्ये निबबन्ध। एवं च स्वस्य यौक्तिकशिरोमणित्वप्रदर्शनायादावधिकरणपचक प्रपचितवानिति (*Vādirāja TPG. p. 122*)

The question is raised in the *STC* also. It says the same subject may be discussed in more than one *adhi.*, if the point at issue in each one is distinct or when the discussion serves distinctive purposes. In the present case, each successive *adhi.* strengthens the Siddhānta position that it must be admitted that all the subtle elements accompany the Jīva. The first *adhi.* is a prelude to all those following, emphasizing the indispensability of Sādhanas as such. The second deals with the fact of the Jīvas being accompanied by all the elements. The third supplies material evidence on the point. The fourth shows there is no conflict of testimony on this point. The fifth draws attention to the superiority of the Upsaṁhāravākya in deciding the question.[31] The *STC* adds further that even if one is reluctant to accept distinctiveness of subject matter in these *adhi.s*, there is authority of precedent from the Pūrva Mīmāmsā to have different *adhi.s* on the same subject where supervening doubts justify it:—

'पुनश्च प्रापकाद्धेतोस्तत्राधिकरणान्तरम्'

Such supervening doubts have been indicated then and there in respect of these *adhi.s*.

31. किमत्र विषयभेदस्याभावादधिकरणारम्भ प्रतिषिध्यते, उत प्रयोजनाभावात् ? आद्ये, भूतमहगमनस्यप्रमेयैवयेन वैयर्थ्यशकने, फलपेटिकाया मक्षपेटिकायाश्च पूर्वतंत्रे, इह पचाधिकरण्याश्च तच्छ्का स्यात् * * न द्वितीय: * * आद्ये समस्तोपादानतत्वेन साधनावश्यकताया , द्वितीये भूतत्रयमहगमनस्य, तृतीये तत्र मूलप्रमाणस्य, चतुर्थे बाधकाभावस्य, पचमे उपसंहारप्राबल्यस्य च विषयस्य भेदेन न तत्राप्यन्येनान्यस्य गतार्थता (*STC*. iii. 1.6)

CHAPTER XLV

PLACE AND ROLE OF KARMA AMONG SĀDHANAS DEFINED

7. *Bhāktādhikaraṇam* (iii.1.7)

This *adhi.* establishes the indispensability of Vairāgya and other Sādhanas for the attainment of Mokṣa by showing that it is not within the competence of Karma as such to be the direct means of attaining Mokṣa.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that Karma is directly the means of attaining Mokṣa. This is clear from Śrutis like "We have drunk Soma (in the sacrifices) and have become immortal" (*R.V.* vii.48.3) "Inexhaustible merit accrues to one who offers the Cāturmāsya sacrifice" (*Ā. Ś.S.* viii.1.1). As Mokṣa is thus said to be attained thro' such Karma, without the aid of other Sādhanas like Vairāgya etc., the latter are not indispensable and can be dispensed with. Where is the need for anyone to climb a mountain to collect honey when the same can be had from one's own beehive at home?[1]

The Siddhānta shows the indispensability of Sādhanas as such by elucidating how Śrutis like *Apāma somam amṛtā abhūma* quoted for the Pūrvapakṣa can be made consistent with the indispensability of the Sādhanas recommended by the Śāstra.

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1. Cf. अक्के चेन्मधु विन्देत किमर्थं पर्वत व्रजेत् ?
इष्टस्यार्थस्य ससिद्धो को विद्वान् यत्नमाचरेत् ?

2 मन्वन्तराद्यवच्छिन्नकालेषु मरणरहितत्वरूपगुणयोगेनामृता इवामृता इति गौणार्थतया (Raghu. *TPB.* iii. 1 7)

This is shown by term भाक्तम् in the Sūtra which means: भागविषयम् i.e. गौणम् (*TDP*).

The question is raised in the *STC* also. It says the same subject may be discussed in more than one *adhi.*, if the point at issue in each one is distinct or when the discussion serves distinctive purposes. In the present case, each successive *adhi.* strengthens the Siddhānta position that it must be admitted that all the subtle elements accompany the Jīva. The first *adhi.* is a prelude to all those following, emphasizing the indispensability of Sādhanas as such. The second deals with the fact of the Jīvas being accompanied by all the elements. The third supplies material evidence on the point. The fourth shows there is no conflict of testimony on this point. The fifth draws attention to the superiority of the Upsaṁhāravākya in deciding the question.[31] The *STC* adds further that even if one is reluctant to accept distinctiveness of subject matter in these *adhi.s*, there is authority of precedent from the Pūrva Mīmāmsā to have different *adhi.s* on the same subject where supervening doubts justify it:—

'पुनश्च प्रापकाद्धेतोस्तत्राधिकरणान्तरम्'

Such supervening doubts have been indicated then and there in respect of these *adhi.s*.

31. किमत्र विषयभेदस्याभावादधिकरणारम्भः प्रतिषिध्यते, उत प्रयोजनाभावात्? आद्ये, भूतसहगमनस्यप्रमेयैक्येन वैयर्थ्यशंकने, फलपेटिकाया भक्षपेटिकायाश्च पूर्वतन्त्रे, इह पञ्चाधिकरण्याश्च तच्छंका स्यात् * * न द्वितीयः * * आद्ये समस्तांगाग्रातत्वेन साधनावश्यकताया, द्वितीये भूतत्रयसहगमनस्य, तृतीये तत्र मूलप्रमाणस्य, चतुर्थे बाधकाभावस्य, पञ्चमे उपसंहारप्राबल्यस्य च विषयस्य भेदेन न तत्राप्यन्येनान्यस्य गतार्थता (*STC*. iii. 1.6)

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1 Cf. अक्के चेन्मधु विन्देत किमर्थं पर्वत व्रजेत् ?
इष्टस्यार्थस्य ससिद्धौ को विद्वान् यत्नमाचरेत् ?

2 मन्वन्तराद्यवच्छिन्नकालेषु मरणरहितत्वरूपगुणयोगेनामृता इवामृता इति गौणार्थतया
(Raghu. *TPB.* iii. 1.7)
This is shown by term भाक्तम् in the Sūtra which means: भागविषयम् i.e. गौणम् (*TDP*).

(i) If the Karma contemplated in *Apāma somam* and such other texts is what is recognized as *Sakāmakarma* (or what is done with the avowed object of securing transient personal benefits like heavenly rewards) the immortality spoken of in the Śrutis as attained by such Karma will have to be understood in a metaphorical sense (*gauṇārtha*) of lasting till the time of the periodical dissolution of the great elements:

आभूतसंप्लवं स्थानममृतत्वं हि भाष्यते

This is because it is categorically affirmed in the Śrutis that Mokṣa cannot be attained by any means other than Aparokṣajñāna:

नान्यः पन्था अयनाय विद्यते

(ii) On the other hand, if these Karmas like Jyotiṣṭoma or even bigger sacrifices like Aśvamedha are performed as Niṣkāma-Karmas without the desire for heavenly rewards and solely as worship of B.[3] there are *two ways* in which they can be reconciled with the indispensability of Sādhanas like Vairāgya, Bhakti, Upāsanā and Aparokṣa. (a) If such forms of Niṣkāma Karma are those performed by Sādhakas *still on the path of inquiry* (Jijñāsus), the immortality associated with such (Niṣkāma) Karmas will of course be the highest one. Nevertheless, it cannot be deemed to be directly *attained by Karma as such* i.e., *independently* of the major Sādhanas like Vairāgya, Bhakti, Upāsanā and Aparokṣa. In this case, such karmas must be viewed as making for the purification of the mind of the seeker and aiding Jñāna by setting him on the road to Vairāgya. Equipped with such assets, he will go thro' Jijñāsā (Śravaṇa, manana, etc.) attain Aparokṣa and achieve Mokṣa, thro' successive stages.[4] This is clear from the latter half of the *mantra*: "We have seen the light of B. and known the gods in their gradational relation to B." (*RV*. viii.48.3)

(b) If the (Niṣkāma)-karma in question is that of Aparokṣa-Jñānis, it is to be taken that it contributes to the welling up of spiritual bliss in the state of Mokṣa attained by Aparokṣajñāna (and other Sādhanas) without making Mokṣa itself attained directly by such Niṣkāmakarma.[5]

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3 The possibility of performing all such Kāmyakarmas mentioned in the Śrutis in a spirit of niṣkāma as the true intention of Śrutis has been ably expounded by M. in his *GB* (ii. 47)

4 यदा निष्कामानुष्ठानरूपस्य कर्म विवक्षितं, तदामृतत्वेन मुख्यामृतत्वमेव । किन्तु, तस्य कर्मणा न साक्षात् भवति कर्मभिः शुद्धान्तःकरणस्य वैराग्यादि, ततो जिज्ञासा, ततो ज्ञानं, ततो मोक्ष इति पारम्पर्येण (*TP*. iii, 1.7). See also अज्ञानकर्मसंश्रितानन्त कर्मशुद्धिद्वारा ज्ञानान्वयात् भवति (*J. GBt*)

5. अथ ज्ञानिनामनुष्ठानस्य कर्म, तदापि न तेन मोक्षः । किन्त्वानन्दाभिवृद्धिरेव । ज्ञानसाधनत्वे मोक्षसाधनकर्मत्वमनियतो भवति । तदा न कर्मणा मोक्षनिर्वृत्तिरिति भावः (*TP* ibid).

Raghūttama in his *TPB* raises an interesting query here. If Niṣkāma-Karma makes for welling up of the joy of selfhood in Mokṣa, it follows that it is the means of attaining Mokṣa. For Mokṣa is but the experience of the welling up of the bliss of selfhood. We have no evidence of there being any other state of Mokṣa than this which is not brought about by such Karma and is accomplished only thro' Jñāna. How then is the commentator Jayatīrtha justified in saying:

तथापि न तेन मोक्षः[6] ?

The same point is raised by the *STC* also in somewhat different terms. Mokṣa is a state of experience of the pure joy of selfhood qualified by complete cessation of the misery of bondage. If then, Niṣkāma-Karma should be the cause of welling up of this joy, it will be equivalent to saying that it is competent to make manifest the substantival aspect (*viśeṣyāmśa*): Mokṣa. How then can we say that Niṣkāma-Karma is *not* competent to accomplish Mokṣa?[7]

The *STC* solves the difficulty by showing how J. himself has seen the point and cleared the difficulty in summing up his position: *Sarvathā na karmaṇā samsāranivṛttiḥ* which freely recognizes that Niṣkāma Karma enriches the welling up of the joy of selfhood in Mokṣa, while the termination of bondage (*samsāranivṛtti*) is brought about by Ātmajñāna or Brahmāparokṣa and *not* by Niṣkāmakarma *as such*, however estimable it may be.[8]

J. shows how the three distinctive explanations given by him are implicit in the three different Śruti texts cited by the Bhāṣyakāra:—

(i) "The Supreme Being, if not known, does not protect him or make him who is ignorant enjoy[9] his bliss of selfhood—even as the Śrutis not duly studied under a teacher or duties not properly performed do not." (*R.V.* x.71.6) "Whatever great or meritorious deeds

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6. ननु, यदि कर्मण आनन्दातिशयहेतुत्वं, तर्हि अंगीकृतमेव मोक्षसाधनत्वम्; तस्यैव मोक्षत्वात्। तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य कर्मासाध्यस्य ज्ञानमात्रसाध्यस्य मोक्षस्याश्रवणात्। 'तथा च, न तेन मोक्ष' इति कथमुक्तमित्यत आह (*op. cit.*).

The reading in the printed edn. of *TPB* तयाच is incorrect for तथापि in J.'s text.

7. ननु दुःखनिवृत्तिविशिष्टयावदानन्दाविर्भावो हि मोक्षो दलद्वयात्मकः कर्मणामानन्दातिशयजनकत्वे विशेष्यांशं प्रति हेतुत्वसिद्धे, तथापि न तेन मोक्ष इति कथमुक्तमित्यत आह—सर्वथेति (*STC.* iii. 1.7)

8 'सर्वथा न कर्मणा मोक्ष' इति वक्तव्ये 'संसारनिवृत्तिः' इत्युक्त्या विशेष्यांशः कर्मसाध्योऽङ्गीकृत एव। परंत्विह संसारनिवृत्तिरेव मोक्षो विवक्षित इति ज्ञायत इति सिद्धम् (*Op. cit.*)

9. न भुनक्ति न पालयतीत्यर्थः। 'भुजोऽनवने' इत्यभ्यवहारार्थं एवात्मनेपदस्मृतेः (Ragh. *TPB.*) नामृतत्वं भोजयति (*BD*)

the ignorant one performs they perish in the end. Whoever meditates on B. as the abode of light, his works do not perish. By the grace of the Supreme, his works fulfil for him all his desires." (*Bṛh. Up.* i.4.15).

(ii) "The imbiber of Soma becomes immortal for as long as Indra or Manu or Sūrya lasts" ( ).

(iii) "By works he extends his knowledge by knowledge he becomes immortal. So works are undying; for they lead to immortality." ( ).

Of these, the first one supports the position that immortality in the full primary sense is attained only by those who have attained Aparokṣa of B. The second supports the position that the immortality associated with Kāmyakarmas, in some Śrutis, is to be understood in a partial (metaphorical) sense of the word. The third text is evidence of the Niṣkāmakarma of Jijñāsus leading them to Mokṣa successively thro' the pathway of Sādhanas. Admitting Niṣkāma Karma as a successive (parampāra) sādhana does not affect the position of Aparokṣajñāna as the direct means of Mokṣa.[10] Nor does it go against the intentions of the *Gītā* verse (iii.20):

कर्मणैव हि संसिद्धिमास्थिता जनकादयः ।

The purport of the verse is this that Karma is not entirely banished but remains closely associated with a life of Jñāna in the case of eminent Jñānins like Janaka and others.[11]

We have, thus, in M.'s interpretation of this *adhi.* a clear lead defining the place and the role of Kāmya and Niṣkāma Karmas, in the general set-up of Mokṣasādhanas, *vis-a-vis* Aparokṣajñāna. The struggle between the socalled Karma and Jñāna mārgas is familiar enough to students of Vedānta literature. It has baffled many a system-builder. *M.'s solution imparts a new dimension to Niṣkāmakarma as Jñānottarakarma for the first time in Vedāntic philosophy* and shows the rich dividend it pays the Aparokṣa Jñānin thro' welling up of the joy of selfhood in Mokṣa.

This is a unique conception which has not been *so well or so fully articulated*, by any other interpreter of India's religious and philosophical tradition. Even the socalled Jñānakarmasamuccayavāda of

10 [illegible] (*STC.* iii. 1.7)

11 'कर्मणैव हि संसिद्धिमास्थिता जनकादयः' [illegible] (*STC.* iii.14) Cf. 'कर्मणा सह' [illegible] (*M. GB.* iii. 20)

some schools does not measure up to Jñānottarakarmavāda and has not realized its possibilities. The far-raching effect of Niṣkāmakarma *after* Aparokṣajñāna stands clearly articulated by *M.* even in his earliest work the *G.B.* iii.50. The expression "Jñānottarakarma" occurs for the first time in J.'s c. on M.'s GB: (iii.50): ज्ञानोत्तरमनुष्ठितेन निवृत्तकर्मणा प्रसन्नः परमेश्वरो मुक्तौ ज्ञानानभिव्यक्तमपि स्वरूपसुखं व्यक्तीकरोति । अत्र च भाष्यकृतैव तत्र तत्र प्रमाणान्युक्तानि ।

The thoughtful way in which M. has constituted this Sūtra into a separate *adhi.* to discuss the place and role of Karma in its varied aspects in the general scheme of Mokṣa Sādhanas deserves handsome appreciation as against the routine way in which it has been tagged on by others to the previous Sūtras to dispose of a casual objection which has not much substance in it.

Śaṁkara's and Rāmānuja's Interpretation.

S. and R. treat Sūtras 1-7 as one *adhi.* According to S. the discussion in the first five Sūtras covers the elements and the Jīvas while in the last two it is confined to the Jīvas. Such a distinction is *not* supported by the wording of the Siddhānta Sūtra viz. "he goes out enveloped by the subtle elements" (*Sampariṣvakto ramhati*) which shows the discussion is throughout about the Jīvas going out enveloped by the elements.

The Pūrvapakṣa according to S. is that the subtle elements do *not* go with the self as in the description of the first oblation there is no mention of the waters but only of *Śraddhā* and it is only in the fifth oblation that reference is made to the waters. The Siddhānta is that it is clear from the question and the manner of the answer that the elements go with the self.

However, in so far as the concluding statement "the waters take the shape of man" presupposes the association of the waters with the self right thro' all the oblations, the Pūrvapakṣa can hardly arise.[12] The Siddhānta too is open to question as the going out of the Jīvas with the elements is still left in doubt here, according to S. In the circumstances, it will be difficult to conceive of insentient elements going of their own accord to assume a new shape as man. Even granting the movement of the Jīvas, it would be of no use unless their envelopment

12. तत्र या आपस्ता पुरुषवचसो भवन्तीति स्पष्टमुद्देश्यविधेयभावप्रतीतेरुद्देश्यस्य च व्रीह्यादेरिव प्राक्सत्त्वावश्यंभावेन, भूतानामपि गमनसिद्धेर्न पूर्वपक्षोदयः (*STC.* iii. 1.7)

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10. परम्परासाधनेन साक्षात्साधनापरोक्षज्ञानाविरोधात् (*STC.* iii. 1.7)

11. 'कर्मणैव हि संसिद्धिमास्थिता जनकादयः' इत्यवधारणात् कर्मभिरेव निरवकाशेति चेन्न । अयोगव्यवच्छेदार्थत्वात्तेः । अन्यथापि तथास्त्विति चेन्न । एवकारस्यार्थस्वरूपेण भावकत्वात् । 'अन्यः पन्था न' इत्यस्य सद्भावात् (*STC.* ibid) Cf. 'कर्मणा सह'—कर्म कुर्वन्न एव (*M. GB.* iii. 20)

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The thoughtful way in which M. has constituted this Sūtra into a separate *adhi.* to discuss the place and role of Karma in its varied aspects in the general scheme of Mokṣa Sādhanas deserves handsome appreciation as against the routine way in which it has been tagged on by others to the previous Sūtras to dispose of a casual objection which has not much substance in it.

Śaṁkara's and Rāmānuja's Interpretation.

S. and R. treat Sūtras 1-7 as one *adhi.* According to S. the discussion in the first five Sūtras covers the elements and the Jīvas while in the last two it is confined to the Jīvas. Such a distinction is *not* supported by the wording of the Siddhānta Sūtra viz. "he goes out enveloped by the subtle elements" (*Sampariṣvakto ramhati*) which shows the discussion is throughout about the Jīvas going out enveloped by the elements.

The Pūrvapakṣa according to S. is that the subtle elements do *not* go with the self as in the description of the first oblation there is no mention of the waters but only of *Śraddhā* and it is only in the fifth oblation that reference is made to the waters. The Siddhānta is that it is clear from the question and the manner of the answer that the elements go with the self.

However, in so far as the concluding statement "the waters take the shape of man" presupposes the association of the waters with the self right thro' all the oblations, the Pūrvapakṣa can hardly arise.[12] The Siddhānta too is open to question as the going out of the Jīvas with the elements is still left in doubt here, according to S. In the circumstances, it will be difficult to conceive of insentient elements going of their own accord to assume a new shape as man. Even granting the movement of the Jīvas, it would be of no use unless their envelopment

12. तत्र या आपस्ताः पुरुषवचसो भवन्तीति स्पष्टमुद्देश्यविधेयभावप्रतीतेरुद्देश्यस्य च व्रीह्यादेरिव प्राक्सत्त्वावश्यंभावेन, भूतानामपि गमनसिद्धेर्न पूर्वपक्षोदयः (*STC.* iii. 1.7)

(*pariṣvaṅga*) by the subtle elements is accepted.[13] If that is done, the adhikaraṇa-pūrvapakṣa will have to be drastically altered and pitched in a different key that as death marks the severance of the envelopment of Jīvas by the elements, there is no need for Vairāgya and other Sādhanas, for the attainment of Mokṣa.

S.'s Pūrvapakṣa in the second Sūtra questions the propriety of the position taken in the first Sūtra that all the subtle elements accompany the Jīva enveloping him. The Pūrvapakṣa is refuted by showing that when it is stated that the waters produce "man", it means the waters in conjunction with the other elements do so, by reason of their being *trivṛtkṛta* and because the physical body of man cannot be formed out of waters alone. But then, as the opening Sūtra does not contain any express reference to all the elements, it does not seem proper to treat the second Sūtra as a guṇa-sūtra challenging something not specifically stated in the preceding Sūtra. This Sūtra and the others following it can more fittingly be construed as challenging the need for Vairāgya, one after the other, and as such treated as a separate *adhi.s* based on fresh *adhikāśaṅkās.*

S.'s explanation that the waters have been prominently mentioned in the context of the fifth oblation because the Karmas (sacrifices, etc.) which are the efficient causes of the new body consist of offerings of liquid substances like Soma, butter, milk, etc. is rather farfetched. As solid substances also like rice, puroḍaśa, caru and meat are part of the offerings, one may expect the Śruti to have used the expression *Pṛthivi* instead. Tho' the liquid element may preponderate in the seed of the body, the body as such being *Pārthiva* cannot be deemed to be having a preponderance of water content.[14] There are no such difficulties in the explanation given by M. (See under ii.4.23).[15]

In the third Sūtra S. has argued that as the Prāṇas cannot move or remain without a base, we may infer that water mixed with the other elements goes from the old body to the new one. But then, the outgoing Jīva himself can provide the base for the Prāṇas. If a base other than the Jīva is needed, the subtle elements themselves can pro-

13. सिद्धान्तोऽप्ययुक्तः। भूतानां जडत्वेन गमनायोगात्। जीवस्यानैयावस्थितिनिमदेहेन तत्सन्निधानस्याप्ययोगात्। योगे वा, परिष्वङ्गाभावेन तस्याप्रयोजकत्वात्। एकान्तसहस्राधिकरणन्यायेन प्रश्ननिरूपणयोरप्शब्दस्य तदुपलक्षितसर्वपरत्वेन भूतमात्रपरत्वाभावेनासिद्धेश्च। सपरिष्वक्तगन्तव्यविरोधस्योक्तत्वाच्च। (*STC*. iii. 1.7)

14. देहबीजे द्रवबाहुल्यदर्शनेऽपि पार्थिवत्वेन तत्रापां भूयस्त्वासिद्धेः (*STC*. iii. 1.7)

15. Cf. एवं पंचैकशरीरपरीक्षायां तत्र तत्र तस्य तस्य वैशिष्ट्यम्, सभूय सर्वशरीरेष्वपां भूयस्त्वं चास्ति ** एवं च मिलित्वा शरीरत्रिके दृश्यमानत्वा आप: पादद्वयेन पृथिवी *** (Vādirāja *TPG*. ii. 4.23 p. 118).
See P. 362

vide it without introducing the Prāṇas into the picture just *for this purpose and nothing more.*[16]

According to S. the fourth Sūtra shows that the Śruti which refers to the organs (*prāṇas*) merging in fire etc., does not affect the position that they serve as the base for the elements to go with the self. Their socalled merger will have to be construed in a secondary sense —as will be clear from further references in the same Śruti as to how the hairs of the body and the head enter the trees and the shrubs which cannot obviously be taken in its literal sense. Metaphorically interpreted, the merger of Prāṇas in Agni, etc., would mean no more than that their presiding deities cease to be of any further use to these senses, even as things burnt out in a fire can be of no further use.[17]

This overlooks the fact that there is nothing incredible in the subtle forms of Prāṇas or of hairs etc., being drawn back to their presiding deities as stated in the Śruti. Otherwise, it will be equally difficult to see how the subtle elements burnt out along with the physical body at death can at all go with the self as required by the Śruti and the Sūtra.[18] The only way in which both the statements in the Śruti and Sūtras that the Prāṇas get back into Agni etc., and that they follow the Jīvas enveloping them can be reconciled *without denying the truth of either* is by accepting M.'s solution that the Prāṇas and the elements are surrendered *only in part* (*bhāktam*) into their deities.[19]

Under Sūtra 5, S. rejects his Pūrvapakṣa contention that there is no reference to the waters accompanying the Jīva in the initial stage (of the first oblation) on the ground that the term *Śraddhā* which is used there is competent to denote "waters" on the basis of Vedic usage : *Śraddhā vā āpaḥ* (Taitt. S. i.6.7.1) and/or metaphorically on account of resemblance to Śraddhā in respect of its thinness and subtlely while acting as the seed of the body. He also points out that it is only in this way that the initial, middle and concluding parts of the passage can be harmonized and the syntactical unity of the whole preserved:

इति चोपसंहरन् एतदेव दर्शयति (S. *BSB.* iii.1.5)

16 That is why M. has used the introduction of Prāṇas for a different purpose.

17. अतो वागाद्यधिष्ठात्रीणामग्न्यादिदेवतानां वागाद्युपकारिणीनां मरणकाले उपकारनिवृत्तिमात्रमपेक्ष्य वागादयोऽग्नीन् गच्छन्ति इत्युपचर्यते (S. *BSB.* iii. 1.4)

18. सूक्ष्माणां वागादीनां लोमादीनां च तत्तदधिदैवतगमने प्रत्यक्षविरोधाभावात् । अन्यथा, शरीरेण सह दग्धानां भूतसूक्ष्माणां जीवेन सह गमनसिद्धान्तोऽपि न स्यात् (*STC.* iii.1.7)

19. See under M. *BSB.* iii. 1.4.

This appeal to the trend of the *Upasaṁhāra* (concluding part) in deciding the question, while it is in harmony with M.'s line of thought (See M. *BSB.* iii.1.5), is not in tune with the principle of *Upakrama-prābalya* to which S. and his school are wedded.[20]

Coming to the sixth Sūtra, S.'s Pūrvapakṣa is that there is no specific evidence that the Jīva is being actually enveloped by the subtle elements at the time of the fifth oblation; for we hear there of *only* water passing thro' the forms of Śraddhā attaining the shape of man. This objection is refuted by citing the authority of the subsequent passage beginning with "Those who, living in a village, practise sacrifices, other works and alms they attain the 'smoke'" (*Chān. Up.* v.10.3) and ending with their going up to the worlds of the fathers, Ākāśa and the moon. (*Chān. Up.* v.10.4).

The right place for bringing up such an objection as the above that there is no mention of the Jīva as such in the context of the fifth oblation would be immediately after it has been established in the *first Sūtra* that the "Jīvātman goes enveloped" (by the subtle elements) and *not in the sixth Sūtra.*[21]

जीवो देहबीजभूतभूतसूक्ष्मैः संपरिष्वक्तो रंहति ।

Apart from this misfit, the objection of the Pūrvapakṣa is itself untenable for another reason. In the section on Prāṇa-Vidyā (*Chān. Up.* v.2.8) immediately preceding the Pañcāgnividyā (v.4.10), it has been stated that "if during the rites performed for the fulfilment of certain wishes, the performer perceives a woman in a dream, there is fulfilment of desires in such a vision" (*Chān. Up.* v.2.8). This clearly shows the Jīvātman in the light of a sentient person. As it is the same sentient being that figures as the subject of the query in *Chān. Up.* v.3.3, the term Āpaḥ found in that context has necessarily to be construed as conveying, thro' Lakṣaṇā, the Jīvātman enveloped by the waters.[22] The only point left to be clarified is whether this Jīvātman goes enveloped only by the waters or by the other subtle elements also. A doubt on this point is bound to persist as long as no express Śruti text affirming that the Jīva goes enveloped by all the elements

20. उपसंहारप्राबल्यवादिना पुनरुपसंहाराद् व्याख्यानं नोपक्रमप्राबल्यवादिनस्तव मते युक्तम् (*STC.* ibid)

21. 'संपरिष्वक्तो रंहति' इत्युक्त्यनन्तरमेवात्र जीववाचकशब्दाभावात् इत्याक्षेपस्य सगतत्वेन षष्ठे तदयोगात् (*STC.* iii.1.7)

22. अनुपपत्तेरसमाप्तेः। यतः पूर्वत्र प्राणविद्यायां 'यदा कर्मसु काम्येषु स्त्रियं स्वप्नेषु पश्यति' इति दर्शनकर्तृत्वेन चेतनस्यैव प्रकृतत्वात् 'वेत्थ यथा' इत्यादिप्रश्नवाक्ये तस्यैव प्रकृतत्वात् तेन तत्र च अप्शब्दः अद्भिर्वेष्टिते जीवे लक्षणया प्रवर्तत इति निश्चितमेव। परन्तु, सर्वभूतैर्वेष्टितो गच्छति, उताद्मात्रेणेति न ज्ञायते (*STC.* ibid)

It is for this reason that M. renders *pratiteḥ* by the words: प्रत्यक्षतः श्रूयते which suggests the inadequacy of seeking to establish the point thro' *arthāpatti* or other means.

from the first to the last oblation has been cited. Such a text has been cited by M. *but not by S. R. and others* including Baladeva under Sūtra 6, in commenting on the expression *'pratīteḥ'*.

The passage relied upon by them for this purpose from *Chān. Up.* (v.10, 3-4) fails to give satisfaction as the idea has to be eked out thro' Arthāpatti and other means which cannot be expected to have a smooth sailing in all cases. S. and others rely on the parallelism between the accounts in *Chān. Up.* v.4.2 and v.10, 3-4 where the performers of sacrifices and rites are mentioned as going up to smoke, night, year, the world of fathers etc. before coming down. This is obviously a roundabout way of establishing the thesis. The argument based on this context may be looked upon as being in the nature of an Arthāpatti or an appeal to Samākhyā or as an *Upasaṁhāra* (*pramāṇa*). But none of them can be of substantial value. If we can conclude by Arthāpatti from the subsequent context that it is the Jīvātman that is implicated in the opening question (and not mere waters) as going out enveloped by the other elements, it can also be presumed on the same ground that in the statement of the reply also it is the Jīvātman who emerges in the shape of man enveloped by all the elements, in the fifth oblation.[23] There will then be no need for a special Sūtra to convey this point. If the argument supplied by the parallel context is in the nature of a Samākhyā, it will be of inferior status to the evidence of an express statement (Śruti) which in this case refers *only* to the waters as attaining the shape of man and cannot, therefore, override it.[24] Strictly speaking, the subsequent context from *Chān. Up.* v.10 cannot structurally be deemed to be the logical *upasaṁhāra* of the topic of Pañcāgnividyā; for the latter is formally concluded in v.9, 1-2, with the answers to the questions regarding the five oblations (Cf. इति तु * *). The subsequent context of v.10 is taken up with a *different topic*—the path of the gods and the fathers. The text: *Te dhūmam abhisambhavanti* * * (v.10.3) cited by S. and others pertains to that new topic of the tenth section. It cannot, therefore, be legitmately regarded as the *upasaṁhāra* of Pañcāgnividya.[25] Even conceding the point to S., there is no *commitment in these texts* such as "they pass into the smoke, from smoke to night" etc., that the Jīvas go enveloped by *all* the elements —such as we find in the *other text* cited by M.:[26]

23 अत एव सिद्धान्तोऽप्ययुक्त । किमनया भग्या अर्थापत्तिरूपप्रमाणमुपन्यस्तमुत समाख्या, अथोपसहारः? नाद्यः उत्तरवाक्येऽपि शुद्धजीवग्रहणोपपत्ते. (*STC.* p. 62)

24 न द्वितीय । अपृश्रुतिरूपश्रुतिविरोधमूलकत्वात् आक्षेपस्य दुर्बलसमाख्यया अशान्ते (*STC. ibid*)

25. नान्त्य । पचाग्निविद्याया अन्तिमप्रश्नस्य परिहारमभिधाय 'वेत्थ पथो देवयानस्य पितृयाणस्य' इति पृष्टस्य 'तद्य इत्य विदु' इत्यादिना प्रपाठकेन परिहाराभिधानात् तदन्तर्गतस्य 'ते धूममभिसभवन्ति' इत्यादे पंचाग्निविद्योपसंहारत्वाभावात् (*STC.* iii. 1.7)

26 तथात्वेऽपि वा 'भूतैर्भुंक्ते' * * इति कौण्ठरव्यश्रुताविव स्पष्ट भूतपरिष्वगाप्रतीते: (*ibid*)

while being eaten up and, therefre, could not enjoy the fruits of their own deeds. This objection is covered by the ruling given in BS. iii.1.24.

Having regard to the establishment of the eternality and imperishability of the Jīvas in Adhy. II. Pāda 3, it would be more pertinent to let this Sūtra present an objection against the need for Sādhanas as such, rather than that the Iṣṭādikārins will not be able to enjoy the fruits of their deeds. The former objection based on the contention that as death achieves the complete isolation of the Jīva from the envelopment of the elements and thereby the end of Samsāra, there is no further need for the practice of Sādhanas to attain Mokṣa, will be pertinent to the theme of the Pāda. The question of affecting the possibility of the Jīva's enjoyment of the fruits of his good deeds raised by S. and others is not only casual but still *far away from the area of the present discourse and is further repugnant to the theme of Vairāgya.* S. and others admit that this Pāda seeks to foster a spirit of dispassion for the world by taking the Jijñāsu thro' the up and down movements of souls along different planes, so graphically depicted in the allegory of Pañcāgnividyā.

This commits them to the position that the Siddhānta and the Pūrvapakṣa in each of the *adhi.s* of this Pāda should hinge on the indispensability and dispensability of all Sādhanas in general and of Vairāgya in particular. The upshot of their Pūrvapakṣa in the present *adhi.* that there is no proof of envelopment of the Jīva by the subtle elements when he departs from the body will have no adverse bearing on the need for Vairāgya, unless it is pressed to its logical end that as Mokṣa is the separation of the Jīva from the envelopment of the subtle elements and as such a separation arises naturally at death, there is no further necessity in life for practising any of the Sādhanas for the attainment of release.

As Vairāgya is the theme of this Pāda, it is the duty of commentators to highlight it by framing appropriate Pūrvapakṣas and Siddhāntas in the various *adhi.s* calculated to bring out this indispensability of Sādhanas. The Pūrvapakṣas selected by M. under each of these seven adhi. Sūtras (and others following) fulfil this expectation and satisfy this requirement much more thoroughly and consistently than the ones pursued by the other commentators. This should open our eyes to the preferability of M.'s interpretation to theirs. The exhortation to Vairāgya in the subsequent *adhi.s* also by dwelling on the punishments in hell, the entry of souls into plants and their passing from the father to the mother are not at all consistent with any intention on the Sūtrakāra's part *to deny the reality of the world,* which is what S. is trying to attribute to the Sūtrakāra, after all is said and done.

CHAPTER XLVI

JĪVAS RETURN WITH RESIDUAL KARMA

8. *Kṛtātyayādhikaraṇam* (iii.1.8)

This adhi. meets a fresh objection to the indispensability of Sādhanas. It may be that the Jīvas go enveloped by the elements at death. But it may be argued that as bondage is due to the hold of Karma, release can be had directly after the complete liquidation of Karma thro' the enjoyment of their fruits in the heavenly world, as set forth in the scriptures. As the heavenly world is meant only for enjoyment of dividends of Karma and is not a place where one builds up any fresh stock of Karma, it follows that once all Karmas have been liquidated thro' enjoyment of their fruits in Svarga, exit from there will be synonymous with Mokṣa. The need for Sādhanas is thus automatically ruled out.[1]

This objection is set aside in this *adhi.* by showing that after enjoying the fruits of his good works performed here, in the heavenly world, the Jīva returns to this world with a lingering residue of Karmas and not with a clean slate as it were.[2] The liquidation by enjoyment of fruits of Karma in heaven does not and cannot extend to the entirety of good karmas, but only to exhaustion by enjoyment of the merits of *such items of good deeds as have earned the reward*

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1. (a) [illegible] (*TP.* iii. 1.8)
   (b) [illegible] (*STC.* iii. 1.8)
2. [illegible] (*STC.* iii. 1.8)

of going to heaven. This leaves other meritorious Karma untouched.[3] For example, the Smṛtis speak of some persons attaining the world of Brahmā thro' acquisition of special merit of certain exalted deeds. If enjoyment of fruits of Karma in Svarga should wipe out even the merits of such exceptionally meritorious deeds, the validity of the Smṛtis which promise sojourn in Brahmaloka as reward for certain kinds of meritorious deeds will be impugned.[4] The principle can be extended to good deeds performed by the ignorant and the well-informed, competent to yield rewards which have to be enjoyed for shorter or longer periods and are also qualitatively different. There is reason to believe the Jīva brings down with him some residue of karma and their fruits, after enjoying the rewards of *the greater part of them in heaven.* Otherwise, one cannot explain observed facts such as that some people now suffer excessive hardship in life and some others are born luckier than others and enjoy more than their legitimate or fair share of happiness and of the good things of life; or that some persons are born with extraordinary mental agility while others are congenitally dull and that among persons engaged in the same kind of work and expending the same effort, some show a quicker grasp of things with comparatively less amount of practice while others take a longer time or never learn in spite of repeated efforts. There are differences also among children of the same parents brought up under the same conditions and these cannot be accounted for exclusively by heredity. The hypothesis of residual karmas and their merits with which persons come into this world is strongly indicated by such facts.[5]

Apart from the question of residue of good karmas, there is the other question of bad deeds and their fruits to be accounted for. It cannot be supposed that the liquidation of the fruits of good karma thro' enjoyment in heaven includes the liquidation of fruits of *bad deeds also at the same time!* Such a supposition would invalidate the authority of Smṛtis which says that evil doers have to suffer punishment in hell.[6] This also goes to establish that the assumption of residual karma, while returning from Svarga after enjoyment of the fruits

3 यत्पुण्यसाध्य स्वर्ग तत्पुण्यस्यैव भोगेन क्षयेऽपि पुण्यान्तरस्य क्षयाभावात् (*STC.* iii. 1.8)

4 अन्यथा, 'विधूतपापास्ते यान्ति ब्रह्म सनातनम्' इत्यादिवचनबोधितब्रह्मलोकप्रापकपुण्यान्तराणामपि स्वर्गलोक एव भोगेन क्षयापत्त्या ब्रह्मलोकप्रापकाभावेन वचनाप्रामाण्यप्रसगात् (*STC.* iii. 1.8)

5 एकस्मिन्नपि कर्मणि भुज्यमाने न नि शेष नाश. यतो हि दृश्यते भुक्तशिष्टकर्मसद्भावानुमापक इहाप्यातिशयितदु खादिभोगोऽतिशयितबुद्धिमत्त्व च। अन्यथा, इह समकर्मणा समश्रमिणामेव अल्पावृत्तिबहु वावृत्तिभ्या ग्रहणावधारणादिकार्यभेदो न स्यात्। (STC. iii. 1 8).
Vādirāja explains the significance of the term '*anuśaya*' in the Sūtra:
अनु अनन्तरमपि येन ससार एव शेते इति व्युत्पत्त्या सूत्रेऽनुशयपद कर्मशेषवाचकम्। (*TPG.* p. 123)

6 अस्तु वा पुण्यकर्मणा क्षय ; न पापकर्मणाम्—अन्यथा, प्राग्भवीयपापवत एव पुण्यकर्मपरिपाकवशेन स्वर्गप्राप्तौ तदीयपापस्यापि नाशेन पापकर्मणो नरकादिप्रापकत्वबोधकागमविरोध. स्यात्। (*STC*)

of good deeds, is a very necessary one. As karmas are not partless wholes (*niravayava*), there is no difficulty in holding that residual elements of karma are carried by the Jīva during his transmigration and return from heavenly sojourn after enjoying there the fruits of some of his good deeds.

After coming back to this Karmabhūmi, Jīvas naturally raise fresh stocks of Karma in their new lives whose fruits they similarly go up to enjoy. Wiping out the entire stock of Karma—despite slight periodical depreciation thro' enjoyment of their fruits in Svarga, is not possible; for every time the Jīva returns to this world (*Karmabhūmi*), there is bound to be a fresh addition to the balance. A Smṛti source quoted by M. says—even at the lowest estimation a man's Karmas in one life, counted from his fourteenth year, is productive of *not less than ten future births.*[7] Thro' each subsequent birth, this stock of his Karma and their effects in terms of good or bad, goes in increasing, *at this rate of arithmetical progression.* There is little hope then of liquidating this ever-increasing balance of Karma thro' its exhaustion by enjoyment in heaven or working out their consequences thro' more lives.[8] For the more the number of lives, the remoter grow the chances of release. This brings home the need for Vairāgya, Jñāna and other Sādhanas.[9]

7. 'आ चतुर्दशमात् वर्षात् कर्माणि नियमेन तु ।
दशावराणां देहानां कारणानि करोत्ययम् ॥ (M. *BSB.* iii. 1.8)

8. 'अतः कर्मसंचयानुवृत्तिः ध्रुव एव भविष्यति' इत्यादिस्मृतेश्च नैरवशेष्येणायाति । (M. *BSB.* iii. 1.8)

9. अतो वैराग्यादिसाधनमन्तरेण मोक्षाभावात् तदर्थं वैराग्यादिविधायकशास्त्रस्य न वैयर्थ्यमिति (*TP.* iii. 1.8)

स्वर्गादौ भोगेन कर्मणां निःशेषनाशाभावात् तत्र वैराग्यं कार्यमिति युक्तमिति भावः । (Ragh. *TM.* iii. *adhi.* 8)

CHAPTER XLVII

THE RETURNING ROUTE

9. *Yathetādhikaraṇam* (iii.1.9)

This *adhi.* discusses the question whether the returning Jīva takes the same route by which he went to the heavenly world to enjoy the fruits of his good deeds or by a different one. The Pūrvapakṣa is that left to himself he is more likely to prefer the familiar route instead of taking the needless trouble of exploring a new one. As the return is governed by the residual Karma, there is every likelihood of its being made in the same way as the onward journey. There is no need to assume any external agency interfering with this to change the course. As the return from Svarga will *not* thus involve any pain or trouble, the Jīva is not likely to feel called upon to cultivate a feeling of Vairāgya towards heavenly pleasures. This will preclude the need for Vairāgya and other Sādhanas for the attainment of Mokṣa.[1]

The Siddhānta is: *Yathetam anevam ca*: The return is made by the same route *upto a certain stage*[2] and then by a different one, as stated in the Śruti: "From smoke he goes to the cloud from there to Ākāśa, thence to the moon and returns upto Ākāśa as he went. From there he travels to Vāyu and having been in Vāyu, he *becomes smoke,*[3] then cloud, then Megha, and then pours down thro' rain" (*Kāṣāyaṇa Śruti*).

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1. गमनागमनयो परिचितैकमार्गसाध्यत्वेनापरिचितमार्गक्लेशाभावात् किं वैराग्येणेति शकनात् सगति ।
(Ragh. *TPB*. iii. 1.9)

2. Ragh. shows how this meaning is got by introducing the particle 'ā' between *yathā* and *itam*—the *ā* carrying the sense of "to some extent".
Cf. 'ईषदर्थे क्रियायोगे" इति शाब्दिकोक्तेरीषदर्थत्वमाङो बोध्यम् । (*TM*. iii. 1. *adh*. 9)

3. Becoming smoke, or cloud does not mean that the returning Jīva actually transforms into smoke or attains the status of the deity of smoke or clouds but simply that he enters into the bodies of the deities of smoke, etc., moving when they move and tarrying when they tarry. (*BD*. iii. 1.9)

The point of the Siddhānta is that the Jīva is *not a free agent in coming down.* Hence, his remembering the route by which he had gone is of no avail. As the return is fraught with much trouble and pain, he will naturally be well-advised to cultivate dispassion even for such temporary sojourns in heaven and take seriously to the Sādhanas for attaining permanent happiness in release.

4. तस्मादागमनादावतिक्लेशयुक्तत्वेन स्वर्गफलेऽपि विरक्तेन भवितव्यमिति सिद्धम् । (*TP.* iii. 1.9)

CHAPTER XLVIII

OUTGOING AND INCOMING ARE DUE TO EFFECT OF KARMA

10. *Caraṇādhikaraṇam* (iii.1.10-12)

This *adhi.* establishes that the outgoing and the incoming of Jīvas from and to Samsāra are due to the effects of Karma, with a view to bringing home to us the indispensability of Vairāgya and other Sādhanas for the attainment of Mokṣa. If the miseries associated with these outgoings and incomings are not the outcome of Karma, one will not be disposed to cultivate dispassion towards Kāmyakarmas. Hence, the need to show how the continuous round of outgoings and incomings of Jīvas from this world to the other and back again are due to Kāmyakarmas like sacrifices and the need to enjoy their fruits in part and having to come back here with their residue to take fresh birth.

Pūrvapakṣa.

The Pūrvapakṣa maintains that such comings and goings are *not* the result of Kāmyakarmas but of good and bad *conduct*. For the Śruti says: Of them who perform Kāmyakarmas, those whose conduct has been good are born among good classes of beings and those whose conduct has been reprehensible are born among detestable groups. (*Chān. Up.* v.10.7). It follows from this that such comings and goings are only the consequences of one's conduct (*caraṇam*) and are not to be laid at the door of karmas. For the Śrutis distinguish between conduct and karmas as such by defining conduct as that which being observed as part of the main act contributes to its piety or defilement[1] The Pūrvapakṣa repudiates the suggestion that as the

1. आचार इति सम्प्रोक्तः कर्माङ्गत्वेन शब्दितः ।
अशुद्धिदस्त्वनाचारश्चरणं तूभय स्मृतम् । (M. *BSB.* iii. 1.10)

other Śruti beginning with the words "Those who in the village practise a life of sacrifices, good works and alms pass into smoke" and ending with "Having stayed there till as long as there is a residue of good works, they return by the same route" (*Chān. Up.* v.10.3-5), expressly attributes the goings and comings to the fruits of sacrifices and other works, they cannot be attributed to the nature of one's conduct. It argues that even in this case, the intention of the Śruti is that the comings and goings are determined only by conduct. The objection that we do not find the expression "conduct" used in this context is not well-founded. The preposition "upa" in "*upāsate*" used in this context which means "near" signifies conduct which is close to works. The impression created by the text that comings and goings of Jīvas are due to the effects of Karma is a distored one caused by the works and conduct being mentioned *close together* while referring to the ascent to and the descent from Svarga.[2]

We have, therefore, to separate the two and make the comings and goings dependent on conduct—lest the Śrutis pertaining to the efficacy of conduct in leading to good or to detestable births should lose their validity, as they will have no other scope.[3] Since comings and goings of Jīvas will have thus to be due to conduct alone, it is open to us to assume further that as Karmas prescribed in the Śrutis cannot be rejected out of hand as fruitless, they have to be regarded as leading to Mokṣa. One cannot, in the circumstances, be expected to practise Vairāgya or dispassion towards Karmas as the means of achieving Mokṣa.'[4]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that it cannot be held that the comings and goings are not the result of Karmas; for the Śruti *Nānyaḥ panthā ayanāya vidyate* shows that Mokṣa, which is exempt from such comings and goings, cannot be achieved by Karma. There is also clear evidence in *Muṇḍ. Up.* (i.2.10) and *Gītā* (ix.20-21) that comings and goings are bound up with Karmas. This is not contradicted in any way by the Śruti quoted for the Pūrvapakṣa that those whose conduct has been good secure birth in a good environment. For the expression *Ramaṇīyacaraṇāh* can by 'Ajahallakṣaṇā' be construed in the sense of performers of good works (characterized by devotion, piety and other vir-

2 [illegible] (*TP.* iii. 1.10)

3 [illegible]

4 [illegible] (*STC.* iii. 1 10)

tues). This view is ascribed by the Sūtrakāra to Kārṣṇājini.[5] The purpose behind this Lakṣaṇā is to show that only such Karmas as are carried out with a due sense of *ācāra* can be regarded as properly performed.[6] The Sūtrakāra's own view which he shares with Bādari is that in view of established usages like *Dharmam carata* in the sense of 'Dharmam kuruta' it can be held that *'caraṇam'* stands directly (i.e., without recourse to Lakṣaṇā) for Karmas performed with due sense of *ācāra*.[7] In other words, *'caraṇa'* denotes Karma as qualified by conduct (*viśiṣṭa*) while 'Karma' denotes the act as such (*viśeṣya*) and there is no opposition between the two.[8]

Saṁkara's and Rāmānuja's Interpretation

S., R., Bhāskara and others take Sūtras 8-11 as a single *adhi.*, reading *'Yathetam anevam ca' as part of Sūtra 8* instead of as a *separate Sūtra* (and *adhi.*) like M. and, following him, Baladeva.[9] Looking, however, to the self-contained and complete predication of a distinct idea in *Yathetam anevam ca* it seems proper to treat it as a different Sūtra rather than tag it on to *dṛṣṭaśrutibhyām* by way of a tame assertion.[10] It is capable of standing by itself as a separate adhi. combating an objection to the need for Vairāgya and other Sādhanas and should not have been deprived of this opportunity.

Pūrvapakṣa

According to S. and R. the doubt arises here in regard to *Chān. Up.* v.10.5, "Having dwelt there as long as there is residue of good works, they return again by that course by which they came"—whether the Iṣṭādikārins descend to this world after having enjoyed and exhausted *all their Karmas* (of the previous life) or with some part of those Karmas whose fruits have not been enjoyed.[11] The Pūrvapakṣa is that they return after having exhausted by enjoyment *all their stock of Karmas.*[12] Support for this view is claimed from *Bṛh. Up.* iv.4.6. The Pūrvapakṣa also contends that death has the power of manifesting

5. तस्या उदाहृतश्रुत्याद्यनुरोधेनाजहल्लक्षणया मज्ञाद्यर्थत्वोपपत्तेरिति कार्ष्णाजिनिराचार्यो मन्यत इति भाव (*TP.* iii. 1.10)

6. चरणशब्दस्य कर्मणि लक्षणाया' आचारपूर्वककृतकर्मण एव साधुत्वप्रतिपत्तिः प्रयोजनमस्तीति युक्ता लक्षणा (*STC*)

7. TP. iii. 1, 12) सूत्रस्थैवकारस्य चरणशब्दवाच्ये एव न लक्ष्ये इत्यध्याहृतेनान्वय (*STC.* iii. 1.12)

8. विशिष्टविशेष्यवाचकयोश्चरणेष्टापूर्तशब्दयोर्न विरोध. इति द्वितीयमतमपि युक्तमिति सिद्धान्त' (*STC.* ibid)

9. Who, however, does *not* regard it as a fresh *adhi.*

10 ते चावरोहन्तो यथेतमनेव चावरोहन्ति इति सिद्धवन्निर्देशरूपत्वेन सूत्रस्याल्पार्थत्वप्राप्तेः (*STC.* iii. 1.12)

11. किं निरनुशया भुक्तकृत्स्नकर्माणोऽवरोहन्ति, सानुशया वेति (S. *BSB.* iii. 1.8)

12. यत्किंचेत्यविशेषपरामर्शेन कृत्स्नस्येह कृतस्य कर्मणस्तत्र क्षपितता दर्शयति (S. *BSB.* iii. 1.8)

the entirey of Karmas which has not yet borne its fruits[13] by making it *ready to yield its fruits*.[14] Such a manifestation is not possible before death as then it is obstructed by those Karmas whose fruits have already begun. Such exhaustion of Karmas will not render the descent unaccountable. The descent can be ascribed to the effects of the Karmas of the sons, fathers or wives of the departed Jīvas.[16]

यावत्संपातशब्दाभ्यां सर्वकर्माभिधानतः ।
मृतौ सर्वक्रियाव्यक्तिरवरोहोऽन्यकर्मतः ॥

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the Śruti that the Iṣṭādikārin exhausts "whatever Karmas he has performed here" (*Bṛh. Up.* iv.4.6) is to be construed in a restricted sense that all such Karmas as have been performed with a view to obtaining heavenly rewards are exhausted by enjoyment there.[17] This leaves out the other Karmas whose fruits are *to be enjoyed* (or suffered) in this world *after being reborn*. Such a restriction of meaning has naturally to be applied so as to be in conformity with the concluding part of the statement in the Śruti which refers to those whose conduct in the world has been good securing a good birth in the next life and others whose conduct has been objectionable securing a detestable birth.[18] (*Chān. Up.* v.10.7). The expressions good conduct and bad conduct must naturally refer to the conduct of the Iṣṭādikārins themselves—and *not* to those of their wives or sons or other relatives. Where a direct impact on one's future life is possible thro' one's own good or bad conduct of the previous life, it is not proper to rely on indirect impact of the conduct of others to account for one's future.[19]

Criticism

Tho' a Pūrvapakṣa involving complete exhaustion of the entirety of Karmas performed with a view to attaining heavenly rewards may

13. अपि च प्रायणमनारब्धफलस्य कर्मणोऽभिव्यञ्जकम् (S. *BSB.* iii. 1.8)

14. फलदानाभिमुखीकरणं चाभिव्यक्तिः (*Bhāmati*)

15. प्राक्प्रायणादारब्धफलेन कर्मणा प्रतिबद्धस्याभिव्यक्त्यनुपपत्तेः (S. *BSB.* iii. 1 8)

16. यद्यप्ययमिष्टापूर्तकारी स्वयं निरनुशयः भुक्तभोगत्वात् तथापि, पित्रादिगतानुशयवशात् तद्विपाकान् आस्वादयितुं भोगान् चन्द्रलोकादवरोहत्यनुशयवानिव । यदि अन्यस्य सुकृतदुष्कृताभ्यामन्यस्य तत्फलभागिता— 'पत्युः कर्मणा यस्य भार्या गुरु त्रिवेत्' इत्यादि (*Bhāmati* ibid)

17. येन कर्मकलापेन फलमुपभोक्तुं चन्द्रमसमारूढः तावन्मात्र एव चन्द्रमण्डलादवरोहति । इष्टापूर्तकर्मविषयापि यावत्संपातं चरित्वेति तत्र भाष्ये (*Bhāmati*)

18. इतरे रमणीयचरणा इत्यादिर्मुख्यार्थानुरोधात् तदुक्तम् (*Bhāmati*)

19. बहुर्नाहितमाभात्र मनुष्ये जनः ।
मानान्तरकल्पनायां च न युक्तं परस्य ॥

pass muster, the same cannot be said of one which goes beyond it to claim the exhaustion of the totality of the Iṣṭādikārin's Karmas of the previous life as a whole. Such a Pūrvapakṣa will be flouting the spirit and letter alike of the universally recognized principle:

नाभुक्तं क्षीयते कर्म कल्पकोटिशतैरपि[20] .

A Pūrvapakṣa with special reference only to the exhaustion of the entirety of Karmas which has earned heavenly rewards is not open to such an objection and it ought to have been raised, instead. Such a Pūrvapakṣa can hope to have the backing of a good reasoning that once the unseen merit which brings about the enjoyment of Karmas whose fruits are to be enjoyed in the heavenly world is activised at death, it will not leave out anything of it unrequited. For, such unseen merit (*adṛṣṭa*) of works being opposed to its fruits, the continued existence of a residue of such Karmas will have to be automatically ruled out.[21]

S.'s Siddhanta view here, that "Only that Karma which gave the Soul sojourn in heaven is worked out and the remaining Karma brings it back to earth" needs further clarification whether (i) this recognizes that such souls return with a residue of *those Karmas which have given them sojourn in heaven* or (ii) whether they return without any such residue of those Karmas. The first is contradicted by S.'s own stand—"After the fruits of that set of Karmas which is requited in the other world have been completely enjoyed, the *remaining other set of works whose fruits are to be enjoyed in this world constitutes the anuśaya*. With this these souls descend"[22]—as it admits no residue of the Karmas which have earned heavenly reward. But then, the expression "remainder" (*śeṣa*) *used in the Smṛti text quoted by S. himself in this connection*—"After death, members of different castes and āśramas do, in accordance with their works, at first enjoy the fruits of those Karmas and *then with the remainder* enter into new existences in which they are distinguished from each other by locality, caste, family, shape, length of life, knowledge, conduct, property, pleasure and intelligence",[23] *belies the contention* that the Iṣṭādikārins *do not descend with some*

20. स्वर्गार्थकर्ममात्रस्य नि शेषनाशशङ्कासम्भवेऽपि 'नाभुक्त क्षीयते कर्म' इति प्रसिद्धवचनात् सर्वकर्मनाशशङ्काया असंभवात् (*STC*. ibid)

21. स्वर्गार्थिकृतकर्मणो निःशेषनाशस्य 'अदृष्टस्य कार्यविरोधित्वात्' इति युक्तियुक्तत्वेन, तद्विषयस्य प्रबलस्य पूर्वपक्षस्य सभवे, * * फल्गुपूर्वपक्षाश्रयणायोगात् (*STC*. ibid)

22 तस्मादामुष्मिकफले कर्मजात उपभुक्ते ऽवशिष्टमैहिकफल कर्मान्तरजातमनुशय, तद्वन्तोऽवरोहन्ति (S. *BSB*. iii. 1.8)

23 स्मृतिरपि—
"वर्णा आश्रमाश्च स्वकर्मनिष्ठा. प्रेत्य कर्मफलमनुभूय तत शेषेण विशिष्टदेशजातिकुलरूपायु श्रुतवृत्तवित्तसुखमेधसो जन्म प्रतिपद्यन्ते" ( ) इति सानुशयानामवरोह दर्शयति (S. *BSB*. iii. 1.8)

residue of the merits of those Karmas which have taken them to the heavenly worlds. For the term "*Śeṣa*" can only be employed with reference to such Karmas as have been *drawn upon for enjoyment* (there):

न ह्यनारब्धे कर्मणि शेषशब्दो युक्तः (*STC*)

S.'s refutation of the view of "Ekadeśins" as he calls them, that the exhaustion of Karmas referred to in the Śrutis refers *only to the major part of those Karmas which have earned the Iṣṭādikārins the rewards of heaven* and that they return with a residue of *such* Karmas is thus more rhetorical than substantial.

It will be seen that his reliance on the concluding part of the *Chān. Up.* text *Tad ya iha ramaṇīyacaraṇā ramaṇīyām yonim āpadyeran"* (v.10.7) to carry his point that the opening statement therein *Tasmin yāvatsampātam uṣitvā athaitam evādhvānam punarāvartate (Chan. Up.* v.10.5) has to be understood to presuppose the presence of a residue of Karmas to be worked out after returning here and which determines the nature of such births has, in principle, to accept the decisive role of the *upasaṁhāra* in discovering the true intention and meaning of the opening statement: *Yāvatsampātam uṣitvā.* This amounts to an open recognition of the principle of *Upasaṁhāraprābalya* as against *upakrama-prābalya*—to which S. and his school are committed:

सूत्रार्थोऽपि स्वसिद्धान्तविरुद्धः । 'तद्य इह रमणीयचरणा' इत्युपसंहारश्रुतेः प्राबल्यापातात्
(*STC.* ibid)

The *Bhāmatī* has tried to extricate S. from this difficulty by suggesting that even in the absence of any confrontation with the concluding text: *Ramaṇīyacaraṇāḥ* * * * * the opening statement *Tasmin yāvatsampātam uṣitvā* can hardly be taken in an unrestricted sense that the Iṣṭādikārins liquidate their entire Karmas.[24] Such as interpretation is fraught with undesirable contingencies and impossibilities. The expression *Yāvatsampātam* may be understood in terms of *Yāvantas sampātāḥ* (as much Karma as there is) or *yavatīm pumsām sampātāḥ* (the Karmas of as many selves as there are). It is preposterous to expect the potential Karmas of as many souls as there are to be liquidated by the enjoyment of the heavenly rewards of Karmas by *one particular Iṣṭādikārin.* Even in respect of the particular individual, his own Karmas which have long ago been enjoyed and are no longer extant cannot be liquidated by the present enjoyment. The same diffi-

24. तत्किमिष्टादीनामुपसंहारानुरोधेनोपक्रमः सङ्कोचयितव्यः ? नेत्युच्यते । न यावत्सम्पातमित्यनुरोधेऽप्यनवशेषमनुपपत्तेः [illegible] पपत्तुमर्हति ।

culty will apply to such of his Karmas as will have to be enjoyed at a distant future.[25]

Thus, in any case, the opening statement *Yāvatsampātam* has voluntarily to undergo a restriction of meaning and scope owing to the inherent difficulties in its being construed in a wider sense (of *yāvantas sampātāḥ or yāvatāṃ puṃsām sampātāḥ*)—independently of any confrotation with the upasamhāra and while doing so, it defers to the restriction out of consideration for the upasamhāra *also*.[26]

This is not convincing. The Upasaṁhāra cannot be sidestepped by bringing in the plea of the upakrama having to submit to a voluntary cut or restriction owing to other reasons of *atiprasaṅga* etc. For there is no bar save the very text figuring in the upasamhāra viz. *Ramaṇīyacaraṇāḥ* to our conceding the point that all the unrequited Karmas of Iṣṭādikārin are liquidated by the enjoyment of the fruits of Karma in heaven. It is only the *upasamhāra* and its implication that preclude the undesirable contingency.[27] It would be of no avail to go in search of some other Śruti than *Ramaṇīyacaraṇāḥ* (the present *upasamhāra*) to account for the restriction of sense put on the opening statement *Yāvatsampātam uṣitvā*. It would be a very pathetic admission to make that the opening statement *Yāvatsampātam* is being construed in a restricted sense *not because of its own Vākyaśeṣa (or tail-end) but because of some other Śruti of like import to the summoned from elsewhere*.[28] Even as regards the exhaustion of Karmas which have to be requited in the distant future, there is no bar save the *upasamhāra Śruti* (Ramaṇīyacaraṇāḥ) to the Pūrvapakṣa contention that the Iṣṭādikārin exhausts thro' his enjoyment in heaven the entire stock of his Karmas belonging to the past and those which have to be enjoyed in the distant future.[29] Otherwise, even the rapprochement between the prohibition *Na himsyāt* and the injunction: *Agnīṣomīyam paśum ālabheta* can be posited on the same basis of: *Svayameva saṅkucadvṛttir agnīṣomīyaśrutyanurodhaprāptam api saṅkocam anumanyate.*

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25. नहि यावन्तः सपाता यावता वा पुसा सपातास्ते सर्वे तत्रेष्टादिकारिणा भोगेन क्षय नीयन्ते। पुरुषान्तराश्रयाणां कर्माशयाना तद्भोगेन क्षयेऽतिप्रसगात्। चिरोपभुक्ताना च कर्माशयानामत्तना चन्द्रमण्डलोपभोगेनानपनयनात् (*Bhāmatī* iii. 1.8)

26. तथाच, स्वयं सकुचन्तो यावत्सपातश्रुतिरुपसहारानुरोधप्राप्तमपि सकोचमनुमन्यते। (Bhāmatī)

27. तत्र प्रष्टव्यम्–आद्ये कोऽयमतिप्रसगो नामेति? अकृतप्रायश्चित्तानामभुक्तफलाना च कर्मणा क्षयः स्यादिति चेन्न। तत्र इह रमणीयचरणा' इति श्रुतिं विना इष्टापत्तौ बाधकाभावात्। (*STC*)

28. वाक्यान्तरमेव बाधकमिति चेत्। नहीद युक्त सपातश्रुति वाक्यशेषविरोधान्न सकुचद्वृत्तिः किन्तु तत्समानार्थकस्थलान्तरस्थवाक्यविरोधादेवेति! (*STC*)

29. चिरभोक्तव्यानामपि कर्मणा नाशे रमणीयचरणश्रुतिमन्तरा बाधकाभावाच्च। (*STC*)

CHAPTER XLIX

DISABILITIES OF ANIṢṬĀDIKĀRINS

11. *Aniṣṭādikāryadhikaraṇam* (iii.1.13-15)

This adhi. establishes that not only the Iṣṭādikārins but other non-knowers of B. or Ajñānins[1]—viz. the Aniṣṭādikārins have to go thro' the disabilities of goings and comings to and from other worlds.[2] For purposes of this adhi. the expression '*An-iṣṭādikārin*' (non-Iṣṭādikārins) is taken in both the senses of the negative—viz. those who do *not* perform meritorious deeds like sacrifices and building tanks (*iṣṭāpūrta*) and those who commit irreligious and anti-religious acts.[3] If such persons are not to be liable to the disabilities of comings and goings etc., counsels for Vairāgya will be undermined. The present *adhi.* is therefore, necesary to establish the indispensability of Vairāgya by insisting on refraining from objectionable conduct.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that only those who perform meritorious deeds yielding heavenly rewards are liable to go up and come down from the other worlds but not the others who *do not care* to perform such deeds or those who commit sinful deeds.[4] The religious-minded are moved to undertake such deeds by fear of incurring sin (*pratyavāya*) in the event of non-performance. Where there is fear there is always a likelihood of one's falling down. This accounts for the comings and goings of Iṣṭādi-

1. Who have been referred to as *Anātmavidaḥ* in Sūtra iii. 1.7 earlier.
2. ब्रह्मज्ञानरहितः किल । अनिष्टादिकारिणामपि गमनागमने स्तः । (*TP.* iii. 1.13)
3. 'अनिष्टादिकारिणां' इति नञर्थः. अनिष्टकारिणामकर्तॄणां च (*TP.* iii 1.13)
4. पुण्यकारिण गमनागमने नेतरेषामित्याह – (*M. BSB.* iii. 1.13)

kārins.[5] The Aniṣṭādikārins have no such fear of religion and do not bother to do anything religious. They have also no desire for heavenly rewards (as they do not believe in them).[6] It is only the desire for heavenly rewards that prompts men to such meritorious deeds and makes for comings and goings. Thus it is only the Iṣṭādikārins who forge the chains of Samsāra around themselves,[7] in the form of religious injunction to perform this or that sacrifice and prohibition to refrain from this or that act and undergo their consequences of comings and goings. The Aniṣṭādikārins, being liberated from these shackles of Karma, the fears of sin and the desire for heavenly fruits, are directly eligible for Mokṣa after death,—without having to go thro' Vairāgya and other Sādhanas. In their case, the need is not so much for cultivation of Vairāgya towards irreligious acts as perhaps towards performance of meritorious acts[8]! But they are already allergic to them.

Siddhānta

The Sūtra *Aniṣṭādikāriṇām api ca śrutam* establishes the point on the authority of Śrutis (*śrutam*) that Aniṣṭdikārins *also* (*api*) are as much subject to comings and goings from and to the other worlds. The conjunctive *ca* in the Sūtra refers to the punishments in hell and other forms of sufferings that await those guilty of *more objectionable transgressions against religion and morality*—to be dealt with in the next Sūtra.[9]

Sūtra 14 shows that all Aniṣṭādikārins without exception are liable to undergo punishment for their transgressions and omissions in the world of Yama. After this, some of them rise up from there and take birth in this world; while yet others among them who are the worst offenders sink *lower down* into eternal hells: *Samyamane tvanubhūya itareṣām ārohāvarohau tadgatidarśanāt* (iii.1.14). "All those who fail to do what is good and those who do objectionable acts go down to Hell (*samyamana*). There those who hate the Supreme Lord and the preceptors, scorn the Śrutis, all those who are perfidious, obstinate and perverse descend lower still and fall into the hell of darkness. They never come out of it. It is the pit of absolute misery. Others who are

5. इष्टादिकारिणा प्रत्यवायभयवत्वेन तदुपपत्तेः। अन्येषां च तदभावात्–
'बिभ्यत् पतति पादपात्' इति न्यायात्। (*TP.* iii. 1.13)

6. फलकामित्वाच्चेष्टादिकारिणाम्। (*ibid*)

7. इष्टादिकारिणस्तु स्वयमेवात्मानं विधिप्रतिषेधाभ्यां बध्नन्ति, नेतरे। (*ibid*)

8. अतः पुण्यकृतामेव गमनागमनादि। इतरेषां तु तद्रहितो मोक्ष एवेति, पुण्ये तत्फले च विरक्त्या भाव्यं नान्यत्रेति भावः। (*TP.* ibid)

9. चशब्दो दु खान्तरसमुच्चयार्थः। तदेवोत्तरसूत्रेऽनूद्यते। (*TP.* ibid)

thieves, or drunkards, etc., having undergone their punishment, come back to this world (*Kaunṭharavya Śruti*)."

The last Sūtra *Smaranti ca* brings together statements from Smṛtis elucidating all the points made in the two preceding Sūtras.[10]

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10. गच्छन्ति पापिनः सर्वे नरकं नात्र संशयः ।
तत्र भुक्त्वा पतन्त्येव ये द्विषन्ति जनार्दनम् ॥
महातमसि मग्नाना न तेषामुत्थितिः क्वचित् ।
इतरेषां तु पापानामुत्थान विद्यतेऽपि च
सुखस्यानन्तरं दुःखं दुःखस्यानन्तर सुखम् ॥
इति सर्वत्र नियमः, पञ्चक्लृप्ते तु तत्सदा ॥ इत्यादि । (M. *BSB*. iii. 1.15)
तृतीये द्वितीयसूत्रोक्ताशेषार्थप्रतिपादकतदुपात्तश्रुतिव्याख्यानरूपविशेषस्मृतिप्रदर्शनम् ।
(Raghu. *TPB*. iii. 1.15)

CHAPTER L

IMPERMANENT AND PERMANENT HELLS

12. *Saptādhikaraṇam* (iii.1.16)

The *adhi.* deals with the question whether the stay in the hells to which Aniṣṭādikārins were shown to be liable in Sūtra 14, is but temporary or whether, in some cases, it is permanent and eternal. Having spoken of the chastisement of Aniṣṭādikārins guilty of ordinary transgressions, in the world of Yama, the Sūtrakāra now turns to more serious forms of retribution which await the gravest forms of spiritual sin and corruption of the Soul, like denial and hatred of the Supreme Being which merit nothing less than eternal self-damnation.

Most of the commentators have contented themselves with saying *that according to the Sūtrakāra there are seven hells.* But there seems to be no point in his giving us the exact number of Hells after having made it clear that the Aniṣṭādikārins are liable to suffer for their evil deeds in the abode of Yama—unless it be to imply by that statement some other fact concerning the nature of these hells which will serve to warn the Sādhaka against the greatest danger to his spiritual well-being, were he to let himself be corrupted by allergy to Theism and hatred of the Supreme Being.

It is *in this context* that M.'s interpretation of this Sūtra assumes special significance in findnig a place under the terms of its reference to *the doctrine of Eternal Hell in Theism,* besides the acceptance *with other commentators like S. of temporary hells.* This question of eternal and temporary hells has a special bearing on the Sādhaka's intensifying his spirit of Vairāgya and keeping his soul unsullied by any kind of anti-Theistic belief or tendency.

The *adhi.* arises by way of an *ākṣepasaṅgati.* The existence of two types of Hells has been alluded to by the expression *itareṣām ārohāvarohau* used in Sūtra 14 and brought out more explicitly under Sūtra 15. But there is still room for a supervening objection to the acceptance of permanent Hells, *which is met in the present adhi.*

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that the sojourn in hell is not and need not be permanent for anyone. The texts cited in support of such a presumption need not be taken *too literally.* They can be regarded as figurative statements clothed in exaggerated terms intended to reform the more intractable natures of men by putting the wholesome dread of eternal Hell fire into them. These statements are, therefore, to be viewed as mere *arthavādas.*[1] This is clear from other statements such as: *Yādvad Indrāścaturdaśa:* "Euduring as long as the lifetime of fourteen Indras", *Cakāra narakam śūnyam:* "He rendered Hell completely vacant". For, if some persons were to be permanent denizens of Hell, it can not be said to be vacated by all residents, as we find in *Cakāra narakam śūnyam.* Moreover, if there should be two kinds of Hell, there can as well be two kinds of heaven (Svarga)—one permanent and the other temporary.

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that there is clear evidence of the existence of Eternal Hells besides those where the sojourn is temporary. The evidence in support of eternal hells is not weakened by statements like *Yāvad Indrāścaturdaśa, Cakāra narakam śūnyam,* etc. For the ruling of the Mīmāmsā: *Virodhe tvanapekṣam* (*P.M.S.* i.3.3.) invalidates the Smṛti when it is contradicted by a Śruti, as in this case; for the existence of eternal hells is endorsed by the *Kauṇṭharavya Śruti*[2] (quoted under M. *BSB.* iii.1.14). This Śruti is further supported by another Smṛti:

Mahātamasi magnānām na teṣām utthitiḥ kvacit
(Quoted under M.*BSB.* iii, 1, 15)

This cannot be countered by the objection that as the Smṛtis are not

1. तत्र नरके पुनरावृत्तिमदेव । न च 'नैवेते उत्तिष्ठन्तोऽपि कर्हिचित्', 'महातमसि मग्नानाम्' इत्यादिविरोधः । 'यावदिन्द्रा' इति वाक्यविरोधेन तस्य नरके विशेषविषयं 'हेलयो हेलय इति वदन्त' इत्यादिवत् अर्थवादत्वेनोपपत्तेः । (*STC.* iii. 1.16)

2. We have also a clear reference to eternal (everlasting) hell in *RV.* VII. 104.3. abc. where Indra and Soma are called upon to see that *none who sinks into it gets out of it again:*

इन्द्रासोमा दुष्कृतो वव्रे अन्तरनारंभणे तमसि प्रविध्यतम् ।
यथा नातः पुनरेकश्चनोदयत् ॥ (*ibid*)

irresponsible utterances but statement of facts derived from Vedic sources (*Śruti-mūlaka*) and are the compositions of Āptas, the testimony of passages like:

चकार नरकं शून्यम्

cannot be lightly set aside. The objection misses the point that since one and the same kind of Hell cannot be a place of permanent and temporary sojourn, we have to recognize two different regions of hell —one permanent and the other temporary[3] This is the only way in which the conflict of testimony can be got over. In the case of Svarga, there is no such divergence of testimony. Hence, there is no justification to recognize a permanent Svarga in addition to the impermanent one. The Bhāṣyakāra, accordingly, cites relevant authority from the Smṛti (*Mahābhārata*) which speaks of seven principal Hells—Raurava, Mahāraurava, Vahni, Viataraṇī, Kumbhīpāka, Tāmisra and Andhatāmisra of which the first five are temporary while stay in the last two is permanent. These seven hells stand in an ascending order of horribleness.[4] The ascent and the descent of Aniṣṭādikārins take place by passing thro' one or more as the case may be, of the first five only.[5] (See Raghu. TPB).

The *STC* raises an interesting question in this connection—viz. how far it is proper for the Sūtrakāra to resolve the conflict of testimony in respect of permanent and impermanent hells involving opposition between Śruti and Śruti-cum-Smṛti *in this Adhyāya.* It answers it that the question of hells has an intimate bearing on deterring persons from treading the path of evil and drawing them towards Vairāgya. It puts sincere aspirants of Mokṣa on their guard against the disastrous consequences of falling into attitudes of mind calculated to inspire hatred or denial of the Supreme Being in any form or manner. For they are the most insidious forms of moral delinquency and their retribution is self-damnation to eternal Hell.[6] Had the question been discussed in Adhy. II, it could only be to establish the mere fact that there are two different hells one where the stay in permanent

3. तथाप्यावृत्तितदभावयोरेकस्मिन्नसंभवादेव नरकद्वैविध्यसिद्धेः (*STC.* iii. 1 16)

4. 'रौरवोऽथ महांश्चैव वह्निर्वैतरणी तथा।
कुंभीपाक इति प्रोक्तान्यनित्यनरकाणि च।
तामिस्रश्चान्धतामिस्रो द्वौ नित्यौ सम्प्रकीर्तितौ।
इति सप्त प्रधानानि गरीयो ह्युत्तरोत्तरम्॥ (*Mbh* xiv Q *M. BSB.* iii. 1 16).

5. 'एतानि क्रमशो गत्वैवारोहोऽप्यावरोहणम्।
एतानि पंच (*TP*)

6. जीवाभेदो निर्गुणत्वमपूर्णगुणता तथा।
साम्याधिके तदन्येषां भेदः तद्गत एव च।
प्रादुर्भावविपर्यासः, तद्भक्तद्वेष एव च॥ (*M. Mbh. TN.* i. 113-14).

(and the other where it is temporary). But the bearing of the doctrine of eternal Hell on eschewing denial and hatred of the Supreme in any form or manner could not have been brought out[7]—as the topic of Vairāgya would be beyond the scope of the Avirodhādhyāya. The Sūtrakāra has, therefore, chosen the present context to resolve the conflict of testimony and at the same time to highlight its bearing on the subject matter of this Adhyāya and Pāda. The *TD* observes that tho' the number of Hells runs to thousands, the Sūtrakāra has shown that seven of them are the principal ones, by using the term *api*.[8] Raghūttama in his *TPB* mentions that some sources give the number of Narakas as twenty-one, others as twenty-eight and that the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* (v.24.39) refers to hundreds and thousands of them.

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7. द्वितीयेऽस्य निवेशे, तन्नत्याधिकरणैः पाशुपतादिस्मृतिविरोधपरिहारेण विष्णुकारणत्वदार्ढ्यवत् अनेनापि नरकस्य नित्यत्वदार्ढ्यमेव स्यात्। बहुविप्रकर्षस्तु हरिद्वेषादावतिशयेन वैराग्योत्पाद फलम्।
(*STC*. iii. 1.16)

8. यद्यपि बहुकोट्यो नरकाः, तथापि सप्त प्रधानानि इत्यपिशब्दः (*TD*. iii. 1.16) 'सप्त प्रधानानि' इत्यनेन बहुनरकाभिधायकपुराणविरोधोऽपि परिहृतः (*TP*)

See also *Viṣṇu Purāna* (ii. 6 2-5); *Mbh*. (xiii. 2. 23-25) and *Garuḍa Purāṇa* (ii. 2.3-104).

CHAPTER LI

ANIṢṬĀDIKĀRINS' SUFFERINGS IN HELL COMPATIBLE WITH GOD'S PRESENCE THERE

13. *Tadvyāpārādhıkaraṇam* (iii.1.17)

This adhi. arises by way of refuting the supervening objection to the conclusion established in the previous *adhi.* that Hell is a place of unrelieved suffering and that, therefore, the seeker of Mokṣa should keep away from anti-Theistic heresies, lest he should run the risk of eternal self-damnation. Briefly, the point of the objection is that Hell cannot be a place of unrelieved suffering as God must be admitted to be present there, as everywhere else. Otherwise, as a resident of Hell, God too will have to undergo all its sufferings. But then, making God suffer the miseries of Hell will be inconsistent with His acknowledged position as a being untouched by any kind of suffering or blemish: *Niraniṣṭo niravadyaḥ.* We have, therefore, to conclude that Hell cannot be a place of unrelieved suffering.[1]

We cannot say that God does *not* exist in Hell to prevent His being exposed to its sufferings. For, the Srutis say that He is present in heaven *and* in *hell* and everywhere in this world, impelling creatures to reap the fruits of their works. If then God is to be excluded from Hell, He will have to be excluded from the world of creatures altogether. That cannot be done, as the Śrutis say that He is present in all the creatures and sustains them all.

Nor can it be maintained that tho' present in Hell God does not *experience* the suffering of Hell like the other creatures there. In that

1. ईश्वरस्य नरकदु खायुक्तेर्न तत्र दु खमिति भाव (*TP.* iii. 1 17)
The probans: ईश्वरस्य नरकायुक्ते' in M.'s *Bhāsya* is elliptical— (हेतुगर्भं) —See *BD.* iii.1 17.

case, He will cease to be all-knowing[2]—for He will have no knowledge of the sufferings of Hell. What else can suffering be, if it is not its direct perception?

The Pūrvapakṣa, therefore, concludes that in view of the impossibility of accepting any of the above alternatives, statements like *Pañcakaṣṭe tu tat sadā* quoted earlier depicting Hell as a place of unrelieved suffering should be treated merely as an appreciative reference (*arthavāda*) to the joys of Svarga and nothing more (by way of *Nahi nindānyāya*).

The Siddhānta is that tho' Hell is indeed a place of unrelieved suffering and God is certainly present there, as everywhere else and impels its denizens to undergo its sufferings, He is still not liable to its sufferings because of His commanding position *wherever He is:*

Tatrāpi ca tadvyāpārād avirodhaḥ

To explain: God must of course be in a position to perceive the sufferings of offending Jīvas in Hell. While doing so, He must also be uninvolved in their suffering. To render this possible, the experience of suffering has to be distinguished from one's perception of it. In other words, it is *not* the perception of suffering which exposes one to it but one's *susceptibility to depression of spirit on account of such perception.* Suffering is the effect of one's feeling of helplessness in finding oneself in a disagreeable or subordinate position.[3] As God is by hypothesis the independence Reality, He can afford to remain in Hell unaffected while perceiving the sufferings of offending Jīvas in Hell. The particle *ca* in the Sūtra brings out this point. A person who has acquired the power of Agnistambhana can stay unharmed in the midst of a raging fire spreading disaster all round.[4]

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2. This objection wil affect the basis on which the ruling had been given in BS. i.2.8 that tho' tenanting the same body, the Supreme is not obliged to share the sufferings of the Jīva because of its sovereignty, omniscience etc. The objection is answered in the Siddhānta here by making out the vital distinction between the perception of suffering and the susceptibility to depression of spirit on account of such perception. This is reflected in the use of the particle *ca* in the Sūtra—

चशब्दात् 'अदुःखानुभवेन' इति समुच्चिनोतीति शेषः (TP)

3. भवितव्यं चावश्यमीशस्य दुःखसाक्षात्कारेण. निषेद्धव्यश्चासौ दुःखानुभवः, 'निरनिष्टो निरवद्य' इत्यादेः। ततोऽपि दुःखसाक्षात्कारातिरिक्तो नीचोच्चलक्षणो दुःखानुभवोऽभिप्रायः (*STC.* iii. 1.17)

4. नासावीश्वरे आपादयितुं शक्यः, दुःखानुभवप्रयोजकस्यास्वातंत्र्यादेरभावेन, विद्यावतो दाहाभाववत् स्वतंत्रस्य तस्यादुःखानुभवोपपत्तेरिति (*ibid*)

Cf. नरकेऽपि वसन्नीशो नासौ दुःखभुगुच्यते।
नीचोच्चतैव दुःखादेर्भोग इत्यभिधीयते।
नानो नीचोच्चता यानि पश्यत्येव प्रभुत्वतः॥
इति भागवततन्त्रे। (M. *BSB.* iii. 1.17)

CHAPTER LII

FREEDOM OF ADHIKĀRINS IS LIMITED TO SĀDHANAS ONLY

14. *Vidyākarmādhikaraṇam* (iii.1.18)

This *adhi.* makes it clear that the Jīvas are not in a position to go thro' Devayāna and Pitṛyāṇa on their own independent initiative.[1] Tho' it has already been shown in *Svātmanā cottarayoḥ* (ii.3.21) that the passing out etc., of the souls take place only under the guidance of the Supreme B., certain depositions made in *Chān. Up.* (v.10.1-8) regarding the peregrinations of Iṣṭādikārins etc., give rise to a presumption that they move from one stage to another on their own independent initiative. It is, therefore, necessary to discuss the question here, against this background.[2]

We read in *Chān. Up.* "They go to light, they pass into the smoke. But by neither of these paths all these inferior souls of mixed nature go. They are beings that frequently go and return and they have a third place where they are frequently born and are dead" (v.10.1-8). These statements imply that these souls possess independent initiative to go as they do.

The Pūrvapakṣa holds that we cannot justify such predications if the souls have no initiative at their discretion and competence. Such initiative need not be supposed to be out of tune with the dependence of Jīvas on B. established in so many earlier *adhi.s* (such as ii.1.22; 2, 9; 3, 18; 38; 39; 48; 49; 50). For it can be accommodated in terms of an initiative that is subject to the overall control exercised by the

1. प्रकृतं पितृयाणो देवयानश्च विषयः। किं भूतैः स्वातन्त्र्येण गम्यो न वेति संदेहः। (*TP.* iii. 1.18)
2. ईशाधीनस्यापि गतिस्वातन्त्र्यस्य श्रुतिवत्तत्त्वस्य निरासादिन्यर्थः। तेन, न 'स्वात्मना चोत्तरयोः' इत्यनेन गतार्थत्वमिति बोध्यम्। (Ragh. *TPB.* iii. 1.18)

Supreme B. similar to the initiative open to them in practising the Sādhanas for the attainment of Mokṣa or other objectives but for which it will be idle to expect any Sādhanas to be put thro.'[3] The objection that if we should recognizze freedom in the attainment of final results (like attaining Devayāna) it will become easy enough to do so for all souls and that, therefore, none can be said to miss them—as we find it stated in *Chān. Up.* v.10.8 is irrelevant. Such an objection can be raised with equal force in respect of the practice of Sādhanas also. But the fact remains that tho' open to all, only some take to them in earnest, while others are indifferent. The Pūrvapakṣa thus concludes that as the souls are said to be able to attain Devayāna etc. on their own initiative, there is little likelihood of their bothering to cultivate Sādhanas for the purpose of doing so. The Sādhanas will thus lose their point.[4]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta holds that the words 'of these paths" in the Śruti refer only to the assets of knowledge and works by which one attains Devayāna or Pitṛyāṇa and not the *path* of Devayāna or Pitṛyāṇa *as such*. This is clear not only from the emphasis laid in the passages cited for the Pūrvapakṣa, on the cultivation of Śraddhā, tapas etc. on the one hand and the practice of *iṣṭa* and *pūrta* on the other,[5] but also from the corroborating Smṛti cited by the Bhāṣyakāra:

"The paths of knowledge and works have been spoken of. He who is bereft of Jñāna and Karma has three ways to go—to animal life, to hell or to eternal darkness". This shows that the terms 'Vidyāpatha' and 'Karmapatha' are to be understood in the sense of 'knowledge conceived as path' and 'works conceived as path'. As injunctions and prohibitions operate only with reference to Sādhanas and not with reference to fruits which are not amenable to human effort,[6] it is proper to take it that what is contemplated by the Śruti (*Chān. Up.* v. 10) is merely that it is thro' the assets of knowledge and works that one can hope to attain Devayāna or Pitṛyāṇa and that such assets can be built up only thro' Sādhanas.[7]

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3. न च वाच्यम्—जीवस्यास्वातंत्र्यं प्रतिपादितम्। अतः कथं गतिस्वातंत्र्यमिति। तदधीनस्वातंत्र्यस्य विवक्षितत्वात् साधनवत्। तादृशस्याप्यभावे, वैराग्यादिसाधनमपि नोत्पादयितुं शक्यं स्यात्।
4. न च फलस्वातंत्र्ये सर्वेषां तत्प्राप्तिः, साधनेऽपि साम्यात्। अतो 'मूले लब्धफलो नैव शाखाग्रं गन्तुमिच्छति' इति न्यायात् फल एव स्वातन्त्र्यात् किं वैराग्यादिसाधनेनेति। (*TP.* iii. 1.18)
5. एतच्छब्देन विद्याकर्मणोरेव परामर्शात्। न च तयोरप्रकृतत्वम्; इष्टापूर्तवाक्ये तयोरपि प्रकृतत्वात्। (*STC.* iii. 1.18)
6. 'तद्विवर्जितः' इत्युत्तरवाक्यपर्यालोचनया विद्यैव पन्था इति विद्यापथः, कर्मैव पन्था इति कर्मपथः इत्यर्थस्यैव वक्तव्यत्वात्। गमनमूलकारणत्वेन तयोरपि पथिन् शब्दवाच्यतया, वर्जनं च प्रसक्तस्यैव। प्रसक्तिश्च विद्याकर्मणोरेव, न तु पथोः। तयोः प्रयत्नागोचरतया प्रसक्तेरयोगादिति ज्ञेयम्। (Vādirāja *TPG.* iii. 1.18)
7. अतः फलस्वातंत्र्याभावादपेक्षितं वैराग्यादिसाधनमिति सिद्धम् (*TP.* iii. 1.18)

CHAPTER LIII

ABSOLUTE MISERY ON ANDHATAMASA

15. *Mahātamo'dhikaraṇam* (iii.1.19-23)

After having broadly indicated the existence of seven leadnig hells in *adhi.* 12, and shown in *adhi.* 13 that all these regions are places of acute suffering, the Sūtrakāra shows in the present *adhi.* that the worst of these hells known as 'blinding darkness' (*andhatamasa*) is a place of absolute misery without an iota of comfort or relief.[1]

The Pūrvapakṣa argues that as happiness and misery are generally found to be concomitant, in the world, even Andhatamasa cannot be absolutely cheerless[2] The evidence of Smṛti lends support to this contention.[3] The call to keep away from Andhatamasa is not, therefore, justifiable.[4]

The Siddhānta is:—"*Na tṛtīye tothopalabdheḥ. In the third or the lowest region of Hell* there is no happiness at all. This is seen to be so from the Śrutis". The Śruti cited is according to M.:—"He who is not wise or has done no good works goes down. Three different ways there are for his downward passage: (i) the animal world (ii) the hell of torments and (iii) the hell of utter darkness. The first two states are attended with some happiness but the last one is absolutely *void of*

1. Read: विद्याकर्मणोरित्यनेन व्यवधाने कारणं सुखदुःखत्वविचारस्य सर्वनरकविषयत्वं, अस्य तमोमात्रविषयत्वमिति ज्ञापनमिति। (Raghu. *TPB.* iii. 1.19)

2. अन्ध तमोऽपि सुखयुक्तमेव, दुःखयुक्तत्वात्, सुखेन च दुःखस्य व्याप्तत्वात्। (*TP.* iii. 1.19)

3. यत्र दुःख सुखं तत्र सर्वत्रापि प्रतीयते।
अपि नीचगतौ किंचित् किमु मानुषदेहिन॥ (Q. M. *BSB.* iii. 1.19)

4. अतोऽन्धतमस्यपि सुखसद्भावात् न तत्र वैराग्यमपेक्षितमिति। (*TP.* iii. 1.19)

all happiness (vavram).[5] There is but absolute pain and suffering there".

The opening Sūtra thus shows that the scope of concomitance between misery and happiness presupposed in the Smṛti passage quoted for the Pūrvapakṣa has to be restricted to the sphere of the first two cases of downward destiny of souls out of deference to the superior authority of Śrutis which establishes that in the case of the third or the lowest of hells there is only absolute misery in store. It will be seen that the expression "tṛtīya" in Sūtra 19 refers to the third downward destiny of creatures spoken of in the Śrutis and Smṛtis:—

'त्रिधा ह वा अवाग्गतिः तिर्यक् यातना, तम इति' ।
'विद्यापथः कर्मपथौ द्वौ पन्थानौ प्रकीर्तितौ' ।
तद्वर्जितः त्रिधा याति तिर्यग्वा नरकं तमः ।।

It may, however, be felt that it will not be proper to decide the issue on the basis of a bare Śruti text when the objection has been urged on the ground of a Smṛti text fully supported by reasoning that there is every possibility of there being some happiness also in Andhatamasa. This is answered by another argument and analogy (*laukika-dṛṣṭāntayuktānumānam*). The substance of the argument and analogy according to the commentator is: The lives of denizens of Andhatamasa must be devoid of all happiness as it pleaseth not God to keep them happy. What pleaseth not God to be accomplished in a particular way does not come to be so accomplished, like hares being endowed with horns.[5a]

It may still be objected that even this argument is inconclusive as the Pūrvapakṣa may justifiably claim that the Smṛti on which it has taken its stand will naturally have to be traced to some Śruti in the end, which will have to be vested with the same validity as the Śruti cited for the Siddhānta. The next Sūtra: *Darśanācca,* therefore, clinches the issue by referring us to the evidence of the report in the *Padma Purāṇa* of the direct perception (darśana) by the four-faced Brahmā of the conditions in which the three classes of souls viz. Muktiyogyas, Nityasamsārins and Tamoyogyas were found to be placed:

"With his eye of wisdom enkindled by the grace of Nārāyaṇa, the four-faced Brahmā saw *the three classes of beings*—those who are foreever immersed in absolute misery, deprived of all joy; those in nume-

5. Cf. वव्रे अनारंभणे तमसि ** (*RV* vii. 104.3).

5a. विप्रतिपन्ना न सुखवन्तः, तथात्वेन ईश्वरानिष्टत्वात् । यद्यथा ईश्वरानिष्टं, तत्तथा न भवति, यथा शशो विषाणित्वेन, एतच्चानुमानं स्मृतिसिद्धत्वेनातिप्रबलमिति । (*TP.* iii. 1.20)

rous groups of eternally mixed character and those from whom all misery and pain have been totally banished and who are in the enjoyment of everlasting bliss".

"नारायणप्रसादेन समिद्धज्ञानचक्षुषा।
अत्यन्तदु:खसंलीनान् नि:शेषसुखवर्जितान्।
नित्यमेव तथाभूतान् विमिश्राश्च गणान् बहून्।
निरस्ताशेषदु:खाश्च नित्यानन्दैकभागिन:।
अपश्यत् त्रिविधान् ब्रह्मा साक्षादेव चतुर्मुख:॥"

The fourth Sūtra here: *Tṛtīye*[6] *śabdāvarodhas saṁśokajasya* cites an *arthāpatti-pramānṇa* which reveals the horrors of andhatamasa, the mere hearing of descriptions of which is said to be enough to make one's hairs stand on end and cause instantaneous swooning:—

Tṛtīyaviṣaye yas śabdas tena śokas, śokān mūrchāyā avarodhaḥ prāptir bhavati. Evam tatsvarūpaśrotṛṇām api mohānyathānupapatter na tatra sukhaleśa iti. (*TP.* iii.1.22)

Interpretations of Śaṁkara, Rāmānuja and others.
Aniṣṭādikāryadhikaraṇam (ii.1.12-21).

According to S. this *adhi.* comprises the ten Sūtras as above. The opening Sūtra *Aniṣṭādikāriṇām api ca śrutam* represents the Pūrvapakṣa and the rest the Siddhānta. The topic discussed is the fate of those who do not perform sacrifices or other good works. They are denied ascent to the world of the moon. They have to suffer punishment in Hell and rotate between this world and the world of Yama. While agreeing with this purport of the *adhi.* as given by S., Bhāskara and R. differ from him only in extending their Pūrvapakṣa upto Sūtra 16 and starting their Siddhānta from Sūtra 17.

Pūrvapakṣa

S.'s Pūrvapakṣa is that even those who do not perform good works in this life go up to the world of the moon, as stated in *Kauṣīkakī Up.* (i.2.).[7] As birth in the human world is dependent on all the five oblations of which the first one commences in the heavenly world, (see *adhi.*

6. The expression *Tṛtīya* in this Sūtra signifies that there are *three grades of Tamas*—in an ascending order of horror and misery: This is brought out in the next Sūtra (23):

महातमस्त्रिधा प्रोक्तमूर्ध्वं मध्यं तथावरम्।
श्रवणेनैव मूर्च्छादिरधरस्य यतो भवेत्
तस्माच्च विस्तरेणैतत् कथ्यते राजसत्तम॥ इति कौर्मे (M. *BSB.* iii. 1.23).

7. ये वै केचास्माल्लोकात् प्रयन्ति चन्द्रमसमेव ते सर्वे गच्छन्ति।

1 fn. 6), all men must be supposed to resort to the world of the moon after death.[8] There is, therefore, nothing to restrict the scope of the *Kauṣītakī* text. It cannot be done on the strength of the implication of the statement in *Chān. Up.* (v.10.8): "By neither of these two ways are those small creatures continuously returning; for theirs is the third place". This third place is only a place of sojourn and has nothing to do with the *way*. It can very well be that after coming down from the world of the moon these souls come to stay in this third place.[9] The words "those who travel by neither of these ways" in *Chān. Up.* (v.10.8) have, therefore, to be taken to state that while the *Aniṣṭādikārins also do go to the moon*, they simply remain there without any enjoyment whatsoever, and then come back to the third place.[10] It will not be a valid objection that there is no point in their going to the moon if they have nothing to enjoy there (like the Iṣṭādikārins). They go there because there is no other way for them to take and they tarry there and then come down to the world of Yama—just as a traveller plodding along the village road tarries on his way at the foot of one of the trees.[11]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta holds that as two ways have been spoken of in *Chān. Up.* (v.10.3-4) the 'third place' must similarly be deemed to be another way in order to be counted as the "third". It would thus follow that this is the other way by which the Aniṣṭādikārins travel. In the light of this finding, there will be no difficulty in restricting the scope of the words "all those" (in *Kauṣ. Up.* i.2) to Iṣṭādiārins alone.[12] The statement in *Chān. Up.* only predicates that the physical body is formed by the five oblations. But it does not rule out its formation in the absence of one or more of them. To construe it that way would result in a Vākyabheda.[13]

Criticism

The way in which S., Bhāskara, R. and others have initiated the Pūrvapakṣa here in terms of the Aniṣṭādikārins going to the world of

8. देहारंभोऽपि च पुनर्जायमानानां नान्तरेण चन्द्रप्राप्तिमवकल्पते- 'पञ्चम्यामाहुतौ', इत्याहुतिसंख्यानियमात्।
(S. *BSB.* iii. 1.12)

9. 'तृतीयं स्थानम्' इति च स्थानत्वमात्रावगमात् पथित्वेनाप्रतीतेश्चन्द्रलोकादवतीर्णानामपि तत्स्थानत्वसंभवात्
(*Bhāmatī.* iii. 1.12)

10. इष्टादिकारिणामितरेषां च समानगतित्वं न युक्तमिति चेत्; न। इतरेषां चन्द्रमण्डले भोगाभावात्।
(S. *BSB.* iii. 1.12)

11. अनन्यमार्गतया च तद्भोगविरहिणामपि 'ग्रामं गच्छन् वृक्षमूलमुपसर्पति' इतिवत् संयमनादिषु यमवश्यतायै चन्द्रलोकगमनोपपत्तेः। (*Bhāmatī.* iii. 1.12-21)

12. तस्मात् 'ये वै केच' इष्टादिकारिविषयं, न सर्वविषयम् (*ibid*).

13. पञ्चम्यामाहुताविति च स्वार्थविधानपरम्। न पुनरपञ्चम्याहुतिनिषेधपरमपि। वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गात्।
(*Bhāmatī* iii. 1.12-21)

the moon has no direct bearing on Vairāgya—the theme of the Pāda. The interests of Vairāgya are not adversely affected by devoting the opening Sūtra to make out a Pūrvapakṣa that Aniṣṭādikārins also go to the world of the moon. The prospect of Aniṣṭtādikārins going to the moon's world constitutes no challenge to the need for Vairāgya. Nor does the position that they *do not go to the moon,* buoy up the case for Vairāgya, in the Siddhānta. The inquiry into this question is thus wholly irrelevant to the Pādārtha. This defect is avoided in M.'s way of presenting the Pūrvapakṣa and the Siddhānta.

The world of Yama is situated *below* the earth. The Aniṣṭādikārins way to Samyaminīpura does not therefore, lie thro' the moon's world. The *Bhāmatī's* attempt to support the Pūrvapakṣa that the Aniṣṭādikārins make the trip to the moon's world, as there is no other way to reach the world of Yama is, thus, baseless. The objection that it will be a waste of time and energy to let the Aniṣṭādikārins go to the world of the moon, when they have nothing to enjoy there, is beside the point. For these Aniṣṭādikārins are tossed about by their own Karma and have to rue their fate. Such wandering is part of their punishment.[14] The fruitlessness of their journey to the moon *adds to their unenviable fate.* In the absence of such a journey there, evil-doers will be spared so much hardship and far from contributing to Vairāgya, this would make them more indifferent to Vairāgya. The purpose of the Pāda will suffer by such a Siddhānta. This shows that the Sūtra: *Aniṣṭādikāriṇām api ca śrutam* deserves to be treated as a Siddhānta-Sūtra, *and not as a Pūrvapakṣa Sūtra.* As a Siddhānta-Sūtra, it will convey by the force of *ca* that besides the hardship of going from and coming back to the mortal world, these Aniṣṭādikārins have to suffer other disabilities also like the torments of Hell to be mentioned in the next Sūtra. In S.'s interpretation with "api" already there, in the Pūrvapakṣa-Sūtra, this "*ca*" becomes a useless appendage.

The expression *Itareṣām* is a misfit in Sūtra 13 in S.'s interpretation. (The meaning of) "Itara" has naturally to be distinguished from what is contextually given—which, in this case, will be the *Aniṣṭādikārins themselves.* Thus, "the others" who are to be consigned to Yama's worlds will be the Iṣṭādikārins themselves *and not the Aniṣṭādikārins!* If the antecedent of '*Itareṣām*' is to be found in 'Iṣṭādikāriṇaḥ' in Sūtra 6, then the present Sūtra (13) will have to be read immediately *after* No. 6. If "Itareṣām" merely refers to "Aniṣṭādikārins" themselves who are (i) to be denied ascent and descent alike to and from the moon's world and are (ii) to be consigned to punishment in

14. कर्मवश्यत्वेन भ्राम्यमाणस्य वैयर्थ्यशंकानुदयात् (*STC.* iii. 1.10-23)

Yama's world, the wording commensurate with such a meaning and intention, which the Sūtrakāra should have used, will be

संयमने त्वनुभूय नैषामारोहावरोहौ

(After suffering in the abode of Yama, there is no ascent or descent for these persons).

The use of 'Itareṣām' (others) instead of 'Naiṣām' (these) is both misleading and imprecise, if it is intended to convey S.'s meaning. Ghate does seem to have correctly understood S. when he writes "S. has to understand *the descent to Yama's* world and ascent therefrom to this world. (*Op. cit.*, p. 107). This is not warranted by S.'s *bhāṣya* where he clearly says:—

यामीर्यातना अनुभूय पुनरेवेमं लोकं प्रत्यवरोहन्ति (S. *BSB.* iii.1.13)

and this is supported by the *Bhāmatī:*

संयमने त्वनुभूयेति सूत्रेणावरोहापादानतया संयमनस्योपादानात् चन्द्रमण्डलापादाननिषेध आञ्जसः (*Bhāmatī* iii.1.12)

which means the descent of the Aniṣṭādikārins is *from the world of Yama to this world.* This, we have already seen, cannot be accepted, as the world of Yama is situated *below* the world of men, *according to the Purāṇas.*

As S. has put up the Pūrvapakṣa that all those who depart from this world have to go to the moon's world, by taking his stand on the expression "Sarve" in *Kauṣ. Up.* i.2, we *should expect his Siddhānta Sūtra* (no. 13) *to cite the authority which will restrict the meaning of 'Sarve' to Iṣṭādikārins only. The reference* there, *instead, to the* Aniṣṭādikārins being subjected to chastisement by Yama and their subsequent ascent and descent is *not called for,* especially because some of the Iṣṭādikārins too are not wholly exempted from punishment in Hell, if they deserve it on other grounds.

Turning to M.'s way of explaining *'Itareṣām'* we can see how *it is necessary* to convey that there are two types of Anṣṭādikārins. The milder type comes up (*āroha*) to this world after taking its punishment in hell. The more confirmed sinners of tougher type, guilty of grave sins of commission and omission (Paradviṣaḥ, Suradviṣaḥ, Gurudviṣaḥ, etc.) are *not* eligible to *come up at all to this world.* They have to face the prospect of sinking further into permanent hells. The expression "Itareṣām" is, thus, *advisedly used* to succinctly distinguish between the fortunes of these two types with due economy of words.[15] This point

15. Cf. संयमन अनुभूय केषांचिदारोहः केषांचिदवरोहः । (M. *BSB.* iii. 1.14)

is well brought out in Ragh.'s *TDP* in commenting on the words of the Sūtra: that tho' the expression *Aniṣṭādikāriṇām* follows by *anuvṛtti* from Sūtra 13, Sūtra 14, still uses the term *"itareṣām"* (of the others) to pinpoint that among these Aniṣṭādikārins while *some* are eligible for ascent to this world, *some others* among them will have to face only *descent further down* into eternal hells.[16] In R.'s interpretation also the expression *'Itareṣām'* is a luxury for mere *"Teṣām"* and so not quite happy, tho' he has not the same difficulty as S. with *āroha* and *avaroha* which he aligns with the Pūrvapakṣa.

The Sūtra *Tatrāpi ca tadvyāpārād avirodhaḥ* (iii.1.16) has been taken by S., R. and others as a Guṇasūtra (subordinate one) tagged on to *Api ca sapta* which refers to the seven Hells. It is made to answer a comparatively *trivial objection* as to how Yama can be held to be the dispenser of punishments in these hells, *when it appears from the Smṛtis that these different Hells are under the jurisdiction of different officers like Citragupta.* The objection is taken by these commentators to be answered by saying that there is no conflict of authority or jurisdiction as these officers are themselves in the employ of Yama. Surely, it makes no difference to (the sufferings of) the Aniṣṭādikārins whether these seven hells are controlled by Citragupta and others independently of Yama's overall control *or under his general supervision.* That *is a very minor detail relating to the internal administration of Hells* which neither concerns the Aniṣṭādikārins nor the Sūtrakāra here nor deserves to be raised as a Pūrvapakṣa,—albeit incidentally and given the *luxury of a refutation in a separate Sūtra. It can be used to better purpose as has been shown by M. and his commentators,* by being constituted into a *separate adhi.* to dispose of an important objection that there can be no misery or suffering in Hell if God is to be present there, as everywhere else, to regulate its conditions—as a Theist like Bādarāyaṇa is bound to concede. *That* would be a more substantial and meaningful way of utilizing this Sūtra in the context and in the interest of the "Sādhana-Adhyāya".

According to S., the Sūtra: Vidyākarmaṇoh * * * (17) is *the one which expressly repudiates* the Pūrvapakṣa raised in 12 that the Aniṣṭādikārins go to the moon and come back. For this reason, it should have been given precedence over Sūtra 13, which merely shows *where they go instead. But the question of where they go, if not to the moon's*

16. 'अनिष्टादिकारिणाम्' इत्यनुवृत्तावपि इतरेषां इत्युक्तिः, तन्मध्ये केषाचिदारोहोऽन्येषां हरिद्वेषिणामवरोह इति विकल्पसूचनार्था । (Ragh. TDP).

Thus, in M.'s interpretation, *Itareṣām* is a *portmanteau-word* signifying the divergent destinies of the two types of Aniṣṭādikārnis one eligible for ascent and another not eligible for ascent but only for still further descent.

world, can arise only after it has been proved once for all that they do not go to the moon! This is done, according to S., in Sūtra 17. If his interpretation of these Sūtras is correct, we should expect Sūtra 17 to precede Sūtra 13. *The present position of Sūtra 17 is an indication that it represents a fresh adhi.*

S. asumes that there is no need for the five oblations in respect of genesis in the third place. As many of the Aniṣṭādikārins are likely to be reborn in the human world, it will not be correct to make the Śruti *Jāyasva mriyasveti* do away with the five oblations in the third place (See Kaṭha. i.1.6). The non-mention of the five *āhutis* here is no positive evidence of their absence. The examples of Dṛṣṭadyumna or Droṇa quoted by him under iii.1.19. are in the nature of exceptions. Even the absence of the fifth oblation in the case of insects etc. is not verifiable by perception and has to be accepted on the authority of Smṛtis. As this point to be established by Sūtra 20 will be covered by Sūtra 19, the former (Sūtra 20) becomes *unnecessary*. There is also an unwarranted importation of the expression *Caturvidhabhūtagrāma* in S.'s interpretation of Sūtra 20.

His (and R.'s) interpretation of Sūtra 21 as resolving a conflict of evidence whether there are really four kinds of organic life or only three kinds is not really called for, as there is no express recognition in Sūtra 20 of the number of forms of life as four. This question (of their number) is thus outside the scope of the Sūtra, which can be interpreted without any *adhyāhāra*. No conflict as envisaged by S. will arise in Sūtra 20, but for the importation made by him. Sūtra 21 need not, therefore, be required to set right the conflict of number of forms of life.

The supposition that there is omission of one of the four forms of organic life (i.e. *Svedaja*) in Sūtra 20, which calls for an explanation in 21, is itself unsustainable. It is doubtful if the expression "Samśokaja" relied upon for the purpose can denote the 'moisture-born' (*svedaja*) without straining to get at such a meaning thro' Lakṣaṇā. Śoka may mean warmth or heat and sweat and moisture produced by it may be Śokaja. But life generated from moisture or sweat (viz. insects and vermins) cannot be designated by the same word "Śokaja". Such life will be "Śokajaja", if it comes to that! There is no reason why the Sūtrakāra should resort to this *roundabout way referring to this form* of life as Samśokaja, instead of as 'Svedaja' which is the *shorter* and the more widely and commonly used term.

The meaning assigned by M. to Samśokaja is swooning and other reactions induced by listening to the hair-raising descriptions of the torments in Hell to which Aniṣṭādikārins are subjected. Such a meaning is free from Lakṣaṇā in trying to interpret Samśokaja as moisture-born so as to get over a minor irrelevant conflict of testimony, regarding the number of main forms of life. *The excursiveness* of S.'s explanation of Samśokaja raises a presumption that this reading; *Tṛtīyaśbdāvarodha* is itself open to question. The reading *Tṛtīye* (locative) *śabdāvarodhaḥ samśokajasya* prefered by M., besides being able to steer clear of the difficulties of Lakṣaṇā etc., has the advantage of *keeping the discussion linked with the question of punishment in Hell mooted in the preceding Sūtras* (13-17) *and continuing* it in a fresh *adhi.* (19-23)[17] touching other facts *bearing on the same topic.*

17. The reason for interposing the *Vidyākarmādhi* between these two has been explained by Raghu. in his *TPB.* See fn. 1 P. 413 *ante.*

CHAPTER LIV

VICISSITUDES OF RETURNING SOULS

16. *Tatsvābhāvyāpattyadhikaraṇam* (iii.1.24)

After discussing the nature of the downward destiny of some souls, the Sūtrakāra turns to the Karmins returning to this world. Speaking of their having completed their enjoyment in heaven and their coming down to the earth for rebirth, the Śruti says: He becomes the smoke, the mist, the cloud, etc. (*Chān. Up.* v.10.5). Here the terms smoke, cloud, etc. are connotative of the Abhimānidevatās of the respective principles.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa holds that the Śruti posits that these souls attain identity with the Abhimānidevatās of cloud, etc., or that they attain to their exalted positions. The possibility of attaining identity is clear from the wording of the Śruti in terms of *Sāmānādhikaraṇya* or syntactic apposition: *Dhūmo bhūtva ahraam bhavati.* The other possibility of their attaining the exalted position of the Abhimānidevatās is also there. For, these souls being in close touch with these deities and being dear to them by close association, the deities may, out of their affection to them, readily part with their own status in their favor as a king may relinquish his kingship in favor of his dear son or favorite. Anyway, as these souls thus stand the chance of attaining such high status and identify which is bound to last till the end of a whole Kalpa and as such a divine status carries with it immense happiness, the prospect of cultivating Vairāgya in respect of Kāmyakarmas and their fruits is thus bound to recede and disappear once for all.

Siddhānta

This Pūrvapakṣa is overthrown by the Siddhānta: *Tatsvābhāvyāpattir upapatteḥ.* The Sūtra clarifies that what is meant by such statements as *Dhūmo bhavati, abhram bhavati* is nothing more than attaining to a state *similar to that of the deities in question.*[1] This is not the same as becoming the deities themselves or gaining their individual status. For one thing (or person) cannot become another of a different nature: *Na hyanyasya anyabhāvo yujyate* (*M. BSB.* iii. 1.24)—*as it is barred by reason* (*upapatteḥ*).[2] The oneness has, therefore, to be understood in terms of staying in the same place (*sthānaikya*)[3] or entering into the physical body of the deity in question, going where it goes, tarrying where and when it tarries and becoming as light etc., as the deity and so forth. For the same reason, then the possibility of these Karmin-Jīvas attaining the rank of the deity is also ruled out. For it is not open to all to attain the rank of the deities. Only those eligible thro' knowledge to hold such positions can do so and the Śāstra forbids entertaining any such desire in the case of those ineligible to do so.[4] Otherwise, were a number of souls to become entitled to hold the same position of a particular deity there will be serious practical difficulty. Even when it is a case of making a gift of one's position, the deity may be expected to gift what is fit and proper and not its own position and the good soul also may be relied upon to take what is *within its deserts and nothing beyond.* There is thus no possibility of the Karmin Jīvas descending from Svarga attaining the high position of the presiding deities of the cloud etc., lasting for a long stretch of time. The need for Vairāgya in respect of Kāmyakarmas and their fruits thus remains unaffected.

Interpretation of Śaṁkara (and Rāmānuja)

According to S. (R. and others) the *adhi.* discusses the question whether the righteous souls descending from heaven actually attain identity of nature with Ākāsa, Vāyu, smoke etc. as we find in statements in the Śruti such as—"the sacrificer having become smoke, he becomes mist, having become mist he becomes a cloud"; or only a similarity of nature with these substances.

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1 तस्य धूमादे. स्वभावसदृश स्वभावो यस्य स तत्स्वभाव । 'गजमुख' इत्यादिवत् । (*TD.* iii. 1.24)
तस्य धूमादे स्वभावपदोक्तधर्मसदृशः स्वभावो यस्य स तत्स्वभाव.। तस्य भावः तत्स्वाभाव्य, तस्यापत्तिरिति विग्रहः । स्वार्थे ष्यञ् । (*BD*)

2. Cf. मिथ्यैतदन्यत् द्रव्य हि नैति तद्धर्मतां यत. (*Visnu Purāṇa* ii, 14.27) R. reads: तद्द्रव्यताम्

3 स्थानैक्य नामोभयोरेकदेहगतत्वम् । धूमो भूत्वेत्यस्य स्वारस्यायैवमुक्तम् । (Vādirāja *TPG.* iii. 1.24)

4 For details See M. *BSB.* iii. 4.41-42.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that they do attain identity of nature with these substances by transformation. The *Bhāmatī* cites the illustrations of Nandikeśvara who changed his human body into a divine one and of Nahuṣa whose celestial body was changed into that of a boa constrictor (*ajagara*).

The Siddhānta is that these souls *do not attain identity* with Ākāsā, Vāyu, cloud, etc. as it is impossible that one thing should become another of a different nature. In the case of Nahuṣa and others, the change of the celestial body into a boa was possible because the two bodies were not coexistent at the same time. The change of milk into curd is possible for this reason that milk and curd are not, coexistent. But the subtle bodies of the Jīvas, and Ākāsa, Vāyu, the clouds etc. exist at the same time. This renders impossible the transformation of the Jīvas' Sūkṣmaśarīra during their downward journey, into ether, air, cloud, etc. The subtle bodies of the Jīvas can, therefore, attain only a measure of likeness with ether, come under the influence of air and become connected with smoke, etc. The Śruti: *abhram bhūtvā megho bhavati* is, therefore, to be understood in a gauṇa sense.

Criticism

The interpretation is open to various objections. It will have to be clarified if, in the Pūrvapakṣa, Ākāsa, Vāyu, *abhram*, etc. are used for the presiding deities of the substances or for the purely physical substances. As the deities are sentient beings, there can be no possibility of transformation of the descending souls into the deities. To that extent the illustration of Nahuṣa and Nandī will be out of place. In the other case, while becoming a deity may bring great happiness to the Jīva, it will not at all be an agreeable thing for a sentient being to get transformed into a material substance like ether or air. If such a change should really occur, it would engender a profound distaste (Vairāgya) towards all Kāmyakarmas and their fruits in store, in the Adhikārin from the Pūrvapakṣa standpoint itself. To combat this, the Siddhānta will have to play the role of an ardent advocate and upholder of the indispensability of all Kāmyakarmas and their fruits. That will be working at cross purposes with the Pādārtha. Sobriety of thought and judgment would thus demand the reversal of the Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta to keep alive the indispensability of Vairāgya in respect of Kāmyakarmas and their fruits. The evidence of the Epic and the Purāṇas merely show that the bovine body and the human body of Nandī and Nahuṣa were given up by them and a fresh body of a celestial being and of an ajagara were obtained by them as the result of a boon and a curse respectively. There is no evidence of *transformation of bodies in these cases.*

The discussion raised in the *adhi.* appears to be wanting in cogency of purpose. The explanation that if the descending souls should attain oneness with Ākāsa, Vāyu, etc., they cannot possibly be taking birth in good or bad yonis as stated in the Śruti; whereas if they attain only similarity of nature there will be no impediment to their taking such births is not conclusive. Even if the soul should attain identity of nature with Ākāśa etc., only that part of Ākāśa etc. which is an ingredient of the body will be taking birth in the particular yoni. However, as birth in particular yonis will be incompatible with attaining similarity of nature with ether etc., there can be no birth while there is such similarity of nature with the different substances.

CHAPTER LV

RETURNING KARMINS ARE SOON REBORN

17. *Acirapräptyadhikaraṇam* (iii.1.25)

This *adhi.* considers whether the Kāmyakarmins, attaining similarity of nature with the deities of ether, air, smoke, etc. one after the other, stay on in those states for long or get into the mother's womb very soon after beginning the descent from heaven.

The sequence of thought between the present and the preceding *adhi.* is this. Granting that the Jīvas attain only similarity of nature and not identity of being and status with the various deities, in the manner described, even these states of similarity with the deities successively attained in close association with them, is sure to be a source of great happiness[1] to these Jīvas, lasting for a considerable length of time. This is sure to extinguish any desire for Vairāgya towards Kāmyakarmas and their rewards. In the interests of Vairāgya,—the theme of the Pāda, it has, therefore, to be shown that the returning Jīvas get back to the mother's womb within a short time after completing their heavenly enjoyments and are once again caught up in the whirl of Yonipraveśa.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that the Karmin Jīvas coming down from heaven are reborn only after a considerably long stretch of time which may even extend to a veritable Kalpa. For, it is seen from the Śruti:

1 Read [illegible] इति [illegible]। [illegible]। (*AC.* iii. 1 25)

"They return by that course by which they come to Ākāśa; from Ākāsa to air and after having become the air they become *smoke, after* it they become mist, then the cloud and having been in the cloud they rain down. Then they are born as rice and barley, herbs and trees, plants, etc. From these, the release is painful. For whoever eats the food and sows the seed they become like unto him". (*Chān. Up.* v.10.5-16), *that the self goes to so many places. Going thro' so* many places and staying there will naturaly stretch over long periods of time. In tarrying with those deities, there is also the definite prospect of securing great happiness. It will be of no advantage to these souls to forego all that and return quickly—only to suffer the ills of Yonipraveśa. While in the company of the deities, these Jīvas will not be slow to please them and earn their favor,[2] which will give them a further lease of happiness. As the deities will retain their jurisdiction for a full Kalpa,[3] the Jīvas staying with them can expect to enjoy the benefits of their *tatsvābhāvyāpatti* well nigh for a Kalpa. Why then will any Jīva care to shun Kāmyakarmas and cultivate detachment to them (*Vairāgya*) when they carry the promise and potency of conferring such a bright future on him? The Pūrvapakṣa thus deals a deathblow to Vairāgya—the theme of the Pāda.

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is: Karmins return to the earth after staying with the deities of Ākāśa, etc. and are reborn on earth *very soon indeed* (*nāticireṇa*)—before the year is out, to be precise. This is made clear by the deliberate use of the expression "*abhyāśaḥ*"[4] (quickly) in the *Śruti text: those whose conduct has been good,* quickly they attain a good womb. (*Chān. Up.* v.10.7). Lest it should be thought that even the duration of a Kalpa may be deemed to be "*relatively* soon after" *the Bhāṣyakāra, explaining the keyword "nāticireṇa"*[5] *in the Sūtra,* clarifies it with the help of a clearly-worded Smṛti text that the return to the womb takes places within a year of the commencement of the downward journey:

स्वर्गलोकादवाक् प्राप्तो वत्सरात् पूर्वमेव तु।
मातु: शरीरमाप्नोति पर्यटन् तत्र तत्र च ॥
इति नारदीये (M. *BSB*. iii.1.25)[6]

2 देवतासान्निध्यसद्भावेन तत्रावस्थानकारणदेवताप्रसादार्जनोपपत्ते.। (*AC*)

3. कल्पावसाने देवानां पदपर्यवसानात्। (*TP*. iii. 1.25)

4. *The wording is to be construed as:* आपद्यन्त इति यत्, तत् अभ्याश· कालसामीप्येन (*TP*. iii. 1.25)

5 नसमास.। अचिरेणेत्यर्थ: (*TDP*)

6. This dispels the vagueness of the original (*nāticirena*) which other commentators have *not attempted to penetrate.*

The objection that in view of the prospect of enjoying similarity of nature with the deities for a long time, no returning self is likely to wish to return to the earth so soon as within a year is not a formidable one. The Jīvātman is notoriously helpless (*asvatantra*). Where the time limit has been fixed by authoritative sources, it is not open to him to prolong his stay as he likes. If everyone is left to his own likes, no soul would like to come down to the misery of rebirth! So long as the Democlean sword of *garbhavāsa* hangs over the heads of souls, the need to eschew Kāmyakarmas and cultivate Vairāgya towards them is bound to persist.[7]

Interpretation of Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja

According to S., R. and others the question discussed here is whether with reference to the period beginning with the souls' becoming ether, air, etc., and extending upto their entering into rice, barley, herbs and trees, they remain in that state of similarity with each of the substances successively for a very long time or only for a short time.[8]

The Pūrvapakṣa is that as there is no specific ruling in any definite text on the point, the question has to be left an open one.[9] The Siddhānta is that the expression '*durniṣprapataram* (=whence the exit is painful) used in the (vicinity of the) context of the souls' entering into rice, barley, herbs and trees indicates that *prior to* getting into them the passage from stage to stage is quick and easy while *after* raining down on earth and entering into rice, barley, herbs and trees, it is painful and very slow.[10]

Criticism

The Pūrvapakṣa in favor of leaving the question an open one is not justifiable. It can be held thro' a simple generalization that as the Jīvas carrying a residue of their Karmas remain in rice, barley, herbs and trees in a state of similarity with them for a long time, they must be doing the same thing during their association with ether, air and clouds also.[11]

7. अतः कर्मिणोऽपि चिरेणैव गर्भवासादिदुःखप्राप्तिसद्भावात् भवितव्यं कर्माद्यो विरक्तेरिति सिद्धम्।
(*TP.* iii. 1.25)

8. आकाशादिसादृश्यचिराचिरत्वविचारणात् सगतिः (*Kalpataru* iii. 1 23)

9 तत्रानियमः, नियमकारिणः शास्त्रस्याभावात् इति (S. *BSB.* iii. 1.23)

10. दुर्निष्प्रपतरं विलंबं मन्यतेति सिद्धान्तः (*Bhāmati* ibid)

11. अनुशयिनामाकाशादिपर्यन्तानां सादृश्यं चिरमपि, अनुशयिसादृश्यवत्त्वात्, व्रीह्यादिसादृश्यवत्।
(*Kalpataru* iii. 1 24)

If it is arguable that there is a likelihood of rice, barley, corn and other forms of food and vegetation growing on hill tops and other inaccessible places remaining unconsumed by those who perform the act of generation and consequently there is every possibility of such souls as have got into these corn, herbs and trees lying imprisoned in them for long, and reach the mother's womb after considerable delay, then by the same token it may be contended that while delay is possible in such cases, there is no reason to take a long time in passing thro' the stages of ether, air, cloud, etc., in which case, the Pūrvapakṣa that the matter cannot be decided one way or the other, with reference to the first part of the passage till reaching the earth, for want of evidence will fall to the ground. Where a definite and uniform Pūrvapakṣa can be put up thro' reasoning, there is no need to restrict it to the first half of the journey.

Vācaspati pleads that the expression *durniṣprapataram* would rather signify delay in escaping from the condition of rice, barley, herbs and trees, *than* painfulness of such escape, because without the gross body the soul cannot feel any pain or suffering with its subtle body alone.[12] with which it goes about prior to reaching the mother's womb. This misses the point that if the Jīvas can experience no pain with their subtle bodies alone, they will not be able to experience any relief, ease or happiness either, without the gross body. How then can it be presumed in the Siddhānta that in the earlier stages of passing thro' Ākāśa, air and the clouds the passage is smooth, easy and painless?[13]

As the expression *durniṣprapataram* applied with reference to the exit from rice, barley, herbs and trees can also signify subjection to being cut, quartered, pulverised or otherwise injured, there is nothing to show that it must necessarily be taken in the sense of the Jīvas' staying on in them for a long time.[14]

The Pūrvapakṣa that the descending souls attaining similarity of nature with ether, air, clouds etc. will remain in those states *pretty long* cannot be set aside merely by squeezing a farfetched meaning by Lakṣaṇā into the expression *durniṣprapataram. The point can only be*

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12 विना स्थूलशरीर न सूक्ष्मशरीरं दुःखभागीति, दुर्निष्प्रपतरं विलम्ब लक्षयतीति राद्धान्तः (*Bhāmatī* iii. 1.23)

13. Cf. तदत्र दुःखं निष्प्रपतनं प्रदर्शयन् पूर्वेषु सुखं निष्प्रपतनं दर्शयति । (S. *BSB.* iii. 1.23)

14. खण्डनपेषणादिविषयत्वोपलक्षकतयाप्युपपत्तौ, विलम्बलक्षकत्वनिश्चयानुपपत्तेः (*STC.* iii. 1.25)

settled by bringing forward clear evidence from Śruti[15] *and Smṛti* establishing that, right thro' all the stages, from the first to the last, the return of the Anuśayī takes place in a fixed time which is fairly short —not exceeding a year, as has been shown by M. This is the crux of the problem.[16] S., R. and others have all ignored it.

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15. अनुशयिनामाकाशादिसादृश्यप्राप्तौ बहुकालमेवं स्यादिति प्राप्तस्य पूर्वपक्षस्य निरवकाशश्रुत्युपन्यासमन्तरा निरासायोगाच्च (*Op. cit.*)

16. The expression *abhyāśa* in *Chān. Up.* (V. 10, 6) gives the answer. "How soon" it is cleared by the *Smṛti:* श्रुत्यर्थनिर्णयाय स्मृतिमुदाहरति—स्वर्गादिति (*BD.* iii. 1.25)

CHAPTER LVI

RETURNING JĪVAS DO NOT OWN CORN ETC. AS THEIR BODIES

18. *Anyādhikaraṇam* (iii.1.26-27)

This *adhi* shows that the statement in *Chān. Up.* (v.10.6) that the souls of Kāmyakarmins returning with their residuary Karma are "born as rice, barley, herbs and trees" is not to be taken in the sense that they come to own them as their own bodies evincing any close personal attachment to them. If that be the case, these souls are sure to be exposed to the sufferings caused to their "bodies" when these bodies are being cut, quartered, pulverised or subject to various forms of injury while being cooked, boiled, eaten or burnt up. Such mishaps in store for the performers of Kāmyakarmas prescribed and taught in the Śrutis, are sure to raise serious misgivings in the minds of Adhikārins about the wisdom of actively pursuing the other intensive disciplines of Vairāgya etc. taught in the same Śrutis for the attainment of Mokṣa, that they too may likewise be fraught with adverse consequences and deter them from taking to the disciplines of Vairāgya etc. In the interest of upholding the desirability of practising Vairāgya and other Sādhanas *without* such misgivings, it has got to be shown that there is no reason to suppose that the returning Jīvas of Karmins make themselves liable to acute sufferings when they acquire their bodies of rice, corn, herbs and trees as stated in the Śruti.[1] The present *adhi.* does this by showing that there is no basis for the supposition that these returning souls are actually born as rice, corn,

1. सुखसाधनतया वेदोपदिष्टकर्मिणा व्रीह्यादिभावेन दुःखित्वे, वेदविहितवैराग्यादावपि तच्छङ्का स्यात्। न तस्त-न्निरसनीयम्। (*TP.* iii. 1.26)

herbs and trees—in the sense of having them as their *own bodies* to which they bear an intimate personal attachment and becoming affected on account of any injury to those bodies.

One may here raise a question as to how a proper contextual connection can be made out for this *adhi.* here by refuting the objection that in attaining the condition of rice, corn, herbs and trees the returning Jīvas experience pain or suffering when the bodies they have come to live in are injured in various ways. Such a position will be not only against the grain of thought of the previous *adhi.s* where the Sūtrakāra has been harping on the hardships of the peregrinating Jīvas in order to emphasize the need for turning away from Kāmyakarmas and cultivating Vairāgya towards them, but an open discouragement, as well, to Vairāgya.

The objection has been answered in the *STC* and the *AC* on the following lines. What is meant by saying that a meritorious act is worth pursuing because it has been prescribed or recommended by the Śruti (cf. *Jyotiṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta*) is that the deed in question is capable of bringing about an agreeable result which outweighs any possible after-effects of unhappiness arising from some other circumstances connected with it.[1-a] Turning to the sufferings of goings and comings to and from the other worlds during the peregrinations of Karmins, they do not outweigh the happiness which the performance of the Kāmyakarmas bring to the souls in heaven.

It is in this sense that the validity of the Śruti in prescribing the performance of such karmas stands vindicated. But, the pain and suffering likely to be caused to the Karmin-Jivas coming to live in corn, herbs and trees, when such bodies of theirs are injured by pounding or pulverisation etc., outweighs the happines which has accrued to them in their heavenly sojourn as a result of the performance of the Kāmyakarmas. In this sense, these deeds which have contributed to the Jīva's living in the conditions of hardships wearing the bodies of corn, herbs and trees impinges on the validity of the Śruti by bringing in more pain than happiness.

This justifies the discussion undertaken here whether the Karmins do really get the bodies of corn, herbs, plants and trees[2] or whether

1a इष्टाधिक्यं पापजन्यमनिष्टसाधनत्वमिह वेदबोध्यं विवक्षितम्। ननु दुःखजनकत्वमधर्मत्वम्।
(*STC.* iii. 1.26-27)
न; वैधत्वात् • • धात्वर्थस्य बलवदनिष्टाननुबन्धीष्टसाधनत्वस्य गमकत्वात्। (*AC*)

2. व्रीह्यादिभावापन्नस्य तु दुःखस्य बलवत्त्वात्। तत्तत् वैराग्यविधानकनाम्नायमाम्नातकथा वैराग्यानुष्ठानमपि न स्यादिति, नियमेनैवेह व्रीह्यादिभावस्य कर्मफलत्वम्। (*AC*)

the statement in the Śruti to that effect admits of another explanation viz. that these Jīvas merely enter into and stay for some time encased in corn, herbs and trees which are, however, already tenanted by other Jīvas, who own them as *their own* physical bodies and bear deep attachment to them.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that these returning souls of Karmins will be in for much suffering. For the Śruti (*Chān.* Up. V. 10. 6) says "They become here rice and barely, herbs and trees". While doing so, these souls cannot but be exposed to the pain and sufferings caused to them when their own bodies such as these are being ground, boiled, thrashed or cut. From this it would appear that sacrifices and other duties are after all productive of only evil consequences.

It cannot be contended that this Śruti which says these souls *become* rice, corn, herbs and trees is to be understood as in the other instance of the souls becoming ether, air, cloud, etc. (dealt with earlier in Sūtra 24) only in the sense of attaining similarity of nature with corn etc. It is not possible to apply that principle of interpretation here to avoid the consequence of sufferings as a result of being born as corn, herbs and trees. For, in the earlier instance of ether, air and clouds, the impediment to actual identification was that the descending souls could not become identical with the abhimānidevatās of ether, air, cloud, etc., as one being cannot become another of a different nature:

Na hyanyasya anyabhāvo yujyate

What the Pūrvapakṣin contends here is different—viz. that the Karmins themselves returning from heaven with residual karma, enter into rice, corn, herbs and trees which they take on as their own bodies. This is not open to the aforesaid objection that one thing cannot become another.[3]

Even supposing that there are other Jīvas already present in the rice, corn, herbs and trees, owning them as their bodies, and that the returning Jīvas merely happen to tenant the same bodies, there is no avoiding the sharing of pain and suffering caused by injuries done to these bodies where there is cotenancy in the same body. When the "owner"-Jīvas of corn herbs and trees are injured by cutting etc. of their bodies, it is inconceivable that the Karmin-Jīvas occupying the

3. तद्वदिह बाधकाभावात् । न हि बाधकं विना अमुख्यार्थकल्पना युक्ता (*TP.* iii. 1.26). See also Raghu. *TPB.* (ibid).

same body should remain immune from that pain and suffering.[4] The analogy of Īśvara being immune from suffering tho' present in the body of suffering Jīvas (See *B.S.* i.2.8) cannot be brought up here. For, the returning Jīvas of Karmins have *not* got the unique distinction of being *ex hypothesi* untouched by pain and suffering of any kind because of metaphysical independence like Īśvara.[5] As ordinary Jīvas, these Karmins are all of them dependent creatures. When they are caught in the body of the other suffering souls like the owner-souls of corn, herbs and trees, they can hardly remain immune from suffering. The suffering contingent on the returning souls' getting into corn, herbs and trees is naturally to be regarded as the outcome of the kāmyakarmas which have led them to heaven. This point has already been established under the Sūtra: *Caraṇād*[6] (iii.1.10).

Thus, it happens that the meritorious deeds such as sacrifices prescribed in the Śrutis as the means of achieving happiness are equally fraught with the undesirable prospect of bringing in acute suffering and pain in its train for the Karmins. When persons come to realize this grim truth, very few will put faith in the other prescriptions of Śrutis regarding the spiritual Sādhanas and the prospect of future happiness in Mokṣa held out by them. In this way, the whole programme of spiritual Sādhanas for the attainment of Mokṣa will cease to attract, enthuse and inspire anyone.[7]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the entry of the descending Jīvas into rice, barley, herbs, plants and trees referred to in *Chān. Up.* (V.10.6) is not tantamount to their "owning" them as their own bodies. It is only in that case that these Jīvas can possibly come to be affected by the sufferings caused to those bodies.

The Karmins descending from heaven and entering into corn, herbs and trees and remaining there *till they find their way to the mother's* womb, are *merely lodged in them without having any personal attach*ment, *(abhimāna)* to them *as their "own" bodies. It is this factor of*

4. The *objection* is refuted by M. in his *NV:* न च व्रीह्यादिजीवैः सहावस्थानात् दुःखप्राप्तिः (iii. 1. *adhi.* 18)

5. न हि दुःखिना सहावस्थानेऽपि दुःखाप्राप्तौ ईश्वरवत् स्वातन्त्र्यमस्ति (*TP.* iii.1.26)

6. तच्च दुःखं यज्ञादिफलमेव । आमननादेः यज्ञादिकर्मफलत्वस्य प्रतिपादितत्वात् । (*TP.* iii.1.26)
See also: यज्ञादिपुण्यफलहृतो मातुरुदरप्रवेशपर्यन्तमागमनहेतुभूतस्वकृतयज्ञजनितपुण्यफलस्यैवानुभूयमानत्वेन (पापफलानुभवस्यावसराभावात्) (Vādirāja *TPG.* iii. 1.26)

7. अतः सुखसाधनतया वेदोदितस्यापि कर्मणो दुःखसाधनत्वे मोक्षहेतुत्वेनोपदिष्टवैराग्यादावपि विश्वासाभावात् अननुष्ठेयत्वं तस्येति भावः (*TP.* iii. 1.26)

abhimāna which makes for happiness or suffering in all cases of 'embodiment'.[8] The growth and development of corn, herbs and trees is due to their possessing their own "owner-selves".[9] The Karmins are only "visiting" them and staying with them in their bodies, to which however they bear no attachment. They are, therefore, immune from the sufferings caused by possible injuries to those bodies. Where there there is no Śarīrābhimāna, there is no room for suffering thro' the body.

The other possibility of pain and suffering being caused to these visiting Jīvas also by reason of their coming to reside in the same tenement with the owner-selves of those tenements, is ruled out by another consideration also. The visiting Jīvas are not as yet endowed with gross bodies, while they are still lodged in corn, plants, herbs and trees. These are attained only after the act of generation and reaching the mother's womb. There is thus no possibility of their having to suffer pain, the fruits of sin, in the bodies of corn, herbs, etc. where they happen to be lodged.[10]

The Sutra *Anyādhiṣṭhite pūrvavad abhilāpād* sums up all these points by showing that the Karmins merely enter into corn, herbs and trees which are already owned by other Jivas. They do not, therefore, suffer on account of any injury to those bodies. It is the other Jīvas who really own them as their bodies who will suffer in consequence of injuries to those bodies. This is indicated by the term *abihlāpād* in the Sūtra,[11] which refers to relevant sources. These sources are quoted by the Bhāṣyakāra:—

"He who has begun to descend, first enters into the inanimate (motionless) and without any experience of pain or pleasure therein, continues to travel till he obtains a gross body for himself and then by means of that he becomes subject to experiences of pleasure and pain" (*Kauṣārava Śruti*). "The embodied soul, starting downwards from Svarga, gets into the body of corn etc. belonging to other souls. Not being liable to the experiences of those bodies, in course of time, he obtains a gross body of his own" (*Vārāha*).[12]

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8. कर्मिणा व्रीह्यादिशरीरप्रवेश एवोच्यते। न तु तच्छरीराभिमानित्वम्। अतो, नैव छेदादिजातदुःखभोगः। (*TP.* iii. 1.26)

9. न च तस्य तच्छरीराभिमानाभावे वृद्ध्याद्ययोगः। तदन्येनाधिष्ठितत्वात्। (*TP.* iii. 1.26)

10 सहावस्थानेऽपि दुःखकारणपापफलानुभवस्यानवसरप्राप्तत्वान्न दुःखभोगोऽस्येति भावः। (*STC.* iii. 1.26)
Read: रेतःसेकादूर्ध्वमेव देहाभिमत्या अवसरः (Ragh. *TPB.* iii. 1 26).

11. कौषारवश्रुतौ 'स्थावरान् प्रविशत्यभोगेन' इति बाधकस्याभिलापान् इति सूत्रार्थोऽप्यनुसन्धेयः। (*STC.* iii. 1.26)

12. स्वर्गादवागतो देही व्रीह्यादीतरदेहगः।
अभुजस्तु क्रमेणैव देहमाप्नोति कालतः॥ (*M. BSB.* iii. 1.26)

Another interesting question may be raised in this connection. The Karmin-Jīvas who attain similarity of nature with the Abhimānidevatās of ether, air, cloud etc., have been deemed to enjoy some happiness thereby. Why should it not be supposed then that in like manner, these Kamrin Jīvas now entering into corn, herbs, etc. owned by other Jīvas there, are likely to come in for some suffering also when the bodies in which they live are injured?[13]

The question may be answered by saying that there is no harm in conceding the possibility of a little mental suffering sustained thro' the Sūkṣmaśarīra by the descending souls in such cases. Such slight mental suffering thro' the Sūkṣmaśarīra would, however, be an incentive to the awakening of the spirit of Vairāgya. It will be in keeping with the Pādārtha and one need not fight shy of admitting it.[14]

The next Sūtra: *Aśuddham iti cenna śabdāt* is a guṇa Sūtra which raises a fresh objection to the position established in Sūtra 26 and refutes it—thereby strengthening the original position. The objection is—Notwithstanding the explanation given to show that the descending souls have no reason to suffer misery on account of their entry into corn, herbs and trees, the fact remains that *the very nature of the sacrifices and such other deeds performed by the Karmins* which have enabled them to go to heaven *is tainted by sin*, involving as it does injury to living beings. Sin has naturally *to be requited thro' suffering*. The *suffering caused to* those selves which have entered into corn, herbs and trees is part of the toll of sin.[15] For this purpose, the expression *aśuddham* in the Sūtra is understood by M. to be used in its *three collateral senses* of involving injury to life, entailing sin on that account and thus being a source of suffering.[16]

The objectoin is set aside by showing that it is not the act of injury *as such* that entails sin but injury that is forbidden by law and Śāstra. The taking of life in a sacrifice has the approval and sanction of Śruti.[17] It is not, therefore, forbidden. Ergo, it does not lead to sin. In the circumstances, the Pūrvapakṣin's *contention that the Vedic sacrifices*

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13 धूमादिदेवताशरीरे प्रविष्टस्य सुखवत् व्रीह्याद्यभिमानिजीवशरीरे प्रविष्टस्य दुःखमपि स्यादिति चेत् । (*STC*. iii. 1.26)

14 किं तदीयघाताद् दुःखाभावम्? उत किंचित्? नाद्यः दृष्टान्ताभावात् । नान्त्यः, तस्य वैराग्योपयुक्तत्वेन प्रतिक्षेप्यत्वात् । (*STC*. iii. 1.26)

15. हिंसारूपत्वात् (तत्.) पापस्यापि सम्भवात्, दुःखं च भवत्विति चेन्न (M. *BSB*. iii. 1.27)

16. अनेन, यज्ञादिकर्माशुद्धं, दुःखहेतु । कुतः? यतोऽशुद्धं पापकारकम् । पापमपि कुतः? यतो अशुद्धं हिंसात्मकमिति पूर्वपक्षस्य आवृत्त्या व्याख्यानम् । (*BD*)

17. शब्दात् = मन्त्रविहितत्वात् (M. *BSB*. iii. 1.27)
'वायव्यं श्वेतमालभेत' इत्यादेः । (TP. ibid)

themselves contain the seed of suffering is vitiated by *upādhi*,[18] in reasoning. It is not, therefore, competent to prove that the sacrifices performed by the Karmins are themselves responsible for their suffering thro' the injury caused to the rice, corn, herbs and trees wherein the Karmin Jīvas have found lodgment.

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18 तथा चानुमानस्य निषिद्धत्वोपाधिदुष्टत्वमिति भाव (*BD*)

CHAPTER LXII

RETURNING JĪVAS ENTER THE BODY OF THE IMPREGNATOR

19. *Reto'dhikaraṇam* (iii.1.28)

The *adhi.* establishes that, as a rule, the descending souls have got to enter the body of their impregnator and pass from him to the mother's womb. In the absence of such a necessity, the Jīva will be spared that much hardship and to that extent the need for Vairāgya will be diminished. In the interests of Vairāgya then, the Sūtrakāra here establishes *that the entry into the impregnator's body is indispensable and* unriddable in the case of most of the Jīvas.[1] M.'s AV brings the exceptions to this rule of eminent souls of higher order recorded in the Itihāsas and Purāṇas within the scope of the term *atha* in the next *adhi*-Sūtra, where it is taken over by *anuvṛtti* from this one.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that the returning Karmins are under no necessity to enter the body of the father. This is endorsed by the text "When coming down from heaven (and returning from hell),[2] the self goes directly to the mother's womb".[3] This is not weakened in any way by the presence of Śruti texts which refer to the entry into the father such as *Chān. Up.* v.10.6. M.'s bhāṣya brings up a more emphatically worded text in this connection.[4]

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1. यदि कर्मिणो न पितृप्राप्तिः, तदा नातिविरक्तः स्यादत आह मनसंनोत् (*TP.* iii. 1.28)
2. नरकादपीत्यर्थः । (*BD.* iii. 1.28)
3. 'स्वर्गादवागतश्चापि मातुरेवोदरं व्रजेत्' । (M. *BSB.* iii. 1.28)
4. 'ततो रेत सिचमेवानुप्रविशत्यथ नान्यत्, अथ प्रसूयते' ।
(*Kaunṭharavya Śruti Q. M. BSB.* iii. 1.28).

As the development of the body may be taken to be possible directly by the Jīva's entering the mother's womb, where the seed of the father implanted subsequent to such entry of the Jīva can as well be deemed to contribute to the nourishment of the foetus, it is not absolutely necessary, according to the Pūrvapaṣkin, to accept the prior entry of the Jīva into the father's body.[5] The Pūrvapakṣa argues further that it cannot be contended that the Śruti text which refers to the entry into the father has greater weight than the Smṛti text which dispenses with the entry into the father. For the Smṛti text is supported by the reasoning that the entry into the father serves no special purpose.[6] It is, therefore, well-grounded. It cannot be said that the position taken by the Smṛti text would still be of equal standing with the Śruti. For the vantage would remain with the Smṛti text in that it is able to dispense with a superfluous link.[7] The use of the emphatic particle in the Smṛti text:

'स्वर्गादिवागतश्चापि मातुरेवोदरं व्रजेत्'

would further give it an edge over the Śruti text.[8]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that the entry into the impregnator is indispensble for the returning Jīva to be reborn. This is shown by the Śruti text:

'ततो रेतःसिचमेवानुप्रविशति, अथ मातरमथ प्रसूयते'

"Then the Soul first enters into the father who performs the act of generation, *then* into the mother, *then* he is born"—which makes a specific reference *to the order in which the soul passes* into the body of the father and the mother. This is enough to overrule the alleged entry into the mother without first entering into the body of the impregnator.[9]

The emphatic particle (*eva*) in *Mātur evodaram vrajet* can be explained without the least contradiction with the fact of prior entry into

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5 रेतसो देहपरिणामायापेक्षितत्वेऽपि सेकानन्तरं मातृप्रवेशेऽपि तदुपपत्ते ।
(Ragh. *Ny Muktāvalı*. iii 1 19 *adhi*). Vādirāja in his TPG. explains the position somewhat differently:
मातापित्रोरन्योन्यरेत संयोगकाले तत्रैव प्रवेशेन देहोपचयसंभवादिति शङ्कितुरभिप्रायोपपत्ते ।
(P. 129 *op. cit.*)

6 न चास्य वचनस्य पितृप्रवेशश्रुतिविरोध । युक्तिसाहित्येन बलवत्त्वा त् । न हि पितृशरीरगमने किंचित् प्रयोजन पश्याम । (*TP*. iii. 1.28)

7 ननु, तथापि साम्यमेवेति चेन्न । लाघवतर्काम्याधिक्यत्वात् । (*STC*. iii. 1.28)

8. एवकारेण वचनस्य निरवकाशत्वावगमाच्च । (*Op. cit.*)

9 युक्तिसाहित्य लाघवतर्कस्येति चेन्न । क्रमप्रतिपादकनिरवकाशश्रुतिविरोधेनाभासत्वात् । (*STC*. iii. 1 28)

the father, in terms of *ayogavyavaccheda* meaning that the descending soul cannot eliminate his entry into the mother's body—rather than in terms of *anyayogavyavaccheda* meaning that he does *not at all* enter into the father's body.[10] There is, moreover, the same emphasis in the other Śrutis referring to the prior entry into the father: *Retas sicam eva anuviśati; tam eva anuviśati* which cannot be overlooked. The status of the Smṛti text is inherently inferior to that of a Śruti. The Pūrvapakṣin's plea that notwithstanding the question of status, the Smṛti text being supported by a sound reasoning is entitled to greater weight than the Śruti in question cannot bear scrutiny. For, the Śruti text gives us the *order* in which the returning self enters the father and the mother. This leaves no room for doubt that the emphatic particle in the Smṛti text will have to be construed with the predicate and understood in the sense of *ayogavyavaccheda* only.

The seed of the impregnator is absolutely necessary for the proper formation of the foetus.[11] This point according to M. has been highlighted by the use of the descriptive epithet *"Retassic"* in place of "pitṛ" in the Śruti and Sūtra.[12] The biologiacl need for the prior entry of the Jīva into the father's body has to be reckoned with as part of nature's law and Divine dispensation.

तत्प्रेवशस्येश्वरकल्पितत्वात्—

'ईशक्लृप्त्यैव पितरं प्रविश्यायाति मातरम्'[13]

इत्यादेरिति भाव: (*TP.* iii. 1.28)

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10. अयोगव्यवच्छेदेनैवकारस्योपपत्त्या वचनस्य सावकाशत्वाच्च । (*ibid*)

11. शरीरपरिणामाय रेतसोऽपेक्षितत्वेन रेत:सेचकस्योपयोगित्वात् । (*TP. iii. 1.28*)

12. Read: पितृयोग' इति वाच्ये 'रेत:सिक्' इत्युक्ति: पितृप्रवेशानुपयोगो न शक्य:, देहपरिणामाय रेतसोऽपेक्षितत्वेन, ईशक्लृप्त्या तत्सेक्तॄयोगोपयोगादिति सूचनार्था (*TDP.* iii. 1.28)

13. Quoted by M. in his *NV* (iii. 1. *adhi.* 19).

CHAPTER LIV

NORMAL AND EXCEPTIONAL MODES OF GENESIS OF JĪVAS

20. *Yonyadhikaraṇam* (iii.1.29)

The adhi. arises by way of disposing of an adhikāśaṅkā or supervening doubt againt the position established in the previous *adhi.* that the returning soul has got to enter the body of the impregnator. There are also similar objections to its entry into the mother's womb, to the fact of its getting a body to be formed *ab initio* and developed in the womb after the act of impregnation. Thus, the whole process beginning *with the Jīva's entering into the body of the father thro' the food* eaten, his passing into the mother's body thro' impregnation and the origination of his physical body in the womb is reconsidered here in the light of fresh objections and reaffirmed.[1] Fresh facts relating to genesis under special circumstances and conditions referred to in the Itihāsas and Purāṇas are also taken note of and due place is assigned to them.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that none of the details set forth in the previous *adhi.* is admissible. There is no evidence that the Jīva has got to enter the mother's womb thro' the act of generation by the father in order to get his body formed inside the womb. There is counter-evidence of a text which says: The returning Jīva may enter a ready-made body already formed in the mother's womb by the food eaten by her, *and which is waiting for him, there, so to say:*

देहं गर्भस्थितं वापि प्रविशेत् स्वर्गतो गतः।

1. अत एव पूर्वश्रुत्या प्रतिपादितस्य रेतःसिग्योगादिशरीरप्राप्तिपर्यन्तस्य इहाक्षिप्य समाधानादनन्तरसङ्गतिः (*STC.* iii. 1.29)

This makes it unnecessary for the Jīva to enter the womb only thro' the act of generation by the father. There are also other alternative modes of birth referred to various Purāṇic sources. We hear of the bodies of some Jīvas being originated by the fathers themselves and of some others originating outside the mother's womb into which the Jīva enters from without. In some other accounts, we read of the Jīva *being passed into the mother's body by the mere sight or touch of the* husband.[2] To be sure, these other ways of birth should also have to be admitted as being governed by Divine will and dispensation. As *so many of these easier ways of getting a body are open to the Jīva,* there is not much need to cultivate Vairagya out of distaste for Kāmya-karmas arising from a contemplation of the hardship of being born again.

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta *is that entry into the father thro' the food eaten* cannot be dispensed with for the returning Jīvas. The Śruti: "Into him who is a house-holder who performs the act of generation, the returning soul enters"[3] makes it obligatory. This does not conflict with the other text: "The soul returning from Svarga may enter into a ready-made body in the womb or elsewhere", *quoted for the* Pūrvapakṣa. For, that text refers to special or extraordinary forms of genesis which fall outside the scope of the normal ways of birth in the world of human beings. M. holds that the Sūtrakāra has brought them under the scope of the present *adhi. as exceptions to the rule,* by reading the Sūtra: *Yoneś śarīram* in syntactic relationship with *atha* taken over *by anuvṛtti from the preceding adhi.*[3a] *This reorientation of the* Sūtrārtha has been incorporated by M. in his AV:

बीजपूरुषयोनीनां संगतिनियमोज्झितिम्[4] ।
अथशब्देन भगवानाह कारणतश्च ताम् ॥

"By *anuvṛtti* of 'atha' here, the author of the Sūtras wants it to understood that there is no hard and fast rule everywhere regarding the re-

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2. 'स्मरणाद् दर्शनाच्चैव स्पर्शनान्मैथुनादपि ।
उत्पद्यन्ते प्रजाः सर्वाः कृतत्रेताविभागतः ॥'

3. Cf. also: यो यो ह्यन्नमत्ति यो वा रेतः सिञ्चति तद्भूय एव भवति (*Chān Up.* v. 10.6) "Whoever eats the *food and sows the seed, the Jīva becomes like unto him.*"

3a. Cf. अथशब्दः—'रेतःसिग्योगोऽथ' इति पूर्वसूत्रादथशब्दोऽत्राप्यनुवर्तते । न च प्रकृतस्यार्थान्तरे वर्तते । तथा च योनेः शरीरमारभ्यते । क्वचित् तदभावेनोत्पत्त्यभिधानेन भगवान् सूत्रकारो बीजादिसम्बन्धनियमाभावं सूचितवान् इत्यतो नोत्सूत्रितत्वसंभावनो युक्त इति । (*NS.* iii. 1. p. 458 b).

4 The reading of this verse "संगति नियमोज्झिताम्" as given in the *Madras Gov. O. Ser. C XLII* edn. of Raghu.'s *TPB.* (p. 352) is *not supported by the NS* which has specially commented on the term.

quirement of the invariable combination of the seed, the impregnator and the Yoni, in respect of the souls getting their physical body at rebirth." (Tr.).

There are exceptions to these conditions recorded in the Itihāsas and Purāṇas. They pertain to souls of exceptional merit earned thro' the excellences of Aparokṣajñāna, penance, yogic powers of Samādhi and practice of good Karma.[5]

In his Bhāṣya on the present *adhi.* M. has cited relevant authorities showing that we have to distinguish between the ordinary normal way of Jīvas getting embodied and the special or extraordinary modes of genesis of human beings of which interesting information has been given in the Itihāsas and Purāṇas. Apropos the two modes genesis the normal and the exceptional, the *Brahma Purāṇa* (quoted by M.) tells us: that from Svarga, the returning soul reaches herbs, plants and trees. From there he reaches the body of a man; from the man he goes to the woman and thereafter obtains his body in the usual way. This is the normal mode of birth. The special or the extraordinary mode of birth is of various types. Here, some (like Śuka) may be born of Sthāvaras themselves; some only of the father (as in the case of Māndhātā) or of the mother touched by the father (as in the case of Āstika). Or, the soul may, without entering the womb, obtain a body outside (as Dṛṣṭadyumna). These exceptional births do not apply to the ordinary run of souls which is governed by the normal routine of procreation thro' the union of the parents and the soul passing from the body of the father into the mother's womb thro' impregnation and then getting his physical body there thro' gradual development of the protoplasm.

As the normal process of birth involves so much of hardship, the descending soul would do well to cultivate detachment to the ordinary values of life and turn to love of God for his deliverance from the cycle of births:

अत· सामान्यजन्मनि पित्रादिप्रवेशस्य नियमेन, अपवर्गादितरत्र सर्वत्रापि महादु खाविना-भावात्, तत्र विरक्तेन, भगवान् भजनीय इति सिद्धम् । (*TP.* iii 1, 29)

Interpretations of Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja (iii. 1, 24-27)

S., R. and others treat the last four Sūtras as one *adhi.* The topic discussed is whether the descending souls entering into corn, plants etc.,

5. Read: तृ च वीजादिसबन्धनियमोज्झितिं कारणत आह। एतदुक्तं भवति–जन्मकारणादृष्टाकृष्टो जन्तु· बीजादिसबन्धेन शरीरमापद्यत इत्युत्सर्ग.। स च क्वचित् ज्ञानतपोयोगाद्यतिशयलक्षणकारणविशेषेणापोद्यते। यथा क्षुद्रजन्तुयातनाशरीरोत्पत्तावपवाद इति।*** अतो, युक्तमेतत् व्याख्यानमिति। (*NS.* p. 458 b).

with their residual karma, pass into those *different species of* Sthāvaras and enjoy their pleasures; or whether they merely enter into a state of conjunction (*saṁśleṣamātram*) with the (bodies of the) plants, etc. which are animated by other souls.

Pūrvapakṣa

The Pūrvapakṣa is that they pass over into those species and enjoy their pleasures and pain on account of the residue of their works still clinging to them. For, the Śruti clearly says 'They are born as corn rice etc.' (*Chān Up.* v. 10.6). The verb 'born' used here as in 'men are born' is to be taken in its primary sense.[6] Also because we know from Śrutis and Smṛtis that the condition of a plant etc., offers scope for enjoyment of fruits of Karma.[7]

Siddhānta

The Siddhānta is that these souls are only in conjunction with *corn, plants, etc.,* (as with ether, air and clouds). These plants etc., are already animated by other Jīvas. They do not, therefore, have to share the pleasures and pains of the plants etc.[8] The reason for this is that the Śrutis which speak of their passing into the state of corn, plants, etc., *do not attribute their passing into those states to their karma*—as they do when they speak of those whose conduct has been bad getting a low birth (*Chān Up.* V.10.7). For this reason of being mentioned in this context *without ascribing such birth to past karma,* their attaining the state of another is to be treated on a par with the souls attaining the condition of ether, air and clouds.[9]

Criticism

The reason given for het conclusion that the soul's becoming plants, corn, etc., has not been attributed to the effect of karma is *not conclusive.* For we read in *Chān. Up.* (vi. 9.3) of some souls being born as tigers, lions and pigs—where such birth has not been (expressly) attributed to their past karma. Nevertheless, they are admitted to be born *in those species.* The same may be true here also. If it is contended that the other context being one connected with B., the Śruti is to be

6. मनुष्यो जायते, देवो, जायत' इत्यादौ प्रयोगे जनेः शरीरपरिग्रहे प्रसिद्धत्वादत्रापि व्रीह्यादिशरीरपरिग्रह एव जनेर्मुख्यार्थं इति व्रीह्यादिशरीरा एवानुशयिनः इति युक्तम्। (*Bhāmati* iii. 1.24-25)

7. स्थावरभावस्य च श्रुतिस्मृत्योरुपभोगस्थानत्वप्रसिद्धेः (S. *BSB.* iii. 1.24)

8. अन्यैर्जीवैरधिष्ठितेषु व्रीह्यादिषु संसर्गमात्रमनुशयिनः प्रतिपद्यन्ते; न तत्सुखदुःखभाजो भवन्ति, पूर्ववत्। (*S. BSB.* iii. 1 24)

9. अत्रेदं वेद्यम्—यदि रमणीयचरणाः कपूयचरणा इतिवत् व्रीह्यादिष्वनुशयवतां कर्मविशेषं कीर्तयेत्; न चैतदस्ति। (*Bhāmati* iii. 1.24-25)

understood to convey that those who are void of knowledge of B. are born as tigers, lions and pigs, then, in the present context also in so far as the descent of the souls is due to the fruit of their karma, their attaining the condition of plants, etc., may likewise be the result of past karma, *tho' not expressly so stated.*[10]

According to R. the descending souls are not born as plants etc. because the sacrifices and the like which were undertaken with a view to reward, such as enjoyment in heaven, are in the case of the descending souls completely wiped out by enjoyment of the heavenly world and those works the action of which has not yet begun lead to embodiment are mentioned further on in Ramaṇīyacaraṇā etc. (*Chān. Up.* v.10.7). No new karma originates in the interval between these two conditions. Hence, the statement that these souls are born as plants etc. cannot be taken in its primary sense.[11]

If this is accepted, the entry of the descending souls into plants, corn, etc. and their stay there would turn out to be *unaccountable.*[12]

"On account of the physical impossibility of the new born child attaining identity with the person who performs the act of generation which can be effectively done only when adolescence is attained, the statement in the Śruti (*Chān.* Up. V. 10. 6) that "The karmin-soul becomes the person who performs the act of procreation" has to be understood only in the sense of the soul entering into mere conjunction with the one who performs the act of generation.[13] From this we have to infer that the soul's becoming corn, plant etc. simply means that it enters into conjunction with the plant etc." This is how S. R. and others have construed to Sūtra: *Retassigyogo'tha* (iii. 1.26).

The utilization of the above Sūtra in this way and for such a purpose necessitates a good deal of adhyāhāra (importation). It is also outside the competency of the term *'atha'*, in this Sūtra, to play the role of a probans in support of an inference to be drawn from the plain statement of fact—that the soul enters into the body of the father.[14] If

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10 प्रकृतेऽप्यवरोहस्य कर्मफलत्वेन तेषामेव व्रीह्यादिभावोऽवगम्यत इति कर्मपूर्वजन्माश्रवणात्सिद्धे । (*STC.* iii. 1 28)

11 फलप्रदाने प्रवृत्तस्य स्वर्गोपभोग्यफलस्येष्टादेः कर्मण स्वर्गोपभोगादेव समाप्तत्वात, अनारब्धस्य रमणीयचरणा कपूयचरणा इति वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् मध्ये कर्मान्तराभावाच्च । अत आकाशादिभाववचनवत् व्रीह्यादिभावेन जन्मवचनमौपचारिकम् ; (*Śrībhāṣya* iii. 1.24)

12 आगमने व्रीह्यादिप्रवेशादेराकस्मिकतापातात् (*STC.* iii. 1 24)

13 सद्योजातो हि बालो न रेतःसिग्भवति । अपि तु, चिरजात प्रौढयौवन । तस्मादपि स संसर्गमात्रमिति गम्यते । (*Bhāmatī* iii. 1.26)

14 अध्याहारापत्ते' । अथशब्दस्यैवायमर्थं इति चेन्न । तस्य हेतुत्वे शक्त्यभावात् (*STC.* iii.1.29)

such were the intention and purpose of the Sūtrakāra, he would have used the correct and commensurate expression: *Retassigyogavat (ca)* (*like* the conjunction with the one who performs the act of generation).[15] This criticism applies to R.'s interpretation also.[16] The absence of *ca* in the Sūtra is a further indication that it can stand by itself and represent a fresh *adhikaraṇa.*

The fourth Sūtra: *Yoneś śarīram* according to S. discusses the point whether, in the circumstances, it should be held that everywhere the descending soul is only in conjunction with others. If that were so, the statement of the Śruti about those whose conduct has been good getting a good birth and those whose actions have been bad getting a low birth would become falsified. This doubt is taken to be cleared by the Sūtra: Yoneś śarīram[17] which says that it should not be supposed that everywhere the soul is merely in conjunction with the successive stages. In the last stage thro' connection with the person who performs the act of procreation the soul enters the woman and thence does get a body of its own where it is obliged to go thro' the results of its residual karma.[18]

This way of interpreting this Sūtra with this preamble for its background, *is unsustainable. For according to both S. and R. this point* has already been fully covered and disposed of in the first Sūtra itself—where it was shown that the entry of the descending soul in corn, plants, etc. cannot be construed as having them for its body and enjoying the pleasure and pain thereof, because the Śruti text does not refer to the operation of any Karma in this context as it does when it wants to show that the souls undergo pleasure and pain in a body as in: *Ramaṇīya-caraṇā ramaṇīyām yonim āpadyanate*****[19] As this question has, therefore, been raised and disposed of, the same doubt cannot arise over again or be refuted *in this Sūtra.*[20] The Sūtra can gain much from the point of view of its purposiveness in the Vairāgya Pāda, if it is uti-

15, "रेतःसिग्योगवत्" इति सूत्रणापाताच्च। चशब्दाभावाच्च (*op. cit.*)

16. रेतःसिग्भावोऽनुशयिना श्रूयमाणो यथा तद्योगमात्रं प्रतिपादयति तद्वत् व्रीह्यादिभावोऽपीत्यर्थः। (*Śrībhāṣya* iii.1 26)

17. तत्किमिदानीं सर्वत्रैवानुशयिना संसर्गमात्रं, तथा च 'रमणीयचरणा' इत्यादिषु तदभाव आपद्येतेति। नेत्याह- 'योनेः शरीरम्'। (*Bhāmatī* iii. 1.27)

18. योनेरधिशरीरमनुशयिनामनुशयफलोपभोगाय जायत इत्याह शास्त्रम्–'तद्य इह रमणीयचरणा' इति। (*S. BSB.* iii. 1 27)

19. कोऽभिलापस्य तद्वद्भावः? कर्मव्यापारमन्तरेण संकीर्तनम्। यथाकाशादिषु प्रपञ्चान्तेषु न कश्चित् कर्मव्यापारं परामृशत्येव व्रीह्यादिजन्मन्यपि। तस्मान् नास्त्यत्र सुखदुःखभाक्त्वमनुशयिनाम्। यत्र तु सुखभाक्त्वमभिप्रैति परामृशति तत्र कर्मव्यापारं–"रमणीयचरणाः कपूयचरणा"। इति। (S. *BSB.* iii.1.24)

20. कपूयचरणा' इत्यादिवत् कर्मपूर्वजन्माभिलापाभावात् इति प्रथमसूत्रे दृष्टान्तत्वेन, प्रागागतात् (ह्रस्वनुत्र-न्यायेन न्यूनत्वाच्च) (*STC.* iii. 1.20)

lized to underline the misery of Yonipraveśa for the descending souls. Its utilization as a mere *guṇasūtra* for the purpose of saying that the soul is *not simply in conjunction with the physical body* but actually gets it as its own body, where it goes thro' the results of its residual karma, fails to make any fresh point.[21]

The way in which the second Sūtra has been explained as refuting a point raised by the opponent and the Sūtrakāra's being made to revert to reinforcing his own position again in two more Sūtras offends against continuity of theme. In conformity with their own positions S. and R. should have read Sūtras 24, 26 and 27 consecutively and shifted Sūtra 25 to the end so as to give a better logical sequence to the points made.[22] The existing arangement shows that Sūtra 26 forms a separate adhi. and is not to be treated as a guṇasūtra tagged on to Sūtra 24. The Sūtra Tatsābhāvyāpattir**(ii.1.22) rejects identity of one with another, in principle. Its bearing on the larger question of the identity of Jīva with B. in Bādarāyaṇa's philosophy cannot be lost on us.[23]

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21. मातृशरीरप्रवेशादिरूपक्लेशाधिक्यसमर्थनस्यावश्यकस्य त्यागेनानावश्यकसंश्लेषमात्रनिराकरणस्यायोगेन गुणसूत्रत्वोक्त्ययुक्तेः (*STC.* iii. 1.29)

22. सावशेषं स्वपक्षं प्रसाध्य, मध्ये विपक्षं दूषयित्वा, पुनः स्वपक्षसाधनाय युक्त्यन्तरोपन्यासायोगेन तृतीयचतुर्थयोः द्वितीयात् पूर्वंनिवेशस्य न्यायतया, अशुद्धसूत्रस्य द्वितीयत्वायोगेन, सूत्रक्रमोऽप्ययुक्तः (*STC.* iii 1.29)

23. *Refer* the discussion on *Prthagadhikarana* (ii.3 28-29) and *Yāvadadhi* (ii 3.30).

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	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. Bhāṣya —do—
	Aitareya Up. Bhāṣya —do—
	Taittirīya Up. Bhāṣya. —do—
	Kaṭha Up. Bhāṣya —do—
	Muṇḍaka Up. Bhāṣya —do—
	Māṇḍūkya Up. Bhāṣya —do—
	Praśna Up. Bhāṣya —do—
	Mahābhāratatātparyanirṇaya —do—
	Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya —do—
	Gītābhāṣya —do—
	Gītātātparyanirṇaya —do—
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INDEX OF ADHIKARAṆAS

EXTRACTS FROM REVIEWS OF VOLUME I

"Dr. B. N. K. Sharma's book is an important event in Vedānta scholarship. It opens up fresh basic questions of both the method and the content of Brahmasūtra commentaries. And it does this from an admirable base of Sanskrit scholarship and in lucid, lively English."

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Honolulu, Hawaii.

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Tome, cclx. fasc. 1-2; 1972.

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—*Weiner Zeitschrift fur die Kunde*
Sudasiens AF 1973, 208 (Austria).

APPENDIX

The discussion of the various interpretations put on the Utpattyadhi as a criticism or a defence of some special doctrines of Pañcarātra theology will not be complete without taking into consideration their interpretation as given by Yāmunācārya, the great predecessor of Rāmānuja, in his *Āgamaprāmaṇya*. He has given us two additional interpretations of the Sūtras of this adhi. which are distinctive and are not found in the *Śrībhāṣya*. During his recent visit to India Dr. G. Oberhammer of the Vienna University drew my attention to this and later sent me his monograph on the subject published in *Veroffentlichungen der Kommission fur spraschen und Kulturen Sudasiens.* Heft 01, Wien, 1971 which has induced me to look closer into Yāmuna's fresh interpretation.

However, in both these interpretations Yāmuna is obliged to lean heavily on the support of importations (*adhyāhāra*) into the wording of the Sūtras as they stand. The first alternative interpretation of the Sūtra: *Vipratiṣedhācca* given by him requires us to import the words "Bhagavatpratyakṣa" or "Bhagavatpratyakṣānumitaśruti" to be syntactically connected with "Vipratiṣedhāt" in the Sūtra in order to yield the desired sense that the denial of validity to the Pañcarātra would undermine the validity of the (Apauruṣeya) Veda as well:

विप्रतिषेधादिति । पंचरात्रस्मरणानुमितभगवत्प्रत्यक्षविप्रतिषेधात् तदनुमितश्रुतिविप्रतिषेधाद्वा तत्प्रमाणत्वनिषेधोऽतिप्रसक्तः (*Āgama-Prāmāṇya*)

Here the entire predicative clause and the fairly long winded explanatory adjunct to the probans are to be supplied thro' adhyāhāra. This is unlike the direct and forthright manner of the Sūtrakāra.

The other interpretation of all the four Sūtras by way of 'Kṛtvā-cintā' so as to establish the validity of the Pañcarātra in principle against the allegation of its being invalidated by the opposition to the teaching of the Śrutis which are Apauruṣeya, similarly requires us to (i) import the words "Śrutiviruddhapramiti" with which the reason 'utpattyasambhavāt' of the opening Sūtra is to be syntactically connected in this interpretation to convey the sense: *Tadviruddhāyāḥ pramiter utpattyasambhavāt* as desired; which does not however amount to a conclusive proof unless the point to be made in the last Sūtra is presupposed as part of the argument of 'utpattyasambhava' (in that sense) in which case, there is no need to retain the last Sūtra. (ii) Yāmuna construes the expression 'karaṇam' in Sūtra ii, 2.40, in the sense of *karmaṇi lyuṭ*:

न च कर्तुरीश्वरस्य करणं वेदाः । क्रियन्त इति करणं, कर्मणि ल्युट् । अपौरुषेया वेदा इति यावत् (*ibid*)

and (iii) makes the Sūtrakāra resort to a periphrasis in *"ādibhāve"* under Sutra 41,

भगवतस्तु, अवितथसहजसमस्तधर्माधर्मसाक्षात्कारज्ञानम् । तादृशस्य तस्य आदिभावे मूलत्वे सति, तदप्रतिषेधः । प्रमाणमेवेति (*ibid*)

where a shorter and more pointed expression (*vijñana*) *mūlatve* would have sufficed. This again is unlike the direct manner of the Sūtrakāra.

ERRATA

	Page	Line	For	Read
Vol. I	181	17	as	an
	287	38	if	of
	288	9	mire	more
	311 365	34 2	concensus	consensus
	315	34	i, 2, 22	i, 1, 22
	413	6	omprehensive	*comprehensive*
Vol. II	11	23	*vyatireke*	*vyatireka*
	33	27	Sama-	Asama-
	45	22	[between 'member' and '*aparimaṇḍala*' insert]	*parimaṇḍala* will have to seek alliance with another suitable term
	65	20	[between line 20 and 21 insert]	separately in the locative cases and for the additional '*tat*' in '*tadaprāpti*'
	104	15	Sāmaypāda	Samayapāda
	292	25	P. 299	P. 279
	400	5	स्वनरथे	स्वनारथे
	420	6	asume	assume